

IRAN VOL III
1 Jan - 31 Aug 71

1

Folder continued from previous reel

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
18	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	8/21/71	B
23	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	8/15/71	B
43	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	6/22/71	B
45	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	6/17/71	B
52	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	5/27/71	B
55	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	5/25/71	B
56	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	5/25/71	B
62	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	5/20/71	B
64	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	5/19/71	B
80	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	4/19/71	B
95	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	3/4/71	B
98	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	2/24/71	B
99	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	2/23/71	B
104	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	2/16/71	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Country Files - Iran

BOX NUMBER

602

FOLDER TITLE

①

[1]

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
107	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	2/31/71	B
111	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	1/31/71	B
117	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	1/29/71	B
131	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	1/20/71	B
133	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	1/19/71	B
136	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	1/19/71	B
146	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	1/14/71	B
149	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	1/13/71	B
166	telegram	Sec State to Amemb Tehran	4/14/71	B
172	Telegram	Sec State to Amemb Tehran	2/26/71	B
173	telegram	Sec State to Amemb Tehran	2/24/71	B
174	telegram	Sec State to Amemb Tehran	2/24/71	B
190	telegram	Amemb Te hran to Sec State	8/23/71	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Country Files — Iran

BOX NUMBER

602

FOLDER TITLE

(1)

[2]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
 B. National security classified information.
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
191	telegram	Amemb Tehran to SecState	8/20/71	B
192	telegram	Amemb Tehran to SecState	8/21/71	B
193	telegram	Amemb Tehran to SecState	8/19/71	B
194	telegram	Amemb Tehran to SecState	8/19/71	B
200	telegram	Amemb Tehran to SecState	6/17/71	B
203	telegram	Amemb Tehran to SecState	1/18/71	B
205	telegram	SecState to Amemb Tehran	8/19/71	B
214	telegram	NSA to White House	8/13/71	B
FILE GROUP TITLE			BOX NUMBER	
NSC Country Files - Iran			602	
FOLDER TITLE				
(1)			[3]	

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

HH - →

This should
wait a few
developments per
our conversation
al.

APR 26 1971

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS

April 20, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HAIG

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *hal*

SUBJECT: President's Visit to Iran

It seems desirable to keep Haldeman and company up with the latest on the planning in connection with a trip to Iran. Since you were present at the President's talk with Ambassador MacArthur, you may have a slightly different picture of the attached and I would appreciate your adding it.

Concurrence: Jeanne Davis *JMD*

CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HALDEMAN

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: President's Visit to Iran

I just want you to be aware of the information in the attached telegram as you continue to relate the President's visit to Iran to other scheduled matters.

As directed by the President, Ambassador MacArthur has explained to the Shah that it would not be possible for the President to visit Iran in October for the 25th Centenary celebrations. The Shah at first seemed to accept the idea of a State visit as an alternative. Later, however, his Court Minister passed word to MacArthur that the Shah still hoped that the President could come in October to offset the presence of President Podgorny of the USSR and other Communist chiefs of state.

The Court Minister suggested arriving October 14 and leaving late the night of October 16. We will apparently be receiving this recommendation from the Iranian Ambassador here in Washington.

The Ambassador continues to favor a state visit apart from the celebrations and believes that our being able to offer a specific alternative date for a state visit would help cushion the President's inability to attend the October celebrations.

If you are nearing settling on a date, it would be helpful to give this to Ambassador MacArthur.

cc: Dwight Chapin

CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS



#1 WW
Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

P 191155Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4068
BT
CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 2010

CONTROL: 6 0 6 3 Q
APRIL 19, 1971
8:24 AM

NODIS

PASS WHITE HOUSE

1. AS DIRECTED BY PRESIDENT WHEN I SAW SHAH APRIL 14, I EXTENDED PRESIDENT'S WARM GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES AND ALSO INFORMED HIM THAT WHILE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO VISIT IRAN WAS FIRM, TO PRESIDENT'S VERY GREAT REGRET, IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR PRESIDENT TO COME NEXT OCTOBER FOR 25TH CENTENARY CELEBRATIONS BECAUSE IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING HE COULD NOT GET AWAY FROM THE UNITED STATES THAT MONTH. SHAH TOOK THIS NEWS WITH GOOD GRACE AND COMMENTED THAT ALTERNATIVE OF STATE VISIT BY PRESIDENT INSTEAD OF COMING FOR CENTENARY IN OCTOBER WOULD AFFORD MORE TIME FOR HIM TO DISCUSS IMPORTANT MATTERS WITH PRESIDENT.

2. SHAH HAS APPARENTLY HAD SOME SECOND THOUGHTS AND COURT MINISTER ALAM HAS JUST INFORMED ME THAT SHAH STILL HOPES PRESIDENT CAN COME IN OCTOBER FOR CENTENARY SINCE PODGORNÝ AND CHIEFS OF STATE OF COMMUNIST BLOC HAVE ALL INDICATED THEY WILL BE HERE AND PRESIDENT'S PRESENCE AS LEADER OF FREE WORLD IS IMPORTANT TO BALANCE OFF COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION. ALAM SAID IF PRESIDENT COULD ARRIVE OCTOBER 14 AND LEAVE LATE NIGHT OF OCTOBER 16, SHAH COULD STILL SET ASIDE GREAT DEAL OF TIME FOR PRIVATE TALKS WITH PRESIDENT. (ALAM INDICATED AMBASSADOR AFSHAR IN WASHINGTON WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE THIS PROPOSAL.) I REPLIED THAT I WOULD, OF COURSE, TRANSMIT SHAH'S VIEWS TO PRESIDENT BUT I UNDERSTOOD IT JUST NOT POSSIBLE FOR PRESIDENT TO BE ABSENT FROM US IN OCTOBER.

3. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT STATE VISIT HOPEFULLY THIS YEAR PREFERABLE TO ATTENDING 25TH CENTENARY, PARTICULARLY FOR REASONS WE SET FORTH PREVIOUSLY AND SINCE IT ALSO SEEMS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR PRESIDENT TO BE AWAY FROM US IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

CONFIDENTIAL

-2 -TEHRAN 2010, APRIL 19, 1971 (NODIS)

OCTOBER. IF IT POSSIBLE FOR PRESIDENT TO SUGGEST SOME
ALTERNATIVE DATE FOR STATE VISIT IT WOULD OF COURSE HELP
CUSHION NON-ATTENDANCE AT OCTOBER CELEBRATIONS. HOWEVER,
IF THIS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME, RECOMMEND I BE INSTRUCTED
TO REITERATE TO ALAM THAT UNFORTUNATELY IT JUST NOT POSSIBLE
FOR PRESIDENT TO BE ABSENT FROM US IN OCTOBER BUT THAT IN
DUE COURSE PRESIDENT HOPES TO SUGGEST ANOTHER DATE FOR HIS
VISIT.

GP-3.

MACARTHUR

NOTE: NOT PASSED THE WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 4/19/71.

CONFIDENTIAL

		DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION OFF	
		MO	DA	MO	DA	HR			
NS- CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE		4	20	4	21	7	27813		
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION	TO: PRES <u>X</u>	FROM: ELIOT		U		LOG IN/OUT ONLY		<u>X</u>	
	KISSINGER <u>X</u>	ROGERS, W		LOU		NO FORN		NODIS	
	HAIG	LAIRD, M		<u>X</u>		BUO		EXDIS	
		<u>SAUNDERS</u>		S		EYES ONLY		LIMDIS	
				TS		CODE WORD		RES DATA	
SUBJECT: <u>Status Report on Planned President's Trip to Iran in October</u>									
REFERENCE: S/S		OTHER		NOT XEROXED					
APP'TS: PRES		HAK		TALKER		MEMCON		DATE REQ.	
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED				
	ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG		ACTION	INFO	REC	MEMO FOR HAK			
	STAFF SECRETARY			<u>X</u>	CY	MEMO FOR PRES.			
	FAR EAST				FOR	REPLY FOR SIGNATURE			
	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA					FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH			
	NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA					MEMO TO			
	EUROPE/CANADA					RECOMMENDATIONS			
	LATIN AMERICA					JOINT MEMO			
	UNITED NATIONS					REFER TO STATE			
	ECONOMIC					ANY ACTION NECESSARY			
	SCIENTIFIC					CONCURRENCE			
	LR PLANNING					DUE DATE:			
	PROGRAM ANALYSIS					COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)			
	NSC PLANNING								
	CONGRESSIONAL								
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING	DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED				CY TO
	4/21	SAUNDERS	HAK	X	Spec points Holden (4/23)				
	04/26	HAIG	SAUN	S	Hold (0536)				
	4/27/71	SAUNDERS	Secretariat		Close file. This memo will not be needed. HAK				
	4/27				No action required per Saunders				
DISPOSITION	CROSS REF WITH		NOTIFY		DATE		MICROFILM DATA		
	SEE LOG		DISPATCH: LETTER / MEMO				DO <u>X</u>		
	JOINED BY LOG		COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)				INIT <u>X</u>		
	SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA, HP, HM						DATE <u>APR 30 1971</u>		
	SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:						ORIG) NSC		
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES NO								TO) PAF <u>X</u>	
								WHC	
								SUBF	

27897

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4/22/71

→ Mr. Murphy

Jack:

Please log &
send to file. I
think we've covered
this ground.

Hal Saunders


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR SAUNDERS.

SUBJECT: Ltr to Pres fr Amb MacArthur

170021 April 71...The attached letter
just received..

Do you want to use it in your memo of
this morning on the same subject, or shall
we log, and send on to file?





EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tehran, Iran

April 15, 1971

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. President:

As directed by you when I had the pleasure and privilege of meeting with you on April 8, I saw the Shah last evening and after conveying your warm personal greetings and best wishes, I said you had asked me to assure him that your decision to visit Iran was firm and the only question was that of timing. I went on that while you had hoped to be able to accept his invitation to come next October for the 25th Centenary celebrations, it was just not possible for you to come during October. However, you hoped in due course to be able to suggest a possible date for a visit.

The Shah took the fact that you would not be able to be here for the Centenary celebrations very well indeed. He said he knew your obligations and burdens are desperately heavy and then added that a state visit by you instead of coming for the Centenary in October would afford much more time for discussions with you about many important matters, since ceremonial matters will occupy much of his time during the October celebrations.

I continue to believe that if at all possible next September would be an ideal time for your visit here. It would be before the 25th Centenary, which, if you came later, would perhaps tend to take a bit of the bloom off your visit. As you directed, I have not mentioned the September possibility to anyone and will not do so unless so directed.

The President,
The White House.


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

With renewed appreciation for all the time you gave me on April 8 and warm personal regards to you and Mrs. Nixon, in which Wahwee joins,

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Doug', with a large, stylized loop extending from the end of the signature.

Douglas MacArthur II

CONFIDENTIAL

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE				DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION OFF		
				MO	DA	MO	DA	HR				
				4	15	4	23	9	21897			
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION	TO: PRES <u>X</u>		FROM: ELIOT _____		U _____		LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____					
	KISSINGER _____		ROGERS, W _____		LOU _____		NO FORN _____ NODIS _____					
	HAIG _____		LAIRD, M _____		C <u>X</u>		BUO _____ EXDIS _____					
					S _____		EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____					
					TS _____		CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____					
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION	SUBJECT: <u>McArthur Status Report on Pres Trip to Iran</u>											
	REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____											
	APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____											
	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION											
	ACTION REQUIRED											
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING					ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	MEMO FOR HAK _____ (_____)				
	ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG							MEMO FOR PRES. _____ (_____)				
	STAFF SECRETARY							REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE _____ (_____)				
	FAR EAST							FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH _____ (_____)				
	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA							MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)				
	NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA							RECOMMENDATIONS _____ (_____)				
	EUROPE/CANADA							JOINT MEMO _____ (_____)				
	LATIN AMERICA							REFER TO STATE _____ (_____)				
	UNITED NATIONS							ANY ACTION NECESSARY _____ (_____)				
	ECONOMIC							CONCURRENCE _____ (_____)				
	SCIENTIFIC							DUE DATE: _____				
	LR PLANNING							COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)				
	PROGRAM ANALYSIS							<u>Log - Lout</u>				
	NSC PLANNING											
	CONGRESSIONAL											
DISPOSITION	DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED					CY TO		
					<u>No Action Req per Sanders</u>							
CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____												
SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____												
JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____												
SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM												
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____												
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____												

MICROFILM DATA	
DO <u>X</u>	INIT <u>X</u>
DATE <u>APR 26 1971</u>	DATE _____
ORIG) _____	ASC <u>X</u>
TO) _____	PAF _____
	WHC _____
	SUBF _____

File this Ed
here
26697

2.1.71

SECRET/EYES ONLY

April 13, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DWIGHT CHAPIN

FROM:

AL HAIG /g

SUBJECT:

Possible Visit to Iran in the Fall

Dwight, I gave Bob a reading on the Shah visit by memo earlier this week (copy attached). It indicates that the President still has not come down hard on the visit although he has authorized Ambassador MacArthur to mention to the Shah (not to State) that he is seriously thinking of a visit next September or November. I think this is the best we can do for now pending resolution of some other possibilities this fall.

AMH:wgh:12 Apr 71

SECRET/EYES ONLY

SECRET/SENSITIVE

April 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BOB HALDEMAN

FROM:

AL HAIG /5/

SUBJECT:

Presidential Decisions

1. At a meeting yesterday with the U.S. Ambassador to Iran, Douglas MacArthur, the President instructed me to inform you that he wanted you to block off a period of time on his calendar during the month of September which might be used for a Presidential visit to Iran. I am sure that the President will want this time earmarked in such a way that no one, with the exception of yourself and Chapin, would know that he is contemplating such a trip and there are several things on the horizon at this point which might conflict with it.

2. During a meeting with Ambassador Kennedy today, the President mentioned that he wanted to be sure that Pete Peterson's briefing given yesterday at the inaugural meeting of the President's International Economic Council be presented in somewhat more detail to key members of the President's staff. The President mentioned that he thought he had given this requirement to you already so I am merely reiterating it here as a matter of information.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

AMH:rlh:typed 4/9/71

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE _____

TO: *Haris*
FROM: DWIGHT CHAPIN

FYI _____ PLEASE HANDLE _____

OTHER:

*What date
should we be
looking forward to? /C*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*This was rec'd.
to Secretary 4-74*
ACTION/INFORMATION
26697

April 2, 1971

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HALDEMAN

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *K*

SUBJECT: President's Possible Visit to Iran in the Fall

I know you will be looking at the President's visits schedule for the remainder of the year and I want to make sure we keep in mind the time frame for a possible Presidential visit to Iran in the fall. As you know, the President has two invitations from the Shah--to attend the celebrations at Persepolis; October 13-15, and to make an official state visit, either immediately preceding or following those events, if that would suit the President. [The President has said in principle he would like to make a visit but has said he would not be able to set a time until this spring.]

Ambassador MacArthur recommends that the President not attend the Persepolis celebrations--he would be lost in a sea of 40 other heads of state and the security problems would be enormous--nor that he make an official visit immediately preceding or following those events since it would be difficult to explain (especially in view of Mrs. Nixon's role as honorary chairman of the U.S. committee) non-attendance at Persepolis. State also points out that from mid-June through August most of top Iranian officialdom is out of the capital city and would probably not schedule a state visit during those months. The Ambassador recommends a State visit in either late September or very early October.

I suggest holding a decision for a bit longer since we will want to have Ambassador MacArthur's views when he is here at the end of this month. [He has requested an appointment with the President to discuss this.] We can then work out the options and put the matter to the President.

I pass this along to you and Dwight now so that you will have in mind some of the scheduling limits it imposes. This is not a visit that can easily be juggled if the President goes.

cc: Dwight Chapin

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

IRAN
f
INFORMATION
27263
April 6, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER HK
SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Ambassador
Mac Arthur -- Thursday, April 8 at 3:30pm

The main reason for your seeing Ambassador Mac Arthur is to get his feel for how you might manage a visit to Iran later this year. There will be a brief photo opportunity at the beginning of the meeting.

You will recall that the Shah has invited you to attend the anniversary celebration of 2500 years of Persian monarchy at Persepolis October 13-15 and to pay a state visit to Iran either immediately before or immediately after those ceremonies. When the invitation initially came last summer, you replied that you would like in principle to accept but would have to wait before committing yourself. Ambassador Mac Arthur's return to Iran would provide an occasion for sending some informal word to the Shah of your tentative plans.

Ambassador Mac Arthur feels you should avoid the celebrations themselves. Some 40 heads of state are now said to be planning to attend. Security and logistics would be major problems. The Ambassador, however, very much wants you to come to Iran. He feels it would be manageable for you to pay a visit in late September or very early October.

Ambassador Mac Arthur will also probably wish to mention to you the evolving situation in the Persian Gulf. The Iranians may seize three small islands in the mouth of the Persian Gulf if the British fail to make arrangements satisfactory to Iran in permitting Iran to station defense forces there after British departure.

Talking Points

1. What is the Ambassador's advice on the best way to handle a visit to Iran? [Anything you can tell the Ambassador about your travel plans would be worth asking the Ambassador to pass to the Shah when he returns to Iran just to indicate that the Shah's invitation remains on your mind.]
2. Would the Ambassador care to say a word or two about the situation which he sees evolving in the Persian Gulf?

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

27263

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION
April 5, 1971

(Handwritten mark)

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: HAL SAUNDERS
SUBJECT: President's Forthcoming Meeting with
Ambassador MacArthur

Attached for signature is a self-explanatory memo for the President
for his forthcoming meeting with our Ambassador to Iran Douglas
MacArthur, *scheduled for Thursday, April 8. JEANNE DAVIS CONCURS*

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo for the President at Tab A.

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON LOG NO.:

Date: April 2, 1971

Time: 27263

FOR ACTION: Dr. Kissinger

cc (for information):

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date: April 7, 1971

Time: 1:30 P. M. Please

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Ambassador MacArthur
Thursday, April 8, 1971
3:30 P. M.

ACTION REQUESTED:

____ For Necessary Action

____ For Your Recommendations

☒ Prepare Agenda and Brief

____ Draft Reply

____ For Your Comments

____ Draft Remarks

REMARKS:

Original plus 8 copies, please

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.

Jon M. Huntsman
Staff Secretary

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

redo in AMH's action folder
INFORMATION
27263

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Ambassador Mac Arthur --
Thursday, April 8 at 3:30 p.m.

The main reason for your seeing Ambassador Mac Arthur is to get his feel for how you might manage a visit to Iran later this year. There will be a brief photo opportunity at the beginning of the meeting. You will recall that the Shah has invited you both to attend the anniversary celebration of 2500 years of Persian monarchy at Persepolis October 13-15 and to pay a state visit to Iran either immediately before or immediately after those ceremonies. When the invitation initially came last summer, you replied that you would like in principle to accept but would have to wait before committing yourself. Ambassador Mac Arthur's return to Iran would provide an occasion for sending some informal word to the Shah of your tentative plans.

Ambassador Mac Arthur feels you should avoid the celebrations themselves. Some 40 heads of state are now said to be planning to attend. Security and logistics would be major problems. The Ambassador, however, very much wants you to come to Iran. He feels it would be manageable for you to pay a visit in late September or very early October.

Ambassador Mac Arthur will also probably wish to mention to you the evolving situation in the Persian Gulf. The Iranians may seize three small islands in the mouth of the Persian Gulf if the British fail to make arrangements satisfactory to Iran in permitting Iran to station defense forces there after British departure.

Talking Points

1. What is the Ambassador's advice on the best way to handle a visit to Iran? [Anything you can tell the Ambassador about your travel plans would be worth asking the Ambassador to pass to the Shah when he returns to Iran just to indicate that the Shah's invitation remains on your mind.]
2. Would the Ambassador care to say a word or two about the situation which he sees evolving in the Persian Gulf?

CONFIDENTIAL

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		OG NBR		INITIAL ACTION OFF	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR			
4	2	4	2	14	21263	Saunders	

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES X FROM: ELIOT _____ U _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____

KISSINGER X ROGERS, W _____ LOU _____ BUO _____ EXDIS _____

HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C X EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____

HUNTSMAN, J S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____

TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Request for talkers for pass nty with MacArthur on Apr 8*

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK (<u>X</u>)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. (<u>X</u>)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE _____
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH _____
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>		MEMO _____ TO _____
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS _____
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO _____
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE _____
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY _____
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE _____
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <u>4/7</u>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<u>4/5/71</u>	<i>Saunders</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<u>X</u>	<i>Pres for info (4/7)</i>	
<u>4-8</u>	<i>HAK</i>	<i>Pres</i>		<i>Info</i>	
<u>4/10</u>				<i>Noted By Pres</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA	
DO <u>X</u>	<i>8033</i>
INI <u>X</u>	<i>4/14</i>
DATE <u>4/14</u>	
ORIG) NSC <u>X</u>	
TO) PAF <u>X</u>	
WHC _____	
SUBF _____	

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

26944
uk
Fruch
ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

March 22, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *HS*

SUBJECT: Appointment with Ambassador MacArthur

The President has agreed to see Ambassador MacArthur for ten or fifteen minutes on Monday, April 5, at 11:45 a.m.

He has also asked to see you either immediately before or after that appointment. While it would be most convenient for him to see you in connection with his call on the President, he will be in town from April 2 through April 6, and an appointment could probably be arranged at some other time within that period.

As mentioned in your note to the President on this subject, there is no pressing bilateral problem. The main reason for MacArthur to be seen is in connection with the President's projected trip to Iran in September or October. As you know, the President has agreed in principle to go, but Ambassador MacArthur recommends that he not go for the 2500th anniversary celebrations themselves.

Your reason for seeing him would be to get his own sense first hand of how this can be managed without offending the Shah.

RECOMMENDATION: That you see Ambassador MacArthur on April 5.

Approve AK Other _____

MAR 30 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION OFF	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR			
3	22	3	22	16		24944	

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ☒ KISSINGER ☒ HAIG ☐

FROM: ELIOT ☐ ROGERS, W ☐ LAIRD, M ☐ SAUNDERS

LOG IN/OUT ONLY

U ☐ NO FORN ☐ NODIS ☐

LOU ☒ BUO ☐ EXDIS ☐

C ☒ EYES ONLY ☐ LIMDIS ☐

S ☐ CODE WORD ☐ RES DATA ☐

TS ☐ SENSITIVE ☐

SUBJECT: *HAK report w/ Amb MacArthur*
April 5

REFERENCE: S/S ☐ OTHER ☐ NOT XEROXED ☐

APP'TS: PRES ☐ HAK ☒ TALKER ☐ MEMCON ☐ DATE REQ. ☐

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG					MEMO FOR HAK ()
STAFF SECRETARY					MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST					REPLY FOR SIGNATURE ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA					FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ()
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA					MEMO TO ()
EUROPE/CANADA					RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA					JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS					REFER TO STATE ()
ECONOMIC					ANY ACTION NECESSARY ()
SCIENTIFIC					CONCURRENCE ()
LR PLANNING					DUE DATE:
PROGRAM ANALYSIS					COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
3/22	HAS	HAK		Decision	3/26
3/30				HAK Approved Reco	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH ☐ NOTIFY ☐ DATE ☐

SEE LOG ☐ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO ☐

JOINED BY LOG ☐ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) ☐

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: ☐ SA, ☐ HP, ☐ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: ☐

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ☐ NO ☐

MICROFILM DATA	
DO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	INIT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DATE 3/31	
ORIG) NSC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
TO) PAF <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
	WHC <input type="checkbox"/>
	SUBF <input type="checkbox"/>

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NSC #26300

CONFIDENTIAL

March 19, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: President's Appointment with Ambassador
Douglas MacArthur (S/S 7102896)

The President's appointment with Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II has been confirmed for Monday, April 5 at 11:45 a.m. The meeting will be between 10 and 15 minutes. Please confirm acceptance with my office.



Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

Despatched to Eliot 3/19; outside receipt.

NSC #26300

CONFIDENTIAL

March 19, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: President's Appointment with Ambassador
Douglas MacArthur (S/S 7102896)

The President's appointment with Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II has been confirmed for Monday, April 5 at 11:45 a.m. The meeting will be between 10 and 15 minutes. Please confirm acceptance with my office.

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

cc: Carole Farrar
Mr. Saunders

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION
26300

3-8-71

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger /9/

SUBJECT: Appointment for Ambassador MacArthur

Ambassador MacArthur will be here from Tehran for consultation March 29 - April 6.

Recognizing that you like to keep appointments with ambassadors to a minimum and there is no serious substantive issue to discuss, I hesitate to suggest that you see him. However, two points lead me to keep the opportunity open for you:

1. Your relationship with the Shah is always enhanced when the Shah knows you have talked personally with the Ambassador.

2. Much more important are the Ambassador's views on your proposed visit to Iran later this year. As you know, you have been invited--along with about forty other heads of state--to attend the commemorative ceremonies at Persepolis in mid-October--Mrs. Nixon is honorary chairman of the U.S. committee--and the Shah has also renewed his invitation for you to make a state visit, suggesting that you might do so either before or immediately after those events. Ambassador MacArthur hopes you will come to Iran but feels you should avoid the ceremonies because of security and logistical difficulties. He has some ideas on how you might do this without offending the Shah.

If you do not have time to see MacArthur, I will see him.

The President will see MacArthur

Kissinger will see him

CONFIDENTIAL

NHSaunders:unt 3/4/71

✓ 11:45 a.m.
April 5
By - Phone
Chapin/
Houdak

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION
26300

@

CONFIDENTIAL

March 4, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Has*

SUBJECT: Appointment for Ambassador MacArthur with the
President

State in the attached informs you that Ambassador MacArthur will be here from Tehran for consultation, March 29 - April 6, and recommends that the President meet briefly with him to get a run-down on the Persian Gulf situation and particularly, a feel for the proposed Presidential visit to Iran later this year (tentatively October).

From the standpoint of substantive matters, this is not by any means an essential appointment for the President, and he has kept these calls by ambassadors to a minimum. I only raise it because, in the case of MacArthur, there are two items which warrant special note:

1. The President's special relationship with the Shah. It is always useful to let the Shah know that the President keeps in touch through MacArthur.
2. Much more important is the question of his possible visit to Iran later this year. As you know, he has been invited to attend the commemorative exercises at Persepolis in mid-October as well as to make a State Visit either before or after that event (and perhaps skip Persepolis). MacArthur has views on how the President might go to Iran at a time that would please the Shah by being close to the celebrations but avoiding actually attending. [MacArthur feels that the celebrations themselves will be a security and logistical nightmare from which the President should be protected.]

On balance I would recommend a brief call on the President for the latter reason, since it directly affects the President's posture. The alternative would be your seeing him. You could put the question to him by way of the memorandum at Tab A. In any case, MacArthur has asked for an appointment with you.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Recommendations: 1. That you seek the President's action on the memo at Tab A.

2. That you agree to see MacArthur yourself.

Approve HK Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 7102896

CONFIDENTIAL

February 27, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Call on the President by Ambassador
Douglas MacArthur II, March 29-April 6

Ambassador MacArthur will return from Iran to be in Washington from March 29 through April 6 on consultations. We believe it would be highly desirable for him to see the President during this period.

The Ambassador would brief the President on Iran's position on Persian Gulf affairs, which are becoming of increasing concern as the British move towards withdrawal by the end of 1971. Ambassador MacArthur would also be able to tell the President about the circumstances surrounding the proposed State Visit to Iran this year, and to answer any questions the President might have which could later assist him in reaching a determination on whether or not to make the visit.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

20300 "N" "C" status
Dispatch & make entry
showing ~~at~~ & going to
Chapin

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26300

March 22, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM: JEANNE W. DAVIS
SUBJECT: Presidential Appointment
for Ambassador MacArthur

This is to confirm Ambassador MacArthur's appointment
with the President on Monday, April 5 at 11:45 AM.

Add to

26300

MICROFILM	DATA
DO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	INIT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	DATE 3/23
ORIG)	NSC
TO)	PAF <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	WIC
	SUBF

Despatched 3/22/71

Use date

March 19 @ 1800

Note:

Pres approved recom

Status "C"; ARB "None"

Files

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	26 300	SAUNDERS

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____	FROM: ELIOT <u>X</u>	U _____	LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
KISSINGER <u>X</u>	ROGERS, W _____	LOU _____	NO FORN _____
HAIG _____	LAIRD, M _____	C <u>X</u>	NODIS _____
		S _____	EXDIS _____
		TS _____	LIMDIS _____
			RES DATA _____
SUBJECT: <u>Recon that Amb Douglas MacArthur II Meet with</u>			
<u>The Pres while in WASH MARCH 29-Apr 6</u>			
710 2896			
REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____			
APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____			

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK _____ (<u>X</u>)
STAFF SECRETARY		<u>X</u>		MEMO FOR PRES. _____ ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE _____ ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH _____ ()
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	<u>X</u>			MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS _____ ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO _____ ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE _____ ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY _____ ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE _____ ()
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <u>3/6</u>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
3/4/71	saunders	Secretariat			
3/4	NSC/S	HAK	X	Pres per discussion 3/9	
3-8	HAK	PRES		Action	
3/19	Pres	NSC/S	I	Pres Approved Reco	
3/19	DAVIS	ELIOT		Confirmed Apr 5 per DAVIS	Farrar Saunders

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____	NOTIFY _____	DATE _____
SEE LOG _____	DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____	
JOINED BY LOG _____	COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____	
SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM		
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____		
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____		

MICROFILM DATA	
DO <u>✓</u>	INIT <u>3/23</u>
DATE <u>3/23</u>	
ORIG) NSC	
TO) PAF <u>✓</u>	
WHC	
SUBF	

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 887

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04749 261056Z

22
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

R 260840Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5526

S E C R E T TEHRAN 4749

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CHOU EN-LAI MAY PARTICIPATE IN OCTOBER 25TH
CENTENARY

IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE COURT MINISTER ALAM INFORMED ME
THAT CHOU EN-LAI MIGHT ATTEND OCTOBER CENTENARY CELEBRA-
TIONS, AS GOI HAD LET HIM KNOW HE WOULD BE WELCOME. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

RECEIVED
STATE DEPT
019528

71 AUG 26 AM 11:31

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 979

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04705 241420Z

51
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

R 241315Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5507

S E C R E T TEHRAN 4705

EXDIS

SUBJECT: EXPLOITATION OF SU-7

REF: TEHRAN 4659

1. TEAM COMPRISING LT COL SHAWLER, MAJOR LUNDT AND MR. KULIKOWSKI MADE AVAILABLE BY USAF HAS RETURNED FROM ABADAN, IS REPORTING TO GEN KHATEMI TODAY AND IS SCHEDULED DEPART IRAN MORNING AUGUST 25. I WOULD LIKE EXPRESS APPRECIATION TO MEMBERS OF TEAM AND USAF FOR RESPONDING SO PROMPTLY TO GOI REQUEST AND FOR SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TEAM HAS MADE TO STRENGTHENING THE TIES OF CLOSE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL MILITARY COLLABORATION THAT EXIST BETWEEN US AND GOI.

2. I LOOK FORWARD TO TEAM'S REPORT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO GOI AND TRUST IT WILL BE AS FORTHCOMING AND COMPREHENSIVE AS POSSIBLE SO THAT GOI MAY HAVE FULL BENEFIT OF TEAM'S EXPERTISE AND EXPERIENCE.

3. AS FOR SU-7, IRAQI CREW ARRIVED ABADAN AUGUST 23 AND ABOUT 1800 HRS LOCAL FLEW AIRCRAFT BACK TO IRAQ, THUS CLOSING CHAPTER ON THIS INCIDENT.

4. PLEASE ALSO PASS THIS MESSAGE TO APPROPRIATE PEOPLE IN DEFENSE AND AIR FORCE. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DEFENSE AND AIR FORCE.

SITUATION
002369

71 AUG 24 PM 2:39

1/3

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 18 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

WJH
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 684

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04614 210727Z

17
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSD-00 /026 W

P R 210655Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5459
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
USUN NEW YORK 441

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 4614

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: CHIREP - PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO FONMIN

REF: (A) STATE 153035; (B) TEHRAN 4441

1. WHILE I THINK YOUR MESSAGE TO ZAHEDI (REFTEL A) IS EXCELLENT AND STRIKES RIGHT NOTE, THERE IS ONE PHRASE THAT MUST BE AMENDED OR DELETED AS IT DOES NOT RPT NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT IRANIAN POSITION CONVEYED TO YOU BY ZAHEDI IN HIS MESSAGE (REFTEL B). PHRASE IN YOUR MESSAGE WHICH IS INACCURATE IS "AND I WELCOME YOUR ASSURANCE THAT IRAN WILL NOT OPPOSE ITS (ROC) CONTINUED MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS." WHAT ZAHEDI ACTUALLY SAID IN HIS MESSAGE TO YOU WAS THAT GOI SHALL NOT OPPOSE MEMBERSHIP OF "FORMOSA" RPT "FORMOSA." THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT POINT IN VIEW OF STRONG FEELING OF SHAH, WHICH WE HAVE REPORTED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, THAT THERE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE MENTION OF REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN UN RESOLUTIONS DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM AND THAT RESOLUTION SHOULD REFER TO GOVERNMENT OF "FORMOSA" OR SOME SIMILAR FORMULATION.

2. IN LIGHT FOREGOING, WE APPEAR TO HAVE TWO OPTIONS RE AMENDING YOUR MESSAGE TO ZAHEDI:

(A) DELETE PHRASE "AND I WELCOME YOUR ASSURANCE THAT

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04614 210727Z

IRAN WILL NOT OPPOSE ITS CONTINUES MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS;" OR

(B) SUBSTITUTE FOR PHRASE IN 2(A) ABOVE A NEW PHRASE REFLECTING WHAT ZAHEDI ACTUALLY WROTE YOU (E.G., " AND I WELCOME YOUR ASSURANCE THAT IRAN SHALL NOT OPPOSE THE MEMBERSHIP OF FORMOSA IN THE UN.")

3. ZAHEDI PRESENTLY IN ISFAHAN AT RCD MEETING WITH TURKISH AND PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTERS BUT IS RETURNING TEHRAN EVENING AUGUST 22. WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE INSTRUCTIONS ASAP AS TO HOW YOU WISH YOUR MESSAGE TO ZAHEDI AMENDED. GP-3
MACARTHUR

610/10/2090

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

W4

SENT TO SAN CLEMENTE

SECRET 505

KENNEDY'D

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04593 191309Z

51
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

097398

R 191230Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5448
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T TEHRAN 4593

EXDIS- SENSITIVE

SUBJ: CHIREP IN UN

REF: TEHRAN 4589

1. FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI DISCUSSED CHIREP QUESTION WITH ME AUGUST 19 IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. HE CONFIDED HE HAD HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING AUTHORIZATION AT HIGHEST LEVEL HERE TO KEEP GOI POSITION RE CHIREP FLEXIBLE WHEN AGREEMENT FINALLY REACHED WITH CHICOMS ON RECOGNITION.

2. LOOKING TO FUTURE HE SAID IN HIS BEST JUDGMENT QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT IRAN WOULD BE ABLE TO SUBSCRIBE TO KIND OF SOLUTION WE HAD IN MIND WOULD IN FIRST INSTANCE, DEPEND VERY LARGELY ON WHAT TURKS DID. IF TURKS GO ALONG WITH OUR POSITION, ZAHEDI'S HAND WITHIN GOI WILL BE GREATLY STRENGTHENED TO ALSO GO ALONG WITH US. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN IF TURKS DO GO ALONG WITH US, IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT WHEN CHIPS ARE DOWN SHAH WILL FOLLOW SUIT. WITH FOREGOING IN MIND HE URGED THAT WE USE EVERY POSSIBLE PERSUASION WITH TURKS TO GET THEM TO SUPPORT OUR POSITION.

3. COMMENT: I AGREE WITH ZAHEDI THAT POSITION TURKS TAKE COULD DETERMINE FINAL GOI STANCE, THEREFORE,

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 AUG 19 AM 11:26

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

28

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04593 191309Z

RECOMMEND WE WORK VERY HARD ON THEM. IN ADDITION, ANY INFORMATION REPLYING TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY NADIM TODAY WITH DCM (REFTEL) COULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN ASSISTING ZAHEDI TO HOLD LINE.

4. IN VIEW OF ZAHEDI'S GREAT HELPFULNESS WE RENEW OUR RECOMMENDATION IN TEHRAN 4441 AND 4487 THAT SECRETARY SEND SOONESTWARM REPLY TO ZAHEDI'S AUGUST 12 MESSAGE ALONG LINES WE HAVE RECOMMENDED.

GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

0602/01/020

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

WH

SECRET 473

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04589 191249Z

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

097200

R 191203Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5446
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
USUN NY 438
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

S E C R E T TEHRAN 4589

EXDIS

SUBJ: CHINESE REPRESENTATION

REF: STATE 139829

1. STATE 139829 IS MOST HELPFUL WRAP-UP ON STATUS OF OUR EFFORTS REGARDING CHIREP, AND AS PART OF CONTINUING CLOSE DIALOGUE WE HAVE HAD WITH GOI IN RECENT WEEK SON THIS MATTER WE CONVEYED SUBSTANCE AND HIGHLIGHTS OF THIS MESSAGE TO JAFFAR NADIM OF MFA AUGUST 19. NADIM EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR POINTS MADE IN MESSAGE AND SAID HE WOULD GET THEM TO FONMIN ZAHEDI AND SMHH IMMEDIATELY. NADIM SAID ZAHEDI WOULD BE SEEING TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER OLCAY AUGUST 20 FOR PRIVATE TALKS BEFORE RCD MEETING THIS WEEKEND MAJOR POINT ON AGENDA FOR OLCAY WAS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON HOW TO HANDLE CHIREP ISSUE AT UNGA. HE ADDED THAT ZAHEDI HOPED THAT HE AND OLCAY COULD COME TO AGREED POSITION ON NOW BOTH COUNTRIES WOULD HANDLE VOTES ON CHIREP AND GOI HOPED TO WORK "IN UNISON" WITH TURKEY.

2. AFTER GOING OVER POINTS IN REFTEL NADIM AGAIN SUMMARIZED
GOI POSITION ON CHIREP AS FOLLOWS:

(A) GOI WILL VOTE FOR ADMISSION OF PRC TO UN; (B) WILL SUPPORT PRC FOR SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT; AND (C) IS NOT COMMITTED ON QUESTION OF FUTURE OF ROC AND HAS SO INFORMED PRC. LIKE TURKEY, IRAN IS MAINTAINING ITS FREEDOM OF ACTION

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 AUG 19 AM 11:26

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04589 191249Z

ON HOW TO DEAL WITH ROC QUESTION AT UNGA. BUT NADIM ADDED THAT GOI REMAINS TROUBLED WITH ANY RESOLUTION THAT REFERS TO TAIPEI AS ROC AND WOULD PREFER SOME OTHER NOMENCLATURE SUCH AS TAIWAN OR FORMOSA.

3. NADIM HAD FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND POINTS REGARDING SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL:

(1) IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL FOR GOI TO KNOW WHAT COUNTRIES ARE READY TO ACCEPT CONTINUATION OF MEMBERSHIP OF TAIWAN IN UN. MOST ESPECIALLY IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW POSITION ON THIS ISSUE OF COUNTRIES SUCH AS CANADA, ITALY, AUSTRIA, ETC. WHO HAVE RECENTLY RECOGNIZED PRC.

(2) DOES USG BELIEVE THAT IT HAS ENOUGH VOTES TO INTRODUCE NEW IMPORTANT QUESTION RESOLUTION WHICH ONLY REQUIRES SIMPLE MAJORITY?

(3) WHAT IS USG'S CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF LIKELIHOOD OF PRC'S JOINING UN? IF IT IS ADMITTED AND GETS SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT BUT ROC BY ONE WAY OR ANOTHER REMAINS AS MEMBER?

4. NADIM WAS

REMINDING THAT SOME ASPECTS OF HIS QUESTIONS INVOLVED TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WERE BETTER DISCUSSED BY IRAN'S REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK WITH USUN AND WE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER WE COULD GO BEYOND SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL IN ASSESSMENTS INVOLVED IN HIS THIRD QUESTION. HOWEVER, THESE WOULD BE PASSED TO DEPARTMENT.

5. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION REGARDING CURRENT STATE OF GOI'S RELATIONS WITH ROC, NADIM STATED RELATIONS WERE BROKEN AND NOT "SUSPENDED" AS PRESS HAD ERRONEOUSLY REPORTED. NADIM ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ROC HAD SUGGESTED THAT GRC AND GOI MAINTAIN SOME KIND OF TRADE RELATIONSHIP. THIS WAS BEING STUDIED BY GOI BUT NO DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED. AS FINAL NOTE NADIM MENTIONED THAT BEFORE AMBASSADOR WU DEPARTED TEHRAN TO RETURN TO TAIPEI HE HAD TOLD ZAHEDI THAT WHILE ROC COULD NOT SUPPORT USG RESOLUTIONS ON CHIREP HE HOPED VERY MUCH THAT IRAN WOULD.

GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

0602/01/021

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

SECRET 822

HAK

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04487 160726Z

16
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /026 W

066684

P 160700Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5395
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI PRIORITY
USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 432

SECRET TEHRAN 4487

EXDIS/SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: CHIREC: IRAN

REF: TEHRAN 4441

1. VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KHALATBARI CALLED ME THIS MORNING AND AFTER REFERRING TO SPECIALLY CLOSE AND CONFIDENTIAL BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GOI AND USG, SAID THAT COMMUNIQUE WILL BE ISSUED "WITHIN NEXT FORTY-EIGHT HOURS" ANNOUNCING ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN GOI AND PRC.

2. SINCE OTHER FRIENDLY GOVTS ARE NOT RPT NOT BEING INFORMED, HE ASKED US TO KEEP THIS SPECIAL ADVANCE NOTICE TO US MOST CONFIDENTIAL. I ASSURED HIM WE WOULD. WHILE KHALATBARI DID NOT WISH TO GO INTO DETAILED DISCUSSION OF COMMUNIQUE ON TELEPHONE, HE COMMENTED THAT I WAS FULLY INFORMED OF IRAN'S VIEWS FROM MY TALKS WITH FONMIN ZAHEDI (REFTEL).

3. SECRETARY HAS NOT YET ACKNOWLEDGED ZAHEDI'S MESSAGE (PARA 4 REFTEL). I RECOMMEND THAT HE DO SO IMMEDIATELY AFTER GOI-PRC COMMUNIQUE (SO THAT SECRETARY CAN TAKE ACCOUNT OF SUBSTANCE OF ANNOUNCEMENT) AND INCLUDE EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR ZAHEDI'S MESSAGE, CONSIDERATION WHICH GOI HAS GIVEN OUR VIEWS RE CHIREP, AND FOR GOI COURTESY IN CONFIDENTIALLY INFORMING US IN ADVANCE OF COMMUNIQUE WHICH IS IN KEEPING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04487 160726Z

WITH VERY SPECIAL CHARACTER OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS,
ETC. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

0602/01/022

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 23 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 053

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04446 130931Z

16
ACTION SS-25

NFO OCT-01 /026 W

Z 130820Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5372
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL Dacca
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

S E C R E T TEHRAN 4446

EXDTS

SUBJECT: FATE OF SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN

REF: TEHRAN 4292 AND 4335

1. I MENTIONED SEPARATELY TO BOTH FONMIN ZAHEDI AND VICE FONMIN KHALATBARI, WHEN I SAW THEM AUGUST 12, OUR DEEP CONCERN OVER PAKI TRIAL OF MUJIBUR, WHICH COULD NOT ONLY MAKE HIM MARTYR BUT TOUCH OFF DEVELOPMENTS WHICH COULD MAKE IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR PAKISTAN'S FRIENDS TO BE HELPFUL. I REFERRED TO MY PREVIOUS TALK WITH ZAHEDI (REFTEL) AND WONDERED WHETHER GOI HAD PRIVATELY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH PAKIS ON THIS.

2. ALTHOUGH I DID NOT GET DIRECT REPLY, I HAD IMPRESSION THAT GOI HAS BEEN IN TOUCH, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, WITH PAKIS.

3. KHALATBARI SAID THAT YAHYA KHAN WAS CAPTIVE IN
MATTER OF HARD-LINING EMOTIONAL WEST PAKISTAN
MILITARY LEADERSHIP, AND THAT IT ALMOST CERTAIN THAT
MILITARY COURT TRYING MUJIBUR WOULD SENTENCE HIM TO
DEATH. ONLY HOPE, THEREFORE, WAS THAT YAHYA MIGHT
SWIFTLY COMMUTE DEATH SENTENCE TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT.

DISCUSSION

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

7

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

050396

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

CONFIDENTIAL 099

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04415 111458Z

51

ACTION: SS-25

INFO: OCT-01 NSCE-00 SSO-00 /026 W

034010

R 111400Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5357

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 4415

EXDIS

PASS: WHITE HOUSE AND SOHMER/DUNN, OFFICE OF VP

SUBJECT: 25TH CENTENARY; NO. 6

REF: TEHRAN 4414 #

GOI HAS REQUESTED FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO ASSIST IN PLANNING
AND ACCOMMODATION OF PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVE AND PARTY:

1. COMPLETE BIOGRAPHY OF PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVE AND WIFE.
2. COMPLETE NAMES OF FIVE ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF SUITE AUTHORIZED
BY GOI (INCLUDING TITLES), POSITIONS, ORDER OF PRECEDENCE, AND
SHORT BIOGRAPHY OF EACH.
3. INFO ON SPECIAL FOOD DIET OF PRINCIPAL OR ANY OF SUITE.
4. PREFERRED TYPE AND BRAND OF BEVERAGES AND CIGARETTES.
5. BLOOD TYPE OF PRINCIPAL AND MEMBERS OF SUITE.
6. EXACT DATE AND TIME OF ARRIVAL.
7. MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION (TYPE OF AIRCRAFT, PASSENGER CAPACITY,
AVIATION FUEL).
8. PREFERENCE OF HELICOPTER OR CAR FOR TRANSFER TO PERSEPOLIS
FROM SHIRAZ AIRPORT AND RETURN. WE RECOMMEND USE OF US CHOPPER,
WHICH COULD BE ARRANGED.)

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 AUG 11 PM 3:09

CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04415 111458Z

9. DURATION OF STAY IN IRAN BEFORE AND/OR AFTER CELEBRATION.

10. PREFERENCES FROM AMONG ACTIVITIES AVAILABLE DURING FREE TIME OCTOBER 14 AND MORNING OCTOBER 15:

A. VISIT TO:

- (1) NAQSH-E-RUSTAM (FOUR TOMBS INCLUDING THOSE OF DARIUS AND XERXES, ABOUT FOUR MILES FROM PERSEPOLIS);
- (2) PASARGADAE (PALACE AND TOMB OF CYRUS THE GREAT, 50 MILES FROM PERSEPOLIS);
- (3) PALACE OF DARIUS, PERSEPOLIS (WALKING DISTANCE, WITHIN PERSEPOLIS RUINS ADJACENT TO TENT SITE);
- (4) CAMP OF WORLD WELFARE LEGION (VICINITY OF PERSEPOLIS, SHORT RIDE BY CAR);
- (5) ARYAMEHR PILOT FARM (NEAR PERSEPOLIS, SHORT RIDE BY CAR);
- (6) DARIUS DAM (VICINITY PERSEPOLIS/SHIRAZ, SHORT RIDE BY CAR).

B. MEETINGS WITH OTHER HEADS OF STATE OR RANKING REPRESENTATIVES.

11. DEPARTURE DIRECT FROM SHIRAZ OR TEHRAN?

12. NAMES AND PARTICULARS OF TWO MEMBERS OF SUITE WHO WILL RESIDE IN PERSEPOLIS HOTEL (OR ONE IN TENT AND ONE IN HOTEL).

13. NAMES AND PARTICULARS OF THREE MEMBERS OF SUITE WHO WILL RESIDE AT HOTEL IN SHIRAZ.
MACARTHUR.

NOTE BY OC/T: #REF TEHRAN 4414 NOT RECEIVED IN DEPARTMENT AS OF 11 A.M. 8/11/71.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

579/9/2090

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

CONFIDENTIAL 113

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04414 111509Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 NSCE-00 NSC-10 /036 W

034156

R 111357Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5356

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 4414

EXDIS

PASS: WHITE HOUSE AND SOHMER/DUNN, OFFICE OF VP

SUBJECT: 25TH CENTENARY; NO. 5

1. WE INFORMED COURT MINISTER ALAMI AND THROUGH HIM SHAH AND FOMIN ZAHEDI MORNING AUGUST 10 THAT VICE PRESIDENT WILL BE PRINCIPAL US REPRESENTATIVE, STRESSING NO PUBLICITY PENDING FURTHER ADVICE.

2. GOI OFFICIALS PLEASED WITH NEWS VICE PRESIDENT IS COMING AND APPRECIATIVE OF MEETING DEADLINE.

3. IN DISCUSSIONS AFTERNOON AUGUST 10 WITH MINISTRY OF COURT IT WAS REVEALED THAT MAJORITY OF PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVES WILL ARRIVE SHIRAZ MORNING OCTOBER 14.

4. IN VIEW OF ABOVE AND FACT THAT THERE ARE NO MEANINGFUL FUNCTIONS ON OCTOBER 12 AND 13, WE RECOMMEND THAT VICE PRESIDENT AND PARTY ARRIVE MORNING OF 14TH BUT IN ANY EVENT PRIOR TO 1600 HOURS. DEADLINE OF 1600 SET BY GOI AND IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TIME FOR REST AND RELAXATION PRIOR TO ATTENDANCE FORMAL BANQUET (FIRST FORMAL EVENT) SCHEDULED FOR 2030 HOURS.

5. A NUMBER OF PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVES HAVE INDICATED THEY WILL DEPART SHIRAZ TO RETURN TO THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES MORNING OF OCTOBER 16 (WHEN ALL DELEGATIONS DEPART SHIRAZ) INSTEAD OF PROCEEDING TO TEHRAN TO PARTICIPATE IN SCHEDULED ACTIVITIES IN TEHRAN ON 16TH AND 17TH.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

6. PROGRAM TEHRAN ON OCTOBER 16 INCLUDES:
A. VISIT AT 1715 HOURS BY ONLY HEADS OF STATE RPT HEADS OF STATE TO MAUSOLEUM OF SHAH REZA THE GREAT AT REY (12 MILES FROM TEHRAN);

7. ONLY SCHEDULED ACTIVITY FOR SUNDAY OCTOBER 17 IS DEDICATION OF NEW SPORTS STADIUM AT 1700 HOURS COUPLED WITH SPORTS PROGRAM.

9. MINISTRY OF COURT HAS REQUESTED WE NOTIFY THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF VICE PRESIDENT AND PARTY PLAN TO VISIT TEHRAN OCTOBER 16 AND 17. THIS REQUEST IS PROMPTED BY NECESSITY FOR PLANNING ON PART OF GOI AND MAKING NECESSARY HOTEL ARRANGEMENTS FOR VP AND PARTY.

11. IN SEPTTEL FOLLOWING (NO. 6) WE ARE FORWARDING SPECIFIC INQUIRIES AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION PRESENTED TO US BY GOI. EARLY RESPONSE TO THESE INQUIRIES/REQUESTS WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO GOI IN THEIR PLANNING AND ARRANGEMENTS.
MACARTHUR.

0602/01/026



SECRET 088

52
ACTION: SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

R 071430Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5315
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL Dacca
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

S E C R E T TEHRAN 4335

EXDIS

SUBJ: FATE OF SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN.

REF: TEHRAN 4292

FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI INFORMED ME CONFIDENTIALLY AUGUST 7 THAT HE HAD PASSED ON TO SHAH MY "PERSONAL CONCERN" ABOUT PAKISTAN HANDLING OF MUJIBUR CASE AND PROBLEMS YAHYA KHAN COULD CAUSE FOR HIMSELF IF HE MAKES MUJIBUR MARTYR BY TRIAL AND EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE. ZAHEDI INDICATED THAT WHILE GOI MUST HANDLE ITS RELATIONS WITH YAHYA IN MANNER CALCULATED TO AVOID ANY IMPRESSION OF INTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN PAKISTAN'S AFFAIRS, SHAH INDICATED HE WAS AMENABLE TO ZAHEDI SENDING SOME FORM OF PERSONAL MESSAGE TO YAHYA IN DUE COURSE POINTING OUT DANGERS OF MAKING MUJIBUR A MARTYR, ETC.

GP-3.
MACARTHUR:

007598

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

APR 8 AM 9:50



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 093

PAGE 01 TEHRAN: 04334 071511Z

52
ACTION: SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

007613

R 071430Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5314
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T TEHRAN 4334

EXDIS - NOFORN

SUBJ: GULF ISLANDS:

REF: TEHRAN. 4280

1. IN PRIVATE MEETING AUGUST 7 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI GULF ISLANDS CAME UP. STRESSED, AS I HAVE IN PAST, OUR GREAT HOPE THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT WITH BRITISH AND SHEIKHS WITH WHICH IRAN COULD LIVE. ALSO EXPRESSED STRONG PERSONAL HOPE THAT GOI WOULD HANDLE PROBLEM IN WAY WHICH WOULD NOT EMBARRASS SHEIKHS OR CAUSE THEM TO LOSE UNDUE FACE. IN PARTICULAR I UNDERSTOOD GOI HAD WANTED SHEIKHDOM POLICE TO LEAVE ISLANDS VERY SOON AFTER IRANIAN PRESENCE INSTALLED. EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THIS VERY MINOR MATTER IN RELATIONSHIP TO OVER-ALL AGREEMENT AND ASKED WHETHER SHEIKHDOM POLICE COULD NOT REMAIN FOR CONSIDERABLE PERIOD PARTICULARLY SINCE THEIR NUMBERS MINIMAL.

2. ZAHEDI SAID GOI HAD NO INTENTION TO EMBARRASS SHEIKHS AND GOI WOULD NOT INSIST THEIR POLICE LEAVE IMMEDIATELY AFTER IRANIAN PRESENCE INSTALLED. HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT THEY COULD REMAIN ON FOR PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS OR EVEN YEAR OR SO AS LONG AS BASIC AGREEMENT WAS SATISFACTORY. HE ALSO SAID IRAN DID NOT PLAN TO TALK ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY IF AGREEMENT REACHED UNLESS OTHERS DID SO. GOI POSITION REMAINED THAT SOVEREIGNTY WAS IRANIAN BUT IT NOT NEXESSARY TO TALK ABOUT IT.

GP-3. MACARTHUR

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATIONROOM

71 AUG 8 AM 9:50

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head, surrounded by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA".

SECRET 084

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 1046 W

007490

R 071400Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5311
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T TEHRAN 4331

EXDIS.

SUBJ: KING HUSSEIN'S REQUEST FOR AMMUNITION

REF: (A) STATE 144321
(B) TEHRAN 4308

1. AMBASSADOR CONVEYED TO FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI
AUGUST 7 OUR APPRECIATION OF SHAH'S DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL
TO KING HUSSEIN BUT OUR PREFERENCE TO CONTINUE DEAL
DIRECTLY WITH GOJ IN LIGHT OUR ON-GOING BILATERAL ARMS
RELATIOS WITH JORDAN. HE ALSO INFORMED ZAHEDI WE
RESPONDING TO GOJ REQUEST FOR URGENT DELIVERY OF 25,000
ROUNDS 81 MM AMMO.

2. ZAHEDI INDICATED UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION AND SAID HE WOULD INFORM SHAH. WE WILL ALSO PASS SAME WORD TO ZELLI.

GP-3.
MACARTHUR:

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 AUG 8 AM 9:50

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 090

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04329 071505Z

50
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 W

007537

R 071355Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5309
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
USMISSION USUN NY

SECRET TEHRAN 4329

EXDIS - SENSITIVE - NOFORN

SUBJ: CHIREP: IRAN

REF: (A) STATE 142612
(B) STATE 142465
(C) USUN 2135
(D) TEHRAN 4307
(E) TEHRAN 4288

1. I LUNCHED ALONE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI
AUGUST 7 AND GAVE HIM TEXTS OF OUR DRAFT RESOLUTIONS
ON CHIREP (REFTEL A) TOGETHER WITH APPROPRIATE "TALKING
PAPER" BASED ON REFTEL B WHICH INCLUDED FACT THAT TURKISH
FONMIN OLCAY HAD STATED IN PRESS INTERVIEW AUGUST 4 IN
IZMIR (ANKARA 5361) THAT GÖT WOULD VOTE FOR PRO ENTRY
INTO UN BUT WOULD VOTE AGAINST EXPULSION OF ROC.
STRESSED TO ZAHEDI THAT USG BELIEVES WE ARE NOW IN
NEW BALL-GAME RE CHIREP QUESTION; THAT THERE IS
ALTERNATIVE TO STARK EITHER/OR CHOICE POSED BY
ALBANIAN RESOLUTION; AND THAT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
WE BELIEVE IT OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE NOT RPT NOT MAKE
COMMITMENTS WHICH WOULD INHET FLUYIBILITY ON CHIREP
ISSUE WHEN IT CONSIDERED IN UN OR TO LIMIT ABILITY TO
SUPPORT RESOLUTION MORE REASONABLE AND EQUITABLE THAN
ALBANIAN. I CONCLUDED BY RECOUNTING IN CONFIDENCE VAKIL'S
VERY NEGATIVE REACTION TO OUR REPRESENTATIONS (REFTEL C)
AND SAID THAT IN MY OWN PERSONAL JUDGMENT GÖT COULD HAVE
WORST OF ALL WORLDS BY COMMITTING ITSELF PREMATURELY RE

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 AUG 8 AM 9:50

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04329 071505Z

CHIREP QUESTION UNTIL IT COULD ACCURATELY ASSESS HOW UN MEMBERS WOULD LINE UP IN UNGA ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

2. ZAHEDI (WHOM WE MUST PROTECT ALL COST) SAID HE AGREES WITH US. HE HAD RECEIVED VAKIL'S REPORT AND IMPLIED VAKIL WAS TRYING TO KEEP HIS FINGER ON HIS NUMBER BY NOT TAKING A POSITION WHICH WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THAT OF PRINCESS ASHRAF WHO IS GOING ALL OUT FOR DOING EVERYTHING THAT PEKING DESIRES. HE SAID INFORMATION I HAD GIVEN ZELLI AUGUST 5 (REFTEL D) HAD BEEN MOST TIMELY AND HELPFUL IN HIS TALKS WITH SHAH THAT SAME DAY. ZAHEDI INDICATED SHAH HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING SUPPORTING ALBANIAN RESOLUTION AND HAD CHALLENGED ZAHEDI ON ACCURACY OF INFORMATION I HAD CONVEYED THAT TURKS WILL VOTE TO ADMIT PRC BUT OPPOSE EXPULSION OF ROC. ZAHEDI HAD PERSUADED HIM TO DELAY DECISION ON CHIREP ISSUE PENDING FURTHER INFORMATION ON TURKISH POSITION AND THAT OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

3. ON BASIS OF OUR TALK TODAY ZAHEDI SAID HE WOULD GO BACK TO SHAH STRESSING OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE FOR IRAN TO KEEP ALL ITS OPTIONS ON CHIREP ISSUE OPEN SINCE IF IT COMMITTED ITSELF PREMATURELY TO A FORMULA WHICH LATER TURNED OUT TO HAVE ONLY MINORITY SUPPORT, THEN IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY EMBARRASSING.

4. IN THIS REGARD ZAHEDI SAID HE WAS PREPARING MESSAGE TO SECRETARY FOR SHAH'S CONSIDERATION AND HOPEFULLY APPROVAL WHICH WOULD INFORM US THAT GOI WOULD: (A) SUPPORT PRC ADMISSION ON SIMPLE MAJORITY VOTE; (B) SUPPORT PRC FOR SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT (WHICH GOI EXPECTS A MAJORITY OF UN TO APPROVE); (C) LEAVE OPEN QUESTION OF GOI POSITION VIS-A-VIS EXPULSION OF ROC. THIS ZAHEDI BELIEVED WAS VERY BEST HE COULD DO AND IF APPROVED BY SHAH WOULD AT LEAST KEEP OPEN GOI OPTIONS. HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY BUT WARNED THAT HE HAD HIS OWN PROBLEMS (WITH SHAH AND PRINCESS ASHRAF).

5. I ASKED ZAHEDI IF GOI WOULD SOON ANNOUNCE RECOGNITION OF PRC IN LIGHT OF TURKISH ACTION. HE SAID THERE WERE HEAVY PRESSURES FOR GOI TO DO SO FROM TOP AND THAT A RECOGNITION COMMUNIQUE HAD BEEN VIRTUALLY AGREED WITH PRC. HOWEVER,



TELEGRAM

26

GP-3.
MACARTHUR:

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head, surrounded by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA".

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

W H

SECRET 518

PAGE 01 TEHRA 04309 000948Z

18
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046

R 060814Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5300
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T TEHRAN 4309

EXDIS

SUBJ: CHIREP

REF: A) TEHRAN 4288, B) STATE 142465 C) STATE 142612

1. REFERENCES B AND C ARE EXTREMELY TIMELY AND HELPFUL AS FOMIN HAS ASKED ME TO LUNCH ALONE WITH HIM AUG 7 TO DISCUSS SHAH'S REACTION TO OUR CHIREP PROPOSALS.

2. RE PARA 1 REFTEL B, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CLEAR (AS I THINK A REREADING BY DEPT OF TEHRAN'S CHIREP MESSAGES WILL SHOW) THAT ZAHEDI DOES NOT RPT NOT "THINK ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH PRC NECESSARILY WILL TIE IRAN'S HANDS IN VOTING ON CHIREP." WHAT DOES CONCERN ZAHEDI IS POSSIBILITY THAT AT HIGHEST LEVEL HERE SOME PREMATURE COMMITMENT MAY BE MADE WHICH WILL BE DIFFICULT TO REVERSE. ACCORDINGLY, WE WILL DO OUR LEVEL BEST WORKING THROUGH ZAHEDI TO TRY TO AVOID SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. MACARTHUR

127558

WHITE HOUSE -
SITUATION ROOM

71 AUG 6 AM 10:05

SECRET

SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



TELEGRAM

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04308 060657Z

2. ZELLI SAID PRELIMINARY CHECK INDICATED THAT ABOVE TYPES OF AMMUNITION IN SHORT SUPPLY AND SHAH THEREFORE HOPED WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO SUPPLY AT LEAST PART OF HUSSEIN'S REQUEST. IF WE

WERE ABLE TO DO SO, AND IF FOR POLITICAL REASONS, WE WISHED IRAN TO DELIVER SUCH AMMUNITION TO JORDAN, IRAN WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO SO. (PRESUMABLY WE WOULD DELIVER AMMO IN IRAN AND IRANIAN AIR FORCE WOULD ON-CARRY IT TO JORDAN). ZELLI CONCLUDED SAYING SHAH KNEW WE WERE HELPING JORDAN, AND, THEREFORE, TOOK LIBERTY OF MAKING ABOVE REQUEST.

3. I SAID I WOULD FORWARD REQUEST, BUT HAD NOT RPT NO IDEA WHETHER WE COULD IN FACT SUPPLY ITEMS ON ABOVE LIST.
MACARTHUR

0602/01/032

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by small stars.

W / b
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04292 050617Z

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

116951

S E C R E T TEHRAN 4292

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 AUG 5 AM 8:14

CORRECTED COPY (TEXT, PARA 5.)S

SUBJ: FATE OF SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN

REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 7430
(B) TEHRAN 3328
(C) TEHRAN 3603

SUMMARY: AT MEETING WITH FOMMIN ZAHEDI I RAISED ON PERSONAL BASIS FATE OF MUJIBUR RAHMAN AND EXPRESSED HOPE GOI COULD, IF IT AGREED, ADVISE YAHYA FRANKLY NOT TO HANDLE CASE IN WAY WHICH COULD MAKE MUJIBUR MARTYR (E.G., EXECUTE HIM) OR PLAY IN HANDS OF OPPOSITION OR EXTREMIST ELEMENTS. ZAHEDI SAID HE WOULD PASS WHAT I HAD SAID TO SHAH. HE MENTIONED HE HAD URGED BHUTTO COOPERATE WITH YAHYA. I ALSO TOLD ZAHEDI ABOUT INDIAN COMPLAINT OF TRANSFER OF US- FURNISHED ARMS FROM IRAN TO GOP AND OUR REPLY THAT WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH TRANSFERS AND INDIANS SHOULD ADDRESS ANY QUESTION TO IRAN. ZAHEDI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR OUR POSITION AND REITERATED IRANIAN AID TO PAKISTAN WAS NONE OF INDIANS' BUSINESS.

1. IN PRIVATE MEETING WITH FOMIN ZAHEDI AUGUST 3
I RAISED ON PERSONAL BASIS STATE OF SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

4

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04292 050617Z.

SAYING I HAD HEARD REPORTS YAHYA KHAN PLANNED TO PUT HIM ON TRIAL FOR TREASON WITH PROBABILITY DEATH SENTENCE WOULD BE IMPOSED. I HAD VERY STRONG PERSONAL FEELING THAT IF THIS WERE DONE AND MUJIBUR WERE EXECUTED, HE WOULD BECOME A MARTYR AND ANY REMOTE HOPE OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN EAST PAKISTAN WOULD DISAPPEAR. FURTHERMORE, SUCH MARTYRDOM MIGHT LEAD TO RAPID ASCENDANCY OF EXTREMISTS SPONSORED BY CHICOMS OR OTHERS NOT ONLY IN EAST BENGALI RESISTANCE MOVEMENT BUT ALSO ELSEWHERE (REFTEL A). FURTHERMORE, I BELIEVED INTERNATIONAL REACTION COULD SERIOUSLY COMPLICATE EFFORTS OF MANY GOVTS, INCLUDING OUR OWN, TO KEEP LINES OPEN TO GOP, PARTICULARLY SINCE EAST BENGAL CONTAINED MAJORITY OF POPULATION OF ALL PAKISTAN AND MUJIBUR HAD BEEN ALMOST UNANIMOUS CHOICE OF EAST BENGALIS IN RECENT ELECTIONS. I DID NOT KNOW WHAT IF ANYTHING GOI MIGHT SAY TO YAHYA ABOUT ALL THIS, BUT IN VIEW OF IRAN'S FRATERNAL RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND ITS DESIRE TO AVOID SEEING CHICOM OR OTHER EXTREMIST INFLUENCE INCREASE IN NEIGHBORING PAKISTAN, I PERSONALLY THOUGHT GOI SHOULD BE VERY FRANK WITH YAHYA IF IT AGREED WITH ABOVE PERSONAL ESTIMATE.

2. ZAHEDI REPLIED THAT IN HIS VISIT TO PAKISTAN IN JUNE (REFTEL B) YAHYA KHAN HAD SAID GOP HAD IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE THAT MUJIBUR HAD BEHAVED AS TRAITOR AND CONNIVED WITH INDIANS AGAINST UNIFIED PAKISTAN. ON OTHER HAND, HE RECOGNIZED THAT USG IN FACE OF INTENSE PRESSURE FROM CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION HAD COURAGEOUSLY KEPT LINES OPEN TO GOP AND TRIED TO BE HELPFUL. HE WOULD THEREFORE PASS ON TO SHAH WHAT I HAD SAID, MAKING CLEAR MY OBSERVATIONS WERE PERSONAL AND GIVEN AS A FRIEND AND WERE NOT OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIONS BY USG.

3. HE THEN REFERRED TO BHUTTO'S RECENT VISIT TO TEHRAN AND SAID THAT WHILE HE DID NOT TRUST HIM, HE HAD INVITED HIM HERE TO URGE HIM TO SUPPORT YAHYA AND TO PERSUADE HIM THAT OTHERWISE BHUTTO WOULD HAVE NO FUTURE. HE SAID GOI REGARD YAHYA AS HONEST MAN WHO HAS TRIED TO DO HIS BEST BUT WHO PROBABLY MADE MAJOR TACTICAL MISTAKE IN HOLDING FREE ELECTIONS BEFORE NEW CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN PROMULGATED IN PAKISTAN.

4. I THEN INFORMED ZAHEDI THAT INDIANS HAD COMPLAINED TO US THAT IRAN WAS TRANSFERRING US-FURNISHED ARMS TO GOP. WE HAD

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 04292 050617Z.

REPLIED TO INDIANS THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN REQUESTED BY IRAN TO AUTHORIZE ANY TRANSFER OF US-SUPPLIED ARMS FROM IRAN TO PAKISTAN AND AFTER LOOKING INTO MATTER WE HAD NO RPT NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY SUCH TRANSFERS HAD TAKEN PLACE. WE HAD ALSO INFORMED INDIANS THAT IF THEY HAD QUESTIONS ABOUT IRANIAN AID TO PAKISTAN, THEY SHOULD ADDRESS SUCH QUERIES DIRECTLY TO IRAN AND NOT TO US.

5. ZAHEDI SAID HE APPRECIATED POSITION WE HAD TAKEN IN THIS MATTER. HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO INDIAN INDUSTRIES MINISTER CHAUDHURY (REFTEL C) THAT IRANIAN AID TO PAKISTAN WAS NONE OF INDIA'S BUSINESS AND THAT IF INDIA ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES WITH PAKISTAN, THE LATTER "WOULD NOT STAND ALONE."

GP-3.
MACARTHUR

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by small stars.

W+H

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04292 041117Z

INFO OCT-01 /046

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1 99 95

S E C R E T TEHRAN 4292

EXDIS

SUBJ: FATE OF SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN

REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 7430
(B) TEHRAN 3328
(C) TEHRAN 3603

SUMMARY: AT MEETING WITH FOMIN ZAHEDI I RAISED ON PERSONAL BASIS FATE OF MUJIBUR RAHMAN AND EXPRESSED HOPE GOI COULD, IF IT AGREED, ADVISE YAHYA FRANKLY NOT TO HANDLE CASE IN WAY WHICH COULD MAKE MUJIBUR MARTYR (E.G., EXECUTE HIM) OR PLAY IN HANDS OF OPPOSITION OR EXTREMIST ELEMENTS. ZAHEDI SAID HE WOULD PASS WHAT I HAD SAID TO SHAH. HE MENTIONED HE HAD URGED BHUTTO COOPERATE WITH YAHYA. I ALSO TOLD ZAHEDI ABOUT INDIAN COMPLAINT OF TRANSFER OF US- FURNISHED ARMS FROM IRAN TO GOP AND OUR REPLY THAT WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH TRANSFERS AND INDIANS SHOULD ADDRESS ANY QUESTION TO IRAN. ZAHEDI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR OUR POSITION AND REITERATED IRANIAN AID TO PAKISTAN WAS NONE OF INDIANS' BUSINESS.

1. IN PRIVATE MEETING WITH FONMIN ZAHEDI AUGUST 3
I RAISED ON PERSONAL BASIS FATE OF SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN,
SAYING I HAD HEARD REPORTS YAHYA KHAN PLANNED TO PUT HIM
ON TRIAL FOR TREASON WITH PROBABILITY DEATH SENTENCE WOULD

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04292 041117Z

BE IMPOSED. I HAD VERY STRONG PERSONAL FEELING THAT IF THIS WERE DONE AND MUJIBUR WERE EXECUTED, HE WOULD BECOME A MARTYR AND ANY REMOTE HOPE OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN EAST PAKISTAN WOULD DISAPPEAR. FURTHERMORE, SUCH MARTYRDOM MIGHT LEAD TO RAPID ASCENDANCY OF EXTREMISTS SPONSORED BY CHICOMS OR OTHERS NOT ONLY IN EAST BENGALI RESISTANCE MOVEMENT BUT ALSO ELSEWHERE (REFTEL A). FURTHERMORE, I BELIEVED INTERNATIONAL REACTION COULD SERIOUSLY COMPLICATE EFFORTS OF MANY GOVTS, INCLUDING OUR OWN, TO KEEP LINES OPEN TO GOP, PARTICULARLY SINCE EAST BENGALI CONTAINED MAJORITY OF POPULATION OF ALL PAKISTAN AND MUJIBUR HAD BEEN ALMOST UNANIMOUS CHOICE OF EAST BENGALIS IN RECENT ELECTIONS. I DID NOT KNOW WHAT IF ANYTHING GOI MIGHT SAY TO YAHYA ABOUT ALL THIS, BUT IN VIEW OF IRAN'S FRATERNAL RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND ITS DESIRE TO AVOID SEEING CHICOM OR OTHER EXTREMIST INFLUENCE INCREASE IN NEIGHBORING PAKISTAN, I PERSONALLY THOUGHT GOI SHOULD BE VERY FRANK WITH YAHYA IF IT AGREED WITH ABOVE PERSONAL ESTIMATE.

2. ZAHEDI REPLIED THAT IN HIS VISIT TO PAKISTAN IN JUNE (REFTEL B) YAHYA KHAN HAD SAID GOP HAD IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE THAT MUJIBUR HAD BEHAVED AS TRAITOR AND CONNIVED WITH INDIANS AGAINST UNIFIED PAKISTAN. ON OTHER HAND, HE RECOGNIZED THAT USG IN FACE OF INTENSE PRESSURE FROM CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION HAD COURAGEOUSLY KEPT LINES OPEN TO GOP AND TRIED TO BE HELPFUL. HE WOULD THEREFORE PASS ON TO SHAH WHAT I HAD SAID, MAKING CLEAR MY OBSERVATIONS WERE PERSONAL AND GIVEN AS A FRIEND AND WERE NOT OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIONS BY USG.

3. HE THEN REFERRED TO BHUTTO'S RECENT VISIT TO TEHRAN AND SAID THAT WHILE HE DID NOT TRUST HIM, HE HAD INVITED HIM HERE TO URGE HIM TO SUPPORT YAHYA AND TO PERSUADE HIM THAT OTHERWISE BHUTTO WOULD HAVE NO FUTURE. HE SAID GOI REGARD YAHYA AS HONEST MAN WHO HAS TRIED TO DO HIS BEST BUT WHO PROBABLY MADE MAJOR TACTICAL MISTAKE IN HOLDING FREE ELECTIONS BEFORE NEW CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN PROMULGATED IN PAKISTAN.

4. I THEN INFORMED ZAHEDI THAT INDIANS HAD COMPLAINED TO US THAT IRAN WAS TRANSFERRING US-FURNISHED ARMS TO GOP. WE HAD REPLIED TO INDIANS THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN REQUESTED BY IRAN TO AUTHORIZE ANY TRANSFER OF US-SUPPLIED ARMS FROM IRAN TO



PAGE 03 TEHRAN 04292 041117Z.

5. ZAHEDI SAID HE APPRECIATED POSITION WE HAD TAKEN IN THIS MATTER. HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO INDIAN INDUSTRIES MINISTER CHAUDHURY (REFTEL C) THAT IRANIAN AID TO PAKISTAN WAS NONE OF INDIA'S BUSINESS AND THAT CX IWUK#ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES

GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOTE BY DC/T: TEHRAN 4292, #1 AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

**DIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS**

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 097

2

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04280 040853Z

22
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046

108509

R 040726Z JUL 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5282
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

SECRET TEHRAN 4280

EXDIS - NOFORN

SUBJECT: GULF ISLANDS AND FEDERATION

REF: TEHRAN 4234

SUMMARY: DURING AUGUST 3 MEETING WITH FONMIN ZAHEDI HE CONFIRMED DISCUSSIONS WITH BRITISH ON GULF ISLANDS CONTINUING AND AS IRAN POSITION IS CLEAR, SATISFACTORY OUTCOME TO TALKS DEPENDED ON BRITISH. I STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF AGREEMENT AS CHECK AGAINST SOVIET AND RADICAL ARAB INROADS INTO GULF AND NEED FOR FACE-SAVING DEVICE FOR SHEIKHS OF SHARJAH AND RAS-AL-KHAIMA. ZAHEDI CONFIRMED GOI PREPARED TO BE FINANCIALLY GENEROUS AND CONFIRMED FORTHCOMING VISIT OF ABU DHABI AND DUBAI DELEGATIONS AS REPS OF SHEKHOOMS, NOT OF UAE.

1. DURING AUGUST 3 PRIVATE MEETING WITH FONMIN ZAHEDI I ASKED WHETHER THERE ANY NEW DEVELOPMENT RE GULF ISLANDS OR FEDERATION. HE REPLIED THERE NOTHING REALLY NEW. TALKS WITH BRITISH ARE CONTINUING BUT ARE NOT MAKING MUCH PROGRESS. IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO LONDON AFSHAR IS IN TEHRAN FOR SEVERAL DAYS AND WHILE IRAN HOPES THAT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT WITH BRITAIN CAN BE WORKED OUT IN NEXT FEW WEEKS, THIS DEPENDS ON BRITISH AND NOT ON IRAN.

2. ISAID WHILE WE NOT PARTY TO THIS DIFFICULT PROBLEM, WE

71 AUG 4 AM 9:41
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04280 040853Z

ALSO HOPE MOST EARNESTLY THAT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION COULD BE REACHED. FOR IF IT WERE NOT, IT SEEMED CLEAR CERTAIN RADICAL ARAB REGIMES WOULD (A) TAKE PROBLEM TO UN, WITH PRIVATE ENCOURAGEMENT FROM SOVIETS WHOSE BROADCASTS IN ARABIC BEAMED ON GULF DESIGNED TO STIMULATE ARAB RESISTANCE TO IRANIAN POSITION FULLY KNOWN TO GOI AND (B) WOULD ALSO USE ISLANDS ISSUE TO DRIVE WEDGE BETWEEN IRAN AND MODERATE ARABS, THUS PREVENTING IRAN'S STRENGTH FROM BEING EFFECTIVELY USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH MODERATE ARABS TO PRESERVE PEACE AND STABILITY IN GULF AND CONTINUATION OF MODERATE REGIMES IN ARABIAN PENINSULA. I ADDED THAT EVEN IF AGREEMENT WERE REACHED WITH BRITISH AND SHEIKHDOMS IT QUITE POSSIBLE THAT IRAQ, PROBABLY SUPPORTED BY ADEN AND POSSIBLY SYRIA AND LIBYA, MIGHT STILL TRY TO MAKE ISSUE OF ISLANDS. HOWEVER, SUCH OPPOSITION COULD BE BRUSHED OFF IF AN ACCORD IS REACHED WITH BRITISH AND SHEIKHDOMS.

3. ZAHEDI SAID GOI REALIZES THIS AND WHILE THERE NO RPT NO GIVE ON BASIC PROPOSITION THAT ISLANDS ARE IRANIAN, GOI PREPARED TO BE VERY GENEROUS WITH SHEIKHDOMS. FOR EXAMPLE, IRAN WAS PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE "TEN TO FIFTEEN MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR" IN DEVELOPMENTAL AID TO TWO SHEIKHDOMS AND IN OTHER WAYS BE HELPFUL. HE SAID GOI WOULD COPY OUR PRACTICE OF HAVING RECEIVING COUNTRY (SHEIKHDOMS) REQUEST AID SO IT COULD NOT BE ACCUSED OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM AND WOULD ALSO HAVE SAFEGUARDS (UNSPECIFIED) RE SUCH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN EVENT OF LEFTIST COUP. I EXPRESSED VIEW THAT PROBLEM NOT JUST ONE OF MONEY BUT ALSO OF HELPING TO SAVE FACE FOR SHEIKHS OF SHARJAH AND RAS-AL-KHAIMAH. SINCE THERE NOW (RPT NOW) AGREEMENT BY INTERESTED PARTIES TO IRANIAN MILITARY PRESENCE ON ISLANDS, THERE SEEMED NO NEED AFTER IRANIAN PRESENCE INSTALLED TO IMMEDIATELY EXPEL VERY SMALL POLICE ELEMENTS OF SHEIKHDOMS ON ISLANDS NOR TO PUBLICLY ASSERT SOVEREIGNTY AT THIS TIME. ZAHEDI REPLIED IRAN HAD NO DESIRE TO HUMILIATE SHEIKHS AND FELT THAT WHAT IT WAS PROPOSING WOULD NOT DO SO.

4. HE THEN MENTIONED IRANIAN RESTRAINT RE ANNOUNCEMENT OF PROPOSED FEDERATION OF SIX (UAE) AND I CONGRATULATED HIM ON RESTRAINT GOI HAD SHOWN IN REACTING TO ANNOUNCEMENT. HE SAID ABU DHABI AND DUBAI HAD INFORMED IRAN THEY WISHED TO SEND MISSION TO TEHRAN ON BEHALF OF UAE TO DISCUSS GULF FUTURE.



TELEGRAM

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 04280 040050Z

GOI REPLIED THAT IT WELCOMED SUCH A VISIT BUT THAT MISSION MUST COME NOT RPT NOT ON BEHALF OF SO-CALLED UAE (REFTEL) BUT AS REPRESENTING INDIVIDUALLY THE TWO SHEKRDOMS. THIS HAS BEEN AGREED AND REPS WILL SOON VISIT TEHRAN. GOI HAD ALSO TOLD BRITISH IT INEPT OF THEM TO HAVE APPROVED APPROACH TO IRAN OF ABU DHABI/DUBAI MISSION ON BEHALF OF UAE IN LIGHT OF IRAN POSITION IT WILL OPPOSE UAE TILL ISLANDS SETTLED.
GP-3.
MACARTHUR

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

64
TELEGRAM

SECRET 020

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04278 040733Z

12
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

108078

R 040750Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5280
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

SECRET TEHRAN 4278

EXDIS

SUBJ: TEHRAN VISIT OF KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER

REF: TEHRAN 4162

I ASKED FONMIN ZAHEDI AUGUST 3 WHEN KUWAITI FONMIN WOULD VISIT TEHRAN. HE SAID THIS HAD BEEN AN ON-AGAIN/OFF-AGAIN VISIT BUT LATEST WORD HE HAS IS THAT KUWAITI WOULD ARRIVE NEXT SATURDAY, AUGUST 7. HE SAID IN STRICT CONFIDENCE SHAH HAD BEEN ANNOYED AT SHILLY-SHALLYING OF KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS APPARENT EFFORT TO EMBARRASS IRAN BY SERIES OF LAST MINUTE POSTPONEMENTS AND PLAYING WITH THE IRAQIS. HOWEVER, ZAHEDI TOOK POSITION THAT FRANK FACE-TOFACE TALKS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND KUWAITI FONMIN ARE IMPORTANT TO TRY TO CLARIFY MIS-UNDERSTANDINGS OR DIFFERENCES AND AT LEAST LEAVE NO DOUBT WHERE EACH STANDS ON BASIC ISSUES RELATING TO FUTURE OF GULF AND ISLANDS. ZAHEDI THEREFORE DID NOT SEEM UNDULY CONCERNED OR IRRITATED BY SERIES OF POSTPONEMENTS.

02-3.
MACARTHUR

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 AUG 4 AM 9:41

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 758

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04203 311513Z

50
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

084790

R 311320Z JUL 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5245
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

S E C R E T TEHRAN 4203

EXDIS

SUBJECT: GULF DEVELOPMENTS

REF: (A)STATE 139410
(B)TEHRAN 3900, 3123, 4134

1. EVER SINCE WE BECAME AWARE OF SECRET LUCE-AFSHAR TALKS IN LONDON WE HAVE AVOIDED PROBING THEIR STATUS OR DELVING TOO DEEPLY INTO CURRENT GOI VIEWS RE GULF ISLANDS. REFTELS (B) REPORT OUR MOST RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH IRANIANS ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT IRAN'S BASIC POSITION REGARDING GULF ISLAND IS UNCHANGED (TEHRAN 3900) BUT MODERATE PUBLIC POSTURE GOI HAS ADOPTED IN RECENT WEEKS REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS IN GULF, INCLUDING RELAXED REACTION TO ANNOUNCEMENT OF FEDERATION OF SIX TRUCIAL STATES, SUGGESTS IRANIANS ARE HOPEFUL THAT MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION MAY EMERGE FROM LONDON TALKS. WE HAVE NOTHING MORE SOLID TO GO ON AT THIS POINT AND THIS MAY BE WISHFUL THINKING ON OUR PART BUT WE REGARD IRANIAN WILLINGNESS TO RESORT TO QUIET DIPLOMACY AS ENCOURAGING SIGN. GP-3
HECK

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

LOH

CONFIDENTIAL 681

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04004 221234Z

41

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 NSCE-00 /046 W

013509

R 221158Z JUL 71

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5145

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 4004

EXDIS

PASS: WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: 25TH CENTENARY: NO 1

REF: TEHRAN 3780

SUMMARY: DIPLOMATIC CHIEFS OF MISSION WERE CONVENED AGAIN LAST EVENING (JULY 21) TO RECEIVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE 25TH CENTENARY CELEBRATION. MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED CONCERNING ARRIVAL AT SHIRAZ, ACCOMMODATIONS AT SHIRAZ AND PERSEPOLIS,

SECURITY, COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES AND OTHER SERVICES. GRAND MASTER OF CEREMONIES GHARIB AGAIN STRESSED IMPORTANCE AND NECESSITY OF HAVING NAMES OF PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVES AND ENTOURAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IN ORDER THAT GOI MAY PROCEED WITH PLANS.

1. AT A MEETING OF DIPLOMATIC CHIEFS OF MISSION AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON JULY 21, PRESIDED OVER BY CHIEF OF PROTOCOL BAHRAMI, AND IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH DEPUTY CHIEF OF PROTOCOL, MINISTRY OF COURT, BOTH OFFICIALS EMPHASIZED STRONGLY IMPORTANCE OF HAVING NAMES OF PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVE AND ENTOURAGE AND OF RECEIVING THIS INFORMATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, SO THAT GOI CAN PROCEED WITH PLANS, ACCOMMODATIONS, ETC.

2. AT MEETINGS FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ARRANGEMENTS WAS PROVIDED:

A. ARRIVAL OF US REPRESENTATIVE AT SHIRAZ: SPECIAL AIRCRAFT(S) SUCH AS SAM SQUADRON CAN FLY DIRECTLY TO SHIRAZ

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04004 221234Z

FROM OVERSEAS BUT CANNOT BE PARKED AT SHIRAZ. AIRCRAFT(S) MUST BE PARKED AT TEHRAN, AND CREWS MUST BE ACCOMMODATED IN TEHRAN.

B. GROUND TRANSPORTATION: WE WILL BE PERMITTED TO USE OUR OWN LIMOUSINE(S).

C. ACCOMMODATIONS: GHARIB AGAIN EMPHASIZED THAT TOTAL SUITE FOR EACH COUNTRY IS LIMITED TO SEVEN PERSONS INCLUDING PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVE AND WIFE.

D. SECURITY: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AIR AND LAND, ARE VERY ELABORATE AND EXTENSIVE. THEY INCLUDE RADAR SURVEILLANCE EXTENDING 300 KILOMETERS, AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE, A BELT OF GENDARMENAE 20 KILOMETERS FROM CENTER OF TENT CITY, A BELT OF ARMY OFFICERS AND MEN FIVE KILOMETERS FROM CENTER OF TENT CITY, AND A TIGHT RING OF IMPERIAL GUARDS ONE KILOMETER FROM CENTER OF TENT CITY. IN ADDITION, SPECIAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS WILL BE ISSUED FOR ACCESS TO VARIOUS POINTS IN OR NEAR PERSEPOLIS AREA.

E. COMMUNICATIONS: GOI WILL PROVIDE TELEX CAPABILITY AND DIRECT TELEPHONE LINES FROM TENT CITY VIA SATELLITE TO THE US AND MANY OTHER COUNTRIES. (NOTE: WE WERE INFORMED PRIVATELY THAT IF WE DEEMED IT NECESSARY WE WOULD BE PERMITTED TO ESTABLISH A SEPARATE VOICE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY.)

F. BANQUETS AND PARADES, OCTOBER 14 AND 15: THERE WILL BE A FORMAL DINNER GIVEN BY THE SHAH ON OCTOBER 14 (WHITE TIE AND DECORATIONS), PARADE CEREMONIES THE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 15 (MORNING COAT OR UNIFORM AND DECORATIONS), AND ANOTHER DINNER (DARK SUIT) GIVEN BY HIM THE NIGHT OF OCTOBER 15. PRINCIPAL US REPRESENTATIVE AND WIFE, AMB AND MRS. MACARTHUR, AND PRINCIPAL AIDES OF US REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE INVITED TO ALL FUNCTIONS.

G. MEALS OTHER THAN SCHEDULED BANQUETS: MEALS FOR US REPRESENTATIVE AND PARTY CAN BE ORDERED TO BE SERVED IN THEIR TENT OR IN LARGE CLUB TENT BEING PROVIDED AT PERSEPOLIS. MENU WILL BE QUITE EXTENSIVE AND SPECIAL DIETS WILL BE AVAILABLE. STAFF AIDES OR ASSISTANTS WILL DINE IN CLUB TENT. TENTS WILL HAVE SMALL PULLMAN TYPE KITCHEN FOR SNACKS AND DRINKS.

H. PHYSICIANS AND DENTISTS WILL BE AVAILABLE AT TENT SITE.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 04004 221234Z

I. GIFTS: THERE WILL BE NO EXCHANGE OF GIFTS.

J. OFFICIAL GUESTS OF CENTRAL COUNCIL: INVITATIONS HAVE BEEN EXTENDED BY THE IMPERIAL CELEBRATION CENTRAL COUNCIL AND HIM TO SOME PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS (NOT OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THEIR COUNTRIES) INCLUDING (1) A FORMER RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR, (2) RETIRED US ARMY GENERAL AND MRS. JAMES VAN FLEET AND (3) MR. JAMES A. LINEN OF TIME, INC. WE UNDERSTAND THE VAN FLEETS AND MR. LINEN HAVE ACCEPTED.
MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

31

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head, surrounded by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA".

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 076

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 03900 180515Z

19
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1946 W

112830

R 171551Z JUL 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5100
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T TEHRAN 3900

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: GULF ISLANDS

1. I ASKED FONMIN ZAHEDI JULY 17 WHETHER THERE WERE ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF ISLANDS. HE REPLIED THERE NOTHING NEW AND THAT IRANIAN AMBASSADOR AFSHAR IN LONDON IS CONTINUING HIS SECRET TALKS WITH SIR WILLIAM LUCE TO SEE WHETHER A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE. WHILE IRAN HOPES THIS WILL BE THE CASE IF NO RPT NO SOLUTION FOUND THEN IRAN'S DETERMINATION REMAINS UNCHANGED;
(A) TO PREVENT FORMATION OF A GULF FEDERATION BEFORE ISLAND ISSUE SETTLED; AND
(B) TO OCCUPY ISLANDS AFTER BRITISH WITHDRAWAL.

2. I SHOWED ZAHEDI A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST IN ARABIC BEAMED ON GULF WHICH REFERRED TO GULF AS "ARABIAN GULF" AND WHICH ALSO ACCUSED US OF IMPERIALISTIC INTENTIONS AND DESIRE TO "FILL VACUUM" LEFT BY BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. ZAHEDI ASKED FOR TRANSCRIPT WHICH I GAVE HIM. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



TELEGRAM

WH

071757

51
ACTION SS-45

071757

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 3780

EXDIS

PASS WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: 25TH CENTENARY: PALACE PLACES DEADLINE OF
AUGUST 10 FOR NAMING REPRESENTATIVES TO 25TH
CENTENARY OF MONARCHY

SUMMARY: THIS IS INITIAL MESSAGE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR 25TH CENTENARY CEREMONIES TO BE FOLLOWED BY NUMBERED SERIES ON SAME SUBJECT SLOGGED "25TH CENTENARY," WHICH WILL CONVEY DETAILS BASED ON BRIEFING GIVEN DIPLOMATIC MISSION CHIEFS AT PALACE EVENING JULY 12 AND FURTHER INFO AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. PALACE EMPHASIZED THAT ABSOLUTE DEADLINE OF AUGUST 10 HAD BEEN PLACED ON DESIGNATING REPRESENTATIVES (CHIEFS OF STATE OR THEIR DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES) TO CEREMONIES. TOTAL SUITE FOR EACH COUNTRY LIMITED TO SEVEN PERSONS INCLUDING SECURITY PERSONNEL, ETC.

1. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PALACE, ALL DIPLOMATIC CHIEFS OF MISSION WERE CONVOKED LAST EVENING (JULY 12) BY GRAND MASTER OF CEREMONIES OF IMPERIAL COURT GHARIB TO RECEIVE BRIEFING ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR 25TH CENTENARY OF MONARCHY NEXT OCTOBER. GHARIB OPENED BY EMPHASIZING THAT PALACE MUST HAVE NAMES OF PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVES (E.G., HEADS OF STATE OR THEIR DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE) NOT LATER THAN AUGUST 10. I GATHER THIS DEADLINE HAD BEEN FIXED BY SHAH BECAUSE OF COMPLEXITY OF PLANNING NECESSARY TO ACCOMMODATE SUCH LARGE NUMBER OF CHIEFS OF STATE, CHIEFS OF GOVERNMENT, ETC. (PALACE HAS RELEASED PRELIMINARY LIST OF 42 ACCEPTANCES TO DATE, WHICH INCLUDES EIGHT MONARCHS, NINE CHIEFS OF STATE, NINE HEREDITARY PRINCES.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 03780 131311Z

OR CONSORTS, EIGHT CHIEFS OF GOVERNMENT, SEVEN SHEIKHS AND WIFE OF PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT, ETC.) AND NEED TO HAVE INFORMATION BY OR BEFORE AUGUST 10 IN ORDER TO WORK OUT VERY COMPLEX PROTOCOL ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH SHAH ON PART OF LARGE NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES.

2. PROGRAM STILL BEING WORKED OUT BUT GENERAL OUTLINE OF ARRANGEMENTS SO FAR DECIDED FOR FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDES:

(A) BYPASSING TEHRAN ON ARRIVAL AND PROCEEDING DIRECTLY TO SHIRAZ FROM OVERSEAS IF REPRESENTATIVE TRAVELING ON OWN AIRCRAFT;

(B) PROGRAM WHICH EXTENDS FROM OCTOBER 13 (WHEN NO OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS SCHEDULED) TO 18 BUT WHICH CAN BE SHORTENED TO ARRIVAL OCTOBER 14 WHEN FIRST OFFICIAL FUNCTION TAKES PLACE TO MORNING OCTOBER 16 WHEN HEADS OF STATE AND OTHERS WILL OLEAVE SHIRAZ;

(C) OPTION OF DEPARTING COUNTRY FROM SHIRAZ OR STOPPING OVER IN TEHRAN UNTIL OCTOBER 18 DURING WHICH TIME REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE GUESTS OF GOI AT HOTELS OR OTHER APPROPRIATE ACCOMMODATIONS AND WILL BE INVITED TO SEVERAL CEREMONIES, SPORT EVENTS, ETC.;

(D) TOTAL SUITE FOR EACH COUNTRY STRICTLY LIMITED TO SEVEN PERSONS INCLUDING PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVE AND WIFE, ANY OTHER REPRESENTATIVE, EQUERRY, PERSONAL STAFF OR SERVANTS AND SECURITY PERSONNEL. OF SEVEN PERSONS FIVE WILL BE ACCOMMODATED AT PERSEPOLIS AND TWO AT HOTEL IN SHIRAZ, ABOUT FORTY MILES AWAY, WHERE RESIDENT AMBASSADORS WILL ALSO BE STAYING. GHARIB STRESSED THERE IS NO RPT NO UPWARD FLEXIBILITY IN NUMBER OF SEVEN PERSONS WHO WILL BE ACCOMMODATED AS GUESTS OF GOI AT PERSEPOLIS AND SHIRAZ AND NO MORE THAN FIVE CAN STAY IN PERSEPOLIS. HE ADDED SHAH WILL ALSO BE STAYING IN PERSEPOLIS WITH PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVES IN AREA WHICH WOULD BE FULLY SECURE.

3. I URGE THAT PROBLEM OF US REPRESENTATIVE TO ABOVE CELEBRATIONS BE GIVEN MOST URGENT CONSIDERATION BY WHITE HOUSE, PARTICULARLY SINCE I INFORMED SHAH IN APRIL THAT PRESIDENT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO COME IN OCTOBER, AND TIMELY INFORMATION-- THE SOONER, THE BETTER-- IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO GET FOR OUR REPRESENTATIVE TREATMENT HE DESERVES IN LIGHT OF FACT THAT SO MANY CHIEFS OF STATE AND CHIEFS OF GOVERNMENT WHO WILL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 23 TEHRAN 0378X 131311Z

RE SENIOR TO HIM IN PROTOCOL HIERARCHY WILL BE ATTENDING.
I SHOULD ADD THAT PALACE HAS ASKED ME PRIVATELY WHEN THEY
MAY EXPECT TO HEAR FROM US RE US REPRESENTATIVE AND I WOULD
ACCORDINGLY BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR ANY INDICATION AS TO APPROX-
IMATELY WHEN I MAY EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO ANSWER THIS QUERY.

GP-3.

MACARTHUR

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 778

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 03406 250829Z

18
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SS0-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

066210

O 250730Z JUN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4834

SECRET TEHRAN 3406

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: NEW YORK TIMES PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED
PENTAGON DOCUMENTS

REF: (A) STATE 107556; (B) TEHRAN 3229

COURT MINISTER ALAM INFORMED ME LAST NIGHT (JUNE 24) THAT SHAH HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO EXPRESS PRIVATELY AND CONFIDENTIALLY GRAVE CONCERN OVER THE UNAUTHORIZED PUBLICATION OF THE CLASSIFIED PENTAGON DOCUMENTS RELATING TO VIET-NAM. ALAM INDICATED IT WAS NOT THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE DOCUMENTS WHICH UPSET THE SHAH, BUT RATHER THE PRINCIPLE INVOLVED, NAMELY THAT HIGHLY CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS WHICH MIGHT CONTAIN INFORMATION ON SECRET EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS, SUCH AS IRAN, MIGHT IRRESPONSIBLY FIND THEIR WAY INTO THE PRESS. ALAM POINTED OUT THAT IN HIS RELATIONS WITH US THE SHAH IS COMPLETELY FRANK IN HIS DISCUSSION OF HIGHLY SENSITIVE CONFIDENTIAL MATTERS. HOWEVER, HE HAS FELT ABLE TO BE FRANK WITH US BECAUSE HE FELT THAT WE WOULD TIGHTLY GUARD THE SUBSTANCE OF CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS AND EXCHANGES WITH HIM. IF WE ARE NOT ABLE TO DO THIS, SAID ALAM, IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE A VERY INHIBITING EFFECT ON IRAN'S ABILITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH US ON CONFIDENTIAL MATTERS WITH FULL FRANKNESS.
MACUNTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



7
Department of State

W H
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 204

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 03344 230748Z

12
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

P 230705Z JUN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4796

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 3344

EXDIS

FOR NEA/IRN MIKLOS

SUBJECT: "FREE IRAN" ADVERTISEMENT IN WASHINGTON POST

1. WE HAVE JUST SEEN WIRELESS FILE SUMMARY OF LATEST ADVERTISEMENT IN WASHINGTON POST BY "FREE IRAN" COMMITTEE CONTAINING NUMBER OF SCURRILOUS ALLEGATIONS AGAINST IRAN AND SHAH. THIS ADVERTISEMENT AND ITS TIMING STRIKES US AS RELATED TO DARYANI CASE AND AS ANOTHER CLEAR AND DELIBERATE EFFORT BY SUBVERSIVE FORCES TO DRIVE WEDGE BETWEEN IRAN AND US. IT HAS EARMARKS OF BEING MASTERMINED BY COMMUNISTS WHO ARE BEHIND CONFEDERATION OF IRANIAN STUDENTS AND WHO IT BELIEVED ALSO PUT DARYANI UP TO HIS FALSE (BUT PERSUASIVE TO SOME) CHARGES ABOUT US. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT PURPOSE PEOPLE WHO GET OUT WIRELESS FILE HAD IN CARRYING THIS STORY, BUT IT CERTAINLY SERVES MOSCOW'S PURPOSES?

2. I EXPECT TO BE GIGGED ON THIS AND WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION YOU CAN LET ME HAVE ON THIS ADVERTISEMENT, BACKGROUND OF HABIBY AND COMMITTEE AND WHETHER THERE IS ANY TRUTH TO STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY WHEN HE WAS SENATOR REGARDING SHAH POCKETING MONEY SENT TO IRAN TO PROMOTE LAND REFORM PROGRAM. IN ANTICIPATION OF QUESTIONS I WOULD LIKE TO GET EXPLANATION AND COMMENT TO COURT MINISTER ALAM AND OTHERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

GP-3

MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 43 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

SECRET 514

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 03329 221402Z

SI
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 221245Z JUN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4788
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL HONGKONG
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USUN NEWYORK 407

S E I C I R E I T TEHRAN 3329

EXDIS: - NOFORN

SUBJECT: CHIREC: IRAN

REF: TEHRAN 3159

SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI CONTINUES TO TRY SLOW DOWN IRAN'S MOVE TOWARDS RECOGNITION OF PEKING AND AVOID DISCRIMINATION THEREAFTER AGAINST GRC AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN WHICH WOULD FORCE HIM TO WITHDRAW. ZAHEDI IS ALSO DISTURBED BY A SEMINAR OF UN REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK WHICH HAS CONCLUDED THAT WHEN UN VOTES TO ADMIT PEKING, GRC WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY EXCLUDED AND PEKING'S RIGHT TO A SEAT ON SECURITY COUNCIL CANNOT BE CHALLENGED.

1. I RAISED CHIREC QUESTION WITH ZAHEDI JUNE 21 AND AGAIN EXPRESSED HOPE THAT IRAN WOULD NOT HANDLE IT IN WAY DESIGNED TO FORCE GRC EMBASSY IN TEHRAN TO WITHDRAW.

2. ZAHEDI REITERATED HIS DESIRE TO SEE GRC EMBASSY REMAIN HERE. IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE HE SAID THAT DURING HIS RECENT ABSENCE (HIS TRIP TO ITALY, PORTUGAL AND SENEGAL I BELIEVE), "AN UNFORTUNATE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN" THAT AFTER IRAN RECOGNIZES PEKING, IT WILL TREAT GRC AMBASSADOR IN A DISCRIMINATORY AND SECOND RATE FASHION.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

31

WHITE
SITUATION ROOM

039924

71 JUN 22 PM 3:07

2/3

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two stars separate the top and bottom text on the left and right sides.

SECRET

ZAHEDI SAID HE EXPLAINED UPON HIS RETURN THAT THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE AND THAT ALL AMBASSADORS MUST BE TREATED EXACTLY SAME WAY FOR TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD BE DISHONORABLE AND NOT IN KEEPING WITH INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM. HE BELIEVES HIS VIEW HAS BEEN ACCEPTED WITHIN GOI AND IF PEKING DOES NOT ACCEPT THIS VIEW, "IT IS JUST TOO BAD" INSOFAR AS HE PERSONALLY IS CONCERNED.

4. ZHAEDI ADDED HE WAS MUCH DISTURBED ABOUT A SEMINAR WHICH WAS HELD IN MAY 1971 IN WHICH LORD CARADON OF BRITAIN AND THE PERMANENT UN REPRESENTATIVES OF ITALY, PAKISTAN AND TUNISIA, AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF OTHER PERMANENT UN MISSION, PARTICIPATED, INCLUDING AUSTRIA, AUSTRALIA, TANZANIAN, SENEGAL, FRANCE AND CANADA. ZAHEDI UNDERSTOOD SEMINAR WAS HELD SOMEWHERE IN NORTHERN NEW YORK STATE AND IT HAD REACHED CONCLUSION THAT WHEN ASSEMBLY VOTED TO ADMIT COMMUNIST CHINA, COMMUNIST CHINA WOULD AUTOMATICALLY ASSUME GRC SEAT ON SECURITY COUNCIL WITH GRC BEING EXPELLED BECAUSE QUESTION OF VETO DID NOT ARISE SINCE NO NEW MEMBER WAS BEING ADMITTED AND PEKING WAS SIMPLY ASSUMING RIGHTFUL SEAT OF CHINA WHICH IT WOULD REPRESENT. THIS APPARENT STAMPEDE BY ABOVE COUNTRIES WOULD NOT HELP HIM HANDLE CHIREC PROBLEM IN ORDERLY WAY WITH MINIMUM DAMAGE TO TAIWAN.

GP-3.

SECRET

0602/01/044

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 45 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars separate the top and bottom text on the left and right sides.

TELEGRAM

2
JUN 15 PM 5:06
WHITE, J. J.
SITUATION REPORT

12
ACTION SS-45

114816

S E C R E T TEHRAN 3159

SUBJECT: CHIREC: IRAN

REF: STATE 88633

2. ZAHEDI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR VIEW. AT SAME TIME HE WAS, AS HE HAD EXPLAINED TO ME PREVIOUSLY, STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF FINDING FORMULA THAT WOULD PERMIT GRC EMBASSY TO REMAIN HERE BECAUSE HIS "PERSONAL" VIEW IS THAT IF GRC REMAINS, PRC WILL NOT ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN TEHRAN. HOWEVER, ON OUR PART WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT STORIES THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAD

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 03159 151057Z

EXPRESSED DESIRE TO VISIT CHINA AND THAT MEMBERS OF OUR CONGRESS AND OTHER PROMINENT PERSONALITIES ALSO HOPE TO MAKE VISITS, COUPLED WITH CHANGING US POLICY WITH RESPECT TO CHICOMS, HAD BEEN SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN GOI DECISION (OBVIOUSLY AT THE TOP) TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH PEKING. I EXPLAINED TO ZAHEDI THAT WHILE WE HAD WELCOMED INDICATIONS FROM PEKING VIA US TABLE TENNIS TEAM THAT PEKING WAS WILLING FOR IMPROVEMENT IN US-PRC RELATIONS AND WE THOUGHT THAT SUCH IMPROVEMENT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO RELAXATION OF TENSIONS, POSSIBILITY OF US ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH PRC IS FAR, FAR DOWN THE TRAIL AS THERE HAS APPARENTLY BEEN NO BASIC CHANGE IN PRC POSITION ON FUNDAMENTAL SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. ZAHEDI REPLIED THAT DECISION TO RECOGNIZE PRC HAD BEEN TAKEN AND WAS IRREVERSIBLE.

3. IN STRICT CONFIDENCE ZAHEDI SAID THAT HE HAD DONE HIS BEST TO HELP AMB WOO AND HAD EVEN COACHED HIM ON HOW TO APPROACH SHAH AND LINE TO TAKE IN ORDER TO MAKE MOST CONVINCING PRESENTATION. AT SHAH'S DINNER HE HAD ARRANGED FOR WOO TO SEE SHAH BUT TO HIS DISMAY WOO HAD BEEN "INSIPID" AND TOTALLY INEFFECTIVE. ZAHEDI SAID HE HAD RECENTLY URGED WOO TO TELL HIS GOVT NOT TO WITHDRAW AND AT SAME TIME MESSAGE HAD BEEN SENT TO CHICOMS THAT WHILE IRAN WOULD VOTE IN UN AGAINST TWO-THIRDS RULE AND IN FAVOR OF PRC ENTRY, IT WOULD NOT EXPEL GRC EMBASSY IN TEHRAN. HE SAID BALL IS IN PEKING'S COURT AND IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE SAID CONVERSATIONS WITH PEKING HAD BEEN CARRIED ON BETWEEN IRAN AND PRC AMBASSADORS IN PAKISTAN. SINCE HE WAS LEAVING FOR VISIT TO PAKISTAN JUNE 15, HE MIGHT PICK UP SOMETHING, IN WHICH CASE HE WOULD LET ME KNOW ON HIS RETURN.

4. COMMENT: ABOVE TALK WITH ZAHEDI AGAIN MAKES CLEAR THAT IT IS SHAH WHO IS WAY OUT IN FRONT ON THIS ISSUE AND THAT ZAHEDI WOULD BE MUCH HAPPIER TO DELAY RECOGNITION OF PRC UNTIL AFTER QUESTION OF PRC'S ENTRY INTO UN IS THRASHED OUT IN UNGA NEXT AUTUMN. HOWEVER, WHILE HE HAS LITTLE FREEDOM OF ACTION, HE OBVIOUSLY WOULD LIKE PRC NOT TO WITHDRAW ITS EMBASSY HERE IF GOI-PRC AGREEMENT



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 03159 151057Z

ON RECOGNITION IS REACHED BEFORE UNGA BECAUSE OF HIS
BELIEF THAT IF GRC EMBASSY REMAINS, CHICOMS WILL NOT
ESTABLISH EMBASSY HERE AS LONG AS GRC REPRESENTED ON
ANY REASONABLE BASIS. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

CONFIDENTIAL 478

19
ACTION SS-45

P 141517Z JUN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4688

EXDIS

REF: TEHRAN 3128

3. ZAHEDI SAID HE WANTED ME TO KNOW PRIVATELY THAT HE FELT BADLY ABOUT WAY STORY WAS HANDLED. HAD HE BEEN CONSULTED, HE WOULD NEVER HAVE AGREED TO GIVING STORY TO PRESS BUT WOULD HAVE ASKED ME TO CALL TO DISCUSS IT MAN TO MAN. HE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 03145 21 OF 22 150-277

SAID HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH COURT MINISTER ALAM (REFTEL) AND ORDERS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO KILL USE OF TV TAPES ON TELEVISION TONIGHT. FURTHERMORE, HE HAD PERSONALLY CALLED AP AND REUTERS CORRESPONDENTS ASKING THEM TO QUOTE EMBASSY STATEMENT SAYING STORY IS FABRICATION (PARA 5 REFTEL) AND AT SAME TIME SAY DARYANI STATEMENT REPRESENTED ONLY HIS VIEWS. HE ALSO HAD ASKED MINISTRY OF INFORMATION TO HAVE PAPERS CARRY SIMILAR APPROPRIATE EXPLANATION ALONG THESE LINES. FINALLY, HE EXPRESSED HOPE WE WOULD KEEP COOL. HE KNEW HOW EXASPERATED WE MUST FEEL BECAUSE WHEN HE WAS AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON HE HAD HAD A SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TYPE OF UNPLEASANT EXPERIENCE WHEN ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT KENNEDY NOT ONLY RECEIVED GROUP OF RADICAL IRANIAN STUDENTS THAT HAD BEEN ATTACKING SHAH BUT HAD ACTIVELY ENCOURAGED THEM BY GIVING THEM BALL-POINT PENS WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S NAME INSCRIBED THEREON. I ASSURED HIM WE HAD NOT LOST OUR COOL AND HAD NO DESIRE TO MAGNIFY THIS INCIDENT. WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED ACTION HE HAD TAKEN AND IMPORTANT THING WAS TO DAMP STORY DOWN AND IN FUTURE DISCUSS WITH US PRIVATELY ANY SUCH CHARGES AGAINST US AS MIGHT COME TO ATTENTION OF GOI.

4. I THEN SAW COURT MINISTER ALAM AT 4:40 P.M. AND MADE SAME PITCH TO HIM. I ALSO GAVE HIM MY PERSONAL VIEW, AS I HAD TO ZAHEDI, THAT THERE SEEMED VERY REASONABLE PROSPECT THAT DARYANI, WHO HAD BEEN RECRUITED BY SOVIETS MANY YEARS AGO, WAS STILL ACTUALLY IN THEIR EMPLOY AND ACTING AS AGENT. BY HIS OWN STORY HE HAD BEEN IN EAST GERMANY FOLLOWING HIS DEPORTATION FROM CANADA IN 1974. SINCE SOVIETS ARE FULLY AWARE OF KIND OF TELEVISION SPECTACULARS GOI HAS PUT ON PREVIOUSLY WITH FORMER RADICAL STUDENTS WHO HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY RECALLED, WHAT BETTER WAY WAS THERE TO TRY TO DISCREDIT US AND DRIVE WEDGE BETWEEN IRAN AND US THAN TO HAVE DARYANI ACT THE WAY HE HAD.

5. ALAM SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN STORY IN THIS MORNING'S PAPER AS HE HAD GONE TO HIS OFFICE VERY EARLY TO PRESIDE OVER SOME MEETINGS. WHILE HE HAD GIVEN ORDERS TO SCRUB TELEVISION OF DARYANI STORY TONIGHT, THE HEAD OF TELEVISION HAD JUST CALLED HIM TO SAY THAT BEFORE ORDERS HAD BEEN RECEIVED, IRAN TELEVISION HAD AT ABOUT 1:20 P.M. TODAY BROADCAST A SEVERAL MINUTE STORY CALLING ATTENTION TO DARYANI STORY AND SAYING IT WOULD BE TELEVISED TONIGHT.

TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL



PAGE 03 TEHRAN 03140 01 OF 72 150637

HEAD OF IRAN TV NOW DID NOT KNOW HOW HE COULD EXPLAIN
SCRUBBING STORY AND THEREFORE ASKED PERMISSION TO USE IT
TONIGHT. ALAM SAID HE TOLD HIM FLATLY THAT SHAH HAD GIVEN
ORDERS TO SCRUB STORY AND THAT WHILE HE WOULD REPORT WHAT
TV HEAD HAD SAID TO SHAH LATER, ORDERS TO SCRUB WERE STILL
VALID.

DIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 03146 02 OF 02 150401Z

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

11-2753
SITUATION ROOM
46

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TEHRAN 3146

71 JUN 15 AM 8:07

IN

7. COMMENT: I BELIEVE WE HAVE DONE ALL WE CAN AT THIS JUNCTURE TO BRING TO ATTENTION AT HIGHEST LEVEL HERE OUR CONCERN OVER EFFECT THAT THIS KIND OF STORY AND WAY IT WAS HANDLED CAN HAVE ON OUR RELATIONS. I DELIBERATELY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 03146 02 OF 02 1504017

PITCHED MY REPRESENTATIONS "MORE IN SADNESS THAN IN ANGER"
AND I KNOW THAT WHAT I SAID WAS SYMPATHETICALLY RECEIVED BY
BOTH ZAHEDI AND ALAM WHO ARE GOOD FRIENDS OF US. INDEED THEY WERE
BOTH EMBARRASSED ABOUT IT. I WOULD, THEREFORE, NOT RECOMMEND
ANY FURTHER EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN OR DISPLEASURE FROM
WASHINGTON AT THIS TIME AND UNTIL I HAVE HAD FURTHER TALK
WITH ALAM, WHICH PROBABLY TAKE PLACE TOMORROW AFTERNOON
OR WEDNESDAY A.M. IN MEANTIME RECOMMEND WE CONTINUE TO
STICK TO LINE WE HAVE TAKEN HERE WITH PRESS (PARA 5 REFTEL).
IF DEPT SHOULD BE QUERIED AS TO WHETHER WE HAVE MADE
REPRESENTATIONS TO GOI, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT WE SAY WE
HAVE NOT RPT NOT MADE ANY "REPRESENTATIONS" BUT THAT
EMBASSY HAS MADE CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO TRUTH IN DARYANI
ALLEGATIONS AND THAT STORY IS OBVIOUS FABRICATION.
GP-3
MACARTHUR

840/10/090

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

JUN 9 PM 2:20

2/3

SECRET 125

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 03060 091352Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

070236

R 091300Z JUN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4641
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T TEHRAN 3060

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: UAR-USSR TREATY

REF: STATE 101071

1. GREATLY APPRECIATE DEPT'S EFFECTIVE ACTION IN KEEPING US CURRENTLY INFORMED OF ITS ASSESSMENT RE UAR-USSR TREATY AND GENERAL MID-EAST SITUATION. DIRECTLY AND THROUGH VICE FONMIN KHALATBARI AND COURT MINISTER ALAM, HAVE KEPT SHAH INFORMED ON HIGHLY SECRET BASIS OF OUR ASSESSMENTS, INCLUDING MOST RECENTLY FACT THAT SINCE SIGNING OF UAR-USSR TREATY, EGYPTIANS HAVE INFORMED US TREATY WILL NOT AFFECT US-EGYPTIAN DIALOGUE AND THEY REMAIN INTERESTED IN PURSUING NEGOTIATIONS FOR INTERIM SUEZ AGREEMENT, ETC.

2. KHALATBARI INFORMS ME SHAH GREATLY APPRECIATES ASSESSMENTS WE HAVE GIVEN HIM SINCE SIGNING OF TREATY; THAT GOI LEADERS AGREE GENERALLY WITH OUR ASSESSMENT AND THAT WHILE TREATY A NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT, IT IS NOT YET DISASTER THEY INITIALLY FEARED IT MIGHT BE. SHAH ALSO AGREES WITH US IT PREMATURE TO COME TO ANY FINAL CONCLUSIONS AS ONLY DEVELOPMENTS WILL SHOW WHAT TREATY REALLY MEANS.

GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

35

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 055

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02907 021248Z

41
ACTION SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 /046 W ----- 012816

P 021212Z JUN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4549

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 2907

EXDIS

SUBJECT: EXTENSION OF GENERAL TWITCHELL

REF: STATE 90119

WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE FORMAL CONFIRMATION THIS WEEK
(NOT LATER THAN SATURDAY, JUNE 5) THAT GENERAL TWITCHELL
CAN BE EXTENDED AS SHAH REQUESTED AND EXPECTS. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 891

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02872 011228Z

41
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

RI 01145Z JUN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4529

SECRET TEHRAN 2872

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO, MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV

SUBJ: GOI CONCERN RE UAR-USSR FRIENDSHIP TREATY

REF: (A) STATE 95354
(B) STATE 95361

1. I MET JUNE 1 WITH ACTING FONMIN KHALATBARI AT HIS URGENT REQUEST. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY SAY SO, IT WAS CLEAR HE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM SHAH TO EXPRESS IRAN'S DEEP CONCERN RE UAR-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY AND TO SEEK OUR ASSESSMENT.

2. KHALATBARI SAID GOI REGARDED TREATY AS MOST ADVERSE DEVELOPMENT IN THAT IT SEEMED NOT ONLY TO STRENGTHEN SOVIET POSITION IN UAR BUT TO ENTRENCH IT THERE FOR AT LEAST FIFTEEN YEARS EVEN IF THERE WERE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE SETTLEMENT. MOREOVER, TREATY SEEMED TO HAVE IMPLICIT OVERTONES OF "BREZHNEV DOCTRINE" AND COULD BE USED BY USSR TO CONSOLIDATE ITS HOLD ON EGYPT. TREATY WOULD ALSO SEEM TO PLACE SOVIETS IN STRONGER POSITION TO HINDER ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT AND THUS PERPETUATE PRESENT NO-PEACE SITUATION WHICH ENABLED

USSR TO STEADILY INCREASE ITS PENETRATION OF ARAB WORLD.

3. FINALLY, AND MOST IMPORTANT, KHALATBARI SAID THERE WAS NEWS REPORT THAT UAR-USSR TREATY WOULD SERVE AS MODEL FOR SIMILAR SOVIET TREATIES WITH IRAQ, SYRIA, LIBYA AND SUDAN. THIS, HE SAID, WOULD REPRESENT TERRIBLE DANGER FOR IRAN AND

71 JUN 1 PM 2:40
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02872 011228Z

PERSIAN GULF SINCE IT WOULD ENCOURAGE RADICAL REGIMES IN ARABIAN PENINSULA AND ELSEWHERE TO OVERTHROW MODERATE ARAB REGIMES IN ARABIAN PENINSULA (SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, SHEIKHDOMS) REPLACING THEM WITH RADICAL ARAB REGIMES, LARGELY INFLUENCED BY MOSCOW. THIS IN TURN WOULD ALSO ISOLATE IRAN AND MAKE IT MORE VULNERABLE TO SUBVERSIVE PROBES FROM WITHOUT. HE ASKED ME HOW WE VIEWED NEW SITUATION RESULTING FROM UAR- USSR TREATY.

DRAWING APPROPRIATELY ON TWO VERY HELPFUL REFTELS, I GAVE KHALATBARI WHAT I DESCRIBED AS PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS. HE LISTENED ATTENTIVELY AND WITH APPRECIATION BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT TREATY MIGHT (A) SLAM DOOR ON IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND UAR OVER LAST FEW MONTHS AND (B) HARDEN POSITION OF ISRAELI SO THERE WOULD BE NO FORWARD MOVEMENT ON CANAL AND OVER-ALL PEACE SETTLEMENT. I SAID IT SEEMED PREMATURE TO DRAW SUCH CONCLUSIONS ON LONGER TERM IMPACT OF TREATY ON UAR POLICIES. HOWEVER, WE DID NOT EXPECT AND THUS FAR HAD NO INDICATION THAT SADAT WAS NOT INTERESTED IN CONTINUING RELATIONSHIPS WHICH HE HAD DEVELOPED WITH US, PARTICULARLY SINCE WE FELT HE REALIZED THAT US WAS PRINCIPAL COUNTRY THAT HAD POSSIBILITY OF INFLUENCING ISRAELIS TOWARD SETTLEMENT. WHILE WE AGREED WITH GOI THAT SADAT HAD TO SHOW SOME PROGRESS IN INTERIM SUEZ AGREEMENT OR ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT IN NEXT FEW MONTHS IF HE IS TO RETAIN POPULAR SUPPORT, WE DID NOT, AT THIS JUNCTURE, VIEW SIGNING OF TREATY AS ANY IRREPARABLE DISASTER. ACTUALLY BASIC UAR-USSR RELATIONSHIP SEEMED TO REMAIN MUCH AS IT HAD BEEN BEFORE EVEN THOUGH IT HAD BEEN FORMALLY REINFORCED WHICH OF COURSE WAS POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY IMPORTANT.

5. KHALATBARI SAID HE "FELT A BIT BETTER" AS RESULT OF OUR TALK AND EXPRESSED HOPE WE WOULD CONTINUE TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE ISRAELI TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. I ASSURED HIM WE INTENDED TO DO SO BUT EXPLAINED ROAD AHEAD TO AN ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT WAS OBVIOUSLY BOTH DIFFICULT AND LONG, IN PART BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES WITHIN ISRAELI GOVT AND QUICK RESULTS JUST DID NOT SEEM TO BE IN CARDS. HE NODDED IN AGREEMENT AND SAID HE MUCH APPRECIATED OUR ANALYSIS WHICH HE NOTED WAS "PRELIMINARY." HE HOPED WHEN WE HAD HAD CHANCE FURTHER



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 02872 011228Z

TO ASSESS FULL EFFECT OF UAR-USSR TREATY, WE WOULD PASS ON RESULTS OF OUR ASSESSMENT TO HIM OR FOMIN ZAHEDI. I SAID WE WOULD BE GLAD TO DO SO.

6. COMMENT: IT EVIDENT SHAH AND GOI DEEPLY DISTURBED BY TREATY BECAUSE THEY FEAR IT WILL AID AND CONSOLIDATE SOVIET PENETRATION OF ARABIAN PENINSULA AND MIDDLE EAST. AS DEPT AWARE, SHAH AND GOI LOOK PRIMARILY TO US FOR OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF (A) ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT PROSPECTS; (B) SOVIET POLICIES, ACTIONS AND PROSPECTS IN MID-EAST. REFTELS WERE VERY TIMELY AND HELPFUL AND WE HOPE DEPT WILL CONTINUE AT APPROPRIATE INTERVALS TO BRING OUR ASSESSMENTS UP TO DATE FOR BRIEFING OF SHAH AND HIS PRINCIPAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS.

GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOTE BY OCT: NOT PASSED ADDRESSEES.

IS
EX
DIS
EX
DIS
EX
DIS
EX
DIS

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 52 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched atop a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

WH

$$\frac{2}{3}$$

10
ACTION SS-45

103386

71 MAY 27 AM 11:31
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

EXDIS - NOFORN

SUBJECT: CHIREC

REF: (A) TAIPEI 2548; (B) TEHRAN 2762

1. RE PARA 8 AND 9 REFTEL A, THE "SOCIAL FUNCTIONS" AT WHICH WOO REPORTEDLY HAD "CONSTRUCTIVE EXCHANGES" WITH SHAH AND FONMIN ZAHEDI WAS IN FACT, WE UNDERSTAND, A DINNER FOR HALF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION CHIEFS, WHICH SHAH GAVE APRIL 22. I ATTENDED THIS FUNCTION. THERE WERE ABOUT TWENTY AMBASSADORS PRESENT, ALL OF WHOM CROWDED AROUND SHAH AND ZAHEDI BEFORE AND AFTER DINNER TO HAVE FEW WORDS WITH THEM. NEITHER THE VENUE NOR THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CONDUCTIVE TO SERIOUS DISCUSSION. WOO HIMSELF CONFIRMED TO ME (WHEN I PINNED HIM DOWN) THAT HE HAD LAST DISCUSSED CHIREC QUESTION WITH ZAHEDI AT SHAH'S DINNER APRIL 22 (PARA 2C, REFTEL B).

2. IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING, WE FRANKLY DO NOT CONSIDER THAT WOO HAS BEEN VERY ENERGETIC OR EFFECTIVE IN HIS APPROACH TO GOI. CERTAINLY, ZAHEDI GAVE NO INDICATION IN HIS TALKS WITH ME THAT HE HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE WHATSOEVER OF "THREE POINTS" AND IF WOO IN FACT TOUCHED ON THEM ORALLY AT SHAH'S DINNER WE DO NOT BELIEVE WHAT WOO SAID REGISTERED. IF GRC IS TO

SECRET
3

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02812 270922Z

AVOID POSSIBILITY OF A PAINFUL SURPRISE, WE BELIEVE
IT SHOULD PRESENT ITS CASE MORE EFFECTIVELY, PRIOR TO
WHICH THERE IS LITTLE WE CAN DO TO HELP THEM.

GP-3
MACARTHUR

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

SECRET 3

53
ACTION SS-45

086028

S E C R E T TEHRAN 2762

SUBJECT: CHIREC: IRAN

1. SINCE AMBASSADOR STILL ON RESTRICTED SCHEDULE WHILE RECUPERATING FROM RECENT BOUT OF PNEUMONIA WE ASKED GRC AMBASSADOR WU TO RECEIVE POLITICAL COUNSELOR FOR GENERAL DISCUSSION OF CHIREC AND IRAN (REF A).

(A) WU CONFIRMED HE INFORMED ABOUT THREE POINTS OF GRC POLICY CONVEYED TO EMBASSY TAIPEI (REF D) BUT COMMENTED FIRST POINT IS "OF COURSE MOST IMPORTNAT."

(B) WU SAID HE HAS HAD GENERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS, INCLUDING FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI, ON QUESTION OF IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA AND GRC ON NUMBER OF OCCASIONS (DATES UNSPECIFIED) SINCE KUWAIT AGREED ESTABLISH RELATIONS LAST MARCH, AND THAT POINT HE STRESSED WAS REASON REFERENCE IN KUWAIT-PEKING AGREEMENT TO PRC AS THE "SOLE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02762 251310Z

LAWFUL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA" (REF C) MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR GRC REPRESENTATIVE TO REMAIN IN KUWAIT.

(C) WU HAS "RECENTLY" (AGAIN DATE NOT GIVEN) PRESENTED GRC'S THREE POINTS TO FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI AND HE UNDERSTOOD THEY HAVE BEEN CONVEYED TO SHAH. HE HAS NOT YET RECEIVED GOI'S REACTIONS AND DOES NOT EXPECT REACTION UNTIL AFTER ZAHEDI RETURNS FROM CURRENT VISITS TO ITALY AND SENEGAL (WHICH UNLIKELY BEFORE MAY 31). WU WOULD NOT SAY WHETHER THREE POINTS PRESENTED ORALLY OR IN WRITING, BUT STATED HE HAD BEEN "VERY SPECIFIC" IN GIVING POINTS TO ZAHEDI. (COMMENT: WU TOLD AMB ON PHONE MAY 22 THAT LAST TIME HE SAW ZAHEDI WAS AT BANQUET GIVEN BY SHAH ON APRIL 22, AT WHICH TIME HE HAD MADE "INFORMAL" APPROACH TO ZAHEDI ON CHIREC PROBLEM. THIS, OF COURSE BORNE OUT BY WHAT FOR MIN ZAHEDI TOLD AMB ON MAY 20, VIZ: HE HAD LAST SEEN WU SOME WEEKS AGO -REF D.)

(D) WU HAS NO HARD INFORMATION ON TIMING OF POSSIBLE MOVE BY GOI TOWARD ESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH PEKING, NOR ON GOI POSITION RE ADMISSION OF PEKING TO UN. HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY CONTACTS WILL SAY NO MORE ON THESE QUESTIONS THAN "NO DECISION HAS YET BEEN MADE."

3. DURING COURSE OF MEETING, POLITICAL COUNSELOR NOTED IN REPLY WU'S QUERIES THAT ON BASIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS OVER PAST 6-7 WEEKS, WE HAVE FOLLOWING IMPRESSIONS:

(A) DECISION HAS BEEN MADE IN PRINCIPLE BY GOI TO RECOGNIZE PEKING AND AGREE TO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS, BUT THAT NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE ON QUESTION OF TIMING, CONDITIONS OR FORMULA.

(B) THERE IS BETTER THAN EVEN CHANCE GOI WILL MAKE SOME MOVE TOWARD RECOGNITION WITHIN NEXT FEW MONTHS, POSSIBLY IN CONNECTION WITH CHINESE PROBLEM AT UN.

(C) ON IRANIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD GRC IN EVENT GOI RECOGNIZES PEKING, WE FEEL THERE ARE SENIOR OFFICIALS WITHIN GOI WHO HAVE DEFINITE INTEREST IN MAINTAINING GOI-GRC RELATIONS AND THUS HOPE GRC WILL BE SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE IN ITS POLICY TO PERMIT AMITENANCE OF GRC PRESENCE IN IRAN--THUS CREATING SITUATION WHICH WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, FOR PEKING TO SEND ITS REPRESENTATIVES TO IRAN. ON OTHER HAND, SOME WITHIN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 02762 251310Z

GOI, WHILE NOT OPPOSED TO MAINTENANCE OF GRC PRESENCE IN IRAN, SEEM TO FEEL THIS IS MATTER WHICH SHOULD BE LEFT ENTIRELY TO GRC.

4. DURING SPECULATIVE DISCUSSION RE MOTIVES BEHIND IRANIAN INTEREST IN RELATIONS WITH PEKING, WU EXPRESSED VIEW MOTIVES IN DESCENDING ORDER OF IMPORTANCE AS FOLLOW:

(A) IRANIAN DESIRE NOT TO BE LEFT BEHIND WHEN MOST OF REST OF WORLD IS MOVING TOWARD RELATIONS WITH PEKING (COMMENT: THERE WAS IMPLICATION IN WU'S REMARKS THAT USG IN GOOD PART RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS TREND BY REST OF WORLD).

(B) INTEREST IN HAVING RELATIONS WITH PEKING AS "COUNTER-WEIGHT" TO SOVIETS; AND

(C) DESIRE TO OPEN UP CHINESE MAINLAND MARKET TO SALE OF IRANIAN PETROLEUM BY-PRODUCTS, PARTICULARLY PETROCHEMICALS. POLITICAL COUNSELOR NOTED WE TOO HAVE IMPRESSION THESE THREE FACTORS ENTER INTO GOI THINKING, AS DOES TURKISH DECISION TO MOVE TOWARD RELATIONS WITH PEKING; BUT COMMENTED IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ASSESS WHICH FACTOR CARRY HEAVIEST WEIGHT IN GOI THINKING.

5. COMMENT: COMBINATION OF (A) WU'S RELUCTANCE TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN SHARING INFORMATION WITH US, (B) HIS VAGUESNESS ABOUT DATES AND NATURE OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GOI OFFICIALS, (C) HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO STATE WHETHER GRC THREE POINTS GIVEN TO ZAHEDI IN WRITING OR ORALLY, AND (D) STRONG INDICATION THAT WU HAS NOT SEEN ZAHEDI FOR SOME WEEKS -- ALL LEAD US TO SPECULATE WU HAS NOT BEEN AS ENERGETIC AND DIRECT IN APPROACHING GOI AS WOULD SEEM TO BE NECESSARY IF GOI IS TO HAVE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF GRC POSITION. NOR DID TONE OF WU'S COMMENTS TO US IN MAY 24 MEETING INDICATE EXCESSIVE CONCERN ON HIS PART OVER DIRECTION IN WHICH IRAN MAY BE MOVING OR SPEED OF MOVEMENT.

WE FULLY AGREE WITH DEPARTMENTAL THINKING THAT IT WOULD NOT BE WISE FOR US TO BE OUT IN FRONT OF GRC ON THIS QUESTION AND, THEREFORE, DO NOT THINK IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR US TO PRESS GOI ON THIS MATTER ANY FURTHER UNTIL WE KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT WU ACTUALLY SAID TO ZAHEDI AND WHEN. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 55 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 56 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

SECRET 102

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02757 02 OF 02 251021Z

19
ACTION 88-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

084962

P 054930Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4455
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 TEHRAN 2757

EXDIS.

(C) US ROLE.

(1) AMB MACARTHUR NOTED WE HAVE OFFICIALLY TAKEN POSITION THAT WE ARE NOT A PARTY TO ISLANDS DISPUTE BUT HOPE MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION WILL BE WORKED OUT BEFORE UK WITHDRAWAL. AT SAME TIME WE HAVE FELT OUR MOST USEFUL ROLE WITH IRAN AT THIS JUNCTURE IS NOT TO SUPPORT ANY SPECIFIC UK PROPOSALS OR PLANS ON ISLANDS OR FEDERATION QUESTIONS BUT, RATHER, TO MAKE CERTAIN BASIC POINTS INDEPENDENTLY TO GOI, SUCH AS:

(A) IMPORTANCE TO IRAN OF HAVING SHEIKHDOMS AGREE UPON SOME FORM OF ASSOCIATION, FOR UNLESS THIS DONE SHEIKHDOMS WILL BE MUCH MORE VULNERABLE TARGETS FOR SUBVERSION, WILL NOT HAVE EFFECTIVE MACHINERY FOR COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, AND WILL NOT HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK ENABLING ARMED FORCE (TRUCIAL OMAN SCOUTS) TO ACT ANYWHERE IN FEDERATION TO CONTAIN SUBVERSIVE ACTIONS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE COUP ATTEMPTS.

(B) IMPORTANCE TO IRAN OF HAVING FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION OF MODERATE GULF STATES SO THAT IN FUTURE, IF NEED ARISES, IRANIAN POWER CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON ARAB SIDE OF GULF AT REQUEST OF AND WITH BLESSING OF GULF STATES.

(C) DAMAGE WHICH COULD BE DONE TO SUCH FRIENDSHIP AND

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02757 02 OF 02 231021Z

COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND MODERATE ARABS BY FORCEFUL IRANIAN SEIZURE OF ISLANDS: PTD

(D) HELP DISPELL OR MODERATE IRANIAN SUSPICION THAT UK IS "UP TO SOMETHING" IN GULF. I.E. IS REALLY AIMING AT MAINTAINING ITS TRADITIONAL PRESENCE AND POWER IN GULF IN SOME NEW LESS OBVIOUS GUISE.

(2) AFTER TELLING LUCE OF COMMENTS HE MADE ABOUT UK IN MAY 19 MEETING WITH SHAH (REF C) AND OF HIS EFFORTS TO COUNTER IRANIAN FEELING THAT RECENT BBC BROADCASTS REPRESENTED PART OF ORCHESTRATED EFFORT BY RMG TO UNDERMINE PROGRESS TOWARD ISLANDS SETTLEMENT, AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAS TRIED TO MAKE POINTS IN PARA 1 ABOVE IN RECENT MEETINGS WITH BOTH SHAH AND FOM MIN ZAHEDI AND WILL SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO DO SO AGAIN. LUCE AGREED ROLE OF THIS NATURE IS BEST ROLE FOR US TO PLAY TOWARD GOI AT THIS TIME. HE ALSO NOTED THAT IF AND WHEN UK EFFORTS RE ISLANDS PRODUCE SITUATION WHERE SETTLEMENT APPROXIMATING THAT DESIRED BY IRAN IS ON HORIZON, THERE MAY BE ROLE FOR US TO PLAY IN ENCOURAGING IRAN RE SPECIFICS OF SUCH SETTLEMENT.

(3) BEFORE MEETING ENDED, AMBASSADOR EXTENDED BOTH BEST WISHES AND SYMPATHY TO LUCE FOR WHAT IS, IN MANY WAYS, MOYD DIFFICULT TASK. AMBASSADOR STRESSED HIS STRONG CONVICTION THAT SETTLEMENT OF ISLANDS ISSUE ALONG LINES OUTLINED BY SHAH. WHATEVER ONE MAY THINK OF CORRECTNESS OF SHAH'S POSITION IS ONLY SOLUTION IN SIGHT AT PRESENT AND IS VITALLY IMPORTANT TO FUTURE OF GULF.

FOR WITHOUT SETTLEMENT OF ISLANDS ISSUE, NOT ONLY ARE CHANCES OF FORMING GULF FEDERATION (OF ANY SIZE) AGAINST IRANIAN OPPOSITION VERY SLIM -- WITH ALL ATTENDANT AND SERIOUS DISADVANTAGES -- BUT ALSO IRAN WILL AMOST CERTAINLY SEIZE ISLANDS BY FORCE AND THUS DO SERIOUS HARM TO PROSPECTS OF IRANIAN-MODERATE ARAB COOPERATION IN BUILDING FRAMEWORK FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY IN GULF. VITAL INTERESTS OF US, UK AND ENTIRE FREE WORLD IN GULF STABILITY ARE SO GREAT THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO PREVENT EVENTS FROM MOVING TOWARD THIS GREED TRAGEDY-LIKE CONCLUSION.

GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

LS0110/2090

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

WM
TELEGRAM

SECRET 582

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02678 210821Z

18
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 210656Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4411
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T TEHRAN 2678

EXDIS

SUBJECT: GULF ISLANDS (FONMIN ZAHEDI'S VIEWS)

REF: (A) TEHRAN 2652; (B) THERAN 2359; (C) TEHRAN 2009

1. WHEN I MET WITH FONMIN ZAHEDI MAY 20 I ALSO ASKED HIM RE GULF ISLANDS. LIKE SHAH (REFTEL A) HE SAID THERE WAS NOTHING REALLY NEW. HOWEVER, HE ALSO EXPRESSED UNHAPPINESS OVER GENERAL BRITISH ATTITUDE RE ISLANDS. HE MENTIONED THAT DURING LUCE'S RECENT VISIT HERE (REFTEL B) LUCE HAD TRIED TO SMOTHER HIM WITH LEGAL ARGUMENTS ABOUT BRITISH POSITION WITH RESPECT TO SOVEREIGNTY ON ISLANDS AND HE HAD TOLD LUCE THAT IF HE HAD COME TO TEHRAN TO ARGUE THIS POINT, HE WOULD NOT SEE SHAH. LUCE HAD THEN ABANDONED HIS LEGAL ARGUMENTS ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY AND HAD SEEN SHAH. ACCORDING TO ZAHEDI, SHAH HAD MADE QUITE CLEAR THAT COMPROMISE HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH FORMER AMB DENIS WRIGHT (REFTEL C) WAS AS FAR AS HE COULD GO, AND ZAHEDI SAID THAT HE ALSO HAD MADE THIS CLEAR TO LUCE BEFORE LATTER'S DEPARTURE FOR GULF.

2. ZAHEDI HAS HAD NO REPORT ON WHETHER LUCE HAS MADE ANY PROGRESS WITH SHEIKHS OF SHARJAH AND RAS-AL-KHAIMAH BUT SAID LUCE WOULD ARRIVE HERE MAY 22 AND WOULD SEE BOTH ZAHEDI AND SHAH MAY 23.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
4

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02678 210821Z

3. ONLY OTHER DEVELOPMENT WAS THAT SIR ALEC HOME HAD PURSUED ZAHEDI WITH MESSAGES DURING LATTER'S VISIT TO EGYPT RE STRONG IRANIAN REACTION TO BUZZING OF IRANIAN SHIPS AND ISLANDS BY BRITISH PLANES. ZAHEDI SAID SIR ALEC IS GOOD FRIEND BUT HE HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO REPLY "VERY FRANKLY TO HIM" THAT GOI WILL NOT TOLERATE BUZZING OF IRANIAN SHIPS AND ISLANDS AND POINTING OUT AGAIN THAT ISLANDS ARE IRANIAN AND THAT IF BRITISH DO NOT PERMIT IRANIAN PRESENCE ON ISLANDS BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE, IRAN WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO TAKE THEM FORCEFULLY AFTER BRITISH LEAVE.

4. I SAID WHILE WE WERE NOT PARTY TO THIS DISPUTE, WE HOPED MOST EARNESTLY FORMULA COULD BE FOUND TO SETTLE ISSUE BEFORE BRITISH DEPARTURE. FOR IF IRAN IS OBLIGED LATER TO SEIZE ISLANDS, RADICAL ARABS AND OTHERS WILL MOST CERTAINLY TAKE MATTER TO UN AND EXPLOIT IT TO HILT TO PREVENT MODERATE GULF ARAB-IRAN COOPERATION WHICH IS SO IMPORTANT TO IRAN'S OWN INTERESTS. I ALSO POINTED OUT IN DETAIL WHY A GULF FEDERATION WOULD SERVE IRAN'S OWN INTEREST AND BE USEFUL TO HELP COUNTER SUBVERSION.

5. ZAHEDI REPLIED THAT SHAH HAS PROPOSED FORMULA WHICH IS FAIR TO SHEIKHS AND TO BRITISH AND IF LATTER, WHO CREATED PROBLEM, DO NOT ACCEPT IT, RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE THEIRS. HE ADDED HE HAD DISCUSSED ISLANDS PROBLEM IN DETAIL WITH EGYPTIAN FOMIN RIAD WHO HAD ASSURED HIM THAT EGYPT UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED WITH IRAN'S POSITION AND THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT SIDE AGAINST IRAN IF DISPUTE CAME TO UN. ZAHEDI SAID RIAD ALSO FRANKLY ASTONISHED AT EXTENT TO WHICH IRAN WAS WILLING TO BE GENEROUS IN COMPENSATING SHEIKHDOMS SINCE ISLANDS ARE AFTER ALL IRANIAN.

6. REFERRING TO IRANIS WILLINGNESS TO BE GENEROUS TO SHEIKHS RE ISLANDS, ZAHEDI SAID THAT IRAN COULD NOT ALLOCATE OIL REVENUES DIRECTLY TO SHEIKHDOMS AS THIS MIGHT BE CONSTRUED THAT SHEIKHDOMS HAD VALID CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY AND WERE THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUCH REVENUES. HOWEVER, IRAN WOULD DO SO INDIRECTLY, POSSIBLY ON BASIS OF A SPECIAL IRANIAN POINT FOUR PROGRAM OR SOME SIMILAR DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAM FOR SHEIKHDOMS. (ZAHEDI WORKED FOR POINT FOUR HERE SOME YEARS AGO.) GP-3.

MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

4

850/10/2090

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

PAGE: 01 TEHRAN 02677 210752Z

11
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

R 210655Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4410
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T TEHRAN 2677

EXDIS/NOFORN

SUBJECT: FONMIN ZAHEDI DISCUSSES IRAN-CHICOM RELATIONS

REF: TEHRAN 2646

1. FONMIN ZAHEDI ALSO DISCUSSED WITH ME TODAY (MAY 20) IRAN-CHICOM RELATIONS. (IN LIGHT PARA 3 OF STATE 85986 I DID NOT CONVEY GRC'S THREE POINTS TO ZAHEDI AS WE UNDERSTOOD GRC HAD NOT YET DONE SO HERE.) SHAH HAD ALREADY BRIEFED HIM ON HIS TALK WITH ME YESTERDAY (REFTEL). WHEREAS SHAH HAD GIVEN ME IMPRESSION ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WAS NOT IMMINENT, ZAHEDI GAVE ME IMPRESSION THAT IT MAY BE CLOSER TO REALIZATION THAN WE HAD BELIEVE HERE BECAUSE HE SAID GOI IS ACTIVELY CONSIDERING CANADIAN, ITALIAN AND KUWAITI FORMULAS FOR RELATIONS WITH PRC. ZAHEDI SAID HE IS PERSONALLY INTERESTED IN AN ADAPTATION OF THE FRENCH FORMULA WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS "AN EXPRESSION (PRESUMABLY BY GOI) OF A DESIRE FOR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH PRC WITHOUT ANY MENTION WHATSOEVER OF GRC." HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT UNLIKE FRENCH, WHICH HAD FORCED GRC EMBASSY OUT OF PARIS, IRAN HAD NO INTENTION OF FORCING THEM OUT OF TEHRAN AND INDEED HOPED THEY WOULD REMAIN HERE. HE THEN SAID EVEN A FORMULATION THAT PRC REPRESENTS SOLE LEGAL GOVT OF CHINA SHOULD NOT BE CAUSE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02677 210752Z

FOR GRC GRATUITOUSLY TO PULL OUT.

2. I REPLIED I DID NOT PERSONALLY BELIEVE TAIPEI COULD STOMACH SUCH A FORMULATION. HE SAID THAT IF GRC REFUSED TO BREAK RELATIONS WITH IRAN (WHEN IRAN RECOGNIZED PRC) AND REMAINED IN TEHRAN, PEKING WOULD NOT RPT NOT IN ALL PROBABILITY SEND AN EMBASSY HERE. THIS WOULD MEAN IRAN WOULD HAVE TRADE RELATIONS WITH CHICOMS BUT WOULD NOT EXCHANGE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS. ZAHEDI WENT ON TO SAY UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT IRAN WOULD VOTE FOR ADMISSION OF CHICOMS TO UN NEXT AUTUMN BUT NOT FOR EXPULSION OF GRC. (COMMENT: THIS, OF COURSE, CANNOT BE DONE UNDER TRADITIONAL ALBANIAN-TYPE RESOLUTION.)

3. I ASKED WHETHER HE HAD HAD ANY RECENT TALKS WITH GRC AMBASSADOR WU. HE REPLIED NOT RECENTLY BUT SOME WEEKS AGO HAD DISCUSSED CHIREP PROBLEM VERY FRANKLY WITH WU AND HAD URGED HIM TO PRESS GRC NOT TO ABANDON FIELD WHEN GOI RECOGNIZED PRC, HOWEVER, HE PERSONALLY FEARED THAT CHIANG KAI-SHEK WAS SO RIGID IN THIS MATTER THAT HE WOULD NOT MODIFY GRC POLICY EVEN THOUGH IT SERVED LATTER'S OWN INTEREST. GP-3.
MACARTHUR.

650/10/2090

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

WH

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02674 210400Z

3

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

057923

R 201413Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4407
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

S E C R E T TEHRAN 2674

EXDIS/NOFORN

DEPT PASS CINCSTRIKE

SUBJECT: SHAH'S MAY 16 MEETING WITH KING FAISAL
(FONMIN ZAHEDI'S REPORT)

REF: TEHRAN 2648

1. FONMIN ZAHEDI ALSO BRIEFED ME ON MAY 20 RE SHAH'S MEETING W SH FAISAL WHICH ZAHEDI ATTENDED. ZAHEDI WENT OVER MUCH OF SAME GROUND WITH ME AS DID THE SHAH (REFTEL), COMMENTING THAT WHILE FAISAL'S SIMPLISTIC VIEW THAT ALL PROBLEMS OF MIDDLE EAST WERE RESULT OF "COMMUNIST ATHEISM AND THE JEWS" MIGHT GO DOWN WELL WITH MULLAHS AND BEDQUINS OF SAUDI ARABIA, IT WAS ALMOST EMBARRASSING WHEN FAISAL EXPOUNDED SUCH VIEW ABROAD.

2. I ASKED WHETHER ANY SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN REACHED REGARDING COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA TO PRESERVE PEACE, STABILITY AND SECURITY IN GULF. HE REPLIED THAT SHAH HAD STRESSED NEED FOR CLOSE COOPERATION TO ASSURE SECURITY OF GULF AND GIVEN EMPHASIS ON VITAL IMPORTANCE OF PERSIAN GULF AND STRAITS OF HORMOZ WHICH REPRESENTED LIFELINE OF BOTH SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN BECAUSE THEIR OIL REVENUES DEPEND ON SECURITY OF THIS VITAL WATERWAY. WHILE FAISAL FULLY AGREED, HE DID NOT OFFER ANY SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR CARRYING OUT CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. ZAHEDI COMMENTED THAT WHILE FAISAL AND SAUDIS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

3

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02674 210400Z

MAKE ALL RIGHT NOISES IN PRIVATE ABOUT DESIRABILITY AND NEED FOR CLOSE SAIDI-IRAN COOPERATION AND COORDINATION IN GULF AREA. THEY DON'T EVEN WANT TO HINT ABOUT THIS IN PUBLIC. THIS LEADS ZAHEDI AND SHAH TO WONDER WHETHER FAISAL HAS REALLY DECIDED HOW FAR HE WANTS TO GO IN SUCH COOPERATION. WITH THIS IN MIND ZAHEDI SAID THAT SHAH HAD TACTFULLY MADE QUITE CLEAR THAT WHETHER OR NOT ANY OF OTHER LITTORAL GULF STATES COOPERATED, IRAN WILL USE ITS OWN STRENGTH TO COUNTER ANY SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST GULF FROM OUTSIDE WHICH IRAN BELIEVES THREATENS ITS OWN VITAL INTERESTS. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CINCSTRIKE.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

0602/10/2090

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02659 201242Z

53
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

R 201200Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4399

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 2659

EXDIS.

FOR UNDER SECY ALEXIS JOHNSON AND ASST SECY SISCO FROM
MACARTHUR

PASS DOD FOR GEN WESTMORELAND

SUBJECT: NOMINATION OF MAJOR GEN WILLIAMSON AS NEXT
ARMISH/MAAG CHIEF

REF: STATE 78036

1. I SAW SHAH TODAY (MAY 19) AND INFORMED HIM THAT AFTER SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AT VERY HIGH LEVEL IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO NOMINATE MAJ GEN ELLIS W. WILLIAMSON AS ARMISH/MAAG CHIEF TO SUCCEED MAJ GEN TWITCHELL. I GAVE HIM RESUME OF GEN WILLIAMSON'S SERVICE CAREER, STRESSING WE FELT THAT BY EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE HE WAS BEST QUALIFIED OFFICER WE COULD NOMINATE. AFTER HE HAD PERUSED WILLIAMSON'S SERVICE RECORD, I TOLD HIM THAT HE SHOULD KNOW THAT WILLIAMSON HAD BEEN FALSELY ACCUSED BY ANTI-VIETNAM WAR ELEMENTS IN US OF HAVING AUTHORIZED SHELING OF A VIET CONG-NORTH VIETNAMESE HOSPITAL. THIS CHARGE HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATED AND WAS TOTALLY FALSE AND I GAVE SHAH COPY OF WILLIAMSON'S STATEMENT (REFTEL).

2. SHAH SAID AS LONG AS CHARGE WAS NOT TRUE, HE WAS NOT RPT
NOT CONCERNED AS ONE MUST EXPECT LEFTIST ELEMENTS WHICH ARE
EXPLOITING VIETNAM WAR IN US TO MAKE ALL KINDS OF FALSE
CHARGES. SHAH SAID ON BASIS OF WHAT I HAD SAID, GEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

31

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02659 201242Z

WILLIAMSON'S SERVICE RECORD AND ESTIMATE OF OUR JCS THAT HE IS BEST QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL, HE WOULD ACCEPT WILLIAMSON AND I COULD SO NOTIFY WASHINGTON.

3. WE NEXT DISCUSSED TIMING OF GEN WILLIAMSON'S ARRIVAL, WHICH I SAID I UNDERSTOOD WAS PLANNED FOR ABOUT BEGINNING OF JULY. SHAH TOOK POSITION THAT BASIC STUDY (TWITCHELL-TOUFANIAN STUDY) ON WHICH IRAN'S IMPORTANT FIVE-YEAR MILITARY PLAN IS TO BE BASED WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY NOT BE COMPLETED UNTIL LATE AUGUST. HE FEELS STRONGLY THAT SINCE GEN TWITCHELL HAS MADE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THIS IMPMITANT STUDY AND SINCE HE IS FULLY KNOWLEDGEABLE OF ITS VARIOUS AND COMPLEX ASPECTS AND RAMIFICATIONS, HE SHOULD REMAIN AS ARMISH/MAAG CHIEF UNTIL END OF AUGUST, BY WHICH TIME HOPEFULLY STUDY WOULD BE WRAPPED UP AND APPROVED. SHAH SAID HE ASSUMED THIS REQUEST WOULD VREATE NO PROBLEM. I REPLIED THAT IMPORTANCE OF STUDY IS FULGN APPRECIATED BY USG AND THAT I COULD FULLY UNDERSTAND REASONS WHY HE DESIRED TO HAVE GEN TWITCHELL REMAIN UNTIL END OF AUGUST. I SAID I WOULD THEREFORE PROMPTLY CONSULT WITH DOD AND GEN TWITCHELL TO SEE IF ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE FOR HIM TO REMAIN UNTIL SEPTEMBER.

4. I HAVE DISCUSSED ABOVE WITH GEN TWITCHELL WHO, SUBJECT TO DOD APPROVAL, IS AGREEABLE TO REMAINING ON AS ARMISH/MAAG CHIEF UNTIL SEPTEMBER. ALTHOUGH I REALIZE GENERAL TWITCHELL IS SCHEDULED TO RETIRE JUNE 30, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE CONCUR AT ONCE IN SHAH'S REQUEST AND THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE FOR GEN TWITCHELL TO REMAIN UNTIL SEPTBMER SINCE WE HAVE REALLY NO OTHER CHOICE IN THIS MATTER. I WOULD SUGGEST (AND GEN TWITCHELL STATES THIS WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO HIM) THAT WILLIAMSON PLAN TO ARRIVE IN TEHRAN DURING FIRST WEEK OF SEPGEMBER AND TAKE OVER COMMAND ABOUT SEPTEMBER 10, THIS WOULD ALLOW SUSFICIENT TIME FOR NECESSARY OVERLAP WITH GEN TWITCHELL AND WOULD ALSO GIVE ADEQUATE TIME FOR GEN TO PHASE OUT AFTER COMPLETING STUDY.

5. I TOLD SHAH I DID NOT KNOW WHEN DOD PLANNED TO ANNOUNCE GEN WILLIAMSON'S APPOINTMENT BUT I WOULD LET HIM KNOW IN ADVANCE BOTH DATE AND TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT. WOULD APPRECIATE WORD ON THIS ASAP AND AT LEAST FIVE DAYS IN ADVANCE OF PROPOSED RELEASE DATE.

GP-3. MACARTHUR.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DOD.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

31

190/10/1090

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 62 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 64 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two stars.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02646 201147Z

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

R 200855Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4391
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USUN NEW YORK 393

051476

S E C R E T . TEHRAN 2646

EXDIS

SUBJ: SHAH DISCUSSES IRAN-CHICOMI RELATIONS

REF: (A) TEHRAN 1959; (B) TAIPEI 2225; (C) TEHRAN 2541;
(D) TEHRAN 2542

1. IN MEETING MAY 19 WITH SHAH, WHICH LASTED ALMOST HOUR AND HALF, I ASKED HIM WHAT IMPRESSIONS PRINCESSES ASHRAF AND FATEMEH HAD BROUGHT BACK FROM CHINA (REFS C AND D). SHAH REPLIED THAT THEIR OVER-ALL IMPRESSION OF CHINA WAS ONE OF DREADFUL DRABNESS AND ENFORCED CONFORMITY, UNDER A SYSTEM WHICH HE DID NOT BELIEVE MANY PEOPLES WOULD FIND VERY TOLERABLE IN TERMS OF QUALITY OF LIFE.

2. HOWEVER, QUESTION OF IRAN RECOGNIZING PRC AND ENTERING INTO RELATIONS WITH IT IS QUITE ANOTHER MATTER AND DECISION WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN ON BASICALLY POLITICAL GROUNDS. HE SAID THAT SINCE HE HAD DISCUSSED IRAN-CHICOM RELATIONS WITH ME ON APRIL 14 (REFTEL A), HE HAD GIVEN GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO IT. IN FIRST PLACE, HE BELIEVES SOVIET UNION IS SEEKING DETENTE IN EUROPE BECAUSE OF (A) PROBLEMS AND RESTIVENESS WITHIN ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITE EMPIRE AS STRESSED BY EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND IN LAST SEVERAL YEARS, AND (B) ITS CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA, WHICH ALTHOUGH LESS BITTER THAN LAST YEAR WILL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02646 201147Z

CONTINUE INTO INDEFINITE FUTURE. HOWEVER, SHAH FEARS DETENTE WITH EUROPE MAY INEVITABLY LEAD MOSCOW TO TRY TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE IN MIDDLE EAST. "WHY," HE ASKED, "WHEN THE RUSSIANS ARE TALKING ABOUT DETENTE IN EUROPE, BALANCED REDUCTION OF FORCES IN EUROPE, LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS THROUGH SALT TALKS, ETC., ARE THEY STEADILY INCREASING NOT ONLY THEIR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONRY BUT ALSO CAPABILITIES OF THEIR ARMY AND NAVY?" SHAH BELIEVES ANSWER IS DESIRE TO EXPAND SOVIET PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE INTO VITALLY IMPORTANT INDIAN OCEAN, MEDITERRANEAN, MIDDLE EAST AREA IN YEARS THAT LIE AHEAD.

3. SHAH THEN SAID FACED WITH THIS POSSIBILITY, IRAN HAD TO KEEP ALL ITS OPTIONS OPEN AND ONE OF COUNTERWEIGHT OPTIONS TO SOVIET EXPANSION IS COMMUNIST CHINA. LATTER IS NOT ONLY BY FAR MOST POPULOUS NATION IN WORLD BUT IS ALSO ASIAN NATION WITH THERMONUCLEAR CAPABILITY WHICH IS AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE AT

ODDS WITH SOVIET UNION AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO ITS UTMOST TO PREVENT EXPANSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE INTO FREE ASIA, OF WHICH IRAN IS A PART. SHAH SAID IN LIGHT OF THESE AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, AND SINCE PRC IS FACT OF LIFE, ITS RECOGNITION AND ENTRY INTO US IS INEVITABLE.

4. HE THEN STRESSED THAT WHEN IRAN RECOGNIZED PRC, HE WISHED TO MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH GRC ON FORMOSA. WHILE THIS DEPENDED ENTIRELY ON GRC, HE SAID HE HAD LET GRC KNOW HIS "HOPE" THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN. HE SAID THERE WERE SOME PEOPLE IN LEADERSHIP IN FORMOSA WHO CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT EVENTUALLY A REVOLUTION MIGHT OCCUR ON MAINLAND CHINA, IN WHICH CASE GOVERNMENT ON FORMOSA WOULD COME TO POWER OVER MAINLAND. SHAH FELT THIS WAS ABSURD. WHILE HE DID NOT DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY OF SOME UPHEAVAL ON MAINLAND CHINA AFTER PRESENT LEADERSHIP DISAPPEARS, SUCCESSOR REGIME WOULD NOT COME FROM FORMOSA BUT WOULD BE MAINLAND GROUP THAT HAD LED SUCCESSFUL COUP.

5. COMMENT: SHAH DISCUSSED CHIREC PROBLEM IN DETACHED AND PHILOSOPHICAL MANNER, GIVING NO INDICATION THAT RECOGNITION IS IMMINENT IN NEXT MONTH OR TWO. HE DID SAY THAT CHICOM LEADERSHIP HAD DISCUSSED WITH THE PRINCESSES NOT ONLY ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS BUT ALSO QUESTION OF TRADE BETWEEN IRAN AND CHINA.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 02646 201147Z

AND HAD EXPRESSED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN CERTAIN PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, PARTICULARLY PETRO-CHEMICALS. HE SAID IRAN IS ALSO MUCH INTERESTED IN TRADE POSSIBILITIES AND IS QUITE PREPARED TO WORK OUT APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH PRC. (HE GAVE NO INDICATION OF WHERE OR WITH WHOM SUCH TRADE DISCUSSIONS MIGHT TAKE PLACE, NOR THAT THEY ARE NECESSARILY IMMINENT.) MY IMPRESSION IS THAT SHAH HAS REACHED DECISION TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA BUT THAT HE HAS NOT REACHED ANY CONCLUSIONS AS TO TIMING. HE DID SAY SPECIFICALLY THAT HE WOULD "NOT PAY ANY UNREASONABLE PRICE" TO PRC FOR RECOGNITION. HE ALSO WENT SLIGHTLY FURTHER WITH ME THAN IN PAST RE HIS "HOPE" THAT GRC WOULD MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH IRAN (PREVIOUSLY HE HAS SIMPLY SAID THIS QUESTION IS UP TO GRC NOT IRAN). I DO NOT, HOWEVER, THINK THAT EITHER OF THESE COMMENTS SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS INDICATING WILLINGNESS ON SHAH'S PART TO ACCEPT WHAT HE WOULD CONSIDER UNREASONABLE CONDITION BY GRC FOR MAINTAINING RELATIONS WITH GRC.

GP-3.
MACARTHUR

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02565 151445Z

46
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

016196

R 151400Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4349
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T TEHRAN 2565

EXDIS

SUBJ: PERSIAN GULF: IRANIAN CONCERN THAT USG REGARDS SAUDI ARABIA AS LEADER

REF: (A) TEHRAN 2473; (B) BEIRUT 3679; (C) JIDDA 1566 AND 1582; (D) STATE 84017

1. IN LIGHT OF (A) CONCERN ACTING FOMIN KHALATBARI EXPRESSED TO DCM ON MAY 11 RE REPORT SECRETARY HAD TOLD FAISAL THAT USG CONSIDERS SAUDI ARABIA DOMINANT POWER IN GULF (REF A), AND (B) FAISAL'S MEETING WITH SAH DURING BRIEF STOP-OVER IN TEHRAN MAY 16 EN ROUTE TO FAR EAST, I TELEPHONED KHALATBARI MORNING MAY 15.

2. I SAID THAT AFTER HIS TALK WITH DCM ON MAY 11, WE HAD EXCHANGED MESSAGES WITH WASHINGTON AND JIDDA (HAVING IN MIND REFS B, C AND D), AND IT WAS NOW QUITE CLEAR NOTHING HAD BEEN SAID DURING SECRETARY'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA THAT SHOULD CAUSE IRAN ANY CONCERN.

3. SECRETARY HAD MADE CLEAR USG CONTINUES TO BELIEVE FIRMLY THAT PEACE AND STABILITY GULF SHOULD, AFTER BRITISH WITHDRAWAL, BE MAINTAINED BY CLOSE COOPERATION OF LITTORAL STATES, PARTICULARLY IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA. I NOTED THIS WAS WHAT SHAH HAS STEADFASTLY PROPOSED OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS. SECRETARY HAD MADE CLEAR TO KING FAISAL THAT WE FELT SAUDI ARABIA, AS LARGEST NATION ON ARAB SIDE OF GULF, COULD PLAY A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE OF LEADERSHIP

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
26

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02565 151445Z

INSOFAR AS THE ARAB SIDE OF THE GULF IS CONCERNED, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO SMALL SHEIKHDOMS ON THE SOUTHERN SIDE OF THE GULF. THIS, FROM WHAT BOTH THE SHAH AND FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI HAD SAID TO ME, SEEMED FULLY IN KEEPING WITH IRANIAN POLICY.

4. FINALLY, I SAID WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IRAN IS ONLY REALLY STRONG, LARGE, STABLE AND PROGRESSIVE STATE IN THE REGION, AND THEREFORE HAD A VERY SPECIAL ROLE OF LEADERSHIP TO PLAY. OBVIOUSLY, WE COULD NOT BELABOR THIS POINT PUBLICLY WITHOUT OFFENDING IRAN'S MODERATE ARAB FRIENDS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE GULF, BUT IT WAS BASIC TO OUR POLICY IN THIS AREA. I SAID I HONESTLY FELT THERE HAD BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING IN TALK BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA FOREIGN MINISTER SAQQAF AND IRANIAN AMBASSADOR FARZANEGAN WHICH HAD LED TO KHALATBARI'S ORIGINAL QUERY OF THE DCM.

5. KHALATBARI THANKED ME WARMLY FOR MY CALL WHICH HE SAID WAS MOST TIMELY IN VIEW OF KING FAISAL'S VISIT HERE. IRAN, OF COURSE, AGREED THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD A ROLE OF LEADERSHIP TO PLAY ON ARAB SIDE OF GULF BUT THERE HAD BEEN CONCERN OVER REPORT THAT USG TOLD KING FAISAL THAT SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD EXERCISE OVER-ALL LEADERSHIP ON ALL GULF MATTERS. THIS HAD NOW BEEN CLARIFIED AND HE WOULD SEE THAT SHAH, AS WELL AS FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI, WERE INFORMED OF THE FACTS BEFORE KING FAISAL'S VISIT TOMORROW.

GP-3.
MACARTHUR

TELEGRAM

SECRET 839

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02542 140954Z

2
ACTION. SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

004911

R 140846Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4336
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USUN NY 392

SECRET TEHRAN 2542

EXDIS.

SUBJ: PRINCESS ASHRAF'S REPORT RE. COMMUNIST CHINA

REF: TEHRAN 2541

DURING TWO RECENT TALKS, ABDOL RESA ANSARI (CHIEF OF PRINCESS ASHRAF'S SECRETARIAT WHO ACCOMPANIED HER TO COMMUNIST CHINA IN APRIL) INDICATED ASHRAF'S REPORT TO SHAH INCLUDED FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS (PLEASE PROTECT ANSARI AS SOURCE OF THIS INFO):

• PRC WOULD WELCOME ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS TOWARD THAT END AT ANY TIME. PRC POSITION, HOWEVER, BASICALLY ONE OF "BEING READY BUT NOT PRESSING." KANSARI INDICATED SUBJECTS OF POSSIBLE TIMING OR VENUE OF DISCUSSIONS, OR POSSIBLE RECOGNITION FORMULAE DID NOT ARISE DURING ASHRAF'S DISCUSSIONS IN PRC).

2. THERE WOULD BE POSITIVE ADVANTAGES TO IRAN IN NEAR FUTURE FROM ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WITH PEKING:

A) LARGE PART OF WORLD HEADING TOWARD RELATIONS WITH PRC
AND IRAN STANDS ONLY TO LOOSE (IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL
PRESTIGE AND STANDING AT UN, AMONG AFRO-ASIANS, ETC.)

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02542 140954Z

IF IRAN DOES NOT MOVE IN SAME DIRECTION.

B) ONCE RELATIONS ESTABLISHED, CHICOM CRITICISM OF IRANIAN SOCIAL & POLITICAL SYSTEM, BOTH IN PUBLIC MEDIA AND IN CLANDESTINE PUBLICATIONS, WOULD BE RESTRAINED AND PERHAPS EVEN TEMPORARILY ELIMINATED. (ANSARI INDICATED THIS POINT WAS RESULT NOT SO MUCH OF TALKS IN PRC BUT OF TALKS WITH PAKIS WHO HELPED ARRANGE ASHRAF TRIP TO COMMUNIST CHINA--INCLUDING, WE ASSUME, BHUTTO).

C) AFTER RELATIONS ESTABLISHED, MOREOVER, IT POSSIBLE TO DESTROY OR MAKE LARGE DENT IN ADMIRATION FOR CHICOMS AND MAOISM WHICH HAS GROWN TO SERIOUS PROPORTIONS AMONG SMALL BUT POWERFUL SUBVERSIVE SEGMENT OF ANTI-SHAH DISSIDENTS IN IRAN. ONCE PERSIANS CAN WITNESS AT FIRST HAND DULLNESS, MOTONOMY, AND PHYSICAL/INTELLECTUAL REGIMENTATION OF LIFE IN COMMUNIST CHINA, AND REALIZE THIS IS PRICE BEING PAID FOR UNIMPRESSIVE LEVEL OF MATERIAL WELFARE AND PROGRESS, OPPORTUNITIES FOR PRO-CHICOM ELEMENTS AMONG IRANIAN DISSIDENTS TO INCREASE THEIR FOLLOWING WILL BE CURTAILED, AND MANY WHO NOW PROFESS ADMIRATION FOR CHINESE WAY WILL LOOK ELSEWHERE FOR INSPIRATION.

D) ON ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH IRAN-PEKING TIES WOULD INCLUDE STRICT MUTUAL PLEDGES TO REFRAIN FROM INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, IRAN WOULD THEN HAVE BASIS TO MAKE PROTESTS TO CHICOMS WHENEVER THAT PLEDGE IS BROKEN BY CHICOM SUPPORT OR ENCOURAGEMENT OF SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS IN IRAN. WHILE THIS LESS TURE WITH REGARD TO CHICOM SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN GULF, EXTENT OF RESOURCES AND TALENT PRC CAN DEVOTE TO SUCH ACTIVITIES IN GULF UNLIKELY TO BE LARGE IN NEAR FUTURE.

3. IRAN-PRC RELATIONS WOULD HAVE TWO OTHER ADVANTAGES FOR IRAN IN LONG-TERM: A) ACCESS TO CHINESE MARKET FOR IRANIAN OIL AND OTHER EXPORTS (ANSARI SAID IT CLEAR ECONOMIC BENEFITS DISTINCTLY THING OF LONG-TERM FUTURE); AND B) ABILITY TO USE PRC FOR IRANIAN DIPLOMATIC ENDS SHOULD SOVIET POSTURE OF FRIENDSHIP TOWARD IRAN UNDERGO SERIOUS CHANGE: /

4. SET AGAINST ABOVE ADVANTAGES IRAN WOULD GAIN FROM

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 02542 140954Z

RELATIONS WITH PRC, DISADVANTAGES APPEAR RELATIVELY SMALL
AND WOULD NO LONGER SEEM TO INCLUDE DISAPPROVAL OR OPPO-
SITION OF U.S.
MACARTHUR

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched atop a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

SECRET 825

19
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

004837

R 140845Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4335
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
INFO RUESGUXAMEMBASSY ANKARA 1697
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USUN NY 391

S E C R E T TEHRAN 2541

EXDIS

SUBJ: CHIREC: IRAN

REF: A) STATE 081678 (B) TAIPEI 2225; (C) TEHRAN 1959
(D) STATE 83042

1. NOT ONLY IS SHAH (AS NOTED REF C) OUT IN FRONT OF FONMIN ZAHEDI ON QUESTION OF IRAN'S ESTABLISHING TIES WITH PRC BUT ALSO WE HAVE IMPRESSION ZAHEDI (AND OTHER TOP PEOPLE IN FONMIN) ARE NOT ENTIRELY CERTAIN OF SHAH'S PRESENT THINKING ON THIS MATTER.

2. THIS, PLUS FACT AMBASSADOR (PRESENTLY CONVALESCING FROM PNEUMONIA) HAS NOT BEEN ABLE DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH SHAH SINCE APRIL 14 (WHICH WAS BEFORE PRINCESS ASHRAF REPORTED TO SHAH ON HER VISIT TO COMMUNIST CHINA) MAKES US RELUCTANT TO HAZARD DEFINITE ASSESSMENT ABOUT PACE AT WHICH SHAH MOVING TOWARD RELATIONS WITH PRC. ANOTHER FACTOR OF UNCERTAINTY IS NATURE OF DISCUSSIONS WHICH PRINCESS FATIMEH (PRESENTLY ON HER RETURN JOURNEY FROM PEKING) MAY HAVE HAD WHILE IN CHINA.

3. AMBASSADOR EXPECTS TO SEE SHAH DURING WEEK BEGINNING MAY 17 AND SHOULD THEN HAVE BETTER FEEL ON THESE QUESTIONS. RECENT TALKS WITH ABDOL REZA ANSARI (WHO ACCOMPANIED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02541 140942Z

PRINCESS ASHRAF TO COMMUNIST CHINA) DO NOT NECESSARILY INDICATE IRAN MOVING TOWARDS ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. ANSARI SAID ASHRAF'S REPORT TO SHAH, THOUGH CLEARLY COMING DOWN ON SIDE OF ESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH PRC BECAUSE OF ADVANTAGES THIS WOULD HAVE FOR IRAN, DID NOT GET INTO QUESTION OF TIMING. HIS OWN PERSONAL VIEW IS ASHRAF VISIT WILL PROBABLY NOT RESULT IN ANY IMMEDIATE MOVE BY GOI TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH PRC (I.E. WITHIN NEXT 2 TO 3 MONTHS), BUT HE DID THINK SUCH MOVE POSSIBLE IN AUTUMN--PERHAPS IN CONNECTION WITH PRC ADMISSION TO UN.

4. ON QUESTION OF FORMULA FOR IRANIAN RECOGNITION OF PRC, HOWEVER WE HAVE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

A) AMBASSADOR PLANS TO DISCUSS CHIREP MATTER INFORMALLY WITH ZAHEDI NEXT WEEK AND CONVEY TO HIM THREE NUMBERED POINTS IN SUMMARY (OPENING PARA) OF REF B.

B) WE BELIEVE THAT WHILE SHAH WILL CONTINUE TO BE WILLING TO MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH GRC AND HAVE GRC MAINTAIN PRESENCE IN IRAN, HE WILL DO SO ONLY IF GRC SO DESIRES AND IS WILLING DO SO ON BASIS OF TERMS WORKS OUT WITH GRC. SHAH WILL NOT, WE ARE CONVINCED, BE WILLING TO URGE OR BEG GRC TO MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH GOI OR A GRC PRESENCE IN IRAN, AS HE HAS ALREADY INDICATED TO AMBASSADOR THIS IS ENTIRELY UP TO GRC.

C) WE HAVE NO IDEA WHAT "FORMULA" SHAH MAY HAVE IN MIND TO DESIGNATE RESPECTIVE STATUS OF PRC AND GRC, BUT IT IS FACT HE HAS ALREADY PUBLICLY REFERRED TO GRC ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION AS "GOVERNMENT OF TAIWAN."

5. RE PARA 2 OF REF D WE AWARE OF NO IRAN-PRC TALKS OR NEGOTIATIONS (OTHER THAN THOSE VIA PRINCESSES ASHRAF AND FATIMEH). WE ARE SENDING SEPARATELY REPORT ON WHAT WE UNDERSTAND TO BE MAIN POINTS IN ASHRAF'S REPORT TO SHAH BUT OUR CURRENT INFO IS THAT REPORT DID NOT TOUCH UPON POSSIBLE RECOGNITION FORMULAE (NOR, AS NOTED PARA 3 ABOVE, ON TIMING OF POSSIBLE IRANIAN MOVE TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH PEKING). WE MAY HAVE FURTHER COMMENTS SUPPLEMENTING THOSE IN PARA 3 ABOVE AFTER AMBASSADOR HAS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 02541 140942Z

TALKED WITH SHAH. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT PATTERN
I LET BY TURKS IN THEIR NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENT WITH
PRC WILL INEVITABLY HAVE SOME EFFECT ON SHAH'S THINKING,
POSSIBLY DETERRING HIM FROM TAKING A LINE SIGNIFICANTLY
DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF TURKS DESPITE GREATER CONSIDERATION
IRANIANS (IN CONTRAST TO TURKS) HAVE SHOWN TO GRC THUS
FAR.
MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched over the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched along the bottom. Two small stars separate the top and bottom text on the left and right sides.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 520

PAGE: 01 TEHRAN 02490 121342Z

46
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

P 121212Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4306

S E C R E T TEHRAN. 2490

EXDIS/NOFORN

SUBJ: POSSIBLE VISIT TO U.S. BY EMPRESS FARAH

1. WE HEAR FROM IMPERIAL COURT SOURCES THAT EMPRESS FARAH IS PLANNING VISIT CANADA FOR ROUGHLY ONE WEEK AT END OF JUNE WHEN SHE WILL, AMONG OTHER THINGS, BE PRESENT DURING WEEK DESIGNATED AS "IRAN WEEK" AT THREE-MONTH LONG IRANIAN EXHIBITION IN MONTREAL PAVILION (BEGINNING JUNE 12) IN HONOR OF IRAN'S 25TH CENTENARY CELEBRATIONS.

2. WE BELIEVE QUESTION MAY SOON ARISE AS TO WHETHER SHE SHOULD ALSO VISIT U.S. AND THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT AS MATTER OF URGENCY WE EXAMINE AT ONCE POSSIBILITY OF ARRANGING FOR EMPRESS (PERHAPS ACCOMPANIED BY CROWN PRINCE) TO VISIT U.S. ON BASIS INFORMAL COMMENTS MADE TO US BY MEMBER OF EMPRESS' STAFF, WE BELIEVE EMPRESS WOULD WELCOME VISIT TO U.S. PROVIDED SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS MADE.

3. POSSIBILITY OF SUCH VISIT WAS FIRST RAISED IN INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN NEA/IRN-MIKLOS AND AMBASSADOR IN LATE 1970 AND EARLY 1971. OUR CURRENT THINKING IS AS FOLLOWS:

A) VISIT TO U.S. BY EMPRESS UNDER PROPER CONDITIONS WOULD HAVE GREAT VALUE TO US-IRANIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS AND WOULD BE A "NAUTRAL" AND NOT A "LABORED" EXERCISE ON OUR PART SINCE SHE WILL IN ANY EVEN VISIT CANADA; VISIT TO U.S. WOULD PROBABLY HELP BALANCE OFF EMPRESS' SOLO TRIP TO USSR LAST DECEMBER (WHICH WOULD BE IN INTERESTS OF BOTH US AND GOI); AND IT WOULD HELP REDUCE IRANIAN DISAPPOINTMENT THAT PRESIDENT WILL BE UNABLE VISIT IRAN AT TIME OF 25TH CENTENARY CELEBRATIONS IN OCTOBER;

71 MAY 12 PM 7:35
- 1727
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02490 121342Z

B) WE HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER A U.S. VISIT SHOULD BE PURELY "PRIVATE" OR "OFFICIAL." WE CAME DOWN STRONGLY FOR AN "OFFICIAL" VISIT IN THAT SHE WOULD RECEIVE AN OFFICIAL INVITATION. WE SAY THIS BECAUSE EMPRESS IS REGENT-DESIGNATE (IN ADDITION TO SHAH'S WIFE), IS PLAYING ROLE OF INCREASING POLITICAL IMPORTANCE WITHIN IRAN, AND IS BEING GROOMED BY SHAH FOR GREATER ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL FIELD. WE FEEL ARRANGEMENTS FOR PURELY "PRIVATE VISIT" TO U.S. WOULD NOT FILL BILL PARTICULARLY HAVING IN MIND HER RECENT OFFICIAL VISIT TO RUSSIA AND FORTHCOMING ONE TO CANADA. ON CONTRARY, THEY COULD RESULT NOT ONLY IN TURN-DOWN BUT ALSO COULD LEAD TO FEELING OF RESENTMENT ON PART SHAH AND EMPRESS WHICH WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO SAY LEAST.

4. IN OUR VIEW, THEREFORE, ABSOLUTE MINIMUM OF "PROPER CIRCUMSTANCES" FOR TRIP TO U.S. BY EMPRESS WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

A) STIMULATING AN INVITATION TO EMPRESS FROM SOME FAIRLY PRESTIGIOUS SPONSOR IN U.S. EITHER JUST BEFORE OR JUST AFTER HER VISIT TO CANADA. RECEIVING HONORARY DEGREE FROM AND/OR DELIVERING COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS TO OUTSTANDING WOMEN'S COLLEGE WOULD HAVE BEEN OUR THOUGHT, BUT WE RECOGNIZE TIMING IN LATE JUNE NOT GOOD FOR THIS TYPE OF EXERCISE. IF APPROPRIATE OCCASION BY WOMEN'S COLLEGE NOT AVAILABLE, WE BELIEVE INVITATION BY ONE OF OUR VERY IMPORTANT FOUNDATIONS (ROCKEFELLER OUR FIRST CHOICE AND BELIEVE DAVID ROCKEFELLER COULD BE HELPFUL) WOULD BE APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF EMPRESS' DEDICATED AND VARIED EFFORTS IN FIELDS OF SOCIAL REFORM AND PROGRESS IN IRAN.

B) ONCE APPROPRIATE INVITATION IN HAND FROM PRIVATE SPONSOR (WHICH SHOULD RELIEVE WASHINGTON OF MUCH OF BURDEN), WE COULD COUPLE IT WITH AN OFFICIAL INVITATION TO MAKE AN "OFFICIAL STOP" IN WASHINGTON FOR MEETING WITH HIGH USG OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT AND MRS. NIXON.

5. IDEALLY INVITATION SHOULD COME FROM PRESIDENT AND MRS. NIXON. WHILE FULLY AWARE OF PROBLEMS OF PROTOCOL AND PRECEDENT THIS MAY RAISE, WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT COMBINATION OF EMPRESS' SPECIAL POSITION IN IRAN, IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL TIES BETWEEN US PRESIDENT AND SHAH, AND FACT THAT MRS. NIXON IS HONORARY PRESIDENT OF IRAN'S 25TH CENTENARY, MAKE SUCH AN INVITATION QUITE PLAUSIBLE WHILE AT SAME TIME AVOIDING ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 02490 121342Z

NEW AND UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENTS.

6. WE WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO ABOVE ASAP IN VIEW OF SHORTNESS OF TIME. IF, AS WE HOPE, IT IS FAVORABLE, WE WILL HAVE A FEW SUGGESTIONS RE WASHINGTON ITINERARY WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD INCLUDE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AND LUNCHEON OR DINNER AT WHITE HOUSE WITH PRESIDENT AND MRS. NIXON. SPECIAL CARE WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN IN PLANNING ITINERARY AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR EMPRESS' VISIT TO AVOID SITUATIONS WHERE SHE LIKELY ENCOUNTER SIZEABLE ANTI-SHAH OR ANTI-GOI DEMONSTRATIONS BY IRANIAN STUDENTS.

GP-3.
MACARTHUR

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 540

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02473 111518Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 111415Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4297
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

S E C R E T TEHRAN 2473

EXDIS

REF: CAIRO 1034

1. ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER KHALATBARI CALLED IN DCM MAY 11 FOR DISCUSSION OF SECRETARY ROGERS' TRIP TO MIDDLE EAST AND TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF REMARKS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY SECRETARY TO MINSTATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAQQAF DURING VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA.

2. RE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST, DCM SAID THAT WE HAD AS YET NOT RECEIVED FULL REPORT ON TRIP. HOWEVER, ONCE SECRETARY HAD SUBMITTED HIS REPORT TO PRESIDENT WE HOPED TO HAVE HIGHLIGHTS. FURTHER, AMBASSADOR SHOULD BE FULLY RECOVERED FROM PNEUMONIA BY END OF WEEK AND HIS RECOVERY SHOULD COINCIDE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI'S RETURN FROM HIS MISSION TO CAIRO. DCM ASSUMED AMBASSADOR AND ZAHEDI WOULD SOON THEREAFTER BE GETTING TOGETHER FOR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. TO THIS END WE WOULD BE ASKING DEPARTMENT FOR REPORT ON SECRETARY'S VISIT SO THAT DISCUSSION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR AND ZAHEDI WOULD BE WORTHWHILE EXCHANGE.

3. KHALATBARI THEN TURNED TO SECRETARY'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND SAID THAT SHORTLY AFTER SECRETARY'S DEPARTURE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR FARZANEGAN HAD CALLED ON SAQQAF AND FOUND HIM IN FAR MORE RIGID AND INFLEXIBLE MOOD ON ISSUE OF TUNBS AND ABU MUSA. ACCORDING TO FARZANEGAN, SAQQAF WAS PUFFED UP BY

71 MAY 11 PM 4:49
02
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
100097

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02473 111518Z

HIS TALK WITH SECRETARY AND ESPECIALLY BY REMARKS ATTRIBUTED BY SAQQAF TO SECRETARY TO EFFECT SAUDI ARABIA HAD KEY ROLE TO PLAY IN GULF AND ONCE BRITISH LEFT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE DOMINANT POWER IN GULF. KHALATBARI SAID FARZANEGAN ATTRIBUTED MORE INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE BY SAUDIS TOWARD ISLAND QUESTION TO SECRETARY'S REPORTED REMARKS. KHALATBARI SAID HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INQUIRE WHETHER USG DID INDEED CONSIDER

SAUDI ARABIA DOMINANT POWER IN GULF.

4. IN REPLY DCM REMINDED KHALATBARI THAT WHILE US WAS NOT A PARTY TO DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE REGARDING BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM GULF, WE HAD ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS AND IN DIFFERENT CAPITALS EXPRESSED OUR CONVICTION THAT THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN INTERESTS OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN GULF. SECONDLY, WE HAD MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT ONCE BRITISH WITHDRAW PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF RESTED WITH LITTORAL POWERS. THIRDLY, WE RECOGNIZED THAT IN THIS EFFORT IRAN AS BY FAR STRONGEST IN POWER PLAYED A CRUCIAL ROLE. FOURTH, CLOSE COLLABORATION BETWEEN ARAB STATES IN GULF, ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN, SEEMED TO US CORNERSTONE TO WHATEVER AGREEMENT OR ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE WORKED OUT AMONG LITTORAL AGREEMENT OR UNDER IRAN'S LEADERSHIP. IN THIS SENSE SAUDI ARABIA HAS IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY, AS IRAN ITSELF RECOGNIZED BUT SHORT ANSWER TO KHALATBARI'S QUESTION WAS NO.

5. DCM WENT ON TO SAY HE WAS NOT PRIVY TO EXACTLY WHAT SECRETARY SAID TO SAQQAF BUT WITHOUT WRONGING LATTER HE SURMISED SAQQAF HAD EXAGGERATED OR DRAWN WRONG CONCLUSIONS FROM EXCHANGE. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, DCM SAID HE ASSUMED THAT SECRETARY HAD ATTEMPTED INSTILL GREATER SENSE OF URGENCY IN SAUDI VIEWS TOWARDS GULF PROBLEMS AND ISSUES SUCH AS FEDERATION AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES WITH SHEIKHDOMS. THIS EXHORTATION MAY HAVE BEEN BLOWN UP OUT OF REASONABLE PROPORTION BY SAQQAF TO IMPRESS IRANIAN AMBASSADOR.

6. COMMENT: THIS EXCHANGE IS ANOTHER INDICATION OF IRANIAN SENSITIVITY TO WHAT THEY CONSIDER THEIR PREDOMINANT POSITION IN THE GULF. WE BELIEVE MATTER HAS BEEN LAID TO REST, BUT WOULD WELCOME DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON ANYTHING FURTHER WE SHOULD SAY, PARTICULARLY SINCE A) AMBASSADOR HOPES SEE BOTH SHAH AND

TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 02473 111518Z

ZAHEDI NEXT WEEK: B) SHAH AND KING FAISAL WILL BE MEETING BRIEFLY IN TEHRAN ON MAY 17 AND ANY APPARENT HARDENING OF SAUDI POSITION ON GULF ISLANDS MIGHT BE ATTRIBUTED BY IRANIANS TO US.

GP-3.
MAKFRTHUR.

DIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

SECRET 309

53
ACTION SS-45

073543

71 MAY 6 PM 7:51
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SIR WILLIAM LUCE VISIT AND GULF ISLANDS

REF: TEHRAN 2139, 2124, 2009, 1937

1. ON BEHALF OF AMBASSADOR, WHO HAS MILD CASE OF PNEUMONIA, DCM CALLED ON SIR WILLIAM LUCE MAY 5 FOR RUNDOWN ON LUCE'S MEETING WITH SHAH. LUCE SPENT TWO HOURS MAY 4 WITH SHAH, WITH UK CHARGE DONALD MURRAY, ZAHEDI AND IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO UK AFSHAR ALSO PRESENT.

2. LUCE SAID HE STARTED DISCUSSION WITH SHAH BY REVIEWING HIS UNDERSTANDING OF ELEMENTS OF COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHICH SHAH HAD DISCUSSED WITH SIR DENIS WRIGHT APRIL 17 (REF PARA 3 TEHRAN 2009). DISCUSSION CONFIRMED SOME OF POINTS IN SHAH'S PROPOSAL, BUT ALSO REVEALED MISUNDERSTANDING IN FOLLOWING TWO AREAS:

A. TIMING OF WITHDRAWAL OF SHEKHDOM POLICE. WRIGHT HAD REPORTED SHAH AS BEING WILLING TO HAVE POLICE REMAIN ON ISLANDS FOR BRIEF PERIOD AFTER FORMATION OF FEDERATION AND THEN WITHDRAW WITHIN WEEK OR TWO. HOWEVER, IN DISCUSSION WITH LUCE SHAH WAS ADAMANT ON FORMULA CALLING FOR IRAN MILITARY PRESENCE ON ISLAND WITH BRITISH ACQUIESCENCE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

31

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02359 01 OF 02 061449Z

FOLLOWED IN TWO OR THREE WEEKS BY WITHDRAWAL OF SHEKHDOM POLICE BEFORE RPT BEFORE ESTABLISHMENT OF FEDERATION. LUCE ARGUED THAT WITHDRAWAL OF SHEKHDOM POLICE BEFORE ESTABLISHMENT OF FEDERATION WOULD BE HARD FOR SHIEKS TO SWALLOW AND THIS CONDITION OFFERED THEM LITTLE INCENTIVE TO ACCEPT COMPROMISE FORMULA, BUT SHAH REFUSED TO BUDGE.

B. LENGTH OF PERIOD DURING WHICH IRAN WAS WILLING TO FUZZ SOVEREIGNTY WHICH WRIGHT HAD DESCRIBED AS TWO TO THREE YEARS. SHAH AGREED THAT WRIGHT HAD BEEN CORRECT IN REPORTING THAT SHA'S FIRST FORMULATION INVOLVED QUOTE TWO OR THREE YEARS UNQUOTE BUT BY END OF MEETING WITH WRIGHT SHAH HAD DECIDED ON MAXIMUM OF TWO YEARS.

3. ON POSITIVE SIDE LUCE WAS ABLE CONFIRM THAT (A) BRITISH COULD COUNT ON IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR FEDERATION IF IRAN COULD PUT ITS TROOPS ON ISLAND BEFORE FEDERATION ESTABLISHED (B) IRAN WAS PREPARED TO OFFER AID TO AND COOPERATION WITH SHEIKHDOM ONCE SHEKHS HAD WITHDRAWN THEIR POLICE. AT THIS POINT ZAHEDI ASSERTED AID WOULD BE TOKEN GESTURE, BUT SHAH CORRECTED HIM TO SAY HE WAS PREPARED TO BE GENEROUS. IN ADDITION, IF SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE WERE LEFT DORMANT BY ALL PARTIES DURING TWO YEAR PERIOD SHAH SAID AT ITS END HE WAS WILLING TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE TO TWO SHEKHDOMS INCLUDING GENEROUS DIVISION OF AVLL REVENUES FROM ANY OIL FIELDS IN AREAS CLAIMED BY SHARJAH. DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT REVEALED SHAH WAS PREPARED TO OFFER SHARJAH UP TO 49 PERCENT DIVISION OF REVENUE. HE WOULD NOT GO FURTHER BECAUSE SOME MIGHT CONSTRUE 50 PERCENT OR MORE AS IRAN'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SHARJAH'S RIGHTS WHICH GOI NOT PREPARED TO CONCEDE. DURING THIS EXCHANGE LUCE REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE BEING IN ABEYANCE FOR TWO YEAR PERIOD BUT SHAH CORRECTED HIM AS ZAHEDI HAD DONE EARLIER WITH AMBASSADOR (REF PARA 3 TEHRAN 2124) TO INSIST IRAN'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER ISLANDS WAS CLEAR. GOI WAS PREPARED MERELY NOT TO DISCUSS IT.

4. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION REGARDING POSSIBILITY OF PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH SHEIKHS AND/OR GOI MIGHT ISSUE SHORTLY AFTER GOI HAD ESTABLISHED MILITARY PRESENCE ON ISLAND. SHAH SAID HE WOULD NOT ACKNOWLEDGE ANY WRITTEN DOCUMENT FROM SHEKHS BUT WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER PUBLIC STATEMENT FROM

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 02359 01 OF 02 061449Z

SHEIKHS WELCOMING IRANIAN PRESENCE ON ISLANDS IN INTERESTS OF SECURITY AND STABILITY OF GULF AND POSSIBLY STATEMENT ALONG SAME LINES BY GOI. NO DECISION WAS REACHED ON THIS POINT BUT LUCE UNDERTOOK TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY WITH SHEKHS.

5. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN AT END OF TWO YEAR PERIOD WHEN IRAN PRESUMABLY WOULD OFFICIALLY ANNEX ISLANDS. SHAH REPEATED THAT AT END OF THIS PERIOD GOI WAS WILLING TO EXPEND ITS AID TO SHEKHS AND WORK OUT SATISFACTORY DIVISION OF WHATEVER OIL REVENUES THERE MIGHT BE OFF SHARJAH'S SHORES. LUCE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT NO PUBLIC STATEMENT OR OFFICIAL ACT BE PLANNED BECAUSE IF PURPOSE OF TWO-YEAR PERIOD WAS TO COOL THINGS OFF ANY FORMAL AND PUBLIC ACT BY GOI WHEN IT ANNEXED ISLANDS WOULD ONLY RE-OPEN AND HEAT UP ISSUE.

6. LUCE ALSO REPORTED SHAH BECAME QUITE EXPANSIVE ON POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN GOI AND FEDERATION AS WELL AS OTHER LITTORAL STATES IF ISLAND ISSUE RESOLVED. SHAH SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO DEFENSE AGREEMENT WITH FEDERATION AND DEVELOP SOME KIND OF RELATIONSHIP SIMILAR TO QUOTE CENTO UNQUOTE FOR STABILITY AND COOPERATION IN GULF. THIS MIGHT EVEN INCLUDE EXCHANGE OF TOKEN IRAN FORCE ON FEDERATION TERRITORY AND SIMILAR FEDERATION FORCE ON IRANIAN SIDE OF GULF.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 249

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02359 02 OF 02 061502Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 060905Z MA 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4241
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

073648

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 MAY 6 PM 7:51

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 TEHRAN 2359

EXDIS:

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

7. LUCE CONCLUDED THAT AFTER MEETING WITH SHAH HE WAS NOT AS ANGUINE AS BEFORE ON SHAH'S COMPROMISE PROPOSAL. HE SAID SHAH'S INSISTENCE ON SHEIKHS WITHDRAWING POLICE SHORTLY AFTER IRANIANS ARRIVED ON ISLAND AND BEFORE ESTABLISHMENT OF FEDERATION WAS SETBACK WHICH WOULD BE VERY HARD TO SELL TO SHEKHS AND THEY MIGHT CONCLUDE THEY WOULD RATHER BE RAPED THAN SEDUCED. ON OTHER HAND, DISCUSSION HAD HELPED TO CLARIFY DEGREE OF ASSISTANCE WHICH IRAN PREPARED TO GIVE SHEKHS DURING AND AFTER TWO-YEAR PERIOD WHICH WAS FAR MORE GENEROUS THAN LUCE HAD EARLIER UNDERSTOOD. HE SAID HE WOULD BE EXPLORING THESE MATYERS WITH SHEIKHS AND WOULD BE RETURNING TO TEHRAN MAY 25 TO REPORT BACK TO SHAH. THIS REPORT WOULD INCLUDE HIS RECOMMENDATIONS ON SCOPE AND SUBSTANCE OF AID WHICH HE SAID SHAH HAD ASKED HIM TO LOOK INTO.

8. LUCE RECALLED THAT AT RECENT MEETINGS IN LONDON AND IN ANKARA WITH SECRETARY ROGERS AND SISCO, US HAD EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESSTO SUPPORT BRITISH EFFORT, AS APPROPRIATE. LUCE WELCOMED OFFER BUT SAID AT THIS DELICATE STAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS T WAS BETTER IF US DID NOT INJECT ITSELF INTO DISCUSSION. DCM REMINDED LUCE THIS WAS ALSO OUR VIEW AND, AS WE HAD ALREADY INFORMED BRITISH, WE DID NOT FEEL WE SHOULD

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

24

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02359 02 OF 02 061502Z

ASSOCIATE OURSELVES WITH SPECIFICS OF BRITISH DEMARCHES. HOWEVER, AS OCCASION PRESENTED ITSELF AMBASSADOR HAD STRESSED TO SHAH, ZAHEDI AND OTHERS IMPORTANCE OF FEDERATION TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN GULF AND HAD TRIED TO SUPPORT BRITISH EFFORTS IN VARIOUS OTHER WAYS SUCH AS PUTTING BBC INCIDENT INTO PERSPECTIVE (REF TEHRAN 2124).

9. DCM ALSO STRESSED TO LUCE OUR STRONG CONVICTION THAT SHAH WOULD NOT BUDGE ON QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OF ISLANDS AND WOULD MOST CERTAINLY TAKE THEM FORCIBLY IF BRITISH DID NOT DEVISE FORMULA TO PERMIT IRAN PRESENCE ON ISLANDS BEFORE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. THIS WOULD LEAVE VERY MESSY SITUATION WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE US & UK INTERESTS AS WELL AS THOSE OF IRAN IN THE GULF. WE RECOGNIZED DIFFICULTIES LUCE FACED IN DEALING WITH LEGACIES OF PAST ARRANGEMENTS IN GULF BUT OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION WAS WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NEXT YEAR AND IN FUTURE. WE FELT STRONGLY THAT THIS WAS UNDOUBTEDLY LAST CHANCE BRITISH WOULD HAVE TO CONTRIVE FORMULA WHICH WOULD GET IRAN ON ISLANDS AT RIGHT TIME AND LESSEN CHANCES OF IRAN-ARAB CONFRONTATION. SHAH'S COMPROMISE FORMULA, IT SEEMED TO US, OPENED DOOR SUFFICIENTLY FOR VERY SERIOUS EFFORT BY BRITISH TO WORK SOMETHING OUT.

10. COMMENT: DESPITE LUCE'S GENERAL PESSIMISM OVER WHAT HE CONSIDERS SHAH'S INFLEXIBILITY ON TIMING ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN IRAN MILITARY PRESENCE ON ISLANDS AND WITHDRAWAL OF SHEKHDOM FORCES WE FEEL DISCUSSION SERVED USEFUL PURPOSE IN CLARIFYING SHAH'S QUOTE GENEROSITY UNQUOTE TOWARDS SHEKHS, ABOUT WHICH LUCE AND OTHERS HAVE EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE THIS IS FIRST TIME SHAH HAS INDICATED EXTENT OF HIS GENEROSITY BOTH IN ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND IN SHARING OF OIL REVENUES, AND THIS IS PROGRESS. WE REMAIN CONCERNED, HOWEVER, OVER WHAT APPEARS TO BE LUCE'S PREOCCUPATION WITH FINE POINTS OF SHAH'S COMPROMISE FORMULA AND HIS FOCUSING ON LEGACIES OF PAST AND DETAILS WHEN IMPORTANT ISSUE IS NOT HOW TO REARRANGE OUTDATED GULF ARRANGEMENTS BUT TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL AVOID OR REDUCE IRAN-ARAB CONFRONTATION AND PROVIDE BETTER CHANCE FOR COOPERATION AMONG LITTORAL STATES FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN GULF. AT THIS LATE DATE LUCE APPEARS TO BE FOCUSING TOO MUCH ON TREES INSTEAD OF FOREST.

GP-3.

MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

28

120/10/2090

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02221 291528Z

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

P R 291400Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4176
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T TEHRAN 2221

EXDIS

ANKARA FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJECT: SEC VISIT: SEATO US/UK BILATERALS - PERSIAN GULF

REF: LONDON 3859 (SECTO 27)

1. WE DISAPPOINTED BY WHAT APPEARS TO BE RATHER COMPLACENT
BRITISH ATTITUDE IN LONDON BILATERALS (REFTEL) TOWARD POSSIBLE
COMPROMISE ON GULF ISLANDS RECENTLY OPENED BY SHAH.

2. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE RESPONSE TO SIR ALEC'S APPROACH (PARA 7 REFTEL) HIT JUST RIGHT NOTE. WE HOPE THAT RESPONSE, SUPPLEMENTED IF POSSIBLE BY FUTHER TALKS WITH UK IN ANKARA, WILL STIMULATE UK TO TAKE LIVELY INTEREST IN AND PROMPT ACTION TOWARD COMPROMISE ALONG LINES OF SHAH'S THINKING. FOR UNLESS THIS HAPPENS, WE FEAR BREAKTHROUGH ON THIS VERY TROUBLESOME PROBLEM WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE AND ISLANDS PROBLEM WILL SIMPLY DRIFT WITH BRITISH EVENTUALLY PULLING OUT AND LEAVING A VERY UNTIDY AND DISORDERLY SITUATION. GP-3.

MACARTHUR

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

APR 29 PM 4:44

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 870

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02139 271036Z

22
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

128041

O R 270923Z APR 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 4135
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

S E I C R E T TEHRAN 2139

EXDIS:

FOR ASST SECY SISCO AND AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: GULF ISLANDS

REF: (A) TEHRAN 2133 (NOTAL)
(B) TEHRAN 2009
(C) TEHRAN 2124

1. BRITISH CHARGE MURRAY (REFTEL A) HAS JUST CONFIRMED SIR WILLIAM LUCE WILL VISIT TEHRAN NEXT MONDAY, MAY 3. PURPOSE OF VISIT IS TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH ALAM AND/OR SHAH BEGUN BY SIR DENIS WRIGHT IN HIS FAREWELL CALL (REFTEL B) LOOKING TO COMPROMISE SOLUTION ON GULF ISLANDS INVOLVING AGREEMENT BY ALL PARTIES (BRITISH, IRAN, SHEIKHDOMS) NOT TO TALK ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY FOR UNDETERMINED PERIOD OF TIME BEFORE AND FOLLOWING BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. I ASKED MURRAY WHETHER LUCE WOULD BYPASS ZAHEDI WHICH I THOUGHT WOULD BE GRAVE ERROR SINCE HE FULLY AWARE OF PROPOSAL SHAH PUT TO AMB WRIGHT. I THEN BRIEFED MURRAY ON MY TALK WITH ZAHEDI YESTERDAY (REFTEL C). MURRAY ASKED ME IF ZAHEDI HAD INDICATED THAT IF IRANIAN PRESENCE WERE ALLOWED ON ISLANDS BEFORE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL, IRAN WOULD SUPPORT FEDERATION, AND I REPLIED IN AFFIRMATIVE INDICATING THAT I HAD SAME IMPRESSION FROM MY LAST TALK WITH SHAH.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

28

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02139 271036Z

2. RE LUCE VISIT MURRAY SAID ZAHEDI WOULD NOT BE ACTUALLY BYPASSED SINCE HE HAD ALREADY INFORMED UNDER SECRETARY ZELLI OF LUCE'S FORTHCOMING VISIT AND ASKED ZELLI TO MAKE APPROPRIATE APPOINTMENTS FOR HIM. THEREFORE, ZAHEDI KNEW LUCE WAS COMING. ON OTHER HAND BRITISH HAD NOT KNOWN WHETHER SHAH WAS HOLDING HIS COMPROMISE PROPOSAL TO AMB WRIGHT VERY CLOSELY SO THERE HAD BEEN NO DECISION ON HOW FAR LUCE SHOULD DISCUSS IT WITH ZAHEDI. BRITISH EMBASSY HAD NOT WISHED TO PROBE AS TO WHETHER ZAHEDI KNEW ABOUT IT FOR FEAR THAT HE MIGHT NOT BE IN PICTURE. HE SAID IT VERY HELPFUL FOR BRITISH TO KNOW THAT ZAHEDI FULLY CONVERSANT WITH SHAH'S PROPOSAL.

3. I SUGGESTED THAT IN TAHEEI-HOMEI BILATERAL IN ANKARA SIR ALEC SHOULD NOT ONLY BE AWARE THAT ZAHEDI KNEW ALL ABOUT SHAH'S PROPOSAL BUT ALSO SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH UNFORTUNATE BBC BROADCAST ASSERTING ARAB SOVEREIGNTY OVER ISLANDS (REFTEL C). IN CONFIDENCE MURRAY (PROTECT) SAID BROADCAST HAD BEEN VERY UNFORTUNATE. ALTHOUGH LUCE HAD CAUTIONED PERSIAN SERVICE OF BBC NOT TO TALK ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY OF ISLANDS, WORE HAD NOT GOT THROUGH TO ARAB SERVICE WHICH UNDERSTANDABLY HAD TAKEN ARAB SIDE OF ARGUMENT. MURRAY WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER SHAH WILL ACTUALLY RECEIVE LUCE BUT IF NOT HE INDICATED LUCE WOULD TALK WITH ALAM. FOLLOWING TEHRAN VISIT LUCE WILL TOUR GULF AND DISCUSS MATTER WITH ISLAND SHEIKHS AND THEN RETURN TO TEHRAN FOR ANOTHER GO-AROUND WITH IRANIANS.

4. I TOLD MURRAY THAT I DEEPLY BELIEVE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY WAS PERHAPS VERY LAST CHANCE TO ACHIEVE REASONABLE SOLUTION RE ISLANDS THAT ALL SIDES COULD LIVE WITH. IF IT WERE LOST AND SITUATION WAS PERMITTED TO DRIFT, WHEN BRITISH WITHDREW IRAN WOULD SEIZE ISLANDS AND VERY DISORDERLY AND DANGEROUS SITUATION COULD ARISE WHICH WOULD MAKE ARAB SIDE OF GULF, WHERE BRITISH HAVE SUCH PARAMOUNT INTERESTS, MUCH MORE VULNERABLE TO SUBVERSION. THIS PARTICULARLY TRUE BECAUSE GREATEST HOPE FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN GULF IS EFFECTIVE COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN MODERATE ARAB STATES AND IRAN, WHICH WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED IF IRANIANS FELT OBLIGED TO SEIZE ISLANDS FORCIBLY.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE: 03 TEHRAN 02139 271036Z

5. IN CONCLUSION I TOLD MURRAY THAT I HAD NOT INFORMED ZAHEDI THAT I KNEW OF COMPROMISE PROPOSAL FROM AMB WRIGHT BECAUSE I FELT THAT IF IRANIANS GET IDEA THAT US AND UK WERE GANGING UP ON THEM, INFLUENCE WITH IRAN THAT WE COULD EXERT HERE LOOKING TO COMPROMISE SOLUTION COULD BE IMPAIRED BECAUSE OF PERVASIVE IRANIAN SUSPICIONS RE BRITISH. FOR THESE REASONS I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD AT THIS JUNCTURE SUPPORT ANY DETAILED BRITISH PROPOSALS BUT THAT WE COULD SUPPORT BRITISH EFFORTS, AS WE HAD BEEN DOING, BY CONTINUING TO STRESS IMPORTANCE TO IRAN'S OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS OF GULF FEDERATION, DANGER TO IRAN'S INTERESTS IF IT WERE OBLIGED TO FORCEFULLY SEIZE ISLANDS AFTER BRITISH DEPARTURE AND DESIRABILITY OF FUZZING SOVEREIGNTY AT LEAST FOR SOME TIME. MURRAY INDICATED ASSENT. I ALSO SUGGESTED HE KEEP ME FULLY IN PICTURE ON LUCE VISIT SO THAT IF THERE WERE THINGS I COULD USEFULLY SAY TO ZAHEDI, ALAM AND SHAH WHICH WOULD HELP BRING ABOUT COMPROMISE SOLUTION, I WOULD BE IN POSITION TO DO SO. GP-3.

MACARTHUR:

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 269

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02124 261647Z

47
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

P R 261520Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4126
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

S E C R E T TEHRAN 2124

EXDIS - NOFORN

LONDON FOR ASST SECY SISCO AND EMBASSY

SUBJECT: ZAHEDI'S VIEWS ON COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO GULF
ISLANDS PROBLEM

REF: (A) TEHRAN 2009
(B) TEHRAN 2091
(C) TEHRAN 1937

1. DURING MEETING WITH FDNMIN ZAHEDI APRIL 26 I ASKED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS RE GULF ISLANDS. ZAHEDI REPLIED WITH CONSIDERABLE FEELING THAT WHEREAS IRAN HAD PROPOSED TO INVOLVING "NOT TALKING ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY AT PRESENT," BRITISH COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO GULF ISLANDS, BRITISH HAD DELIBERATELY TRIED TO TORPEDO POSSIBILITY OF COMPROMISE SOLUTION IN BBC BROADCAST TWO DAYS AGO BY WHICH MAINTAINED THAT SINCE IN 1820 BRITAIN "RECOGNIZED" ISLANDS AS BELONGING TO TWO TRUCIAL COAST AMIRATES, ISLANDS OBVIOUSLY DID NOT BELONG TO IRAN. (TEHRAN PRESS RESPONDED BITTERLY TO BBC BROADCAST UNDER HEADINGS SUCH AS "TWISTED LOGIC," CASTIGATING BRITISH FOR BELIEVING THEY HAD UNDISPUTED INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY TO DISTRIBUTE FOREIGN RIGHTS OF LAND SEIZED BY BRITISH IMPERIALISM WITHOUT REGARD TO INTERNATIONAL LAW.)

121052
71 APR 26 PM 7:48
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02124 261647Z

2. IN RESPONSE MY QUERY RE SUBSTANCE OF IRAN'S "COMPROMISE SOLUTION," ZAHEDI REPLIED IN GENERAL TERMS DESCRIBING IRAN PROPOSAL AS FOLLOWS AND IN TERMS SIMILAR TO THOSE SHAH DISCUSSED WITH FORMER UK AMB WRIGHT APRIL 17 (REFTEL A):

(A) BRITISH ACCEPT IRANIAN MILITARY PRESENCE ON ISLANDS WITH IRAN, SHEIKHS AND BRITISH REMAINING SILENT ON QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY;

(B) AFTER BRIEF PERIOD SHEIKHS WITHDRAW THEIR POLICE:

(C) IRAN MAKES TOKEN GESTURE OF AID AND COOPERATION TO SHEIKHDOMS:

(D) BRITISH WITHDRAW FROM ISLANDS:

(E) SHEIKHDOMS AND IRAN CONTINUE REMAIN SILENT ON SOVEREIGNTY WITH IRAN MAKING GENEROUS ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO SHEIKHDOMS AND ALSO BEING GENEROUS RE OIL.

3. I COMMENTED THAT IRANIAN WILLINGNESS TO PUT SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION ASIDE WAS IN MY PERSONAL JUDGMENT ACT OF STATESMANSHIP AND I THOUGHT COMPROMISE SOLUTION SERVED IRAN'S OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS INFINITELY MORE THAN BRUSQUE SEIZURE OF ISLANDS. ZAHEDI HASTILY CORRECTED MY REMARK ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY SAYING IRAN WAS NOT "SETTING ASIDE" SOVEREIGNTY INDEFINITELY BUT WOULD AGREE NOT TO RAISE IT OR TALK ABOUT IT FOR PERIOD OF TIME IF SHEIKHDOMS REMAINED SILENT. IF THEY OR BRITISH TOOK POSITION THAT SOVEREIGNTY OF ISLANDS BELONGED TO SHEIKHDOMS, IRAN WOULD REBUT THIS AND PUBLICLY MAINTAIN ITS CLAIM OF UNDISPUTED SOVEREIGNTY.

4. I THEN SAID TO ZAHEDI THAT WHILE I KNEW HE WAS DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF BRITISH, I PERSONALLY DID NOT THINK THAT HMG HAD DELIBERATELY PUT BBC UP TO BROADCASTS WHICH CATEGORICALLY ASSERTED VALIDITY OF SHEIKHDOMS' CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY BECAUSE FORMER AMB WRIGHT HAD OFTEN STRESSED TO ME NEED TO KEEP WHOLE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OUT OF PUBLIC DOMAIN. ZAHEDI REPLIED SKEPTICALLY SAYING IT WAS CHARACTERISTIC OF BRITISH TO WORK BOTH SIDES OF THE STREET. HE SAID IF BRITISH REJECT COMPROMISE SOLUTION PROPOSED BY SHAH, IRAN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 02124 261647Z

WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO SEIZE ISLANDS AS BRITISH WERE FULLY AWARE AND AT SAME TIME USE EVERY CAPABILITY AT ITS DISPOSAL TO OPPOSE GULF FEDERATION UNTIL IRANIAN PRESENCE ESTABLISHED ON ISLANDS.

5. I SAID TO ZAHEDI THAT WE FELT STRONGLY GULF FEDERATION WOULD SERVE LONG-TERM BASIC INTERESTS OF IRAN AND THEN WENT OVER IN DETAIL WITH HIM ARGUMENTS IN PARA 2 REFTEL B AND PARA 2 REFTEL C. ZAHEDI SAID HE AGREED THAT FEDERATION WOULD BE USEFUL AND COULD ADD STABILITY TO ARAB SIDE OF GULF BUT FIRST THINGS MUST COME FIRST AND INsofar AS IRAN

IS CONCERNED, GULF ISLANDS ARE DEFINITELY FIRST. IRAN WILL SUPPORT FEDERATION BEFORE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL AS SOON AS IRAN HAS MILITARY PRESENCE ON ISLANDS. UNTIL THEN, IT WILL ADAMANTLY OPPOSED IT. I PRESSED HARD ARGUMENT THAT IF IRAN FEELS OBLIGED TO SEIZE ISLANDS, INEVITABLY RADICAL ARABS WILL EXPLOIT SITUATION AND ALMOST CERTAINLY TAKE IT TO UN, IN WHICH CASE I BELIEVED SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT WOULD BE OBLIGED TO TAKE PRO-ARAB POSITION RE ISLANDS. ZAHEDI'S INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT THIS WAS SIMPLY BRITISH ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, WHEN I SAID IT WAS OUR OWN ASSESSMENT AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH BRITISH VIEWS AND THEN WENT ON TO EXPLAIN WHY IT WAS IN INTEREST OF MOSCOW AND RADICAL ARABS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT FULL COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND MODERATE ARAB GULF STATES SINCE SUCH COOPERATION WOULD MAKE RADICAL ARAB TAKE-OVER MORE DIFFICULT, HE ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING IN THIS.

6. ZAHEDI CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE WANTED TO DISCUSS THIS ENTIRE MATTER WITH SECRETARY AND ASST SECY SISCO IN ANKARA. IRAN'S POSITION WAS VERY CLEAR: IT HAD OFFERED COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHICH BRITISH APPARENTLY WANTED TO TORPEDO AS BBC BROADCAST CLEARLY SHOWED. PRINCIPAL PROBLEM WAS THAT BRITISH DID NOT HAVE COURAGE AND RESOLUTION TO TAKE STEPS TO REGULATE ISLANDS PROBLEM BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE AND HAD QUITE OPENLY AND BLATANTLY TOLD IRAN THAT IF IT WANTED TO SEIZE ISLANDS AFTER THEIR DEPARTURE, IT COULD DO SO. IN EFFECT BRITISH WERE ONCE AGAIN GETTING OUT OF AN AREA QUITE PREPARED TO LEAVE IT IN CHAOS AS THEY HAD NIGERIA, CYPRUS, ADEN, ETC. I REPLIED THAT WHILE WE WERE NOT DIRECT PARTY TO ISLANDS PROBLEM, WE HAD

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

28

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEHRAN 02124 261647Z

DEEP INTEREST IN PEACE AND STABILITY IN GULF AND HOPED VERY MUCH THAT IRAN WOULD PURSUE IDEA OF COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD MAKE UNNECESSARY SEIZURE OF ISLANDS. ZAHEDI REPLIED IRAN WAS PREPARED TO DO SO AND BRITISH KNEW THIS BUT REAL ANSWER LAY NOT WITH IRAN BUT WITH HMG.

7. COMMENT: TO SAY THAT BBC BROADCAST IS UNFORTUNATE COMING AT THIS TIME IS UNDERSTATEMENT OF THE YEAR. IT HAS AROUSED EVERY SUSPICION HERE, IN PALACE AS WELL AS FOREIGN MINISTRY, AND ZAHEDI PLANS TO RAISE THIS WITH ALEC HOME IN UK-IRAN BILATERAL. FROM HERE IT APPEARS PROBABLE THAT UNLESS BRITISH RAPIDLY PICK UP BALL WHICH SHAH HAS OFFERED THEM IN FORM OF HIS COMPROMISE PROPOSAL (REF A) AND PUT REAL HEAT AND PRESSURES ON SHEIKHS TO GO ALONG, OPPORTUNITY OF A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD AVOID IRAN SEIZING ISLANDS MAY SOON BE LOST, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF RENEWED SUSPICIONS HERE RESULTING FROM BBC BROADCAST. IN OTHER WORDS, BALL IS IN BRITISH COURT AND IF THEY ARE NOT RESPONSIVE TO WHAT SHAH AND GOI BELIEVE IS DEFINITE CONCESSION IN FORM OF SHAH'S COMPROMISE PROPOSAL, ISLANDS PROBLEM RISKS MOVING ON TO AN UNWANTED AND DANGEROUS CONCLUSION WITH ALL FINALITY AND INEVITABILITY OF A GREEK TRAGEDY. OUR FEELING HERE IS THAT BRITISH ARE AS YET UNWILLING TO SHARE ANY RESPONSIBILITY OR TAKE ANY OF HEAT IN FINDING COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO GULF ISLANDS PROBLEM. IF THIS CONTINUES TO BE THEIR POSITION, THEY WILL LEAVE A MESS WHEN THEY DEPART AND IN LONG RUN (AND WE BELIEVE MUCH SOONER THAN THEY THINK) THEY WILL BE BIGGEST SINGLE LOSER.

8. FINALLY A WORD ABOUT IRANIAN AMB AFSHAR IN LONDON. ALTHOUGH HE DEALT WITH MUCH OF BAHRAIN PROBLEM, DENIS WRIGHT DID NOT TRUST HIM BECAUSE IN FINAL NEGOTIATIONS IN SWITZERLAND RE BAHRAIN WHEN WRIGHT AND SHAH AGREED ON AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF MATTER, AFSHAR, ON HIS OWN AND IN NAME OF SHAH, TRIED TO UNDO THIS AGREEMENT. RESULT WAS WRIGHT WENT BACK TO SHAH WITH AFSHAR AND LATTER ATE CROW. IN OTHER WORDS, HE IS TRICKY. IN THIS RESPECT, ZAHEDI, WHILE HAVING NONE OF THE FUAVITY AND FINESSE OF LONDON AFSHAR, IS DEFINITELY MORE STRAIGHT-FORWARD AND OPEN IN HIS DEALINGS. SINCE HE SUPPORTS SHAH'S COMPROMISE PROPOSAL, LONDON COULD DO FAR WORSE THAN TO DEAL WITH HIM AS WELL AS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET



TELEGRAM

PAGE 05 TEHRAN 02124 261647Z

9. ABOVE REINFORCES OUR VIEW THAT UNTIL WE KNOW WHAT BRITISH ARE REALLY UP TO, IT WOULD BE SERIOUS TACTICAL ERROR FOR US TO ASSOCIATE OURSELVES WITH ANY DETAILED SOLUTION THEY MAKE IN RESPONSE TO SHAH'S COMPROMISE PROPOSAL.

GROUP 3.

MACARTHUR.

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 234

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02125 261608Z

47
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

P R 261540Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 4127

SECRET TEHRAN 2125

EXDIS

LONDON FOR ASST SECY SISCO

SUBJECT: SECRETARY-ZAHEDI BILATERAL (INDIAN OCEAN)

1. FONMIN ZAHEDI TELLS ME HE WANTS TO TALK TO SECRETARY AND ALEC HOME BILATERALLY AS WELL AS WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF CONFIDENTIAL CENTO DISCUSSIONS RE INCREASED SOVIET ACTIVITY AND BUILD UP IN INDIAN OCEAN. HE HAS HAD IRANIAN EXPERTS GIVE HIM ANALYSIS OF INCREASED SOVIET ACTIVITY AND THREAT IN INDIAN OCEAN AREA AND I BELIEVE WANTS TO KNOW WHETHER WE AND BRITISH SHARE IT OR HAVE DIFFERENT IDEAS.

2. I THINK HE MAY WANT TO TRY OUT ON YOU AND BRITISH THOUGHT THAT COOPERATION OF CEYLON AND SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO US AND UK IN COUNTERING MAJOR SOVIET NAVAL THREAT IN INDIAN OCEAN AREA, AS WOULD A PORT IN SOUTH ASIAN LAND MASS WHICH COULD BE

AVAILABLE TO US-UK "CENTO" NAVAL UNITS. PORT HE HAS IN MIND IS CHAR BAHAR IN IRAN NEAR PAKISTAN BORDER. THIS PORT REPORTEDLY HAS FINE HARBOR BUT NO RPT NO INFRA-STRUCTURE OF ANY KIND WHATSOEVER AND ZAHEDI RECOGNIZES IT WOULD TAKE SOME YEARS TO DEVELOP NECESSARY INFRASTRUCTURE. ZAHEDI IS OBVIOUSLY THINKING OF LONGER-TERM SOVIET THREAT TO INDIAN OCEAN, NOT EXCLUDING POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILITIES WITH SOVIETS, IN WHICH CASE IRAN WOULD HAVE TO DEPEND ON

120786

WHILE
SITUATION

71 APR 26 PM 7:40

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02. TEHRAN 02125 261608Z

UK AND US AND POSSIBLY OTHER FRIENDLY NAVIES TO POLICE
INDIAN OCEAN AND KEEP APPROACHES TO PERSIAN GULF OPEN.
FROM WHAT HE SAID, I HAD IMPRESSION THAT HE HAS NO FIRM
OR FIXED PROPOSALS BUT RATHER WANTS TO OPEN UP THIS QUESTION
TO OBTAIN OUR THINKING. NOR DO I VOW HOW FAR HE HAS GONE
INTO THIS WITH SHAH ALTHOUGH I AM SURE HE HAS DISCUSSED IT
WITH HIM IN GENERAL TERMS. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

27

0602/01075

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 602

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02133 270632Z

22
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

O R 270610Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 4131

S E C R E T TEHRAN 2133

EXDIS

LONDON FOR ASST SECY SISCO AND EMBASSY

SUBJ: GULF ISLANDS

REF: (A) TEHRAN 2124
(B) TEHRAN 2009

1. I SAW BRITISH CHARGE MURRAY FLEETINGLY LAST NIGHT AT NIOC RECEPTION FOR OIL CONSORTIUM REPS. HE TOLD ME THAT SIR WILLIAM LUCE WILL BE COMING HERE IN VERY NEAR FUTURE TO PICK UP SHAH'S "COMPROMISE PROPOSAL" ON GULF ISLANDS MADE TO FORMER AMB DENIS WRIGHT (REFTEL B). FROM WHAT MURRAY SAID I GATHERED BRITISH IDEA MIGHT BE FOR LUCE TO BYPASS FONMIN ZAHEDI TO EXTENT POSSIBLE AND ACCORDINGLY I INFORMED MURRAY OF MY TALK WITH ZAHEDI YESTERDAY WHICH INDICATED NOT ONLY THAT ZAHEDI WAS FULLY INFORMED OF SHAH'S SO-CALLED PROPOSAL TO DENIS WRIGHT BUT ALSO WAS SUPPORTING IT AND HAD IN EFFECT MADE IT HIS OWN.

2. BECAUSE OF PEOPLE AROUND US IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO HAVE FULL DISCUSSION SO MURRAY IS COMING TO SEE ME LATER THIS MORNING (APRIL 27). HOWEVER, I DID TELL MURRAY THAT SINCE ZAHEDI SEEMED TO BE "ON BOARD" RE SHAH'S COMPROMISE PROPOSAL, I THOUGHT HE MIGHT BE ALIENATED IF BRITISH DELIBERATELY BYPASSED HIM. IT OCCURS TO US LUCE VISIT MAY BE DELIBERATELY TIMED TO OCCUR WHEN ZAHEDI IS ABSENT AT CENTO MEETING ANKARA. IF SO, WE THINK ALEC HOME SHOULD FILL HIM IN THERE AS OTHERWISE WHEN

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

126592

APR 27 AM 8:29

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02133 270632Z

ZAHEDI RETURNS, HIS FEELINGS ABOUT BRITISH DOUBLE-DEALINGS
AMY WELL BE ACCENTUATED, PARTICULARLY HAVING IN MIND
ZAHEDI'S REACTION TO BBC BROADCAST (REFTEL A) ABOUT WHICH
I INFORMED MURRAY.

GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

920/10/0090

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 964

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02101 261136Z

20/20
ACTION SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 /046 W

P 260930Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4114
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

SECRET TEHRAN 2101

EXDIS:

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT AND MRN)

LONDON PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJ: GULF ISLANDS (UK-IRAN NEGOTIATIONS)

REF: (A) TEHRAN 2009
(B) STATE 70710

IN VIEW OF (A) FORMER UK AMB DENIS WRIGHT'S RECOMMENDATION TO HMG THAT ZAHEDI BE BYPASSED IN BRITISH-IRAN TALKS ON ISLANDS (REFTEL A) AND (B) FACT THAT NEW BRITISH AMB NOT DUE ARRIVE HERE TILL LATE JUNE, WE ALSO HAVE SPECULATED THAT IRANIAN AMB AFSHAR IN LONDON MIGHT BE USED BY SHAH IN DEALING WITH BRITISH RE ISLANDS. WE HAVE HAD NO RPT NO INKLING HERE FROM EITHER BRITISH EMBASSY OR IRANIANS THAT AFSHAR WILL BE USED, BUT BELIEVE IT QUITE POSSIBLE. THEREFORE SUGGEST SECRETARY AND ASST SECY SISCO MIGHT PROBE THIS POSSIBILITY IN THEIR TALKS WITH SIR ALEC HOME ET AL.

GP-3.
MACARTHUR

71 APR 26 AM 11:43
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

03

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

32

The seal of the United States Department of State is located in the top right corner. It features an eagle with a shield on its chest, holding an olive branch and arrows. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched over the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched along the bottom. Two small stars separate the top and bottom text on the sides.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 02069 221349Z

45
ACTION SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 /046 W

091169

R 221235Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4101
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL HONGKONG
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USUN NEW YORK 387

S. E. C. R. E. T. TEHRAN 2069

EXDIS- NOFORN

SUBJ: IRAN-CHICOM RELATIONS

REF: (A) TEHRAN: 1959
(B) TEHRAN: 1888

1. FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS SINCE REFTEL WEEK AGO LEAD US TO BELIEVE THAT CHANCES OF IRANIAN RECOGNITION OF CHICOMS IN NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS ARE PRESENTLY BETTER THAN EVEN:

A) IN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH JAPANESE MAINICHI
CORRESPONDENT (ASSUME TOKYO HAS TEXT) SHAH PUBLICLY MADE
MANY OF POINTS HE MADE TO ME PRIVATELY (REFTEL A) RE
CHICOM RECOGNITION AND IS THUS PUBLICLY SLANTED TOWARD
RECOGNITION, PARTICULARLY IF PRINCESS ASHRAF RECOMMENDS IT;

B) GENERAL EXPECTATION IN KNOWLEDGEABLE POLITICAL CIRCLES IN TEHRAN THAT ASHRAFI WILL GO ALL OUT RECOMMENDING RECOGNITION.

2. HOWEVER, SHAH'S POSITION REMAINS THAT: "TAIWAN GOV'T

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02069 221349Z

OF NATIONALIST CHINA AND ITS PEOPLE" HAVE RIGHT TO LIVE AND DECIDE THEIR OWN FATE FREELY AND THAT IRAN WISHES TO CONTINUE TO HAVE RELATIONS WITH IT; HOWEVER, THIS UP TO GRC AND WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE IF LATTER SEVERES RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES RECOGNIZING CHICOMS.

3. IF, AS IN CASE OF KUWAIT, GRC SHOULD WITHDRAW ITS DIPLOMATIC MISSION FOR TEHRAN IF IRAN RECOGNIZES CHICOMS, IT WILL SIMPLY SERVE FURTHER TO ISOLATE AND REDUCE GRC CONTACTS AND INFLUENCE IN FREE WORLD AND PARTICULARLY IN A COUNTRY (IRAN) WHERE THERE IS BASIC SYMPATHY AND RESPECT FOR GRC ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS OVER PAST FIFTEEN YEARS. HOWEVER, SUCH SYMPATHY WILL NOT RPT NOT IN OUR JUDGMENT OUTWEIGH FACTORS FAVORING CHICOM RECOGNITION IN SHAH'S MIND WHICH ARE OF MUCH BROADER STRATEGIC IMPORT TO IRAN IN TERMS OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS RE ASIA AND SOVIET UNION THAN ARE ANY FACTORS RELATING TO NATIONALIST CHINA'S RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THIS VITAL AREA.

4. WE ASSUME THAT, IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING, WE ARE GIVING CONSIDERATION AS TO HOW, IF IRAN RECOGNIZES CHICOMS, GRC MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO MAINTAIN ITS DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN TEHRAN. (JAPANESE AMB MAEDA HAD LONG PRIVATE TALK WITH ME INDICATING (A) HE SHARES ESTIMATE THAT CHANCES FAVOR IRANIAN RECOGNITION OF CHICOMS AND (B) DEEP CONCERN GRC MAY FURTHER ISOLATE AND WEAKEN ITSELF BY VOLUNTARY WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAN IN SUCH EVENT.)

5. PROBLEM IS HOW TO PERSUADE GRC TO REMAIN HERE IF SUCH RECOGNITION OCCURS. IF CHIANG KAI-SHEK COULD BE PERSUADED TO DO SO, INTERESTING SITUATION COULD DEVELOP HERE BECAUSE CHICOMS WOULD BE FACED WITH ALTERNATIVE:

(A) OF SENDING DIPLOMATIC MISSION AND THUS IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZING TWO CHINA FORMULA WHICH THUS FAR PEKING HAS ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO DO; OR

(B) PUTTING GREAT PRESSURE ON IRAN TO EXPEL GRC EMBASSY HERE WHICH, IF RESISTED BY SHAH, MIGHT CAUSE PEKING TO REFUSE TO ACCREDIT DIPLOMATIC MISSION HERE, WHILE SHAH AND FOMIN ZAHEDI (REFTELS) HAVE BOTH SAID THEY WOULD NOT EXPEL CHINA EMBASSY HERE. WE DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE (DESPITE



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 02069 221349Z

ZAHEDI INFORMAL SUGGESTION THAT WE AND GOI URGE CHIANG KAI-SHEK NOT TO ABANDON FIELD PER REFTEL B) THAT SHAH WILL ACTIVELY URGE GRC TO KEEP ITS DIPLOMATIC MISSION HERE. WE UNDERSTAND SHAH'S POSITION IS THAT THIS IS UP TO GRC.

6. IN DISCUSSING THIS PROBLEM, AMB MAEDA EXPRESSED VIEW THAT WHILE THERE ARE ELEMENTS WITHIN GRC AND TAIWAN FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT FAVOR MORE FLEXIBLE POLICY AND PREFER NOT TO ABANDON FIELD WHERE CHICOMS ARE RECOGNIZED, FINAL DECISION CONTINUED TO REST WITH CHIANG KAI-SHEK WHO REMAINS RIGIDLY ON HIS TRADITIONAL POSITION THAT IF A COUNTRY WITH WHICH GRC HAS RELATIONS RECOGNIZES CHICOMS, GRC HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO WITHDRAW ITS EMBASSY. MAEDA SAID IT OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO JAPAN TO HAVE A FREE INDEPENDENT GOVT ON TAIWAN (HE PERSONALLY FEELS ULTIMATE SOLUTION IS REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN RATHER THAN GRC ON TAIWAN BUT THIS NOT POSSIBLE IF CHIANG KAI-SHEK IN CONTROL). BASIC QUESTION TODAY IS THEREFORE WHAT COMBINATION OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCES OR FORCES CAN BE MOBILIZED TO TRY TO PERSUADE CHIANG-KAI-SHEK NOT TO WITHDRAW HIS DIPLOMATIC MISSION FROM FRIENDLY ENVIRONMENT OF IRAN SHOULD IRAN RECOGNIZE CHICOMS.

GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

PAGE: 01 TEHRAN: 02037 201801Z

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
923

71 APR 20 PM 4:02

S E C R E T TEHRAN 2037

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: GULF ISLANDS

REF: JIDDA 1239

UNLESS SHAH MAKES TOTAL ABOUT FACE (WHICH WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE), SUGGESTION IN PARA 2 REFTEL FOR A LONG-TERM IRANIAN LEASE OF ISLANDS IS NOT IN THE BALL PARK. SHAH'S POSITION IS SIMPLY THAT IF HE SIGNS A LEASE HE WILL RECOGNIZE PUBLICLY AND INTERNATIONALLY SHEIKHDOMS' CLAIM TO FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER ISLANDS AND IF SHEIKHS ARE SUBSEQUENTLY OVERTHROWN AND RADICAL REGIMES INSTALLED WHICH TERMINATE LEASES AND ASK HIM TO WITHDRAW, HE WILL EITHER BE OBLIGED TO DO SO OR BE PREPARED TO USE FORCE TO REMAIN ON ISLANDS OVER WHICH HE DOES NOT HAVE SOVEREIGNTY.

GP-3.

MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 80 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

with
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 840

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 01987 171418Z

46

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 7046 W

R 171353Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4055
INFO AMCONSUL DACCA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANILA

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 1987

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PAK DIPLOMAT'S PROPOSAL FOR CONCILIATION IN EAST
PAK POLITICAL CRISIS

REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 3517; (B) STATE 064556

WE FULLY CONCUR WITH ISLAMABAD VIEW (RETEL A) THAT IT BEST
FOR US NOT TO TRY TO INVOLVE SHAH AS SUGGESTED BY PANI.
AT SAME TIME, HOPE DEPARTMENT AND ISLAMABAD WILL CONTINUE TO
KEEP US INFORMED AS TO THEIR THINKING RE EAST PAKISTAN SO THAT
IF SHAH OR FONMIN ZAHEDI DISCUSSES THIS MATTER WITH US FURTHER,
WE WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE APPROPRIATE NOISES. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
447

71 APR 19 AM 8:37

C2

SECRET 141

2. I SAID I THOUGHT GULF FEDERATION WOULD SERVE IRAN'S OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THAT IT WOULD STRENGTHEN ABILITY OF ARAB SIDE OF GULF TO WITHSTAND SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS THAT WOULD SURELY BE MADE FOLLOWING BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. AND IF ARAB SIDE OF GULF FALLS TO SUBVERSIVES IRAN'S SECURITY AND INTERESTS WOULD BE VERY ADVERSELY AFFECTED. FURTHERMORE, WITHOUT A FEDERATION, I DID NOT SEE HOW TRUCIAL-OMAN SCOUTS COULD BE MAINTAINED AS EFFECTIVE COHESIVE FORCE TO BE USED IF SUBVERSIVE COUPS WERE ATTEMPTED AGAINST SHEIKHDOMS. IF THERE WERE NO FEDERATION AND TRUCIAL-OMAN SCOUTS WERE DIVIDED UP INTO SMALL PACKETS ALLOCATED TO DIFFERENT SHIEKHDOMS, THEY WOULD OBVIOUSLY

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 APR 15 PM 12:08

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 01937 151126Z

BE INEFFECTIVE. ALSO A FEDERATION WOULD PROVIDE NECESSARY FRAMEWORK IN WHICH COUNTERSUBVERSION ACTIVITIES CARRIED ON BY DIFFERENT SHEIKHDOMS COULD BE COORDINATED. FINALLY, IF INSTEAD OF FEDERATION, THERE WERE SERIES OF INDEPENDENT AND UNRELATED SHEIKHDOMS, THEY WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE MUCH MORE VULNERABLE TO SUBVERSION AND MUCH EASIER TO PICK OFF ONE BY ONE.

3. SHAH REPLIED HE AGREED THAT A FEDERATION COULD SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE AND WOULD SUPPORT IT IF, BUT ONLY IF, ISLANDS PROBLEM IS FIRST SETTLED. FOR IF FEDERATION COMES INTO BEING BEFORE THERE IS IRANIAN PRESENCE ON ISLANDS, IT MAY BE URGED OR PERSUADED TO TAKE UNIFIED POSITION AGAINST IRAN, WHEREAS IN ABSENCE OF FEDERATION, IRAN IS CONVINCED THAT NOT ONLY SAUDIS BUT SOME OF SHEIKHDOMS WILL ACCEPT IRAN'S PRESENCE ON ISLANDS AND CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED ISLANDS PROBLEM WITH UAR FONMIN RIAD WHO "ACCPETS IRANIAN POSITION."

4. I BRIEFED BRITISH AMB DENIS WRIGHT ON ABOVE (REFTEL B) AND TOLD HIM THAT SHAH SEEMED ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO FEDERATION UNLESS ISLANDS PROBLEM FIRST SETTLED. THEREFORE, MY APPREHENSION CONTINUES TO BE THAT UNLESS BRITISH CONTRIVE MEANS TO PERMIT IRANIAN PRESENCE ON ISLANDS BEFORE WITHDRAWAL, THEY WILL HAVE WORST OF ALL WORLDS AND COULD LEAVE VERY UNTIDY SITUATION IN GULF WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE THEIR OWN AND OTHER VITAL FREE WORLD INTERESTS THERE. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. RUECHKERT SXS.O.

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

SECRET 434

52
ACTION: SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 1046 W

R 131311Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO /SECSTATE WASHDC 3998
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T TEHRAN 1887

EXDIS: - NOFORN

SUBJECT: GULF ISLANDS

REF: STATE 53480

1. IN APRIL 12 MEETING WITH FONMIN ZAHEDI I ASKED HIM IF THERE ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS RE GULF ISLANDS. HE REPLIED NOTHING REALLY NEW SINCE I LEFT FOR US ON CONSULTATION. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD NORTHCUTT ELY HAD MADE PROPOSAL ON BEHALF OF SHEKH OF SHARJA (REFTEL). HE REPLIED ELY PROPOSAL WAS TOTAL NON-STARTER; THAT GOI DID NOT TRUST HIM AND CONSIDERED HIM TO BE TRICKY INDIVIDUAL SEEKING TO PROMOTE HIS OWN INTERESTS. HE ADDED, "WHY SHOULD IRAN HAVE TO HAVE THE PERMISSION OF SHARJA OR ANYONE ELSE TO SEND ITS FORCES TO THE ISLANDS WHICH ARE IRANIAN TERRITORY ANY MORE THAN IT NEEDS PERMISSION TO SEND ITS FORCES TO QASVIN OR BANDAR ABBAST?" HE WENT ON TO SAY SHAH IS ABSOLUTELY AND UNALTERABLY DETERMINED TO ESTABLISH PRESENCE ON ISLANDS AND ASSERT ITS SOVEREIGNTY AFTER BRITISH WITHDRAWAL UNLESS BRITISH WILL DO WHAT THEY SHOULD DO, WHICH IS TO TURN ISLANDS OVER TO IRAN BEFORE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. HE OBSERVED THERE IS PRECEDENT FOR THIS IN THAT AN ISLAND WHICH HAD BEEN ADMINISTERED BY BRITISH FROM ADEN HAD BEEN TURNED OVER TO OMAN BEFORE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM ADEN. HE INTENDS TO PRESS BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY HOME ON

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
53

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 01887 131419Z

TURNING OVER ISLANDS WHEN HE SEES HIM AT CENTO MEETING.

2. ZAHEDI THEN SAID HE HAD HAD EXCELLENT TALK WITH UAR FONMIN RIYAD RE ISLANDS DURING LATTER'S RECENT VISIT HERE AND THAT RIYAD ACCEPTS IRANIAN POSITION RE ISLANDS AND HAD INDICATED HE WOULD DISCREETLY USE UAR INFLUENCE WITH CERTAIN OTHER ARAB STATES TO TRY TO HELP MUTE ADVERSE REACTION WHEN IRAN REASSERTS SOVEREIGNTY.

3. ZAHEDI ALSO SAID HE HAD RECENT TALKS WITH KUWAITI AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN IN WHICH HE HAD REMINDED HIM AGAIN OF KUWAIT'S PLEDGE THAT IF BAHREIN WERE TURNED BACK TO ARABS, THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM RE ISLANDS (DEPT WILL RECALL THAT KUWAITI AMB MADE SAME STATEMENT TO ME LAST YEAR BEFORE BAHREIN SETTLEMENT). HE SAID HE CAUTIONED KUWAITI AMB AGAIN NOT RPT NOT TO INTERFERE IN ISLANDS PROBLEM. HE ALSO SAID HE OBSERVED TO KUWAITI THAT EVEN THOUGH IRAN FULLY RECOGNIZED KUWAIT'S RIGHT AS INDEPENDENT STATE TO RECOGNIZE COMMUNIST CHINA, IF KUWAIT HAD GIVEN SUCH RECOGNITION TO GET SUPPORT IN GULF FOR KUWAIT AND/OR ITS POSITION ON GULF ISLANDS, IT WAS MAKING A COLOSSAL BLUNDER.

4. I COMMENTED TO ZAHEDI ON PERSONAL BASIS THAT ALTHOUGH ISLANDS PROBLEM WAS NOT OUR AFFAIR, WE DID HAVE UNDERSTANDABLE INTEREST IN PEACE AND STABILITY IN GULF WHICH WAS OF SUCH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO MANY FREE WORLD COUNTRIES. MY PERSONAL CONCERN WAS THAT IF IRANIANS FEEL OBLIGED TO ACT FORCEFULLY, SUCH ACTION COULD BE EXPLOITED BY RADICAL ARABS AND OTHERS TO TRY TO MAKE MORE DIFFICULT THE COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND MODERATE ARABS, ON WHICH PEACE AND STABILITY IN GULF SO HEAVILY DEPENDED. ZAHEDI REPLIED ISLANDS BELONG TO IRAN, WHICH HAD NEVER ABANDONED ITS CLAIM TO THEM, AND THAT PROBLEM COULD BE SETTLED PEACEFULLY TOMORROW BY BRITISH IF THEY ONLY HAD WILL TO DO WHAT IS RIGHT AND RETURN ISLANDS TO IRAN BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE, WHICH WOULD MAKE SEIZURE BY IRAN UNNECESSARY.

5. COMMENT: THERE WAS NO GIVE WHATSOEVER IN IRANIAN POSITION THAT ISLANDS BELONGED TO IRAN AND IT WILL ESTABLISH PRESENCE ON THEM AND ASSERT SOVEREIGNTY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

23

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 01887 131419Z

AFTER BRITISH WITHDRAWAL UNLESS AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED
PRIOR TO WITHDRAWAL FOR INSTALLATION OF IRANIAN PRESENCE.
GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
23

0657

RECEIVED
WHCA

1971 APR 3 16 17

Shouder

CONFIDENTIAL

HCE591

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 01665 031604Z

53
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIA-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01
PRS-01 SS-20 SCS-04 SCA-01 O-03 OPR-02 SY-03 IO-13
AID-28 PER-02 RSR-01 EUR-20 EA-15 /174 W
----- 077196

P 031500Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3874
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
AMCONSUL KARACHI

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 1665

SUBJECT: PRESS STATEMENT RE ARRIVAL OF USG EMPLOYEES
AND DEPENDENTS IN TEHRAN

1. AS PREPARATIONS PROCEED TO RECEIVE USG OFFICIALS AND DEPENDENTS FROM EAST PAKISTAN IN TEHRAN BEGINNING APRIL 6, NEWS OF THEIR PLANS COME HERE BOUND TO BECOME WIDESPREAD. THUS, SUBJECT TO DEPT'S APPROVAL, WE PLAN MAKE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AVAILABLE TO PRESS AFTERNOON OF APRIL 4 (IN TIME TO CATCH APRIL 5 MORNING PAPERS):
QUOTE SOME US GOVT OFFICIALS AND TEHR DEPENDENTS STATIONED IN EAST PAKISTAN ARE TEMPORARILY LEAVING THE COUNTRY AND STOPPING OVER IN IRAN. THE MOVE, SIMILAR TO STEPS BEING TAKEN BY OTHER COUNTRIES, IS PART OF A "THIN-OUT" OF BOTH OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL AMERICANS IN EAST PAKISTAN.
QUOTE NO ARRIVAL SCHEDULE HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED, AND IT IS NOT KNOWN AS YET EXACTLY HOW MANY PERSONS WILL COME TO TEHRAN OR HOW LONG THEY WILL REMAIN. DETAILS ARE CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, WHICH HAS INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST. UNQUOTE
2. WE HAVE PASSED PROPOSED TEXT TO FOREIGN MINISTRY ASKING WHETHER THEY HAVE ANY OBJECTIONS, PARTICULARLY TO LAST

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 01665 031604Z

SENTENCE. (IF THEY DO, WE WILL DROP IT.)

3. PRIOR TO RELEAST OF STATEMENT, WE PLAN ANSWER ALL
QUERIES ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: WE UNDERSTAND SOME OFFICIAL
AND NON-OFFICIAL AMERICANS ARE TEMPORARILY LEAVING EAST
PAKISTAN AND IT IS POSSIBLE SOME OF THEM WILL BE COMING TO
TEHRAN. GP-3.
HECK

CONFIDENTIAL

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

TELEGRAM

MAR 18 PM 2:25
 WILSON
 SITUATION ROOM
 2
 3

44
ACTION SS-45

076718

S E C R E T TEHRAN 1515

SUBJECT: IRANIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAEL AND UAR

1. SHIFT IN IRAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISRAEL REPORTED IN MAY OF 1970 (REF A) HAS CONTINUED AND GAINED MOMENTUM IN RECENT MONTHS. MOST DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENT, OF COURSE, CAME IN AGREEMENT TO RENEW UAR/IRAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BEFORE NASSER'S DEATH (AND SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS) FOLLOWING TEN-YEAR HIATUS--RENEWAL WHICH CAME ABOUT WITHOUT IRAN INSISTING (AS IT HAD REPEATEDLY SAID IT WOULD) UPON EITHER APOLOGY OR FIRST STEP BY UAR.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 01515 181341Z.

CHIEF OF ISRAELI MISSION HERE, AND HIS EFFORTS TO GARNER OTHER NATIONS INTO BRINGING PRESSURE UPON ISRAEL (REF C).

3. IN OUR VIEW, GOI'S VEERING AWAY FROM ISRAEL AND TOWARD UAR STEMS FROM FOLLOWING COMBINATION OF FACTORS:

- (A) ISRAELI RIGIDITY AND APPARENT DESIRE FOR TERRITORIAL GAINS, INCLUDING JERUSALEM WITH ITS SACRED ISLAMIC SHRINES;
- (B) DISAPPEARANCE OF NASSER WHO WAS DETESTED AND DISTRUSTED BY SHAH;
- (C) FORTHCOMING RESPONSE BY SADAT TO JARRING'S PEACE INITIATIVES;
- (D) RECOGNITION THAT CHANCES OF IRAN'S SECURING MAXIMUM COOPERATION FROM MODERATE ARABS IN GULF FOR STEPS CONSIDERED NECESSARY FOR FUTURE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF GULF MAY BE SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCED IFN4-'S TRADE AND OTHER TIES WITH ISRAEL ARE BALANCED BY ACTIVE DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR ARAB CAUSE IN ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE;
- (E) IRANIAN DESIRE TO NEUTRALIZE TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE IN ADVANCE ADVERSE ARAB REACTION SHOULD IRAN BE OBLIGED TO SEIZE DISPUTED GULF ISLANDS AFTER BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. IN SUCH EVENT PASSIVENESS OR BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY OF UAR WHICH IRAN HAS RECENTLY PLACED UNDER SOME OBLIGATION WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO IRAN SINCE UAR STILL ENJOYS POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN ARAB WORLD;
- (F) RECOGNITION THAT REOPENING OF SUEZ CANAL (WHICH SEEMS POSSIBLE ONLY WITH ISRAELI-UAR SETTLEMENT) WOULD BENEFIT IRANIAN OIL SALES;
- (G) LONGER TERM THOUGHT THAT IRAN WILL WANT BE IN POSITION TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OIL PIPELINE FROM RED SEA TO MEDITERRANEAN THROUGH UAR TERRITORY; AND
- (H) IN ADDITION TO ALL THIS, OF COURSE, INCREASINGLY PRO-ARAB STANCE BY GOI GAINS SOME DIVIDENDS ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE, WHERE UNDERTONE OF DISCONTENT HAS EXISTED AMONG RELIGIOUS AND CERTAIN OTHER GROUPS RE IRAN-ISRAELI TIES.

5. WHILE WE DO NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT IRAN DOES NOT VALUE ITS TRADE AND OTHER TIES WITH ISRAEL, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT IN TERMS OF ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE, GOI HAS CONCLUDED THERE ARE DEFINITE ADVANTAGES FOR IRAN FROM A STANCE WHICH IS INCREASINGLY FRIENDLY TO EGYPT, AND THAT THESE ADVANTAGES CAN BE ENJOYED WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING BASIC TIES IRAN HAS WITH ISRAEL (PARTICULARLY AT TIME WHEN ISRAEL SEEMS INCREASINGLY ISOLATED IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT). GP-3.

HECK

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

29

530/10/2090

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two stars.

uH

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 01351 181842Z

46.
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

079202

R 181145Z MAR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3735
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T TEHRAN 1351

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (MRN ONLY)

SUBJECT: IRANIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAEL AND UAR

REFS: A. TEHRAN A-148 OF MAY 12, 1970; B. TEHRAN 1038; C. TEHRAN 967

1. SHIFT IN IRAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISRAEL REPORTED IN MAY OF 1970 (REF A) HAS CONTINUED AND GAINED MOMENTUM IN RECENT MONTHS. MOST DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENT, OF COURSE, CAME IN AGREEMENT TO RENEW UAR/IRAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BEFORE NASSER'S DEATH (AND SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS) FOLLOWING TEN-YEAR HIATUS--RENEWAL WHICH CAME ABOUT WITHOUT IRAN INSISTING (AS IT HAD REPEATEDLY SAID IT WOULD) UPON EITHER APOLOGY OR FIRST STEP BY UAR.

2. SINCE THEN, THERE HAVE BEEN NOT ONLY VERY STRONG PUBLIC FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT OF MAR 3 WITH DEFINITE PRO-ARAB BIAS (REF B), BUT ALSO:

(A) VERY SPIRITED PRIVATE SUPPORT FOR SADAT FROM FON MIN ZAHEDI IN RECENT MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HERE;

(B) ORAL MESSAGES FROM BOTH SHAH AND ZAHEDI TO THEIR COUNTERPARTS OBVIOUSLY DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE INCREASED US

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 01351 181842Z

PRESSURE ON ISRAEL; AND

(C) ZAHEDI'S RECENT DEMARCHE TO EBAN, HIS REFUSAL TO RECEIVE CHIEF OF ISRAELI MISSION HERE, AND HIS EFFORTS TO GARNER OTHER NATIONS INTO BRINGING PRESSURE UPON ISRAEL (REF C).

3. IN OUR VIEW, GOI'S VEERING AWAY FROM ISRAEL AND TOWARD UAR STEMS FROM FOLLOWING COMBINATION OF FACTORS:

(A) ISRAELI RIGIDITY AND APPARENT DESIRE FOR TERRITORIAL GAINS, INCLUDING JERUSALEM WITH IS SACRED ISLAMIC SHRINES;

(B) DISAPPEARANCE OF NASSER WHO WAS DETESTED AND DISTRUSTED BY SHAH;

(C) FORTHCOMING RESPONSE BY SADAT TO JARRING'S PEACE INITIATIVES;

(D) RECOGNITION THAT CHANCES OF IRAN'S SECURING MAXIMUM COOPERATION FROM MODERATE ARABS IN GULF FOR STEPS CONSIDERED NECESSARY FOR FUTURE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF GULF MAY BE SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCED IFN4'S, 'S TRADE AND OTHER TIES WITH ISRAEL ARE BALANCED BY ACTIVE DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR ARAB CAUSE IN ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE;

(E) IRANIAN DESIRE TO NEUTRALIZE TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE IN ADVANCE ADVERSE ARAB REACTION SHOULD IRAN BE OBLIGED TO SEIZE DISPUTED GULF ISLANDS AFTER BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. IN SUCH EVENT PASSIVENESS OR BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY OF UAR WHICH IRAN HAS RECENTLY PLACED UNDER SOME OBLIGATION WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO IRAN SINCE UAR STILL ENJOYS POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN ARAB WORLD;

(F) RECOGNITION THAT REOPENING OF SUEZ CANAL (WHICH SEEMS POSSIBLE ONLY WITH ISRAELI-UAR SETTLEMENT) WOULD BENEFIT IRANIAN OIL SALES;

(G) LONGER TERM THOUGHT THAT IRAN WILL WANT BE IN POSITION TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OIL PIPELINE FROM RED SEA TO MEDITERRANEAN THROUGH UAR TERRITORY; AND

(H) IN ADDITION TO ALL THIS, OF COURSE, INCREASINGLY PRO-ARAB STANCE BY GOI GAINS SOME DIVIDENDS ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE, WHERE UNDERTONE OF D SCONTENT HAS EXISTED AMONG RELIGIOUS AND CERTAIN OTHER GROUPS RE IRAN-ISRAELI TIES.

5. WHILE WE DO NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT IRAN DOES NOT VALUE ITS TRADE AND OTHER TIES WITH ISRAEL, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT IN TERMS OF ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE, GOI HAS CONCLUDED THERE ARE DEFINITE ADVANTAGES FOR IRAN FROM A STANCE WHICH IS INCREASINGLY FRIENDLY TO EGYPT, AND THAT THESE ADVANTAGES CAN BE ENJOYED WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING BASIC TIES IRAN HAS WITH ISRAEL (PARTICULARLY AT

SECRET

TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 01351 181842Z

TIME WHEN ISRAEL SEEMS INCREASINGLY ISOLATED IN TERMS OF
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT). GP-3.
HECK

DIS
EX
DIS
EX
DIS
EX
DIS
EX
DIS

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

SECRET 161

3

71 APR 15 PM 12:25

049133
SITUATION ROOM

S E C R E T TEHRAN 1263

EXDIS

SUBJECT: REPLY TO GOI MESSAGE RE ARAB-ISRAELI
NEGOTIATIONS

REF: (A) STATE: 41753
(B) TEHRAN 967

1. AMBASSADOR CONVEYED REPLY IN REFTEL TO FONMIN. ZAHEDI VIRTUALLY VERBATIM. ZAHEDI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION; SAID HE KNEW WE WERE DOING OUR VERY BEST TO ENCOURAGE PARTIES PARTICULARLY ISRAEL, TO BE FORTHCOMING; AND THAT HE WOULD INFORM SHAH OF OUR REPLY.

2. HE ALSO MENTIONED AGAIN DEMARCHE HE HAD MADE TO EBAN (PARA 1 REFTEL B). DEMARCHE HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT BY GOI EMISSARY WHO HAD RECEIVED TWENTY PAGE BRIEFING PAPER WHICH HE HAD LARGELY MEMORIZED AND REPEATED ORALLY TO EBAN. AMONG OTHER THNGS, EBAN WAS ASKED TO JUDGE ISRAEL'S POSITION IN WORLD OPINION TWO YEARS AGO AS CONTRASTED WITH PRESENT AND POINT WAS MADE, THAT THIS DETERIORATION DUE TO RIGID AND NEGATIVE POSITION ISRAEL HAD TAKEN. ZAHEDI SAID HE HAD RECEIVED ORAL REPLY FROM EBAN WHICH WAS GENERAL IN NATURE BUT STRESSED CONSIDERATIONS ISRAELI MUST KEEP IN MIND IN TERMS OF ITS OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS.

GP-3
MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 150

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 01261 151556Z

45
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 151145Z MAR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3694
INFO AMCONSUL DHAMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T TEHRAN 1261

EXDIS - NOFORN

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI DISCUSSES PERSIAN
GULF ISLANDS

1. IN MARCH 15 MEETING FONMIN ZAHEDI RAISED ISLANDS PROBLEM WITH ME, SAYING ON SHAH'S INSTRUCTION BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY HOME HAS RECENTLY BEEN INFORMED (HE DID NOT GIVE ANY DATE) THAT IT WOULD BE TO EVERYONE'S INTEREST IF IRAN HAD A PRESENCE ON ISLANDS BEFORE BRITISH DEPARTURE. THIS WOULD INSURE QUIET TAKE-OVER WITHOUT IRAN HAVING FORCEFULLY TO SEIZE ISLANDS AFTER BRITISH DEPARTURE AND WOULD ALSO ENABLE IRAN TO SEE HOW BEST IT COULD CONTRIBUTE TO WELFARE AND PROGRESS OF BOTH ISLAND INHABITANTS AS WELL AS TO SHEIKHDOMS THEMSELVES. HE SAID ALTHOUGH BRITISH HAVE BEEN NEGATIVE ON INSTALLATION OF IRANIAN PRESENCE BEFORE WITHDRAWAL, GOI STILL HOPES UK WILL AGREE. IF NOT, IRAN WILL BE OBLIGED TO DO EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO PREVENT ANY FEDERATION AND WILL ALSO HAVE TO TAKE ISLANDS AS SOON AS BRITISH DEPART. HE CONCLUDED ISLANDS ARE IRANIAN AND SHAH, AS HE KNEW WE UNDERSTOOD, FELT THEY WERE VITAL TO IRAN'S SECURITY IN FUTURE.

2. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD SHAH HELD VIEW THAT ISLANDS ARE IRANIAN AND ARE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO IRAN. HOWEVER, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, SINCE WE WERE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 01261 151556Z.

THIS PROBLEM, I FELT IT INFINITELY PREFERABLE FOR IRAN TO TRY TO WORK SOMETHING OUT WITH BRITISH AND SHEIKHS SO THAT FORCEFUL SEIZURE OF ISLANDS COULD BE AVOIDED. MY APPREHENSION WAS THAT BRUSQUE SEIZURE OF ISLANDS WOULD MAKE MORE DIFFICULT IMPLEMENTATION OF SHAH'S POLICY FOR FUTURE PEACE AND STABILITY IN GULF SINCE IT BASED ON IRAN'S COOPERATION WITH ITS MODERATE ARAB NEIGHBORS ACROSS THE GULF. FURTHERMORE, IT QUITE POSSIBLE SOMEONE MIGHT SEIZE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WITH MATTER, WHICH COULD BE EMBARRASSING FOR IRAN AS WELL AS AFFORDING RADICAL ARABS AND SOVIETS OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE PROPAGANDA HAY.

3. ZAHEDI SAID GOI HAD CAREFULLY CONSIDERED ADVERSE POSSIBILITIES THAT I MENTIONED BUT ITS SOLID CONCLUSION IS THAT ITS SECURITY INTERESTS ARE OVERRIDING AND IF IT COULD NOT HAVE PRESENCE ON ISLANDS BEFORE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL IT WOULD HAVE NO OTHER COURSE BUT (A) TO SEIZE ISLANDS AFTER BRITISH DEPARTURE AND IT DID NOT EXPECT ANY ACTIVE RESISTANCE; (B) TO OPPOSE ANY GULF FEDERATION. IF, HOWEVER, IRAN IS PERMITTED ON ISLANDS BEFORE BRITISH DEPARTURE, IT COULD ARRANGE FOR CLOSE COOPERATION WITH SHEIKHDOMS AFTER UK LEAVES AND ALSO IT WOULD BE WILLING TO ENCOURAGE FEDERATION RATHER THAN OPPOSE IT.

GP-3

MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

26

0602/10/1088

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched over the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched along the bottom. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 01248 151402Z

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'71 MAR 15 PM 12:25

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 1248

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA AND KUWAIT

REF: KUWAIT 282 (NOTAL)

1. ARGUMENT IN REFTEL THAT KUWAITIS WILL NOT BE INTRODUCING CHICOM PRESENCE INTO GULF BY PERMITTING INSTALLATION OF CHICOM DIPLOMATIC MISSION SEEMS TO US TO LARGELY MISS POINT AND TO BE BASED ON CERTAIN ANTI-IRAN BIAS ALSO SHOWN IN KUWAIT 234.

2. OF COURSE, IRAN, WHICH HAS DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN BAGHDAD, IS FULLY AWARE THAT THERE IS CHICOM EMBASSY IN IRAQ, A "SOCIALIST" STATE. POINT IS SIMPLY THAT FOR FIRST TIME THERE WILL BE OFFICIAL CHICOM REPRESENTATION IN A MODERATE GULF STATE WITH ALL MISCHIEF CHICOMS CAPABLE OF MAKING FROM THERE IN OTHER MODERATE GULF ENTITIES, PARTICULARLY GIVEN RATHER LAISSEZ FAIRE ATTITUDE OF KUWAITIS. IT SEEMS TO US THAT IRAN AND OTHER MODERATE GULF STATES (AS WELL AS WESTERN POWERS AND JAPAN, WHICH HAVE SUCH VITAL INTERESTS IN GULF) WOULD HAVE SOME REASON TO BE CONCERNED, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW CHICOM ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN YEMEN, AND ROLE CHICOMS PLAYING IN ACTIVELY SUPPORTING DHOFAR REBELS IN THEIR EFFORT OVERTHROW SHEIKH QABUS OF OMAN AND THEN MOVE AGAINST TRUCIAL STATES USING LIBERATION FRONT TACTICS. WITH A PRESENCE IN KUWAIT, CHICOMS WILL BE IN EVEN BETTER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 01248 151402Z

POSITION TO SUPPORT RADICAL NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONTS AT
NORTHERN END OF GULF AS WELL AS FROM SOUTHERN YEMEN.

4. FOR WHAT IT MAY BE WORTH, IF (A) KUWAIT COULD BE PREVAILED
UPON TO CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE GRC ON FORMOSA AND PERMIT IT
MAINTAIN ITS EMBASSY (WITH PERSONNEL ON DIPLOMATIC LIST, ETC.)
IN KUWAIT AND (B) IF IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND DESPITE
ACCREDITING OF CHICOM DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO KUWAIT, GRC COULD
BE PREVAILED UPON TO MAINTAIN ITS DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN
KUWAIT, PEKING MIGHT (BASED ON ITS PAST ATTITUDES) NOT RPT NOT BE
WILLING TO SEND A DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO KUWAIT. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 904

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 01175 121046Z

12

ACTION SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

O R 120740Z MAR 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3655
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

S E C R E T TEHRAN 1175

EXDIS

NOFORN

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y P A R A 3

SUBJECT: PERSIAN GULF ISLANDS AND FEDERATION

REF: (A) TEHRAN 1047; (B) TEHRAN 1172; (C) STATE 40751

1. IF EMBASSY LONDON BELIEVES IT WOULD BE USEFUL, I AM PREPARED TO STOP OVER THERE BRIEFLY ON ROUTE TO NEW YORK NEXT WEEK WHERE I MUST ARRIVE NOT LATER THAN EVENING OF SATURDAY, MARCH 20. FOR EXAMPLE, I COULD TAKE DIRECT BOAC FLIGHT 317 DEPARTING TEHRAN MORNING OF THURSDAY, MARCH 18, AND ARRIVE AT 1350 SAME DAY IN LONDON. I WOULD PLAN CONTINUE ON TO NEW YORK ON PAA FLT 101 SATURDAY, MARCH 20, ARRIVING NEW YORK 1235.

2. ABOVE ARRANGEMENT WOULD PERMIT INITIAL GO AROUND WITH EMB LONDON THURSDAY AFTERNOON WITH MEETING WITH BRITISH ON FRIDAY. ON OTHER HAND, IF EMB LONDON BELIEVES NO RPT NO REALLY USEFUL PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED WITH MY MEETING WITH BRITISH AT THIS TIME, I WOULD FULLY UNDERSTAND AND PLAN TO FLY DIRECT FROM TEHRAN TO NEW YORK ON MARCH 20 AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 01175 121046Z

3. IF LONDON STOPOVER SHOULD MATERIALIZE, THRUST OF WHAT I WOULD SAY TO BRITISH WOULD BE BASICALLY ALONG LINES OF PARA 2 REF A. THAT IS, THAT UNLESS ISLANDS PROBLEM IS SOLVED BEFORE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL, WE BELIEVE BRITISH MAY END UP WITH WORST OF ALL WORLDS. I HAVE NOT RPT NOT YET SORTED OUT IN MY OWN MIND WHETHER IT WOULD BE BETTER TO LIFT VEIL WITH BRITISH ON "CIVILIANIZATION" POSSIBILITY WHICH I DISCUSSED WITH ALAM (REF B). MY INITIAL REACTION, WHICH I STILL AM INCLINED TO FAVOR, IS TO LET ALAM TRY TO SELL IT TO SHAH, PERHAPS WITH AN ADDITIONAL PUSH FROM ME LATER IF WE DECIDED IT HOLDS PROMISE, FOLLOWING WHICH IRANIANS WITH OUR SUPPORT WOULD PUT IT HARD TO BRITISH. ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO TRY FIRST TO SELL IT TO BRITISH WHO WOULD THEN PUT IT TO SHAH. IF SHAH WERE RECEPTIVE TO IDEA (WHICH WE CANNOT KNOW AT THIS JUNCTURE) ADVANTAGE OF THIS ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE THAT BRITISH WOULD BE IN POSITION OF MAKING CONSTRUCTIVE AND FORTHCOMING PROPOSAL TO IRAN RATHER THAN SIMPLY BEING NEGATIVE AND LETTING THINGS DRIFT WITH ALL THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD ENSUE FOR BOTH BRITAIN AND IRAN.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING ASAP WHETHER DEPARTMENT AND EMB LONDON WISH ME STOP OVER ON ROUTE TO U.S. BECAUSE IF SO, I HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO DO BEFORE DEPARTURE NEXT THURSDAY. IF ANSWER AFFIRMATIVE, WOULD MUCH APPRECIATE VIEWS OF DEPARTMENT AND LONDON ON (A) LINE I PROPOSE TO TAKE WITH BRITISH, (B) WHETHER WE SHOULD SURFACE "CIVILIANIZATION" POSSIBILITY WITH BRITISH BEFORE OR AFTER ALAM HAS WORKED ON SHAH. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

060/10/8090

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

Wt

CONFIDENTIAL 182

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 01174 111511Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

R 111317Z MAR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3654

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 1174

EXDIS

SUBJECT 25TH CENTENARY

REF: TEHRAN 1045

1. COURT MINISTER ALAM TELLS ME THAT SHAH AND PALACE ARE TREMENDOUSLY PLEASED THAT MRS. NIXON HAS AGREED TO HEAD UP US COMMITTEE FOR 25TH CENTENARY AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS PRESIDENT HIMSELF COULD NOT DO SO WITHOUT SETTING UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT.

2. HOWEVER, SHAH HOPES AND EXPECTS PRESIDENT WILL COME FOR CENTENARY CELEBRATION IN OCTOBER WHICH WILL BE ATTENDED BY MANY OTHER CHIEFS OF STATE OR GOVT. ALAM MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY THAT ALL EASTERN EUROPEAN HEADS OF STATE EXCEPT POLAND HAD ACCEPTED AND THAT SOVIET PRESIDENT PODGORNYY HAD ALSO TOLD IRANIANS HE HOPED TO COME ALTHOUGH NOT YET IN POSITION TO MAKE COMMITMENT. ALAM COMMENTED WRYLY THAT SOVIET BLOC WAS OBVIOUSLY MAKING CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO WOO IRAN AND THIS IS WHY IRAN SO ANXIOUS TO HAVE WESTERN HEADS OF STATE.

3. I REPLIED THAT FACT THAT MRS. NIXON WAS HEADING UP CENTENARY COMMITTEE WAS OBVIOUS INDICATION OF TREMENDOUS IMPORTANCE PRESIDENT ATTACHES TO HIS RELATIONS WITH SHAH AND IRAN. IT WAS, INsofar AS I KNEW, UNPRECEDENTED ACT. RE OCTOBER CENTENARY CELEBRATIONS, I COMMENTED THAT I KNEW PRESIDENT WOULD WISH TO COME, HOWEVER, AT SAME TIME I KNEW OUR IRANIAN FRIENDS UNDERSTAND THAT PRESIDENT IS AT SAME TIME CHIEF OF STATE, CHIEF OF GOVT, AND CHIEF OF HIS

022628

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MAR 11 PM 4:34

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 01174 111511Z

POLITICAL PARTY, POSITIONS FREQUENTLY HELD BY THREE SEPARATE PERSONS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE, AND IN ADDITION PRESIDENT HAS MAJOR GLOBAL AS WELL AS NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BECAUSE OF POSITION OF FREE WORLD LEADERSHIP THAT HAS BEEN THRUST ON US. THEREFORE, IF IT SHOULD JUST NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO ATTEND OCTOBER CELEBRATIONS, I FELT CONFIDENT THAT SHAH AND IRANIAN PEOPLE WOULD UNDERSTAND. ALAM NODDED IN ASSENT AND SAID HE FULLY RECOGNIZED TREMENDOUS BURDENS AND COMMITMENTS THAT PRESIDENT HAD TO BEAR. GP-3. MACARTHUR

160/10/2090

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

W#

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

022454
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 01172 111457Z

DEPEND LARGELY ON COOPERATION OF IRAN AND ITS MODERATE ARAB GULF NEIGHBORS. IF IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH SUCH NEIGHBORS SHOULD BE BADLY IMPAIRED BY WAY IRAN SOLVED ISLANDS PROBLEM, POSSIBILITY OF EFFECTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND ITS GULF NEIGHBORS WOULD BE GREATLY REDUCED. THIS IN TURN WOULD MEAN IRAN'S VERY CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BE USED EFFECTIVELY IN COOPERATION WITH MODERATE ARABS IN DENYING ARAB SIDE OF GULF TO RADICAL FORCES. AND IF OTHER SIDE OF GULF SHOULD FALL TO RADICALS, IRAN, DESPITE POSSESSION OF ISLANDS, WOULD FIND ITS OWN SECURITY VERY ADVERSELY AFFECTED. ALAM SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS BUT SHAH FEELS ISLANDS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO IRAN'S OWN MOST VITAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

3. WE THEN HAD PERSONAL AND UNOFFICIAL BULL SESSION ON HOW DAMAGE TO IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH MODERATE GULF ARABS MIGHT BE LIMITED. IN ADDITION TO TALKING ABOUT NEED FOR GREAT IRANIAN GENEROSITY TO SHEIKHS RE OIL, ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, ETC., WE ALSO GOT INTO DISCUSSION OF WHETHER, AT LEAST IN INITIAL PHASE OF IRANIAN TAKE-OVER, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE BY "CIVILIANIZING" INTRODUCTION OF IRANIAN PRESENCE TO OBTAIN BRITISH ASSENT TO AN IRANIAN PRESENCE BEFORE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. ALAM SAID HE PERSONALLY IS MUCH INTERESTED IN EXAMINING THIS POSSIBILITY BUT DOESN'T HAVE MUCH OF AN IDEA OF KIND OF INSTALLATIONS (LIGHTHOUSES, WEATHER STATION, LORAN, SHORAN, ETC.) WHICH (A) PRESENTLY EXIST ON ISLANDS OR (B) WHICH MIGHT BE INTRODUCED PRIOR TO BRITISH WITHDRAWAL THAT COULD BE MANNED AND OPERATED BY IRANIANS BUT FOR BENEFIT AND USE OF MARITIME OPERATIONS IN GULF OF ALL NATIONS. HE SAID SHAH IS RETURNING ABOUT MARCH 16 OR 17 AND SHORTLY AFTER NOW RUZ (MARCH 21) SHAH WILL PROCEED WITH ALAM TO KISH ISLAND IN GULF WHERE HE WILL REMAIN UNTIL ABOUT APRIL 4. WHILE VACATIONING ON KISH, SHAH WILL HAVE LARGELY UNINTERRUPTED PERIOD TO CONSIDER GULF PROBLEMS AND ALAM SAID HE WILL TRY TO GET SHAH TO FOCUS ON POSSIBILITY OF "CIVILIANIZATION" OF IRANIAN PRESENCE, AT LEAST IN INITIAL PHASE.

4. COMMENT: CANNOT OF COURSE PREDICT HOW SHAH WILL REACT TO "CIVILIANIZATION" SUGGESTION ALAM WILL PUT TO HIM. HOWEVER, IF SHAH COULD BE PERSUADED TO BUY IT, BRITISH (WHO FOR PRESENT SEEM ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO IRANIAN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

24



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 0117Z 111457Z

MILITARY PRESENCE BEFORE WITHDRAWAL) MIGHT ALSO BE PERSUADED OR PRESSURED TO ACCEPT IT. WHILE THIS IDEA OF INITIAL CIVILIANIZATION OF IRANIAN PRESENCE IS STILL EMBRYONIC, WE THINK IT HAS DEFINITE POSSIBILITIES AS IT WOULD AVOID BRUSQUE MILITARY SEIZURE OF ISLANDS BY IRAN AFTER BRITISH WITHDRAWAL WITH EXTREMELY UNFORTUNATE PRECEDENT WHICH IT COULD SET FOR NOT ONLY RADICAL ARABS BUT ALSO SAUDIS VIS-A-VIS ABU DHABI. I PERSONALLY AM TAKEN WITH IDEA, BELIEVE IT SHOULD RECEIVE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AND WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS IT WHEN I AM IN WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATION LATER THIS MONTH. WHEN ALAM PUTS IT TO SHAH, IF LATTER SHOULD BE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT IT IN LIEU OF INITIAL IRANIAN MILITARY PRESENCE, I WOULD IN PRINCIPLE HAVE NO HESITANCY IN DISCUSSING IT WITH HIM AND ALAM AND POINTING OUT ITS MANY ADVANTAGES OVER BRUSQUE UNILATERAL MILITARY SEIZURE BY IRAN. AND THESE ADVANTAGES, COUPLED FOR EXAMPLE WITH ASSURANCE ON OUR PART THAT WE WOULD PRESS BRITISH HARD TO ACCEPT IT, MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT TO PERSUADE HIM. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT ANY SUCH APPROACH TO SHAH HIMSELF SHOULD AWAIT RESULTS OF ALAM'S DISCUSSIONS WITH SHAH AT KISH ISLAND. MERIT OF WAITING IS THAT THIS IDEA IS NOW RPT NOW ALAM'S PROPOSAL AND IS ENTIRELY IRANIAN IN THAT ALAM WILL PROPOSE IT. AND THIS, OF COURSE, IS AS IT SHOULD BE. REQUEST NOFORN CLASSIFICATIONS THIS MESSAGE BE STRICTLY OBSERVED. GP-3. MACARTHUR.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 610

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 01168 120608Z

11
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 W

R 111240Z MAR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3650
INFO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T TEHRAN 1168

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y P A R A 3

SUBJECT: IRANIAN ASSURANCES RE FIVE-YEAR OIL AGREEMENT

REF: STATE 39026

1. IN MEETING WITH COURT MINISTER ALAM MARCH 10 HE MENTIONED SHAH'S GREAT SATISFACTION OVER POSITION THAT BOTH USG AND AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES TOOK IN TEHRAN OIL NEGOTIATIONS. THIS AFFORDED NATURAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ME TO STRESS TO ALAM THAT CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION WE AND OIL COMPANIES HAD BEEN ABLE TO TAKE RESULTED FROM STATESMAN-LIKE AND CATEGORIC ASSURANCES WHICH SHAH HAD GIVEN US AND COMPANIES THAT IRAN AND OTHER OPEC GULF PRODUCERS WOULD OBSERVE TERMS OF AGREEMENT FOR FULL FIVE YEAR PERIOD REGARDLESS OF OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS IN LIBYA OR ELSEWHERE. I OBSERVED THIS DEPENDABLE ASSURANCE BY SHAH, COUPLED WITH HIS STATESMANLIKE ACTION IN GIVING MORE TIME TO COMPANIES DESPITE ARTIFICIAL OPEC DEADLINES, WAS ALMOST ENTIRELY RESPONSIBLE FOR IRAN'S GREAT SUCCESS IN OIL TALKS.

2. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT LIBYA WAS TAKING VERY INTRANSIGENT AND UNREASONABLE POSITION IN TALKS WITH COMPANIES IN TRIPOLI AND THAT THIS MADE SHAH'S ASSURANCES RE DEPENDABILITY OF FIVE-YEAR GULF AGREEMENT MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER. ALAM

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

WHITEHOUSE
STATION ROOM
02859

71 MAR 12 AM 8:33

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 01168 120608Z

SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS AND ALSO RECOGNIZED LIBYA WAS IN STRONG POSITION BECUASE IF IT SUSPENDED PRODUCTION, EUROPE WOULD HAVE TO GO TO RATIONING. IF MORE TANKERS WERE AVAIL-ALBE, THIS WOULD INCREASE OFFTAKE FROM IRAN AND OTHER GULF PRODUCERS, BUT UNFORTUNATELY TANKER SHORTAGE WAS SUCH THAT GULF PRODUCERS WOULD PROBABLY NOT BENEFIT VERY MUCH AT THIS TIME FROM LIBYAN SHUTDOWN.

3. COMMENT: ALAM GAVE NOT SLIGHTEST HINT THAT SHAH WAS CONCERNED ABOUT EXCESSIVE LIBYAN SETTLEMENT OR WAS CASTING ABOUT FOR SOME WAY TO EASE HIS POSITION IF COMPANIES AGREED TO LIBYA'S VERY TOUGH TERMS. AS DEPT IS AWARE FROM OUR REPORTS, I HAVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS TO ALL TOP PEOPLE IN IRANIAN GOVT (INCLUDING SHAH AFTER HIS RETURN) OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF FIRM ASSURANCES HE HAS GIVEN US AND I FEEL REASONABLY CERTAIN, AS INDICATED IN REFTEL, THAT HE INTENDS TO HONOR HIS AGREEMENT WITH OIL COMPANIES.

GP-3.

MACARTHUR

0602/01/093

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two stars.

TELEGRAM

W/H

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 01089 090942Z

22
ACTION SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 /046 W

R 080632Z MAR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3625
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T TEHRAN 1089

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

DEPT PASS COMIDEASTFOR AND CINCSTRIKE.

SUBJECT: IRAN-SAUDI-KUWAIT STATEMENTS ON GULF.

REF: TEHRAN 966.

FONMIN ZAHEDI TELLS ME THAT BEFORE SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS
 ISSUED THEIR STATEMENTS COMMENTING ON BRITISH FONSEC
 HOME'S WITHDRAWAL STATEMENT, THEY DID REPLY TO ZAHEDI'S
 ORIGINAL MESSAGE (SUGGESTING JOINT OR SEPARATE STATEMENTS)
 AND INFORMED HIM THEY PREFERRED TO MAKE SEPARATE STATEMENTS.
 MACARTHUR

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

71 MAR 9 PM 12:57
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 95 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 749

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 01016 030942Z

2

18
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 030900Z MAR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3591
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

087241

WHITE
SITUATION ROOM

71 MAR 3 AM 8:23

SECRET TEHRAN 1016

EXDIS

DEPT PASS COMIDEASTFOR AND CINCSTRIKE

SUBJECT: IRANIAN STATEMENT ON GULF (COMMENT ON BRITISH
STATEMENT)

REF: TEHRAN 966

VICE FONMIN KHALATBARI TELLS ME THAT ALTHOUGH ZAHEDI HAD
ORIGINALLY PLANNED NOT RPT NOT TO TAKE LEAD IN ISSUING
OFFICIAL STATEMENT COMMENTING ON BRITISH WITHDRAWAL
STATEMENT (REFTEL), HE CHANGED HIS MIND YESTERDAY AND

DECIDED TO ISSUE AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT BECAUSE IRAN
PRESS COMMENTATORS INITIALLY INTERPRETED BRITISH WITH-
DRAWAL STATEMENT AND ENSUING DEBATE IN COMMONS AS
INDICATING VAGUE AND INDECISIVE POLICY RE: WITHDRAWAL
FROM GULF. THEREFORE, TO AVOID NEGATIVE REACTION IN
IRANIAN PRESS TO BRITISH WITHDRAWAL STATEMENT, FOREIGN
MINISTRY HAD ITSELF ISSUED STATEMENT MARCH 2 WELCOMING
BRITISH DECISION TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM PERSIAN GULF
BY END OF THIS YEAR. TEXT OF STATEMENT CABLED IN SEPTEL.

GP-3
MACARTHUR

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED COMIDEASTFOR AND CINCSTRIKE.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00922 260721Z

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

R 251330Z FEB 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3542
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T TEHRAN 922

EXDIS:

CORRECTED COPY (PARA. 3.)

SUBJECT: (A) POSSIBILITY OF IRAN-SAUDI-KUWAIT STATEMENT
ON GULF; (B) GULF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

REF: (A) TEHRAN 904; (B) TEHRAN 844.

1. I BRIEFED UK AMB WRIGHT ON MY TLAKS WITH ZAHEDI RE POSSIBLE PUBLIC STATEMENT ON GULF BY IRAN-SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS AS IN PARA 1 REFTEL A. HIS INITIAL PERSONAL REACTION WAS THAT FOR PRESENT IRANIAN INITIATIVE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERVENTION.

2. WE ALSO DISCUSSED ISLANDS, WITH WRIGHT AGAIN EXPRESSING PESSIMISM THAT ANY FORMAL AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED WITH SHEIKHS BY WHICH THEY WOULD IN EFFECT BE AGREEING TO IRAN TAKING OVER ISLANDS. WRIGHT CONTINUES BELIEVE SHEIKHS WOULD PREFER TO HAVE IRAN TAKE ISLANDS RATHER THAN APPEAR TO BE CEDING ARAB TERRITORY. SIMILARLY THERE SEEMED VIRTUALLY NO RPT NO PROSPECT THAT UK AND/OR US COULD PERSUADE SHAH TO MODIFY HIS POSITION ON ISLANDS.

3. IN LIGHT THIS SITUATION WE AGREED THAT IN CONSIDERING THIS PROBLEM, THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN NOT JUST TO CONTINUING TO TRY TO WORK OUT SOME AGREEMENT

SECRET

SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00922 260721Z

BETWEEN IRAN AND SHEIKHS BUT ALSO AS TO HOW IN EVENT NO AGREEMENT POSSIBLE, DAMAGE TO IRAN-GULF ARAB RELATIONS OF EVENTUAL IRANIAN TAKE-OVER MIGHT BE LIMITED. ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE SOME PRIVATE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN IRAN, SHEIKHDOMS AND HOPEFULLY SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS ALONG LINES TOUCHED ON BY ZAHEDI IN MY FEB 20 TALK WITH HIM (PARA 1C, REFTEL B), WHEREBY (A) SHEIKHS WOULD OFFER NO ACTUAL RESISTANCE TO INTRODUCTION OF IRANIAN PRESENCE ON ISLANDS AND (B) THEY AS WELL AS SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS WOULD LIMIT PUBLIC OBJECTIONS TO RELATIVELY MODERATE PRO FORMA STATEMENTS OF DISAPPROVAL, (C) IN RETURN FOR WHICH IRAN WOULD ACCORD SHEIKHDOMS GENEROUS TREATMENT.

GP-3

MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0602/01/097

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 98 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 99 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 734

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00862 230805Z

10

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 230700Z FEB 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3521
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T TEHRAN 0862

EXDIS/NOFORN

DEPT PASS CINCSTRIKE AND COMIDEASTFOR

SUBJECT: GULF: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

REF: A. TEHRAN 844 B. DHAHRAN 224

1. NOW THAT AMB HAS FLOATED IDEA ON "PERSONAL BASIS" TO FONMIN ZAHEDI OF POSSIBILITY OF STATEMENT BY IRAN, SAUDIS AND POSSIBLE KUWAIT AFTER EXPECTED UK POLICY STATEMENT RE WITHDRAWAL FROM GULF (REF A), WE THINK BEST THING IS TO TREAD WATER AND AWAIT FURTHER REACTION FRM GOI. WE WILL KEEP EAR TO GROUND AND IF WE HEAR GOI HAS DECIDED TO PURSUE IDEA OF STATEMENT, USG WILL BE IN BETTER POSITION TO DECIDE WHETHER SOME FURTHER ACTION WITH SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS IS DESIRABLE. WE PREFER NOT TO LIFT VEIL WITH BRITISH AT THIS JUNCTURE AND UNTIL WE GET FURTHER INDICATION OF GOI REACTION.

2. ON RELATED SUBJECT OF FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN IRAN AND MODERATE ARABS IN GULF RAISED IN REF B, WE ALSO SEE NO NEED FOR ACTION BY USG AT THIS STAGE. DHAHRAN INDICATES IRAN HAS GIVEN PRIVATE BUT CLEAR SECURITY ASSURANCES TO BOTH QATAR AND DUBAI, AND WE UNDERSTAND SIMILAR ASSURANCES HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO ABU DHABI AND BAHRAIN AND PERHAPS OTHERS.

3. IN OUR VIEW, SHAH CONTINUES TO HAVE SAME ATTITUDE TOWARD

021681
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 FEB 23 AM 8:22

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00862 230805Z

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH MODERATE GULF STATES AS THAT HE OUTLINED TO KING FAISAL AT TIME OF RABAT ISLAMIC SUMMIT IN 1969 AND HAS REPEATED TO US SINCE THEN, NAMELY: INSOFAR AS IRAN CONCERNED, ANY KIND OF REASONABLE ARRANGEMENTS IN SECURITY FIELD DESIRED BY MODERATE ARABS IS ACCEPTABLE TO IRAN. THUS, WHILE WILLING ENTER INTO CLOSE FORMAL ARRANGEMENT (SUCH AS MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY) IF SAUDIS AND OTHER MODERATE GULF ARABS SO DESIRE, GOI RECOGNIZES THIS COULD POSE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR MODERATE GULF ARABS IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH REST OF ARAB WORLD. THEREFORE, WE UNDERSTAND THAT IF MODERATE ARABS PREFER SOME INFORMAL AND CONFIDENTIAL ARRANGEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING THAT IRAN WOULD COME TO THEIR ASSISTANCE IF SO REQUESTED, THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO IRAN. SEEN FROM TEHRAN VANTAGE POINT, THIS APPROACH IS BOTH FLEXIBLE AND REALISTIC AND IS PROBABLY MOST THAT CAN BE EXPECTED FOR PRESENT OR IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

4. WHILE WE NOT IN POSITION TO JUDGE ATTITUDES AMONG MODERATES ON ARAB SIDE OF GULF RE COOPERATION WITH IRAN IN SECURITY FIELD LOOKING TO PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN GULF AREA, WE DO HEAR FROM QUALIFIED NON-IRANIAN (AND NON-US) SOURCES HERE THAT SOME GULF SHEIKHDOMS, AS THEY CONTEMPLATE THEIR POSITIONS AFTER UK WITHDRAWAL, ARE TENDING: (A) TO THINK MORE ABOUT IRAN AS SOURCE OF POSSIBLE AID AND ASSISTANCE SHOULD THEIR SECURITY BE THREATENED FROM OUTSIDE; AND (B) TO APPRECIATE INCREASINGLY IRANIAN STRENGTH. AND FACT THAT, ONCE UK LEAVES GULF, IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE ANY OTHER MODERATE NEIGHBOR WITH BOTH WILL AND CAPACITY TO COME TO THEIR AID.

5. IF, AS WE UNDERSTAND FROM AMB WRIGHT, ANY FUTURE UK TREATY RELATIONSHIP WITH GULF FEDERATION OR INDIVIDUAL STATES WILL NOT INVOLVE AUTOMATIC COMMITMENT BY UK TO COME TO THEIR AID MILITARILY IN EVENT THEIR SECURITY THREATENED FROM OUTSIDE, IT SEEMS POSSIBLE GULF SHEIKHDOMS MAY BE MORE INCLINED TO LOOK TO IRAN AS SOURCE OF AID IF THEIR FUTURE SEEMS THREATENED BY OUTSIDE ELEMENTS. GP-4.
MACARTHUR.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASS ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0602/10/2090

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 339

PAGE: 01 TEHRAN 00857 221431Z

45
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

P 221335Z FEB 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3519
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T TEHRAN 857

EXDIS

NOFORN

DEPT PLEASE PASS COMIDEASTFOR AND CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA

SUBJ: GULF ISLANDS

REF: A. TEHRAN 844 B. STATE 028524

1. WHILE IT USEFUL TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE FORMULAS RE
DISPUTED ISLANDS WHICH MIGHT BE FED TO IRAN AND/OR UK
AT SOME FUTURE DATE, IT SEEMS APPARENT FOR REASONS
STATED BY FONMIN ZAHEDI IN FEB 20 MTG WITH AMB (REF A)
THAT FORMULA ALONG LINES PROPOSED PARAS 2 AND 4 REF B
WILL NOT RPT NOT WASH WITH IRANIANS AT THIS TIME.

2. REASONS AS OUTLINED BY ZAHEDI--WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY HE ATTRIBUTED TO SHAH AND INDICATED HIM FEELS STRONGLY ABOUT-- BOIL DOWN TO: IF, CONTRARY TO IRAN'S ACTUAL INTENTIONS, IT REACHED AN AGREEMENT WITH SHEIKHDOMS WHICH LED THEM TO BELIEVE IRAN IS PREPARED TO KEEP ISSUE OF SOVERIGNTY OVER ISLANDS IN INDEFINITE STATUS AFTER UK WITHDRAWAL, IRAN WOULD: (A) LAY ITSELF OPEN TO CHARGES OF DUPLICITY AND BAD FAITH--AND THEREBY UNDERMINE CREDIBILITY OF GENUINE IRANIAN DISCLAIMERS OF ANY OTHER TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN GULF; AND (B) CREATE SITUATION WHICH COULD LEAD

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

— 35 —

21

71 FEB 22 PM 2:57

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00857 221431Z

RADICAL ARABS TO MISJUDGE IRAN'S DETERMINATION TO RETAIN ISLANDS AND THEREBY TEMPT THEM, IF CONDITIONS AT SOME FUTURE TIME SEEMED PROPITIOUS, TO TAKE OVER ISLANDS WHICH WOULD THEN OBLIGE IRAN TO REACT MILITARILY TO EXPEL THEM FROM ISLANDS. AND ACTION WHICH RADICALS WOULD PRESENT AS AGGRESSION RATHER THAN DEFENSE OF IRANIAN TERRITORY.

3. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER IRANIAN POSITION (AS OUTLINED BY SHAH TO LUCE AND BY ZAHEDI TO AMBASSADOR) REPRESENTS "HARDENING" OR IS, AS ZAHEDI MAINTAINED, RESULT OF GENUINE MISUNDERSTANDING RE SHAH'S POSITION (I.E., HE WILLING TO FUZZY SOVEREIGNTY TILL AFTER UK WITHDRAWAL TO AVOID SERIOUS CONFRONTATION IN BRITISH-IRAN RELATIONS BUT IS DETERMINED TO LATER ASSERT IRANIAN SOVEREIGNTY.) WHICHEVER IT IS, AS LONG AS IT REMAINS FIRM, WE SEE NO POSSIBILITY OF SELLING TO SHAH A FORMULA RE ISLANDS WHICH WOULD KEEP QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY INDEFINITE BEYOND DATE OF UK WITHDRAWAL.

4. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, MOST WE CAN SEE WOULD BE INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN IRAN ON ONE SIDE AND TWO SHEIKHDOMS (AS WELL AS SAUDIS, SOME OF OTHER SHEIKHDOMS, AND PERHAPS KUWAITIS) ON OTHER SIDE INVOLVING: (A) AGREEMENT ON MODERATE ARAB SIDE TO LIMIT THEIR REACTION TO IRANIAN OCCUPATION OF ISLANDS AND ASSERTION OF SOVEREIGNTY AFTER UK WITHDRAWAL TO NON-USE OF FORCE AND RELATIVELY MODERATE EXPRESSIONS OF DISAPPROVAL OR OBJECTIONS; AND (B) AGREEMENT ON IRAN'S PART, IN RETURN, TO BE GENEROUS WITH SHEIKHDOMS IN FIELDS OF ECONOMIC AID, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND DIVISION OF INCOME FROM ANY OIL (OR OTHER MINERALS) FOUND AND EXPLOITED ON ISLANDS AND THEIR TERRITORIAL WATERS.

5. WE NOT IN POSITION TO JUDGE WHETHER SHEIKHDOMS AND THEIR MODERATE ARAB FRIENDS WOULD FEEL ABLE TO ENTER INTO SUCH ARRANGEMENT, AND PROBABLY THEY THEMSELVES WILL NOT KNOW TILL THE "MOMENT OF TRUTH" ARRIVES. IF SHEIKHS WERE DISPOSED TO GO ALONG CONFIDENTIALLY WITH ABOVE IDEA BECAUSE IT THE BEST THEY COULD GET AND OTHERWISE WOULD LOSE CONSIDERABLY, IT COULD PROVIDE A POSSIBLE WAY OUT. ON OTHER HAND EVEN WITH SHEIKHS CONFIDENTIAL AGREEMENT TO SUCH A SOLUTION, IT COULD COME UNSTUCK BECAUSE (A) WHAT SHEIKHS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00857 221431Z

AND MODERATE ARABS MIGHT CONSIDER "RELATIVELY MODERATE REACTION" COULD WELL BE JUDGED DIFFERENTLY IN IRAN; (B) SHEIKHS AND/OR MODERATE ARABS MIGHT FIND THEIR INTENTION TO STICK BY SUCH AGREEMENT UNDERMINED BY A STRONG PROPAGANDA FROM RADICAL ARABS (PRINCIPALLY IRAQ) AND (C) ARAB AND IRANIAN DEFINITION OF "GENEROSITY" COULD ALSO TURN OUT TO DIFFER. IN ANY EVENT FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST WE DO NOT SEE OTHER ALTERNATIVES AND BELIEVE THAT OTHER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAT COULD LIMIT DAMAGE TO IRAN-MODERATE ARAB RELATIONS IN THE GULF DUE TO IRANIAN TAKEOVER OF ISLANDS WILL HAVE TO AWAIT EVOLUTION OF EVENTS-- PARTICULARLY FORMAL BRITISH STATEMENT RE WITHDRAWAL AND FURTHER BRITISH (AND IRANIAN) TALKS WITH SHEIKHS AND MODERATE ARABS. GP-4
MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00844 01 OF 02 221205Z

12
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

014500

P R 220630Z FEB 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3509
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 844

EXDIS.

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (THROUGHOUT TEXT)

DEPT PASS COMIDEASTFOR AND CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA

EXDIS-NOFORN

SUBJECT: FONMIN ZAHEDI'S VIEWS ON (A) GULF ISLANDS; (B) POSSIBILITY OF IRAN-SAUDI-KUWAIT STATEMENT ON GULF.

REF: (A) TEHRAN 839; (B) STATE 28524;
(C) STATE 26230

USED DELIVERY OF SECRETARY'S MESSAGE RE OIL
AGREEMENT (REF A) AS PRETEXT TO CALL ON ZAHEDI
EVENING FEB 20 TO DISCUSS GULF PROBLEMS. HE
RECEIVED ME ALONE. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY:

1. GULF ISLANDS.

(A) I OPENED ASKING HIM ABOUT LUCE TALKS RE ISLANDS. HE REPLIED ISLANDS WERE DISCUSSED AT LENGTH BY SHAH AND LUCE, DURING WHICH SHAH HAD MADE UNEQUIVOCALLY CLEAR AGAIN THAT IRAN MUST HAVE ISLANDS. HE SAID WHAT APPEARED TO BE A GENUINE MISUNDERSTANDING ON PART OF

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

32

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00844 01 OF 02 221205Z

BRITISH RE SHAH'S POSITION HAD EMERGED IN THIS MEETING. BRITISH SAID THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY UNDERSTOOD THAT AGREEMENT WITH SHEIKHS FUZZING SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE OF ISLAND WOULD

LAST INDEFINITELY AFTER BRITISH VACATED ISLANDS, FOLLOWING WHICH BRITISH INDICATED GOI COULD BRING IN IRANIANS TO GRADUALLY CHANGE ETHNIC CHARACTER OF ISLANDS' POPULATION MAKING IT ESSENTIALLY IRANIAN. HOWEVER, SHAH AND ZAHEDI BOTH FELT THAT SINCE IRAN INTENDED TO ASSERT SOVEREIGNTY AFTER BRITISH WITHDRAWAL, IT WOULD BE DISHONEST AND COULD RESULT IN CHARGES OF BAD FAITH AGAINST IRAN IF IT DELIBERATELY AND FALSELY LED SHEIKHS TO BELIEVE THAT IRAN WOULD INDEFINITELY FUZZ SOVEREIGNTY. FURTHERMORE, SHAH REITERATED IRAN WOULD VIGOROUSLY OPPOSE ANY ARAB GULF FEDERATION IF ISLANDS PROBLEM NOT SOLVED TO IRAN'S SATISFACTION.

(B) I EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW IT SEEMED ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR SHEIKHS TO PUBLICLY RECOGNIZE IRAN'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER ISLANDS AS THIS WOULD EXPOSE THEM TO ATTACKS NOT ONLY BY RADICAL BUT BY SOME MODERATE ARABS AS WELL FOR GIVING AWAY ARAB TERRITORY. IF THIS ASSUMPTION CORRECT, I DID NOT SEE HOW IT POSSIBLE FOR IRAN TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH SHEIKHS AND IF THERE NO RPT NO AGREEMENT THEN IRAN WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ISLANDS BY FORCE WHICH COULD COMPLICATE IRAN'S DESIRE FOR CLOSER RELATIONS WITH ITS MODERATE ARAB NEIGHBORS ON OTHER SIDE OF GULF.

(C) ZAHEDI SAID HE FULLY AGREED SHEIKHS COULD NOT PUBLICLY AGREE TO IRAN'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. HE ADDED THAT AS PRACTICAL MATTER SHEIKHS SEEMED REALLY TO PREFER TO HAVE IRAN TAKE ISLANDS BY FORCE RATHER THAN TO EVEN TACITLY AGREE TO IRANIAN SOVEREIGNTY. HOWEVER, THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT AN AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED WITH WHICH BOTH SIDES COULD LIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, IF (A) TWO SHEIKHS OFFERED NO ACTUAL RESISTANCE TO IRAN TAKING OVER ISLANDS, AND (B) IF THEY AS WELL AS SAUDIS AND HOPEFULLY KUWAITIS ALSO LIMITED THEIR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00844 01 OF 02 221205Z

PUBLIC OBJECTIONS TO RELATIVELY MODERATE STATEMENTS OF DISAPPROVAL AND AVOIDED INFLATING THE PROBLEM, THEN IRAN WOULD BE DISPOSED TO ACCORD THEM GENEROUS TREATMENT WITH RESPECT TO ECONOMIC AID, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, OIL, ETC. (THIS SEEMS TYPE OF "AGREEMENT" WITH SHEIKHS AND MODERATE ARABS WHICH GOI IS PRESENTLY THINKING ABOUT.)

(D) ZAHEDI THEN ASKED ME PRIVATELY WHAT I THOUGHT OF SHAH'S FEB 16 STATEMENT ON POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE TO TAKE GULF ISLANDS (REF B). I REPLIED SPEAKING PRIVATELY I THOUGHT IT MISTAKE BECAUSE AT THIS DELICATE TIME ANYTHING SAID PUBLICLY IN THIS SENSE COULD MAKE IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR SHEIKHS TO BE RESPONSIVE TO IRAN'S DESIRES. IT SEEMED TO ME IT WAS TIME FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY. ZAHEDI SAID HE THOUGHT SHAH'S STATEMENT WOULD STRENGTHEN BRITISH HAND AS IT WOULD ENABLE BRITISH TO GO BACK TO SHEIKHS AGAIN INDICATING IT CLEARER THAN EVER IRAN INTENDED TO HAVE ISLANDS AND THEREFORE SHEIKHS SHOULD MAKE BEST DEAL THEY COULD. THEN IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE HE ADDED SHAH'S REMARKS ON THIS TO CORRESPONDENT IN AIRCRAFT EN ROUTE SWITZERLAND HAD BEEN OFF-THE-RECORD. WHEN SAME EVENING ZAHEDI HAD HEARD ABOUT THEM THROUGH A PRESS DISPATCH, HE HAD CALLED SHAH AT MIDNIGHT SUGGESTING PUBLICATION BE BANNED, AT LEAST IN MACARTHUR.

NOTE BY OCVT: NOT PASSED.

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00844 02 OF 02 220807Z

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

013061

P R 220631 FEB 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3510
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEHRAN 844

EXDIS-NOFORN.

DEPT PASS COMIDEASTFOR AND CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA

IRAN. SHAH AGREED TO BAN UNTIL MATTER COULD BE CONSIDERED FURTHER. HOWEVER, REMARKS HAD BEEN WIDELY PUBLISHED ABROAD AND GOI FEARED ANY EFFORT TO BAN PUBLICATION WOULD SIMPLY LEAD SHEIKHS AND OTHERS TO BELIEVE SHAH DID NOT REALLY MEAN WHAT HE SAID SO PUBLICATION IN IRAN APPROVED. (THIS EXPLAINED TWO DAY LAG IN PUBLICATION IN IRAN.)

(E) I ASKED IF THERE WERE NOT STILL SOME WAY ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER ISLANDS COULD BE FUZZED INDEFINITELY. FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD IT YET BE POSSIBLE LEAVE IT IN ABEYANCE INDEFINITELY AND SUBSTITUTE FOR IT IRANIAN PRESENCE ON ISLANDS COUPLED WITH SEPARATE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OR AGREEMENTS REFERRING TO COMMON INTEREST OF SHEIKHS AND IRAN TO COOPERATE TO ASSURE PEACE, STABILITY AND SECURITY OF GULF? HE SAID THIS NOT RPT NOT IN CARDS BECAUSE IRAN IS DETERMINED TO NOT ONLY TO HAVE PRESENCE ON ISLANDS BUT ALSO TO MAKE CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT SOVEREIGNTY OVER ISLANDS IS IRAN'S SO THAT THERE WILL BE LATER NO MISCALCULATIONS ON PART OF RADICAL ARABS OR OTHERS THAT COULD LEAD TO CONFLICT. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE QUITE DISHONEST FOR IRAN, IN ORDER TO REACH A TEMPORARY AGREEMENT WITH SHEIKHDOMS, TO GIVE THE SHEIKHS IMPRESSION SOVEREIGNTY WOULD BE FUZZED FOREVER WHEN THIS WAS NOT THE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00844 02 OF 02 220807Z

CASE. IT WOULD PUT IRAN IN POSITION OF ACTING WITH DUPLICITY VIS-A-VIS SHEIKHS WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE OF ALL MODERATE GULF ARABS IN SHAH'S WORD RE LACK OF IRANIAN TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS, ETC. ALL GULF ARABS KNEW IRAN DETERMINED FOR VARIOUS SECURITY REASONS NEVER TO ABANDON ITS LEGITIMATE CLAIMS TO ISLANDS AND IT BETTER TO BE HONEST WITH GULF ARABS THAN DEVIOUS. COMMENT: FORMULA IN PARA 4, REF B, RE ISLANDS SEEMS CLEARLY NON-STARTER AT THIS JUNCTURE.)

(F) ZAHEDI CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WHEREAS ORIGINALLY SHAH HAD WANTED SAUDI'S TO SUPPORT WITH SHEIKHS IRAN'S CLAIM TO ISLANDS, AFTER REFLECTION, SHAH HAD DECIDED IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO URGE SAUDIS TO SUPPORT IRANIAN MOTION ON ISLANDS BECAUSE IT MIGHT MAKE FAISEL, WHOSE POSITION IS TODAY UNFORTUNATELY QUITE WEAK, MORE VULNERABLE TO ATTACKS BY RADICAL ARABS. THIS COULD FURTHER WEAKEN FAISEL.

2. POSSIBILITY OF IRAN, SAUDI, KUWAIT STATEMENT ON GULF (REF C).

(A) I NEXT REFERRED TO REPORTS THAT BRITISH MIGHT ISSUE STATEMENT RE WITHDRAWAL FROM GULF IN NEXT WEEK OR TWO. I ASKED ON PURELY PERSONAL BASIS WHETHER IRAN PLANNED SUBSEQUENTLY TO ISSUE STATEMENT REFERRING TO SHAH'S OFT REITERATED PUBLICLY EXPRESSED VIEW THAT AFTER BRITISH WITHDRAWAL PEACE AND STABILITY IN GULF SHOULD BE ASSURED BY CLOSE COOPERATION OF LITTORAL POWERS. IN SUCH EVENT I WONDERED WHETHER IRAN WOULD TRY TO GET SAUDI ARABIA AND PERHAPS KUWAIT ALSO TO SUBSCRIBE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF IMPORTANCE SHAH ATTACHES TO CLOSEST POSSIBLE IRAN-SAUDI COOPERATION. ZAHEDI SAID THIS WAS INTERESTING POSSIBILITY TO WHICH HE HAD NOT GIVEN THOUGHT. HE MADE SEVERAL NOTES ON A PAD SO I EMPHASIZED MY QUERY WAS PURELY A PERSONAL ONE TO WHICH HE REPLIED "OF COURSE." THEN SPEAKING "PERSONALLY" HE EXPRESSED TENTATIVE THOUGHT CONTEXT DEPENDING ON WHAT BRITISH SAID, SUCH A STATEMENT COULD BE USEFUL PARTICULARLY IF SAUDIS AND ALSO KUWAITIS COULD ALSO SUBSCRIBE TO IT. HE DID NOT KNOW IF SAUDIS WOULD FEEL IT POSSIBLE AND IF THEY DID NOT, IRAN WOULD UNDERSTAND. IT ALSO IMPORTANT THAT IF SAUDIS SUBSCRIBE, EFFORT BE MADE TO BRING KUWAIT IN TOO SO THAT KUWAITIS, WHO ARE QUITE SENSITIVE, WOULD NOT FEEL TOTALLY LEFT OUT OF PROMISE.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00844 02 OF 02 220807Z

(B) I OBSERVED THAT IF IRAN SHOULD TRY TO SELL SUCH STATEMENT TO SAUDIS, QUALITY OF SALESMAN WOULD BE IMPORTANT AND I COULD THINK OF NO BETTER SALESMAN WITH KING FAISEL THAN ZAHEDI HIMSELF. HE LAUGHED AND SAID HE WAS GOING TO THINK ABOUT ALL THIS AND THEN TURNED TO ANOTHER SUBJECT. (COMMENT: I HAD IMPRESSION ZAHEDI INTRIGUED WITH IDEA OF STATEMENT SUGGESTED IN (REF C) AND WILL (ON ASSUMPTION BRITISH ANNOUNCE WITHDRAWAL) PROBABLY FLOAT IT WITH SHAH AS HIS OWN IDEA, (WHICH IS AS IT SHOULD BE.) GP-3. MACARTHUR.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED COMIDEASTFOR AND CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

WA

$$\frac{2}{3}$$

71 FEB 16 PM 3:1

102117

902117

902117

100

10

10

ASSADOR

ASSADOR

ASSADOR
ME

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00774 161524Z

(MAKING POINT ABOUT IMPORTANCE OF FIVE YEAR AGREEMENT)
WHICH I COULD CONVEY IN WRITING TO FONMIN FOR ONWARD
TRANSMISSION TO SHAH IN SWITZERLAND.
GP-3
MACARTHUR

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0602/01/108

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 104 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET **326**

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00738 131441Z

50
ACTION: SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCEL-00 /046 W

091090

O R 131300Z FEB 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3458
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T TEHRAN 0738

EXDISE

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION; MESSAGE FROM GOVTS.

REF: (A) STATE 24735; (B) TEHRAN 722

1. BELIEVE SUGGESTION IN PARA 2 REFTEL A RE POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO HEADS OF STATE VISITED BY UNSEC IS, IF DEVELOPMENTS MAKE IT APPROPRIATE, AN EXCELLENT IDEA. OUR SUGGESTION (REFTEL B) THAT IN ANY MESSAGE OR STATEMENT WE SHOULD TRY TO SAY SOMETHING TO HELP NAIL DOWN ASSURANCES OF FIVE-YEAR PERIOD WAS NOT RPT NOT INTENDED TO IMPLY WE SHOULD GO INTO ANY DETAIL ON QUESTION OF ASSURANCES. RATHER WE MEANT REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO OUR SATISFACTION THAT AGREEMENT IS FOR FIVE YEAR PERIOD WHICH WILL BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TO PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS IN HELPING TO ESTABLISH STABLE PRICES WITHIN TERMS OF AGREEMENT. WE BELIEVE

THAT A PHRASE OR CLAUSE TO THIS EFFECT COULD VERY USE-
FULLY AND PROPERLY BE INCLUDED WITHOUT GETTING INTO
COMPLEX DETAILS OF ASSURANCES THEMSELVES AND WOULD NOT
AROUSE ANY ADVERSE OR COUNTERPRODUCTIVE REACTION.

2. IN ADDITION TO ANY MESSAGE SENT TO HEADS OF STATE, WE ALSO BELIEVE DEPT SHOULD HAVE STATEMENT READY TO USE IN

SECRET

25

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00738 131441Z

REPLY TO PRESS QUERIES IF, AS EXPECTED, AGREEMENT IS REACHED. IN ANY SUCH STATEMENT WE ALSO THINK IT DESIRABLE TO EXPRESS SATISFACTION THAT AGREEMENT IS FOR FIVE YEARS ALONG LINES IN PARA ONE ABOVE. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE LANGUAGE WHICH ON ONE HAND MIGHT AT SOME FUTURE TIME BE USEFUL IF ASSURANCE CONTAINED IN AGREEMENT SEEMED ON POINT OF ERODING AWAY AND ON OTHER HAND AVOIDS GETTING INTO DETAILS OF ASSURANCES THEMSELVES OR IMPLYING THAT PRICE OF GULF PETROLEUM WILL BE FIXED AS OF NOW AT PRESENT LEVELS WHICH WILL NOT BE CASE GIVEN ESCALATORY CLAUSES CONTAINED IN AGREEMENT.

3. GOI IS SHOOTING FOR ANNOUNCEMENT THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON EVENING FEB 13 OR MORNING FEB 14. IF THIS TIMETABLE MET, DEPT WILL PROBABLY BE FACED WITH PRESS QUERIES MONDAY, FEB 15. IN VIEW OF PARAMOUNT ROLE SHAH HAS PLAYED, WE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING ABLE TO COMMENT ON DEPT'S STATEMENT AND/OR ANY LETTERS SENT TO HEADS OF STATE OF COUNTRIES UNSEC VISITED BEFORE RELEASED IF TIME PERMITS. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

SECRET

25

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

501/10/7090

State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 337

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00571 050801Z

12
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

027247

O 031810Z FEB 71 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3372
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION NATO
EC BRUSSELS
OECD PARIS

S E C R E T TEHRAN 571

EXDIS

SUBJ: OIL SITUATION

REF: TEHRAN 0559

1. ALAM CALLED BRITISH AMB WRIGHT LATE THIS AFTERNOON SAYING HE HAD REPORTED TO SHAH ON POINTS WRIGHT AND I HAD MADE EARLIER TODAY (REFTEL). ALAM ADDED HE "THOUGHT" THINGS WOULD BE ALRIGHT (IMPLYING I GATHER SOME MORE TIME WOULD BE GIVEN).

2. AT TELEVISED OPEC MEETING TONIGHT AND AT SHAH'S PRESS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00571 050801Z

CONFERENCE WHICH FOLLOWED (ALSO TELEVISED), NO RESOLUTION WAS TABLED AND SHAH ASSIDUOUSLY AVOIDED GETTING PINNED DOWN ON QUESTION OF UNILATERAL ACTION. IN EFFECT HE INDICATED A LEGISLATED SOLUTION WOULD BE PUT FORWARD BY OPEC BUT THAT EFFECTIVE DATE OF SUCH LEGISLATION WOULD BE DECIDED BY OPEC COMMITTEE, IMPLYING THAT IF AGREEMENT WAS SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED BEFORE EFFECTIVE DATE WHICH MET PRODUCERS ASPIRATIONS, SO MUCH THE BETTER.

3. WE ARE KEEPING OUR FINGERS CROSSED BUT BELIEVE SHAH HAS AT LEAST HAD SOME SECOND THOUGHT AS RESULT OF REPRESENTATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE BY CONSUMER GOVERNMENTS, PARTICULARLY US AND UK.

4. 4. "QUOTE" FROM TEHRAN WITH L--- "UNQUOTE"
MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE

N OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

901/10/2490

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 107 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched atop a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

SECRET 410

11
ACTION SS-45

008471

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 FEB 3 PM 4:22

EXDIS

REF: STATE 18185

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

SECRET

WAS THAT STABILITY OF OIL SUPPLY TO FREE WORLD NOT BE
JEOPARDIZED BY UNILATERAL ACTION. I SAID IT SEEMED TO
ME HEART OF PROBLEM WAS QUESTION OF ASSURANCES. I
RECOGNIZED THERE HAD NOT BEEN AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT
AND I WAS NOT A LAWYER BUT WITH MORE TIME I FELT THIS
COULD BE SORTED OUT. I WENT ON TO MAKE POINT THAT
MORE TIME TO REACH AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT COST IRAN OR
PRODUCER GOVTS ANYTHING BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH I COULD NOT
SPEAK FOR COMPANIES, I FELT QUITE SURE THAT OIL
COMPANIES WOULD AGREE TO MAKE JAN 1, 1971, EFFECTIVE
DATE FOR AN AGREEMENT. STRATHALMOND HAD PRIVATELY SUGGESTED
THIS TO AMOUZEGAR (TEHRAN 497, PARA 2). ALAM SAID, "YOU
MEAN AN AGREE-
MENT REACHED A BIT LATER COULD BE RETROACTIVE TO JAN 1,"
AND I REPLIED THAT THIS WAS MY VIEW. ALAM SAID HE WOULD
REPORT WHAT I HAD SAID TO HIS MAJESTY AND CALL ME BACK
LATER.

3. GERMAN AMB HAS JUST CALLED ME AND I BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON MY TALKS WITH ZAHEDI YESTERDAY AND ALAM THIS MORNING. HE SAID HE HAD SEEN AMOUZEGAR YESTERDAY EXPRESSING STRONG HOPE THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT AND THAT NOTHING WOULD BE DONE TO IMPAIR OIL SUPPLY FOR CONSUMING NATIONS. HE ALSO SAID A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WOULD REDOUND TO PRESTIGE OF SHAH. AMOUZEGAR (WHO HAS GERMAN WIFE) WAS POLITE AND FRIENDLY BUT SAID, "IT'S ALL UP TO THE OTHER SIDE." BRITISH AMB ALSO MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO ALAM THIS MORNING PARALLELING MINE.

SECRET

0602/01/108

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 906

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00540 021540Z

53
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

O 021440Z FEB 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3357
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T TEHRAN 540

EXDIS

NOFORN

SUBJ: OIL SITUATION

REF: STATE 17387

1. HAD TWO AND HALF HOUR LUNCHEON MEETING ALONE WITH
FONMIN ZAHEDI TODAY (FEB 2) BEFORE RECEIPT REFTEL.
HE MENTIONED HE HAD JUST COME FROM SEEING SHAH WHERE
OIL WAS ONE OF PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS. I SAID TO HIM THAT
I WAS DEEPLY WORRIED AND CONCERNED ABOUT OIL TALKS HERE
BECAUSE IF THEY BROKE DOWN AND OPEC TOOK UNILATERAL
ACTION THERE WOULD INEVITABLY BE MAJOR AND UNHAPPY
REPERCUSSIONS IN RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN IRAN AND OTHER
GULF PRODUCERS AND CONSUMER NATIONS. IN SUCH UNHAPPY
EVENT HE AND I WOULD HAVE TO PUT BACK TOGETHER BROKEN
CHINA WHICH MIGHT BE UNMANAGEABLE TASK. ACCORDINGLY
I HOPED MOST EARNESTLY THAT BEFORE ANY DECISION WAS
TAKEN BY GOI TO PROCEED TO UNILATERAL OPEC ACTION, THE
CONSEQUENCES, IN TERMS OF RELATIONS OF IRAN AND OTHER
MODERATE GULF PRODUCERS WITH FREE WORLD CONSUMER NATIONS
WOULD BE WEIGHED MOST CAREFULLY. IN MY HUMBLE JUDGEMENT
ONLY MOSCOW AND RADICAL ARABS WOULD BENEFIT FROM A
BREAK IN TALKS AND YET IT WAS PRECISELY MOSCOW AND
RADICAL ARABS THAT SHAH, PRIME MINISTER AND ZAHEDI
HIMSELF HAD ASSURED ME REPRESENTED GREATEST THREAT

SECRET
32

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
002116

71 FEB 2 PM 2:35

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00540 021540Z

TO IRAN.

2. ZAHEDI SAID HE SHARED MY "DEVOUT WISH" THAT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED. HE ALSO AGREED THAT MOSCOW WOULD BE PRIMARY BENEFICIARY AND, ACCORDINGLY, HAD REQUESTED EMBASSY MOSCOW TO CABLE SUMMARIES AND QUOTES OF SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF OIL DISPUTE WHICH HE HAD GIVEN TO SHAH THIS MORNING.

3. I SAID I HOPED HE WOULD USE HIS INFLUENCE IN FAVOR OF A COMPROMISE SOLUTION AND HE REPLIED HE WISHED TO BE HELPFUL. I SUGGESTED THAT IF SOME NEW ELEMENT WERE NEEDED TO GET BY THE OPEC PLENARY TOMORROW, I THOUGHT THERE WAS ONE READILY AVAILABLE. THIS WAS PRIVATE SUGGESTION I UNDERSTOOD STRATHALMOND HAD MADE TO AMOUZEGAR THAT EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OPEC GULF PRODUCERS AND COMPANIES COULD BE ABOUT JANUARY ONE, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL TIME FOR FURTHER TALKS (TEHRAN 497 PARA 2.) FURTHERMORE I PERSONALLY FELT COMPANIES WOULD NOT OBJECT TO SOME REASONABLE CUT-OFF DATE FOR TALKS AFTER FEB 3 IF GULF PRODUCERS AGREED TO CONTINUE TALKS. TO ME IT SEEMED UNTHINKABLE THAT TALKS SHOULD COME TO TRAGIC END WHEN THERE WAS BASICALLY A CONSIDERABLE AREA OF AGREEMENT, WHEN COMPANIES HAD ALREADY CEDED ON PROCEDURAL QUESTION OF SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH GULF PRODUCERS AND WHEN FROM COMPANY SIDE WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS CLARIFICATION OF ASSURANCES AGAINST LEAP-FROGGING TO WHICH SHAH HAD PUBLICLY COMMITTED HIMSELF. WHILE I WAS TALKING ZAHEDI MADE SOME NOTES ON A PAD AND I THINK HE WILL PASS ON AT LEAST GIST OF WHAT I SAID. HE COMMENTED CONFIDENTIALLY THAT SHAH HAD ASKED HIM TO ATTEND LUNCH FOR FULL OPEC GROUP TOMORROW AND HE HAD REPLIED SUGGESTING IT MIGHT BE BETTER FOR HIM NOT TO ATTEND SINCE IF THERE WERE INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS FROM OIL TALKS, HE COULD BE MORE USEFUL IF HE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE COMMITTED FROM OUTSET TO OPEC GROUP AS SUCH RATHER THAN TO IRAN AS ITS FOREIGN MINISTER. SHAH SAID HE WOULD THINK ABOUT THIS AND ZAHEDI SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER HE WOULD BE DIRECTED TO ATTEND LUNCH OR NOT. WHILE HE MADE NO COMMITMENT TO SPECIFIC ACTION, HE SAID SUCH INFLUENCE AS HE HAD WOULD BE USED IN FAVOR

SECRET

TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



TELEGRAM

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00540 021540Z

4. COMMENT; ZAHEDI IS CLEARLY MOST SYMPATHETIC AND WANTS COMPROMISE SOLUTION. I THINK THRUST OF WHAT I SAID WILL BE REPORTED BACK TO PALACE AND PERHAPS TO PRIMIN HOVEYDA. THEREFORE DO NOT THINK THERE IS ANYTHING FURTHER I CAN USEFULLY DO UNTIL WE HEAR O T. COME OF TODAY'S MEETING WHICH NOW HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO THIS EVENING.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

RECEIVED
WHCA

1971 FEB 2 15 35

Bonesson
SAC WDC

SECRET

HCE322

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00538 021512Z

45-42
ACTION E-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 NEA-13 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 USIE-00
COM-08 INT-06 JUS-02 OEP-01 IO-13 ARA-12 AF-12
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10
P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 TRSY-11 RSR-01 /169 W
----- 001875

O 021430Z FEB 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3355
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

S E C R E T TEHRAN 538

DEPARTMENT PASS AS APPROPRIATE

SUBJ: OIL SITUATION

1. AT FEB 2 MORNING SESSION OPEC REPS TABLED THEIR QUOTE
ROCK BOTTOM UNQUOTE DEMANDS AND BOTH SIDES CONSIDERED TEXT
OF ASSURANCES THAT LAWYERS HAD WORKED OUT OVERNIGHT.

2. PRINCIPAL DEMANDS OF OPEC GULF COMMITTEE AS GIVEN US
BY COMPANY REPS ARE:

QUOTE (A) FIVE YEAR DEAL

(1) ACCEPT 55 PERCENT TAX.

(2) FOR COMBINED ITEMS 2 AND 3 OF OPEC RESOLUTION 120 A PRICE
OF 35 CENTS PER BARREL.

(3) GRAVITY FOR CRUDES BETWEEN 40 DEGREE AND 30 DEGREE ONE
AND A HALF CENT BARREL PER DEGREE DIFFERENTIAL WITH HALF
CENT. PAYMENT PER TENTH DEGREE. SIDE NOTES FROM APPROPRIATE
COUNTRIES SAYING FOR EXAMPLE QUOTE SAUDI ARABIA UNQUOTE
IS PREPARED TO DEAL IN NEGOTIATION WITH ARAMCO AS TO
THE PRICE OF 31 DEGREE AND 27 DEGREE OIL AND FAILING THE
GENERAL FORMULA OF ONE AND A HALF CENT WILL BE APPLIED.

(4) INFLATION FACTOR 3 PERCENT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00538 021512Z

(5) MORATORIUM FACTOR 5CENT. THIS IS THE DESIGNATION THEY HAVE SELECTED FOR SHAH'S POINT.
(6) ELIMINATION OPEC ALLOWANCES.
(7) EFFECTIVE DATE JANUARY 1ST 1971.
(8) EFFECTIVE DATE JANUARY 1ST 1971.
(8) AGREE TO THE REMOVAL OF DISPARITIES ON GULF CRUDES. WE BELIEVE THIS MAY BE COVERED BY FORM OF LETTER UNDER (3) BUT MUST BE CLARIFIED.
(B) ONE YEAR DEAL
(1) 40 CENT PER BARREL.
(2) ALL OTHER FACTORS SAME AS FIVE YEAR DEAL, EXCEPT MORATORIUM ITEM IS DROPPED. INFLATION FACTOR INCLUDED IN ONE YEAR DEAL SINCE THEY SAY THEY MAY CHOOSE NOT TO REOPEN CRUDE PRICE AT END OF FIRST YEAR. UNQUOTE.

3. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MESSAGE HAS TEXT OF ASSURANCES STATEMENT TOGETHER WITH MESSAGE FROM STRATHALMOND TO LONDON PRINCIPALS IN EFFECT RECOMMENDING THEIR ACCEPTANCE AS BEST POSSIBLE DEAL IN CIRCUMSTANCES.

4. NEGOTIATORS NOW AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS FROM LONDON PRINCIPALS WHO WE UNDERSTAND ARE MEETING THIS AFTERNOON. NEGOTIATIONS IN TEHRAN ARE EXPECTED TO RESUME FOR WHAT SHOULD BE FINAL SESSION LATER THIS EVENING.

5. MEANWHILE GOI IS PREPARING FOR OPEC MEETING WITH OPENING SESSION SCHEDULED FOR 1000 HRS FEB 3, LUNCHEON WITH SHAH, FOLLOWED BY JOINT SESSION MAJLIS AT 1600 HRS WHICH SHAH PLANS ADDRESS WITH OPEC MINISTERS AS GUESTS. THIS SHOULD PROVIDE FORUM FOR SHAH TO HAIL OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS IF AGREEMENT REACHED OR TO ANNOUNCE INTRODUCTION OF VENEZUELAN FORMULA IF NEGOTIATIONS BREAK DOWN.
MACARTHUR

SECRET

SECRET

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 111 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 FEB 1 AM 8:27

91
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

119643:

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEHRAN 497

EXDIS

7. AMBASSADOR WRIGHT RETREATED AND SAID WHAT HE HAD IN MIND WAS "INFORMAL" APPROACH TO ALAM AND ZAHEDI AND NOT A FORMAL DEMARCHE ON BEHALF OF GOVERNMENTS. I SAID I DISAGREED IN UTILITY OF SIMPLY GOING THROUGH THE FORMALITY OF AN APPROACH AND PREFERRED TO KEEP OUR POWDER DRY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS WE HAD TO USE IT. (AMBASSADOR WRIGHT ASKED ME WHAT I WOULD REPLY IF COURT MINISTER ALAM CALLED ME AND ASKED ME ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID IF HE TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN CALLING ME, I WOULD SAY THAT WE FELT (A) THE COMPANIES WERE SINCERE AND SERIOUS IN THEIR DESIRE TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT, (B) THAT ARTIFICIAL DEADLINES WERE WRONG AND SERVED NO USEFUL PURPOSE, AND (C) THAT WE TRUSTED THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF A LONG-TERM AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF BOTH PRODUCER AND CONSUMER COUNTRIES BY ARTIFICIAL DEADLINES WHICH SOME EXTREMISTS MIGHT TRY TO INSIST ON FOR THEIR OWN REASONS. WRIGHT, STRATHALMOND AND DECRANE PROFESSED TO UNDERSTAND AND AGREE.

3. STRATHALMOND SAID HE APPRECIATED THE FRANKNESS WITH WHICH HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK AND HE WANTED US TO KNOW THAT HE COULD NOT RECOMMEND TO HIS PRINCIPALS FURTHER CONCESSIONS. UNLESS HE COULD KNOW THAT THE IRANIAN ASSURANCES FOR THE DURABILITY OF A FIVE-YEAR OVER-ALL AGREEMENT WERE REASONABLY DEPENDABLE.

AT THIS JUNCTION HE HAD DEFINITE DOUBTS AND RESERVATIONS ABOUT
DEPENDABILITY OF ASSURANCES IRANIANS HAD
OFFERED AND HIS LEGAL ADVISERS WERE CONTINUING TO PROBE ON THIS
SUBJECT. HE INDICATED THAT IF, WHEN HE MET LATER THIS EVENING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00497 02 OF 02 010010Z

WITH GULF OPEC PRODUCERS, THERE WERE NO CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENTS HE MIGHT FEEL OBLIGED TO TELL THEM THAT COMPANIES HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO OFFER.

9. I SAID THAT IF HE WERE SUGGESTING HE WOULD SAY SOMETHING TO TERMINATE THE NEGOTIATIONS, I PERSONALLY BELIEVED IT WOULD BE A GRAVE ERROR ON COMPANIES' PART. IT SEEMED TO ME COMPANIES SHOULD KEEP NEGOTIATIONS IN PLAY AND IF A BREAK CAME, SHOULD PRESENT THE BEST POSSIBLE IMAGE TO THE WORLD. (HE HASTENED TO SAY HE WAS NOT CONTEMPLATING SAYING ANYTHING LATER THIS EVENING THAT COULD BE

CONSTRUED AS BREAKING OFF NEGOTIATIONS.) I REFERRED TO HIS ACCOUNT OF MEETING WITH AMUZEGAR THIS MORNING WHEN HE TOLD US HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS WERE PERMITTED TO RUN THEIR COURSE BEYOND FEBRUARY 3, THE EFFECTIVE DATE (FOR PAYMENTS) COULD BEGIN JANUARY 1 WHICH WOULD PROTECT GULF

PRODUCERS FROM LOSS THROUGH DELAY IN FINAL AGREEMENT. I FELT THAT IF A BREAK HAD TO COME BETWEEN COMPANIES AND GULF PRODUCERS WITH ALL THE CONSEQUENCES THAT MIGHT ENSUE, IT SEEMED VERY IMPORTANT THAT COMPANIES PRESENT MOST FORTHCOMING AND POSITIVE IMAGE. THIS THEY COULD HELP TO DO BY MAKING CLEAR, IF NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT BE CONCLUDED BY FEBRUARY 3, THAT THEIR AGREEMENT WOULD BE RETROACTIVE TO JANUARY 1, AS STRATHALMOND HAD SUGGESTED, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE A CUT-OFF DATE, PERHAPS A MONTH, BEYOND WHICH A NEW SITUATION WOULD ENSUE. THIS WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO WORLD OPINION THAT PRODUCER COUNTRIES WOULD LOSE NOTHING BY CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS BEYOND FEB. 3.

10 STRATHALMOND SAID HIS GREATEST CONCERN WAS PROTECTION AGAINST LEAP FROGGING AND SUCH PROTECTION DEPENDED ON THE VALIDITY OF A FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENT TO WHICH THE SHAH HAD COMMITTED HIMSELF. THERE WAS ONE THING THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE QUITE CLEAR. THIS WAS THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD HE, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP, SIGN ANY AGREEMENT UNLESS THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS ALSO SIGNED WITH HIM. HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY REFER TO ANTI-TRUST PROBLEM BUT MAY HAVE HAD IT PARTLY IN MIND.) HE AND DECRANE LEFT THE EMBASSY TO HEAD BACK FOR ANOTHER MEETING THIS EVENING WITH THE PEC.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00497 02 OF 02 010010Z

GULF PRODUCERS. LATER THEY CALLED US TO SAY MEETING
HAD BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING.

11. MY OWN DEFINITE FEELING IS THAT THE COMPANIES HAVE NOT
REPEAT NOT YET DEVELOPED NEGOTIATIONS TO POINT WHERE WE CAN SEE
CLEARLY A SOUND BASIS FOR ANY INTERVENTION AT GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL.
WHILE UK AMBASSADOR WRIGHT AND STRATHALMOND INITIALLY SUGGESTED
AN AMBASSADORIAL APPROACH TO GOI, I THINK ON REFLECTION THEY
AGREED IT WOULD ACCOMPLISH NOTHING AND IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES
MIGHT HARDEN FURTHER SHAH'S POSITION. OUR SUGGESTION TO NEGOTIATORS
WAS THAT THEY SHOULD, AS THEY INTENDED, GO AHEAD AND PROBE
VALIDITY OF ASSURANCES WHICH SHAH HAD GIVEN UNDERSEC IRWIN
AND LATER AFFIRMED PUBLICLY RE A DEPENDABLE FIVE YEAR AGREEMENT.
IF SUCH PROBING INDICATED THAT REASONABLY VALID ASSURANCES WOULD
NOT BE FORTHCOMING FROM GULF PRODUCERS, A DIFFERENT SITUATION MIGHT
ENSUE WHICH MIGHT PERMIT A VALID APPROACH ON GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL.

12. WHILE DICTATING THIS MESSAGE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR CALLED
SAYING HE UNDER URGENT INSTRUCTIONS TO CONSULT WITH US WITH A
VIEW TO A PARALLEL DEMARCHE TO GOI. I SENT WORD BACK THAT NEGOTI-
ATIONS BETWEEN THE COMPANIES AND PRODUCERS WERE STILL IN PROGRESS,
BUT I WOULD BE HAPPY SEE HIM TOMORROW MORNING. WOULD APPRECIATE
DEPT'S SUGGESTIONS ASAP RE MEETING TOMORROW MORNING WITH
JAPANESE AMB.

GP-3
MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 150

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00495 301530Z

44
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

115325

O 301400Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3339
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

SECRET TEHRAN 495

EXDIS

SUBJ: OIL SITUATION

REF: (A) STATE 16444
(B) TEHRAN 480
(C) TEHRAN 301

1. AS INDICATED IN REF B, AMERICAN OIL COMPANY NEGOTIATORS HAVE, IN CONNECTION WITH CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT NO RPT NO ASSURANCES THAT SHAH GIVES ON FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENT ARE WORTH MUCH. IN MY FIRST BRIEFING OF PIERCY (ESSO) AND STRATHALMOND JAN 19 (REF C) PIERCY TOOK THIS POSITION, WHICH AS ECHOED BY US COMPANY REPS YESTERDAY (REF B).

2. AMERICAN OIL REPS ADVANCE FOLLOWING REASONS TO SUPPORT THEIR CONVICTION THAT ASSURANCES NOT WORTH MUCH:

(A) THEY CLAIM IRAN HAS NOT ABIDED BY AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED IN EARLY FIFTIES AT END OF MOSSADEGH PERIOD;
(B) FACT THAT DESPITE EXISTING AGREEMENTS, THERE HAS FOR PAST SEVERAL YEARS BEEN ANNUAL CONFRONTATION BETWEEN CONSORTIUM AND GOI WITH GOI INSISTING ON NEW MEASURES TO INCREASE ITS BENEFITS, PARTICULARLY THROUGH INCREASED OFFTAKE.

(C) SHAH'S INSISTENCE ON ESCALATION CLAUSE TO PROTECT IRAN AGAINST INFLATION IN WEST IN ITSELF MEANS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

JAN 31 AM 9:21

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00495 301530Z

THAT PRICE FOR OIL WHICH GULF PRODUCERS AGREE TO WILL NOT BE FIXED BUT WILL BE SUBJECT TO UPWARD FLUCTUATION:
(D) DITTO FOR GULF PRODUCERS INSISTENCE ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRICE OF CRUDE AND PRICE COMPANIES CHARGE CONSUMERS;

(E) AND, FINALLY, DEEP INGRAINED FEELING ON PART OF AMERICAN COMPANY REPS THAT NO RPT NO ASSURANCE FROM SHAH OR GULF PRODUCERS IS WORTH VERY MUCH AND THAT EVEN IF AGREEMENT REACHED ON PRICE, GOI WILL CONTINUE TO PUT PRESSURE ON CONSORTIUM MEMBERS FOR INCREASED OFFLIFT.

3. WE HAVE NO RPT NO INDICATION THAT AMOUZEGAR HAS WATERED DOWN ASSURANCES EXPRESSED TO UNSEC IRWIN AND ME AGAINST WHIPSAW OR THAT HE IS WEAKENING ON FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, AS I PUT SQUARELY TO US COMPANY REPS IN MEETING YESTERDAY (REF B), WHETHER OR NOT CONDITIONS (PARA 2 ABOVE) IRAN AND GULF OPEC GROUP HAVE PUT FORWARD AS ESSENTIAL TO AN AGREEMENT WOULD AS A PRACTICAL MATTER COMPROMISE VALIDITY OF ASSURANCES FOR FIVE-YEAR PERIOD WOULD SEEM TO DEPEND ON ACTUAL TERMS WHICH ARE AGREED BETWEEN TWO PARTIES. YESTERDAY AMERICAN COMPANY REPS SEEMED EITHER NOT WELL INFORMED OR DISINGENUOUS WHEN THEY SAID TO ME THAT "AMOUZEGAR HAS RAISED NEW CONDITIONS SINCE HIS TALK WITH UNSEC IRWIN THAT INVALIDATE SHAH'S ASSURANCES RE FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENT." THEY CITED AS BASIS OF THIS ASSERTION IRANIAN INSISTENCE ON A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRUDE PRICES AND CONSUMER PRICES. THIS PROPOSAL, AS I POINTED OUT TO THEM (REF B), HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR TO UNSEC AND ME BOTH BY SHAH AND AMOUZEGAR IN JAN 18 MEETING AND I HAD CONVEYED IT, AS WELL AS OTHER IRANIAN POSITIONS IN DETAIL TO PIERCY AND STRATHALMOND WHEN I BRIEFED THEM FOR OVER AN HOUR JAN 19 SO THAT THEY WOULD KNOW PRECISELY WHAT THEY WOULD BE UP AGAINST.

4. IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING I DO NOT RPT NOT THINK A QUERY OF AMOUZEGAR WOULD ELICIT MORE THAN RENEWED ASSURANCE THAT GOI AND OTHER OPEC GULF PRODUCERS ARE WILLING TO SUBSCRIBE TO A FIVE YEAR AGREEMENT IF SATISFACTORY OVER-ALL AGREEMENT REACHED WITH COMPANIES. I RECOGNIZE OF COURSE THAT SOME OF RELATED CONDITIONS (PARA 2 ABOVE) BY THEIR VERY NATURE DO PROVIDE FOR SOME

SECRET

11

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00495 301530Z

CHANGE IN PRICES EVEN IF THERE IS A FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENT. HOWEVER COMPANY REPS ARE FULLY AWARE OF THIS AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THESE ARE THINGS THAT THEY SHOULD TRY TO TIE DOWN IN THEIR NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE POINTS TO GET BEST DEAL POSSIBLE. THEY DO NOT AFFECT SHAH'S COMMITMENT TO GIVE FIVE YEAR ASSURANCES SUBJECT TO SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON CONDITIONS HE ATTACHES.

5. INSOFAR AS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMPANIES' OFFER FOR POSTED PRICE INCREASES OF 15 CENTS AND INITIAL GULF PRODUCERS' DEMAND OF 54 CENTS ARE CONCERNED, WE NOTICE THAT GERMANS (BONN 1080, PARA 1) AS WELL AS OTHERS BELIEVE COMPANY OFFER SUBSTANTIALLY TOO LOW TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO GULF PRODUCERS. WE ALSO RECALL THAT AMOUZEGAR COMMENTED PRIVATELY TO US THAT IN BARGAINING OVER POST PRICE INCREASE HE EXPECTED COMPANIES WOULD ASK A FIGURE SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW WHAT GULF PRODUCERS WOULD ACCEPT, WHEREAS GULF PRODUCERS WOULD ADVANCE A FIGURE SUBSTANTIALLY ABOVE WHAT THEY KNOW COMPANIES COULD ACCEPT AND THAT THIS INVOLVED USUAL TYPE OF BARGAINING THAT WENT ON IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

GP-3

MACARTHUR

SECRET

17

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 129

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00494 301454Z

46
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

P R 301425Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3338
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T TEHRAN 494

EXDIS

SUBJ: GOI ARMS LOANS TO SAG

REF: TEHRAN 481

WE JUST INFORMED BY FORNMIN OFFICIAL PRIVATELY THAT SAUDI
AMBASSADOR DURING CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI TODAY (JAN 30)
SAID SAD HAD DECIDED RETURN AA GUNS AND RECOILLESS RIFLES
LOANED TO IT BY GOI. OFFICIAL NOTIFIED US IN ORDER HALT
ACTION REQUESTED REFTEL, BUT ASKED WE KEEP INFO TO OURSELVES
UNTIL FORMALLY NOTIFIED BY MINISTRY.
MACARTHUR

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
115488

JAN 31 9:10 AM

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 087

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00481 301210Z

12
ACTION SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

0 301130Z JAN 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3334
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

SECRET TEHRAN 0481

EXDIS

FOR NEA/IRN MIKLOS: DELIVER 0900 JANUARY 30

SUBJ: EXTENDING GOI ARMS LOANS TO SAG

REF: STATE 008023

1. FOREIGN MINISTER HAS ASKED IF THERE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPMENTS IN USG CONSIDERATIONS RE AA GUN AND RECOILLESS RIFLE LOAN EXTENSIONS TO SAG OR POSSIBLE SUBSTITUTE MEASURES (REPORTED REFTEL, SUBSTANCE OF WHICH WE GAVE MINISTRY). SAUDI AMBASSADOR HAS ASKED TO CALL IN NEXT DAY OR TWO AND MINISTER EXPECTS SUBJECT OF LOAN RENEWAL MAY BE RAISED.
2. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WE MIGHT PASS TO MINISTER FOR RESPONSE TO SAG QUERY. OUR OWN RECOMMENDATION, SUBJECT, OF COURSE, TO AMB. THACHER'S CONCURRENCE, WOULD BE TO EXTEND BOTH AGREEMENTS FOR ONE YEAR FROM FEBRUARY 1.
GP-3.
MACARTHUR

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 JAN 30 PM 4:38

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two stars.

Wif

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00465 292019Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046. W

O P 281730Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3328
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION OECD PARIS
AMEMBASSY THEHAGUE

S E C R E T TEHRAN 465

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION; SECOND GULF NEGOTIATING SESSION.

1. INDUSTRY TEAM MET WITH OPEC GULF COMMITTEE FOR 3 1/2 HOURS BEGINNING 2:30 PM LOCAL JAN 29. TEAM REPORT WILL NOT RPT NOT BE AVAILABLE HERE UNTIL TOMORROW JAN 30 BUT STRATHALMOND BRIEFED US AND UK EMBOFFS AS FOLLOWS:

2. ATMOSPHERE FRIENDLY AND CORDIAL WITH FEW OUTBREAKS OF TEMPER. STRATHALMOND DESCRIBED TEAM'S APPROACH AS FRANKLY TRYING TO GET THE GULF COMMITTEE TO SET FORTH WHAT THEY REALLY WANT. THERE WERE SOME DIFFICULT MOMENTS AND SOME VERY HARD NUTS TO TRY TO CRACK BUT INDUSTRY TEAM IS SENDING FOLLOWING SET OF RECOMMENDED GOALS BASED ON TODAY'S DISCUSSION AND ASKING AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE TOWARD THESE GOALS.

A. POSTED PRICE: GLOBAL INCREASE OF 30 CENTS PER/BBL. STRATHALMOND ASKED AMUZEGAR PRIVATELY WHAT A 20 CENT OFFER WOULD BRING. AMUZEGAR RESPONDED WITH 44 CENTS. (FYI TEAM'S BEST GUESS IS THAT 30 CENT FIGURE IS LOWEST THEY CAN ACHIEVE AND THEY MAY HAVE TO

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00465 292019Z

GIVE WAY TO 35 CENTS BUT THEY ARE NOT SO RECOMMENDING AT THIS TIME.
PROTECT SOURCE.)

B. CRUDE/PRODUCT PRICE RELATIONSHIP: AFTER LONG DISCUSSION, GULF COMMITTEE AGREED TENTATIVELY THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT A 1 TO 3 1/2 PER CENT INCREASE IN PRICE TO TAKE THE PLACE OF PRICE RELATIVITY. TEAM IS RECOMMENDING ATTEMPTING ACHIEVE 2 PERCENT PRICE INCREASE. AMUZEGAR SAID PRIVATELY HE THOUGHT SHAH WOULD BACK AWAY FROM HIS ORIGINAL CONCEPT ON THIS BASIS.

C. INFLATIONARY INDEX: DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT REVOLVED AROUND PER/BARREL FIGURE. COMPANY REPS OFFERED 3 CENT INCREASE YEARLY, OPEC COMMITTEE COUNTERED WITH 7 CENTS. TEAM BELIEVES THEY CAN GET BY WITH 4 CENT INCREASE PER YEAR. RTD. OPEC ALLOWANCE: (REMOVAL OPEC ALLOWANCE DEMANDED PARA. 5 OF RES. 120) COMPANIES AGREE THEY MUST CONCEDE ON THIS POINT.

E. GRAVITY ALLOWANCE: ATTEMPT ACHIEVE GRAVITY ALLOWANCE SYSTEM SIMILAR TO SEPTEMBER 1970 LIBYAN PATTERN BUT WITH NO DISCOUNTS APPLICABLE BELOW 30 DEGREE MARK. (GULF COMMITTEE SAY THEY WILL ACCEPT NO CHANGE FROM LIBYA FORMULA BUT INTRODUCTION OF 30 DEGREE MARK. (HOPEFULLY 32) WILL WORK TO ADVANTAGE OF LOW GRAVITY CRUDE PRODUCERS, E.G. KUWAIT.)

F. SHORT HAUL CRUDES: NO POSSIBILITY EXISTS OF GETTING DEAL ON POSTED PRICE FOR EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN GULF CRUDE. HOWEVER, WHEN PRESSED HARD, YAMANI INDICATED THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD NOT USE ANY LIBYAN SETTLEMENT TO ATTEMPT TO RAISE RAS TANURA POSTED PRICE.

3. TOTAL ADDITIONAL REVENUE TO GULF PRODUCERS IS ESTIMATED BY COMPANIES TO BE \$1.2 BILLION FOR GULF ALONE.

4. KIRSCHER (CONTINENTAL) AND DE CRANE (TEXACO) LEAVING FOR LONDON TONIGHT TO PRESENT RECOMMENDATIONS TO LONDON POLICY GROUP.

5. WE UNDERSTAND TEAM MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS SET FORTH IN PARA 2 ABOVE BECAUSE EVEN "DOUBTERS" CONVINCED THAT OPEC GULF COMMITTEE FULLY COMMITTED TO LEGISLATE A SETTLEMENT IF

SECRET

TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00465 292019Z

NEGOTIATIONS FAIL. IN ADDITION, THEY EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT A ONE WEEK CUT OFF OF PRODUCTION WOULD ALSO OCCUR TO SHOW CONSUMER GOVERNMENTS AND COMPANIES THE SOLIDARITY OF THE OPEC MEMBERS.

6. NO RPT NO MEETING SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW JAN 30. AMUZEGAR IS TAKING STRTHALMOND, HAMADI, AND OTHERS, ON SIGHTSEEING TOUR IN AFTERNOON. AMUZEGAR IS THUS THE HIGHEST PRICED TOUR GUIDE IN THE WORLD TO DATE. MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 117 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.



TELEGRAM

SECRET 618

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00463 281836Z

46:
ACTION SS-45:

INFO: OCT-01 SSO-00 1046 W

O P 281700Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3326
INFO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION OECD PARIS
AMEMBASSY THEHAGUE

S E C R E T TEHRAN 463

EXD:IS:

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION; FIRST GULF NEGOTIATING SESSION

REF: TEHRAN 437

1. AT CLOSE OF FIRST NEGOTIATING SESSION, JAN 28, INDUSTRY NEGOTIATORS BRIEFED EMBCONS LEHFELDT AND UK REP ON RESULTS FIRST DAY'S NEGOTIATIONS. GENERAL CONSENSUS WAS THAT SITUATION IS "GLOOMY BUT NOT HOPELESS". IN BRIEF STATEMENT TO PRESS AFTER MEETING, AMUZEGAR EXPRESSED HIMSELF AS OPTIMISTIC AND ADDED THAT THINGS WERE MOVING VERY WELL INDEED. SOME GAPS REMAINED TO BE FILLED, HE SAID, BUT NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUING AND TWO TEAMS MEETING AGAIN ON FRIDAY MORNING, JAN 29.

2. STRATTHALMOND SAID INDUSTRY TEAM TABLED PROPOSAL OUTLINED LONDON 744 AND OPEC REACTION IN BRIEF TO MAJOR POINTS AS FOLLOWS:

SECRET

25

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00463 281836Z

A. POSTED PRICE: OPEC COMMITTEE ASKED FOR 54 CENTS PER/BBL POSTED PRICE INCREASE.

B. GULF SHORT-HAUL CRUDE: REFUSED EVEN CONSIDER DISCUSSION OF MEDITERRANEAN POSTED PRICE FOR IRAQ AND SAUDI SHORT-HAUL CRUDES. INDICATED THAT THEY EXPECTED GET WHATEVER WAS GIVEN TO LIBYA RATHER THAN SET GULF PRICE FOR MEDITERRANEAN OUTLETS.

C. FREIGHT FORMULA: INSISTED THAT WHATEVER FREIGHT FORMULA AGREED TO FOR LIBYA WHICH RESULTED IN FUTURE POSSIBLE DECREASE IN LIBYAN PRICE, MUST BE PUT INTO EFFECT WITH CONSEQUENT DECREASE IN LIBYAN PRICES OR POSTED PRICES FOR GULF

CRUDES MUST BE CORRESPONDINGLY INCREASED.

D. COMPANY PROFITS: OPEC GULF COMMITTEE INTRODUCED QUESTION OF PROFITS CITING WELL-PUBLICIZED FIGURES ON UKI GASOLINE INCREASED AS WELL AS OTHER STATISTICS, AS PROOF THAT NO FURTHER PRODUCT PRICE INCREASES TO CONSUMER SHOULD FLOW FROM GENERAL POSTED PRICE INCREASES.

E. INFLATIONARY INDEX: OPEC COMMITTEE PREFERRED LIBYAN TYPE OF DEFINED YEARLY INCREASE RATHER THAN PRICE ESCALATOR CLAUSE TIED TO UN COMMODITY INDEX.

3. AT TIME OF BRIEFING, LEGAL EXPERTS WERE STILL MEETING TO DEFINE CHARACTER OF ASSURANCES GULF COUNTRIES PREPARED TO GIVE INDUSTRY AGAINST LEAPFROGGING.

4. CONCERNING ATMOSPHERE, STRATHALMOND COMMENTED THAT AMOUZEGAR'S ATTITUDE WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THAT IN PRIVATE MEETING YESTERDAY. HE WONDERED WHAT REASON MIGHT BE SPECULATING THAT VISITS OF LIBYAN, ALGERIAN AND VENEZUELAN MIGHT HAVE ALTERED HIS APPROACH. WONDERED, TOO, WHETHER HE MIGHT BE PLAYING TOUGH ROLE FOR BENEFIT OF THREE AMERICAN TEAM MEMBERS. WHATEVER REASON TURNED OUT TO BE, AMOUZEGAR WAS TODAY ANYTHING BUT HELPFUL. STRATHALMOND INTENDED WAIT FOR TOMORROW'S MEETING (10 AM LOCAL) FOR FURTHER INDICATION AMOUZEGAR'S STRATEGY BEFORE ATTEMPTING ASCERTAIN MOTIVATION. NOTE: NEGOTIATORS JUST INFORMED EMBASSY TOMORROW'S MEETING POSTPONED UNTIL 2:30 P.M.

5. CONCERNING TOMORROW'S MEETING, STRATHALMOND SAID THEY REALLY HAD NOTHING NEW TO TABLE SINCE THEIR NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS WOULD NOT PERMIT THEM TO GO BEYOND 15 CENT POSTED

SECRET

25

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00463 281836Z

PRICE INCREASE. HE ANXIOUSLY AWAITING RESULTS LEGAL EXPERTS MEETING ON "ASSURANCES" FOR FURTHER INDICATION OF POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF LIBYAN ET AL. VISITS.

6. NEGOTIATING TEAM REPORT FOLLOWS:

"FROM STRATHALMOND AND TEAM

FIRSTLY

WE MET FOR SIX HOURS TODAY WITH AMOUZEGAR, HAMMADI AND YAMANI AND REGRET TO REPORT VERY LITTLE PROGRESS MADE AND DIFFICULTY TO SEE MUCH HOPE OF REACHING SETTLEMENT ANYWHERE CLOSE TO WHAT LONDON SAW AS REASONABLE.

SECONDLY

ON ADDITIONAL CRUDE PRICE OUR FIGURE WAS REJECTED OUT OF HAND AND IN ITS PLACE THEY SUGGESTED 54. WE BELIEVE THIS 54 MIGHT BE NEGOTIABLE DOWN TO LIMIT OF DOUBLE OUR PRESENT FIGURE BUT IN OUR OPINION NO LOWER. MEETING DEVELOPED THAT GULF COMMITTEE TAKING POSITION THEY ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER PARAGRAPH 2 OF OPEC 120 BECAUSE OF SEPTEMBER LIBYA SETTLEMENT. THEY SAY THAT 32 CENTS CAN NOT ALL BE JUSTIFIED ON BASIS OF FREIGHT SO THIS DISPARITY WHICH HAS TO BE GIVEN TO GULF NOW. THIS DEMAND IS IN ADDITION TO GENERAL PRICE RISE UNDER OPEC 120 PARAGRAPH 3. THEY SAY THE 54 CENTS COVERS THEIR CLAIMS UNDER BOTH PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 AND WHEN TOTAL PRICE AGREED THEY WILLING TO DIVIDE TOTAL PRICE IN ANY WAY WE WANT. FOR EXAMPLE IF 30 CENTS WERE FINAL TOTAL FIGURE THEY WOULD, WE FEEL, SPLIT IT 20 CENTS FOR GENERAL AND 10 CENTS FOR LIBYA DISPARITY IF WE WISHED, OR SOME OTHER SIMILAR SPLIT.

THIRDLY THEY REFUSE TO TALK ABOUT THE PRESENT FREIGHT ELEMENT

BECAUSE THEY SAY THEY ARE NOT AUTHORISED AND IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT IF A DEAL IS REACHED HERE IT DOES NOT REPEAT NOT INCLUDE EITHER KIRKUK OR SIDON CRUDE EITHER IN REGARD TO INCREASE IN PRICE OR ON FREIGHT ELEMENT. MOREOVER IF WE REACH AGREEMENT ON FREIGHT ELEMENT IN LIBYA THIS SAME ELEMENT WILL BE APPLIED TO SIDON AND KIRKUK CRUDE. IN ADDITION THEY EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT IF FOR SOME REASON WE DO NOT CARRY THROUGH WITH OUR

SECRET

25

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

X
D
I
S
E
X
D
I
S
E
X
D
I
S
E
X
D
I
S

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEHRAN 00463 281836Z

FREIGHT AGREEMENT WITH LIBYA BECAUSE WE FIND WE CANNOT REDUCE THE FREIGHT ELEMENT THEN THE PERSIAN GULF WILL WANT A CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN THEIR PRICES DURING THE FIVE YEAR PERIOD.

FORTHLY ABSOLUTELY NO MOVEMENT ON PARAGRAPH FIVE OF STRATHALMOND'S LETTER. THEY INSIST THAT IF PRICES ON PRODUCTS INCREASE THEN DURING THE FIVE YEARS THEY WILL WANT SOME INCREASE IN CRUDE PRICES.

FIFTHLY WE HAVE IMPRESSION THAT AMOUZEGAR IS PRESSING BECAUSE HE HAS LITTLE TIME NOW IN WHICH TO CALL OFF THE OPEC MEETING. STRATHALMOND FEELS THIS IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM HIS POSITION LAST WEEK AS HE NOW SEEMS RELAXED AND CONFIDENT OF HIS APPROACH. THEREFORE WE FEEL WE MIGHT BE FACING A BREAK UP WITHIN THE NEXT TWO DAYS SINCE A REASONABLE AREA OF COMPROMISE HAS NOT YET PRESENTED ITSELF.

SIXTHLY ESCALATOR WAS ONLY AREA WHERE THEY SEEMED RECEPTIVE TO REASONABLE CONSIDERATIONS. THEY RAISED POSSIBILITY OF A FIXED CENTS PER BARREL APPROACH.

SEVENTHLY YOUR 0055 PLEASE HOLD NOTIFICATIONS UNTIL MIDDAY TOMORROW.

EIGHTLY NOTHING IN TODAY'S MEETING CHANGED OUR APPROACH RE PARAGRAPH IV OF STRATHALMOND'S LETTER TO AMOUZEGAR.

NINTHLY WE HAVE ANOTHER MEETING TOMORROW AT TEN A.M. AT WHICH THEY WANT US (A) TO CONVINCE THEM THAT THE FIGURES ON WHICH THEY HAVE BASED THEIR DEMAND FOR 54 CENTS ARE WRONG AND THAT THEIR EXPERTS ARE MISLEADING THEM AND (B) TO TABLE OUR FINAL OFFER ON INCREASE IN CRUDE PRICES. SUGGEST WE ARE AUTHORIZED TO OFFER A FURTHER 5 CENTS PROVIDED WE CAN GET SOME LIGHT ON OTHER POINTS IF IT IS NECESSARY TO KEEP NEGOTIATIONS GOING. INTEND THIS FIVE CENTS BE ALLOCATED PARA 2 OPEC RESOLUTION....."
MACARTHUR

SECRET

25

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

811/10/2090

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 132

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00437 281238Z

16
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

095505

O P 270500Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3316
INFO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
/USINT ALGIERS 032
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION OECD PARIS
AMEMBASSY THEHAGUE

S E C R E T TEHRAN 437

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y F O R T E X T

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION: STRATHALMOND/AMOUZEGAR MEETING

REF: TEHRAN 423

1. LORD STRATHALMOND BRIEFED UK AND US EMBOFFS ON HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON (JAN 27) WITH FINMIN AMOUZEGAR. ATMOSPHERE WAS FRIENDLY AND FORTHCOMING. STRATHALMOND'S REPORT ON MEETING FOLLOWS:

2. "FOLLOWING FROM STRATHALMOND:

1. OTHERS NOT YET ARRIVED THEREFORE NOT COMPLETELY UP TO DATE.
2. SAW AMOUZEGAR PRIVATELY TODAY AND SHOWED HIM DRAFT LETTER BUT NATURALLY NOT REPEAT NOT PROPOSALS.
3. LETTER PARAGRAPH IV. HE FEELS THIS IS A BASIS FOR COMMENCING NEGOTIATIONS BUT:

SECRET

21

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

JAN 28 PM 12:58

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00437 281238Z

- (A) THE REASONABLE TIME SHOULD BE ABOUT A MONTH.
(B) THE DATE OF INITIALLING MUST BE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AGREEMENT.
(C) THE INITIAL AGREEMENT MUST BE BINDING AND NOT MADE WORSE FOR THEM THROUGH EVENTS ELSEWHERE. I SEE NO DIFFICULTIES IN THESE POINTS. BUT,
(D) HE VERY MUCH DOUBTS IF WE CAN FIX MEDITERRANEAN TERMS FOR SAUDI AND IRAQI CRUDE IN HIS COMMITTEE. HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE QUOTE HINGE UNQUOTE AND WILL DO EVERYTHING HE CAN TO HELP.
4. BASIC PROBLEM WILL BE THE ONE OF CRUDE PRICES MOVING WITH PRODUCT PRICES. HE APPRECIATES NEED FOR FAIRER RETURN ON CAPITAL THAN NOW AND THE DANGERS OF INVOLVEMENT OVER CONSUMER TAXATION, ETC.
HOWEVER, HE IS FIRM THAT IF WE WANT A FIVE YEAR DEAL POINT MUST BE TAKEN CARE OF SOME WAY OR ANOTHER. HE KNOWS OF OUR STRONG FEELINGS. ANY THOUGHT FROM YOU WOULD BE APPRECIATED.
5. OPEC 120 POINTS FOUR AND FIVE REMAIN IN ISSUE BUT HE WILL HOLD TILL LATER. COULD THOUGHT BE GIVEN ON FOUR TO REDUCING MEDIAN FROM 40 DEGREES TO SAY 32 DEGREES AND THE EFFECT OF SO DOING. ARGUMENT WOULD BE THAT 32 DEGREES IS NEARER WEIGHTED AVERAGE OF GULF CRUDE. I HAVE SOME FIGURES HERE AND POSSIBLY THERE MAY BE SOME MEANS OF COMPROMISE IN THIS WAY. FOREGOING IS OF COURSE ONLY MY PERSONAL THOUGHT BUT I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY IDEAS YOU MAY HAVE.
6. OUR PROGRAMME IS TO TRY AND HAVE A PACKAGE DEAL HOME IN LONDON BY SATURDAY EVENING FOR ACCEPTANCE OR NOT BY SUNDAY EVENING"
3. AMOUZEGAR APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED IN ADVANCE BY COMPANIES OF "CRUDE/PRODUCT" PRICE PROBLEM WHICH HE RECOGNIZED HAD NOT AS YET BEEN RAISED FORMALLY BY GULF PRODUCERS. HE TOLD STRATHALMOND THAT THERE WOULD BE STRONG PUSH TO GET SOME RELATIONSHIP ESTABLISHED. (THIS RELATIONSHIP IS SHAH'S IDEA.) STRATHALMOND IS ATTEMPTING FIND SOME FORMULA WHICH WILL SATISFY THIS NEED AS WELL AS NEED TO ASSURE DECENT RETURN ON CAPITAL TO COMPANIES.
4. (BEGIN FYI: CONCERNING GRAVITY ALLOWANCE PROBLEM, STRATHALMOND SAID PRIVATELY THAT CURSORY STUDIES DONE HERE ON BASIS OF A POSSIBLE GULF 33 DEGREE MEDIAN (INSTEAD

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00437 281238Z

OF 40 DEGREE AT PRESENT) MAKES IT LOOK LIKE A BP PROPOSAL SINCE INDEPENDENTS (IMINOCO, IPAC, AND JAPANESE ESPECIALLY GET HURT MOST WHILE BP CRUDE MOVES VERY LITTLE. INDEPENDENTS, HE AVERS, WILL COMPLAIN SO HE LOOKING FOR ALTERNATE SOLUTION. END FYI).

5. FIRST NEGOTIATING SESSION SCHEDULED FOR 10 A.M. (LOCAL) JAN. 28. STRATHALMOND AND AMOUZEGAR HAVE AGREED NOT TO LET MEETINGS BOG DOWN ON ANY ONE POINT BUT WILL MOVE TO NEXT SUBJECT IF ONE SEEMS PROMISE DIFFICULTY. THEY EXPECT BREAK UP INTO WORKING GROUPS TO CONSIDER SPECIAL PROBLEMS, INCLUDING ASSURANCES WHICH GULF PRODUCERS ARE TO GIVE COMPANIES. TARGET IS TO COMPLETE DISCUSSIONS BY SATURDAY EVENING, BUT STRATHALMOND CONTINUES BELIEVE THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS GOING WELL AND REAL PROGRESS BEING MADE, AMOUZEGAR CAN BE PERSUADED ATTEMPT POSTPONE FEB 3 OPEC EXTRAORDINARY SESSION ONCE AGAIN.

6. FYI STRATHALMOND SAID IF NEGOTIATIONS GO WELL HE MIGHT MEET WITH PIERCY IN KUWAIT SUNDAY (JAN 31) TO COMPARE NOTES. END FYI.
MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00424 271401Z

47
ACTION. SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046. W

086857

O P 271305Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3310
INFO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
USINT ALGIERS
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION OECD PARIS
AMEMBASSY THEHAGUE

S. E. C. R. E. T. TEHRAN 424

EXDIS.

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION; TEHRAN NEGOTIATIONS

1. LORD STRATHALMOND BRIEFED U.S., U.K., FRENCH AND DUTCH AMBASSADORS AT BRITISH EMBASSY AT NOON JAN 27 ON HIS DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON WITH THE OIL INDUSTRY'S POLICY COMMITTEE AND GAVE AMBASSADORS COPY INDUSTRY LETTER REPLYING TO OPEC GULF COMMITTEE LETTER OF JAN. 22, 1971 WHICH HE WILL DELIVER PRIVATELY TO AMUZEGAR THIS AFTERNOON, (TEXT OF LETTER IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TEL). AT SAME TIME HE WILL POINT OUT TO AMUZEGAR MAJOR POSSIBLE SNAGS. HE INDICATED HE WOULD TACTFULLY MAKE CLEAR TO AMUZEGAR COMPANIES DID NOT FEEL THEY COULD AGREE TO TYING PRODUCERS 5 YEAR GUARANTEE ON STABLE PRICES TO COMMITMENT BY COMPANIES NOT TO INCREASE PRICES TO CONSUMER. STRATHALMOND WILL BRIEF EMBASSIES THIS EVENING ON OUTCOME HIS TALK WITH AMUZEGAR.

2. STRATHALMONDI DESCRIBED LETTER AS A VERY CAREFULLY
CONSTRUCTED RESPONSE WHICH WOULD, HE THOUGHT, PERMIT NEGOTIATIONS.

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00424 271401Z

TO COMMENCE AS IT SEEMED SUFFICIENTLY RESPONSIVE TO THE OPEC COMMITTEE'S FIVE CONDITIONS. MAJOR STICKING POINT AS SEEN BY STRATHALMOND IS COMPANIES' ATTEMPT TO GET THE GULF COMMITTEE TO NEGOTIATE NOT ONLY A GULF PRICE BUT ALSO A MEDITERRANEAN CRUDE PRICE FOR SAUDI ARABIAN AND IRAQI SHORT-HAUL CRUDES. STRATHALMOND FEELS THIS IS AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE TO ACHIEVE SINCE IT WILL IN PART ASSIST THEIR CO-NEGOTIATORS IN LIBYA IF A MEDITERRANEAN PRICE PRECEDENT IS SET.

OTHER MAJOR PROBLEM WILL BE COMPANIES' REQUEST THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS ARE COMPLETED IN THE GULF, BUT THOSE IN LIBYA INCOMPLETE, GULF AGREEMENT WILL BE INITIALED AND FINAL SIGNATURE PUT OFF UNTIL SOME REASONABLE TIME (A MONTH WAS MENTIONED) SO THAT A CONSLUSION IN LIBYA MIGHT BE REACHED. (FYI: STRATHALMOND INDICATED THAT EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT COULD BE DATE OF INITIALLING SO THAT GULF PRODUCERS WOULD LOSE NOTHING. END FYI).

4. STRATHALMOND COMMENTED THAT "IF WE CAN GET AT WHAT THEY REALLY WANT HERE BY SATURDAY NIGHT AND IF IT IS REASONABLE, WE MIGHT WELL BE ABLE GIVE OUR ANSWER BY MONDAY MORNING." HE NOTED THAT THE HEADS OF COMPANIES AND INDUSTRY POLICY COMMITTEE ARE STANDING BY FOR EMERGENCY SESSIONS IN LONDON ON SUNDAY, JAN. 31.

5. STRATHALMOND SAID HE NOT ABLE TO GIVE DETAILS OF THE COMPANIES OFFER, SINCE SOME PROBLEMS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION. HE DID NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT COMPANY OFFER COULD CONTAIN PROPOSALS FOR INCREASES IN POSTED PRICES, REMOVE DISPARITIES, AND PROVIDE INFLATIONARY INDEX BASE (PROBABLY THE UN INDEX OF COMMODITY PRICES) BUT THAT ON OPEC ALLOWANCES AND GRAVITY ALLOWANCES THE INDUSTRY POSITION WAS STILL NEGATIVE.

6. REMAINDER OF TEAM INCLUDING SOME 14 REPS OF GULF COMPANIES ARE ARRIVING TEHRAN TODAY AND TONIGHT. THE COMPOSTION OF THE TEAM IS STILL A BIT UNCERTAIN.
MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0602/01/120

The seal of the United States Department of State is located in the top right corner. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched across the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched across the bottom, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

Wf

3

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

089608:

71 JAN 27 PM 8:50
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

EXDIS

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION; TEHRAN NEGOTIATIONS;

REF: TEHRAN: 423

1. TEXT INDUSTRY LETTER TO OPEC GULF COMMITTEE DATED JANUARY 28, 1971 FOLLOWS:

"EXCELLENCIES, WE WERE PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR JOINT LETTER OF 22ND JANUARY, 1971, WITH ITS RECOGNITION THAT THE COMPANIES ENTERED UPON OUR CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE POSITIVE INTENTION OF MOVING FORWARD QUICKLY WITH SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS. TO THIS END, OUR EXPERTS HAVE BEEN IN TEHRAN FOR SEVERAL DAYS AND OUR COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL IS ATTACHED.

WE ARE EQUALLY PLEASED THAT YOUR MESSAGE RECOGNISED ALSO THE
MUTUAL DESIRE AND NEED FOR BOTH OUR GROUPS TO AVOID "LEAP-FROGGING".
FOR THE RECORD, AND WITHOUT WISHING IN ANY WAY TO COMPLICATE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00424 272023Z

MATTERS FURTHER, THERE ARE TWO POINTS WE SHOULD MAKE IN RELATION TO YOUR LETTER:-

(A) PAGE 3 PARAGRAPH 4 - OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE POINT MADE BY YOU IN THE TALKS WE HAD ON THIS MATTER WAS SIMPLY THAT IF YOU WERE TO AGREE TO A FIVE YEAR DEAL AND IF, AT THE SAME TIME LIBYA WERE TO RECEIVE SPECIAL TREATMENT ON ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENT HIGH FREIGHT RATES

AND THE CLOSURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL, THEN WHEN MATTERS BECAME MORE NORMAL AGAIN YOU WOULD EXPECT THAT THE LIBYAN TAKE MUST COME DOWN OR THAT THE GULF TAKE MUST GO UP.

WE DO NOT RECOLLECT ANY SUGGESTION FROM YOU REGARDING A COMMITMENT THAT ANY ADDITIONAL PROFITS ACCRUING TO THE COMPANIES AS A RESULT OF INCREASES IN PRODUCT PRICES WOULD BE REFLECTED ON CRUDE OIL PRICES AND WE CERTAINLY HAVE HAD NO DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT.

(B) ON PAGE 4 YOU SAY THAT THE "LOGIC OF THE PROCEDURE ENVISAGED BY THE OPEC RESOLUTION WAS FINALLY 'RECOGNISED' BY YOU." WE THINK THE WORD 'RECOGNIZED' COULD BE MISLEADING - ALL WE DID DO WAS TO 'UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION'.

COMING NOW TO THE FIVE POINTS YOU RAISE ON PAGE 6.

(I) THE MEETING IS BEING HELD AT THE TIME AND ON THE DAY YOU WISH.

(II) WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSALS WHICH ARE ATTACHED TO THIS LETTER COVER THE FIVE POINTS SPECIFIED IN OPEC RESOLUTION 120.

(III) WE ARE FULLY AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED WITH THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO SEEK AGREEMENT. IT WILL BE OUR ENDEAVOR TO HAVE THIS ACCOMPLISHED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE BUT WE THINK WE ALL MUST RECOGNISE THAT WE ARE NOW DEALING WITH ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS EVER CONSIDERED IN THE INTERNATIONAL OIL BUSINESS, AND, THEREFORE, A DEAD-LINE MAY PROVE TO BE IMPOSSIBLE TO MEET. HOWEVER, AS WE HAVE SAID, WE SHALL CERTAINLY ATTEMPT TO REACH AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(IV) AS WE HAVE MENTIONED ABOVE, SIMULTANEOUS NEGOTIATIONS ARE STARTING IN LIBYA BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INDUSTRY TEAM, LET BY MR. PIERCY. WE RECOGNISE THAT ONE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS MAY TAKE LONGER THAN THE OTHER. WE WOULD, THEREFORE, ASK THAT IF WE REACH TENTATIVE AGREEMENT FIRST WITH YOU, IT WOULD BE INITIALLED BY ALL OF US, AND SOME REASONABLE TIME WHICH WE CAN DISCUSS, SHALL TAKE PLACE SO THAT-

1. WE CAN ATTEMPT TO REACH A CONCLUSION IN LIBYA AND FINALIZE THERE AT THE SAME TIME AS WE FINALIZE WITH YOU. HOWEVER,

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00424 272023Z

WE DO RECOGNISE THAT THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE AND THAT THEREFORE FINAL COMPLETION OF YOUR AGREEMENT MAY HAVE TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE AGREEMENT WITH LIBYA IS ACHIEVED PROVIDED THAT SUITABLE ASSURANCES ARE SECURED.

2. YOUR COMMITTEE CAN ATTEMPTS, AS YOU HAVE SAID YOU WOULD DO, TO BROADEN THE SCOPE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN NEGOTIATIONS INTO AN OVERALL MEDITERRANEAN SETTLEMENT. THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE BUT BY THEN WE WILL HAVE REACHED A SOLUTION WITH YOAG MUGBING SAUDI ARABIAN AND IRAQI SHORT-HAUL CRUDES AND IT WOULD BE OUR HOPE THAT IT WOULD BE GENERALLY RECOGNISED THAT THE TERMS YOU HAD NEGOTIATED WERE REASONABLE AND ACCEPTABLE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES.

(V) AS NOTED, WE HAVE ALREADY SENT OUR EXPERTS TO TEHRAN AND THEY HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING POINTS 4 AND 5 OF OPEC RESOLUTION 120 WITH YOUR EXPERTS.

WE ARE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN OUR PROPOSAL IN DETAIL TO YOUR COMMITTEE. STRATHALMOND
MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

SECRET 812

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00423 280837Z

16
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W
----- 093698

O P 271305Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3310
INFO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
USINT ALGIERS
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION OECD PARIS
AMEMBASSY THEHAGUE

S E C R E T TEHRAN 423

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (FOR MRN 423 VICE 424)

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION: TEHRAN NEGOTIATIONS

1. LORD STRATHALMOND BRIEFED U.S., U.K., FRENCH AND
DUTCH AMBASSADORS AT BRITISH EMBASSY AT NOON JAN 27 ON HIS
DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON WITH THE OIL INDUSTRY'S POLICY
COMMITTEE AND GAVE AMBASSADORS COPY INDUSTRY LETTER REPLYING
TO OPEC GULF COMMITTEE LETTER OF JAN. 22, 1971
WHICH HE WILL DELIVER PRIVATELY TO AMUZEGAR THIS AFTERNOON,
(TEXT OF LETTER IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TEL). AT SAME TIME
HE WILL POINT OUT TO AMUZEGAR MAJOR POSSIBLE SNAGS. HE INDICATED
HE WOULD TACTFULLY MAKE CLEAR TO AMUZEGAR COMPANIES
DID NOT FEEL THEY COULD AGREE TO TYING PRODUCERS
5 YEAR GUARANTEE ON STABLE PRICES TO COMMITMENT BY COMPANIES
NOT TO INCREASE PRICES TO CONSUMER. STRATHALMOND WILL BRIEF
EMBASSIES THIS EVENING ON OUTCOME HIS TALK WITH AMUZEGAR.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00423 280837Z

2. STRATHALMOND DESCRIBED LETTER AS A VERY CAREFULLY CONSTRUCTED RESPONSE WHICH WOULD, HE THOUGHT, PERMIT NEGOTIATIONS TO COMMENCE AS IT SEEMED SUFFICIENTLY RESPONSIVE TO THE OPEC COMMITTEE'S FIVE CONDITIONS. MAJOR STICKING POINT AS SEEN BY STRATHALMOND IS COMPANIES' ATTEMPT TO GET THE GULF COMMITTEE TO NEGOTIATE NOT ONLY A GULF PRICE BUT ALSO A MEDITERRANEAN CRUDE PRICE FOR SAUDI ARABIAN AND IRAQI SHORT-HAUL CRUDES. STRATHALMOND FEELS THIS IS AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE TO ACHIEVE SINCE IT WILL IN PART ASSIST THEIR CO-NEGOTIATORS IN LIBYA IF A MEDITERRANEAN PRICE PRECEDENT IS SET.

OTHER MAJOR PROBLEM WILL BE COMPANIES' REQUEST THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS ARE COMPLETED IN THE GULF, BUT THOSE IN LIBYA INCOMPLETE, GULF AGREEMENT WILL BE INITIALED AND FINAL SIGNATURE PUT OFF UNTIL SOME REASONABLE TIME (A MONTH WAS MENTIONED) SO THAT A CONCLUSION IN LIBYA MIGHT BE REACHED. (FYI: STRATHALMOND INDICATED THAT EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT COULD BE DATE OF INITIALLING SO THAT GULF PRODUCERS WOULD LOSE NOTHING. END FYI).

4. STRATHALMOND COMMENTED THAT "IF WE CAN GET AT WHAT THEY REALLY WANT HERE BY SATURDAY NIGHT AND IF IT IS REASONABLE, WE MIGHT WELL BE ABLE GIVE OUR ANSWER BY MONDAY MORNING." HE NOTED THAT THE HEADS OF COMPANIES AND INDUSTRY POLICY COMMITTEE ARE STANDING BY FOR EMERGENCY SESSIONS IN LONDON ON SUNDAY, JAN. 31.

5. STRATHALMOND SAID HE NOT ABLE TO GIVE DETAILS OF THE COMPANIES OFFER, SINCE SOME PROBLEMS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION. HE DID NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT COMPANY OFFER COULD CONTAIN PROPOSALS FOR INCREASES IN POSTED PRICES, REMOVE DISPARITIES, AND PROVIDE INFLATIONARY INDEX BASE (PROBABLY THE UN INDEX OF COMMODITY PRICES) BUT THAT ON OPEC ALLOWANCES AND GRAVITY ALLOWANCES THE INDUSTRY POSITION WAS STILL NEGATIVE.

6. REMAINDER OF TEAM INCLUDING SOME 14 REPS OF GULF COMPANIES ARE ARRIVING TEHRAN TODAY AND TONIGHT. THE COMPOSITION OF THE TEAM IS STILL A BIT UNCERTAIN. MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0602/01/22

*Bergsten
Sander*

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

HCE496

PAGE 01 ,TEHRAN 00385 251220Z

42-S
ACTION E-15

INFO OCT-01 AF-12 ARA-12 EUR-20 NEA-13 EA-15 SSO-00 NSCE-00
USIE-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-03 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10
P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 STR-03 CEA-02 COM-03 INT-05
TRSY-11 JUS-02 OEP-01 CCO-00 RSR-01 /181 W
----- 068494

O 251100Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3293
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY CARACAS

S E C R E T TEHRAN 385

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION: SHAH'S PRESS CONFERENCE

REF: TEHRAN 368

1. WE HEAR SHAH'S DECISION TO HOLD TWO-HOUR PRESS CONFERENCE ON JAN 24 ON OIL WAS TO MAKE ABSOLUTELY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY CLEAR TO OIL COMPANIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS THAT BASIC PRINCIPLES (RATHER THAN DETAILS) OF GULF OIL PRODUCERS POSITION IS FIRM AND NON-NEGOTIABLE. IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE HE PUBLICLY AND FORMALLY COMMITTED HIMSELF NOT ONLY TO IRANIAN PUBLIC BUT ALSO TO OTHER GULF OIL STATES TO DEFEND TO END THEIR INTERESTS INCLUDING BASIC PROPOSITION IN OPEC RESOLUTION 120 OF SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH COMPANIES FOR GULF

UNLESS COMPANIES PREFER AND OPEC-WIDE AGREEMENT BASED ON VENEZUELA TERMS. AT SAME TIME HE PUBLICLY REAFFIRMED WHEN THE FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENT REACHED WITH COMPANIES, IRAN WOULD RESPECT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00385 251220Z

IT IF COMPANIES DID. FROM TONE AND CONTENT OF HIS REMARKS IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT PURPOSE OF PRESS CONFERENCE IN ADDITION TO MAKING HIS VIEWS CRYSTAL CLEAR TO COMPANIES AND THEIR GOVERNMENTS WAS ALSO TO STAKE OUT FOR IRAN A POSITION OF PRIMARY LEADERSHIP IN GULF AFFAIRS AS DEFENDER OF INTERETS OF ALL GULF STATES (ARABS AS WELL AS IRAN) AGAINST OUTSIDE POWERS WHETHER LARGE OR SMALL IN OIL AND OTHER MATTERS.

2. WE ARE CABLING (IN SEPTTEL) SUMMARY OF SHAH'S REMARKS. ALTHOUGH SHAH DID NOT GET INTO DETAILS SUCH AS PRICE INCREASES, INFLATION, INDEX, ETC., IT WAS A VERY TOUGH SPEECH YIELDING NOT ONE INCH INSOFAR AS BASIC PRINCIPLES IN OPEC RESOLUTION 120 AND SUPPLEMENTARY POSITIONS HE HAS TAKEN WITH US IN PRIVATE TALKS ARE CONCERNED. IT PROVIDED CLEAR WARNING TO GOVERNMENTS NOT TO SUPPORT PRESENT COMPANY POSITION. STATEMENT ALSO CONFIRMED HIS DISTRUST OF COMPANIES BASED ON THEIR UNILATERALLY LOWERING POSTED PRICES IN 1959-60 FROM \$2.04 TO \$1.78 PER BARREL; COMPANIES EFFORTS TO DEDUCT 6.4 MILLION POUNDS STERLING AFTER BRITISH DEVALUATION IN 1967 DESPITE FACT OIL HAD ALREADY BEEN EXPORTED; COMPANY PRICE RISES IN EUROPE, JAPAN AND US DURING PAST FEW MONTHS; ETC. HE HIT HARD THEME THAT IF COMPANIES ARE ADAMANT, CONTENDING THEY HAVE FORMED "CARTEL" WHICH HAS SUPPORT AND BACKING OF BIG INDUSTRIAL POWERS, THIS WOULD BE "INDUSTRIAL IMPERIALISM" AND "NEO-COLONIALISM." HE WARNED IF COMPANIES BELIEVE HISTORY WOULD REPEAT ITSELF, THEY ARE ENTIRELY MISTAKEN "AS IT IS NO LONGER 1951."

3. MOMENT OF TRUTH FOR COMPANIES HAS THEREFORE ARRIVED SINCE IT IS CLEAR SHAH HAS PUBLICLY STAKED HIS POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN ENTIRE AREA ON OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS AND WILL NOT BACK DOWN ON PRINCIPLES. EITHER COMPANIES MUST BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE A SPEEDY AGREEMENT WITH GULF PRODUCERS REGARDLESS OF AGREEMENTS ELSEWHERE OR THEY WILL FACE (A) CUTBACK OR SHUTDOWN OF GULF PRODUCTION OR (B) ADOPTION BY OPEC FEB 3 MEETING OF VENEZUELA

FORMULA FOR GULF AS WELL AS VENEZUELA.

4. OUR STRONG RECOMMENDATION IS THEREFORE THAT COMPANIES:
(A) INFORM GULF COMMITTEE (IRAN, IRAQ, SAUDI ARABIA) THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE AND CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ASAP WITH GULF PRODUCERS REGARDLESS OF OUTCOME OF LIBYAN AND ALGERIAN NEGOTI-

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00385 251220Z

ATIONS, AND (C) SEND THEIR NEGOTIATORS BACK TO IRAN ASAP WITH TERMS OF REFERENCE WHICH WILL ENABLE THEM TO HAMMER OUT AN AGREEMENT SPEEDILY. (FYI ONLY: IN AN UNGUARDED MOMENT, STRATHALMOND COMMENTED PRIVATELY THAT AN AGREEMENT PROBABLY COULD BE HAMMERED OUT IN A FEW DAYS IF ONLY ONE COMPANY WERE INVOLVED BUT WITH SIXTEEN THERE WERE INEVITABLE DELAYS IN DEVELOPING AND, AS NEGOTIATIONS PROCEEDED, MODIFYING INSTRUCTIONS. END FYI)

5. WE CONTINUE TO AGREE WITH STRATHALMOND (REFTEL) THAT RIGIDITY OF TIMETABLE CAN ONLY BE EASED IF TALKS OF SUBSTANCE WITH OBJECTIVE OF EARLY AGREEMENT WITH GULF PRODUCERS GET GOING SOONEST AND IF REAL PROGRESS IS MADE WHICH WILL MAKE CLEAR COMPANIES ARE NOT FOOT-DRAGGING. (IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE SHAH REFERRED TO FEB 3 OPEC MEETING AS DEADLINE (RATHER THAN FEB 1) FOR A CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT, BUT IF NEGOTIATIONS WERE REALLY WELL ADVANCED

BY FEB 3, WE DO NOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY REPEAT POSSIBILITY THAT GULF PRODUCERS UNDER IRAN'S LEADERSHIP COULD HAVE SOME SECOND THOUGHTS RE FEB 3 DEADLINE.

6. THE KEY, AS SEEN FROM HERE, IS THAT COMPANIES'S SENIOR REPS GET BACK TO NEGOTIATING TABLE SOONEST WITH INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WILL PERMIT THEM TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT WITH GULF GROUP REGARDLESS OF AGREEMENTS WITH LIBYA AND ALGERIA. I SHOULD ADD THAT IN VIEW OF THE FRAGILITY OF THE GULF AREA AFTER BRITISH WITHDRAWAL AND THE DETERMINED EFFORT RADICAL ARAB REGIMES (WHICH ARE HOSTILE TO US) WILL MAKE TO FILL THE VACUUM, THE POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE GULF (AS DEFENDER OF MODERATE ARAB'S INTERESTS) TO WHICH THE SHAH ASPIRES, WOULD SEEM TO SERVE OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS VERY WELL INDEED AS LONG AS WE DID NOT HAVE TO PAY AN UNACCEPTABLE PRICE FOR IT. THE CONCLUSION OF A SEPARATE AND EQUITABLE AGREEMENT WITH GULF PRODUCERS CERTAINLY DOES NOT SEEM AN UNREASONABLE PRICE FROM HERE, PARTICULARLY SINCE SHAH IS NOW (RPT NOW) PUBLICLY COMMITTED TO RESPECT FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENT SO THAT COMPANIES' FEARS OF LEAP-FROGGING BY OPEC WILL NOT BE VALID INSOFAR AS GULF PRODUCERS CONCERNED. MACARTHUR

SECRET

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 879

PAGE: 01 TEHRAN: 00368 231502Z

44
ACTION: SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 /046 W

062143

O 231310Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3285
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 0368

EXDIS:

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (LONDON ADDED AS INFO ADDRESSEE)

FOR UNDER SECRETARY

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION

REF: (A) TUNIS 448; (B) TEHRAN 348

1. AT LUNCH WITH AMOUZEGAR AND ALAM YESTERDAY (REF B)
I SPENT OVER TEN MINUTES HAMMERING ON:

(A) VERY GREAT DIFFICULTIES COMPANIES WHICH SIGNED
COMPANY PAPER HAVE SINCE INDEPENDENTS WHICH ARE NOT
OPERATING IN GULF MUST BE SURE THEIR INTERESTS ARE
SAFE-GUARDED BEFORE THEY WILL AGREE TO CHANGE NEGOTIATING
CONCEPT WHICH WOULD PERMIT COMPANIES OPERATING IN GULF
TO PROCEED IN LESS THAN OPEC-WIDE CONTEXT;

(B) FACT THAT ANY CHANGES IN PAPER WOULD, IN MY
JUDGMENT, HAVE TO BE REFERRED BACK TO DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE WHICH HAD CLEARED EARLIER COMPANY PAPER; AND

(C) THEREFORE, NEED FOR TIME TO SORT OUT ALL THESE
MATTERS WITHOUT ARBITRARY DEADLINE.

2. WHILE AMOUZEGAR AND ALAM PROFESSED TO UNDERSTAND ALL
THIS, AMOUZEGAR MADE QUITE CLEAR THAT FEB FIRST DEADLINE
WAS ESSENTIAL IN LIGHT OF FACT THAT OPEC EXTRAORDINARY

CONFIDENTIAL

25

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00368 231502Z

SESSION WOULD BE HELD FEB THIRD REGARDLESS OF ANY INTERVENING DEVELOPMENTS. HE STRESSED THAT HE AND IRAN HAD PUT NECK OUT POSTPONING OPEC EXTRAORDINARY FROM JAN 19 TO 21 TO 23 TO 25 AND NOW RPT NOW TO FEB THIRD AND IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DO MORE. ALAM TELLS ME MY COMMENTS WERE ACCURATELY REPORTED TO SHAH BUT THIS HAS ALTERED NOTHING.

3. IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING, I THINK IT WOULD BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE FOR ME TO TRY TO SEE YAMANI OR ATEGI WHOM I DO NOT KNOW AS I AM SURE THEY WOULD STAND FIRM WITH AMOUZEGAR'S POSITION AND INFORM HIM OF MY DEMARCHE. YOU WILL NOTE IN STRATHALMOND'S MESSAGE (VR 0006 IRANOP FROM OPERAT) STRATHALMOND'S BEST JUDGMENT IS: "THE RIGIDITY OF THE TIMETABLE I THINK CAN BE EASED BUT ONLY IF TALKS OF SUBSTANCE GET GOING." I FULLY CONCUR IN THIS JUDGMENT AND DO NOT EXCLUDE IF COMPANIES REALLY GET DOWN TO BRASS TACKS THAT DEADLINE MIGHT IN FACT BE POSTPONED. HOWEVER, THIS WILL DEPEND ENTIRELY ON COMPANIES AND NOT ON ANYTHING WE CAN DO HERE. GP-3. MACARTHUR

CONFIDENTIAL

25

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0602/01/124



TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00353 231159Z

12
ACTION SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 (NSCE-00 /046 W

061492

O P 230830Z JAN 71 ZFF 4
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3280
AMEMBASSY LONDON:
INFO OECD PARIS PRIORITY 1006
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
EC BRUSSELS 239
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USINT ALGIERS

S E C R E T T A I R A N 0353

EXDIS.

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION

REF: TEHRAN 0348.

1. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS:

(A) COURT MINISTER ALAM CALLED ME LATE LAST NIGHT (JAN 22). HE HAD BRIEFED SHAH ON LUNCHEON DISCUSSION BETWEEN HIMSELF, AMOUZEGAR, BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND ME AND SAID SHAH, WHO INSPIRED LUNCHEON HAD FELT IT WOULD BE USEFUL SO UK AND US WOULD KNOW AND UNDERSTAND IRANIAN POSITION IN DETAIL.

(B) ALAM THEN SAID NEXT TUESDAY JAN 26 (8TH ANNIVERSARY OF WHITE REVOLUTION) SHAH WILL MAKE A MAJOR STATEMENT WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WILL LAY OUT OVERALL ASPERKS OF OIL PROBLEM AND IRAN'S POSITION WHICH, WHILE REASONABLE, IS ABSOLUTELY FIRM. SHAH WANTED US TO KNOW ABOUT THIS INADVANCE (IN VIEW OF UNDER SECRETARY'S VISIT) SO HIS STATEMENT WOULD NOT COME AS A SURPRISE TO US. (HE DID NOT GIVE SIMILAR MESSAGE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00353 231159Z

TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR.) FROM WHAT ALAM SAID SHAH'S STATEMENT WILL INCLUDE IRANIAN POSITION STATED BY SHAH AND AMOUZEGAR TO UNDER SECRETARY AS AMPLIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AND SIGNALS FROM SHAH INCLUDING THOSE IN REFTEL.

(C) PER REFTEL AMOUZEGAR HANDED STRATHALMOND LETTER LATE LAST NIGHT AND STRATHALMOND LEFT FOR LONDON WITH IT EARLY THIS MORNING. (WE HAVE NOT SEEN COPY.)

(D) COMPANY EXPERTS ARRIVING TEHRAN TODAY TO BEGIN TALKS WITH IRANIAN EXPERTS ON STATISTICAL AND OTHER DETAILED INFORMATION.

2. COMMENT

(A) THIS LETTER (PARA 1(C) ABOVE) AND FEB 1 DEADLINE FOR CONCLUSION OF OIL GULF GROUP/COMPANIES' NEGOTIATIONS WERE QUID PRO QUO FOR WHICH AMOUZEGAR WAS AUTHORIZED BY HIS GULF COLLEAGUES INCLUDING IRAQI TO POSTPONE EXTRAORDINARY OPEC SESSION FROM JAN 25 TO FEB 3.

(B) IN COURSE OF LUNCHEON DISCUSSION YESTERDAY AMOUZEGAR SAU HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT OBJECT IF COMPANY REPLY MADE REFERENCE TO PARALLEL OR SIMULTANEOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH MEDITERRANEAN PRODUCERS (LIBYA AND ALGERIA) LOOKING TO SIMILAR DEAL THERE SO LONG AS SUCH REPLY DID NOT RPT NOT TIE CONCLUSION AND SIGNING OF GULF NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH LIBYA AND/OR ALGERIA. HE EMPHASIZED AGAIN (REFTEL PARA 2C) IF COMPANIES INSISTED THEY WOULD NOT CONCLUDE AGREEMENT WITH GULF PRODUCERS UNTIL AGREEMENT REACHED WITH OTHER OPEC PRODUCERS (LIBYA AND/OR ALGERIA) THE TALKS HERE WOULD TERMINATE AND OPEC EXTRAORDINARY WOULD FOLLOW FEB 3 WITH (BY IMPLICATION) ADOPTION OF VENEZUELAN TERMS.

(C) REFERRING AGAIN TO FIRM GUARANTEE IRAN WILLING TO GIVE COMPANIES THAT AGREEMENT WOULD BE FIRM FOR 5 YEARS REGARDLESS OF WHAT BETTER TERMS COMPANIES GRANTED TO LIBYA AND ALGERIA, AMOUZEGAR ALSO SAID IF NECESSARY SUCH GUARANTEES COULD BE PUT INTO LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD BE PASSED BY MAJLIS THUS EMBEDDING GUARANTEE IN LAW.

(D) WHILE APPRECIATING COMPLEXITIES IN PROBLEM OF HANDLING ON OPEC-WIDE BASIS PROBLEMS OF MAJORS OPERATING IN GULF AND

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



PAGE: 03 TEHRAN: 00353 231159Z

(1) PROCEEDING AHEAD WITH SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS IN TEHRAN
LOOKING TO EARLIEST POSSIBLE AGREEMENT WITH GULF PRODUCERS, WHILE
AT SAME TIME CARRYING ON PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS WITH LIBYA (FRANCE
WITH ALGERIA). WHEN AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN COMPANIES AND GULF
PRODUCERS, SIGNING AGREEMENT WHETHER OR NOT NEGOTIATIONS WITH
MEDITERRANEAN PRODUCERS COMPLETED. (AMOUZEGAR SAID IN SUCH EVENT
IRAN WILL PUBLICLY DISASSOCIATE ITSELF FROM EXTREME LIBYAN
AND ALGERIAN POSITIONS.)

(II) ACCEPT VENEZUELAN TERMS ON OPEC-WIDE BASIS, WHICH IRANIANS ESTIMATE WOULD TACK \$1 BILLION 4 MILLION ON TO COMPANY COSTS.

(III) COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS WITH GULF PRODUCERS BUT REFUSE TO SIGN TILL AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH MEDITERRANEAN PRODUCERS. IN THIS EVENT PRESENT GULF TALKS WILL TERMINATE AND GULF PROBLEM WILL GO TO OPEC EXTRAORDINARY SESSION WHICH RADICALS WILL DOMINATE WITH POSSIBLE END RESULT OF OPEC-WIDE ADOPTION OF VENEZUELAN TERMS. (WHILE LAST WEEK IRANIANS MAKING NOISES ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF CUTBACK OR SHUTDOWN, AND WE CANNOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE SOME SUCH COMMON ACTION, IN RECENT DAYS TALK OF "COMMON ACTION" HAS CENTERED ON IMPOSING VENEZUELAN TERMS.))

3. WE JUST INFORMED SHAH HOLDING PRESS CONFERENCE ON OIL TOMORROW MORNING (TEHRAN TIME) JAN 24.
MACARTHUR:

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 204

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00348 221542Z

51
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

054308

O P 221450Z JAN 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3277
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO OECD PARIS PRIORITY 1005
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
EC BRUSSELS 238
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

S E C R E T TEHRAN 0348

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS ALGIERS

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION

REF: A. TEHRAN 344
B. TEHRAN 337

1. BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND I LUNCED PRIVATELY WITH
ALAM AND AMOUZEGAR JAN 22 (PARA 7 REF A) DURING WHICH AMOU-
ZEGAR EXPRESSED VIEW THAT COMPANIES WERE STILL ENGAGED
IN DELAYING TACTICS AND WERE NOT PREPARED SERIOUSLY TO NEGOTIATE.
AMOUZEGAR SAID HE HAD BEEN UNDER VERY HEAVY PRESSURE FROM
IRAQI OIL MINISTER TO CONVENE JANUARY 25 OPEC EXTRAORDINARY
SESSION WHICH RADICAL PRODUCERS WOULD HAVE DOMINATED
AND HAD ONLY BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN IRAQI CONSENT TO POST-
PONEMENT OF OPEC EXTRAORDINARY MEETING UNTIL FEB 3 ON BASIS
OF LETTER (PARA 4 REF A) WHICH HE WOULD GIVE STRATHALMOND
THIS AFTERNOON (JAN 22).

2. AMOUZEGAR WENT ON TO SAY THAT IRAQI INSISTED

SECRET

29
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

71 JAN 22 PM 3:30

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00348 221542Z

THAT WHEN NEGOTIATORS (STRATHALMOND AND PIERCY) RETURN TO CONFERENCE TABLE NEXT WEEK, JAN 28, MEETING MUST OPEN AT 9 AM (NOT 4 PM) SO THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE PRETEXT TO POSTPONE IT FURTHER AT LAST MOMENT. HE SAID COMPANIES WOULD THEN HAVE THREE OPTIONS TO THEM ON WHICH THEY WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A DEFINITE POSITION ON JAN 28:

A. NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH WITH GULF GROUP IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPEC RESOLUTION 120.

B. NEGOTIATE ON OPEC WIDE BASIS IN WHICH CASE GULF GROUP WOULD AGREE BUT WOULD INSIST ON SAME TERMS FOR GULF AS FOR VENEZUELA.

C. NEGOTIATE WITH GULF GROUP BUT REFUSE TO SIGN AGREEMENT REACHED WITH GULF UNTIL AGREEMENT REACHED WITH OTHER OPEC PRODUCERS (LIBYA AND ALGIERS). IF COMPANY OPTED FOR THIS SOLUTION, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE BROKEN OFF AND OPEC EXTRAORDINARY SESSION DOMINATED BY RADICALS WHO WOULD TAKE OVER.

3. AMOUZEGAR ALSO SAID THAT WHEN COMPANY NEGOTIATORS RETURNED TO CONFERENCE TABLE JAN 28 IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THEY RESPOND SUBSTANTATIVELY TO QUESTIONS THAT GULF PRODUCERS HAD POSED. HE HAD WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY BEEN ABLE TO ACCEPT LETTER "DRAFTED BY 15 LAWYERS" WHICH PIERCY AND STRATHALMOND HAD GIVEN HIM (REF B, PARA 4) BECAUSE IT ADDED ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO WHAT COMPANY LOWER LEVEL GROUP HAD SAID ON JAN 12 AND PIERCY AND STRATHALMOND HAD SAID ON JAN 19. IN OTHER WORDS, COMPANIES MUST SAY WHERE THEY STOOD. IF, AS THEY HAD INDICATED, THEY AGREED TO PRINCIPLE OF POSTED PRICE INCREASE AND INFLATION INDEX THEY SHOULD SAY SO AND BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS DETAILS. IF THEY DISAGREED WITH SOME OF GULF PRODUCERS DESIDERATA THEY SHOULD SAY THEY DISAGREED BUT WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS MATTER GIVING THEIR REASONS FOR DISAGREEMENT.

4. FINALLY AMOUZEGAR SAID THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT HAPPENED OPEC EXTRAORDINARY SESSION WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE FEB 3. THEREFORE IF COMPANIES WERE SERIOUS AND WERE NOT JUST STALLING, IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT NEGOTIATIONS BE COMPLETED BEFORE THAT DATE. IT SEEMED EVIDENT THAT LUNCH AT COURT MINISTER ALAM'S HOUSE HAD BEEN AT DEMAND OF SHAH AND POINTS WHICH AMOUZEGAR MADE WERE POINTS WHICH SHAH WISHED TO GET ACROSS TO COMPANIES IN FK UNCERTAIN TERMS.

SECRET

29

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00348 221542Z

5. SUBSEQUENTLY WRIGHT AND I SAW STRATHALMOND AND BRIEFED HIM ON LUNCHEON MEETING. HE SAID HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM LONDON GROUP INSTRUCTING HIM TO PERSUADE AMOUZEGAR TO ABANDON PRESENTATION OF LETTER TO COMPANY NEGOTIATORS TODAY AND ALSO TO PERSUADE AMOUZEGAR TO ABANDON FEB 1 DEADLINE. STRATHALMOND VERY CONCERNED BECAUSE HE FEARED THAT IF HE TRIED DO THIS HE WOULD BLOW THE TALKS WIDE OPEN SINCE AMOUZEGAR, SHAH AND OTHER MEMBERS OF GULF OPEC GROUP WOULD CERTAINLY CONSIDER THIS AS A DELAYING TACTIC INVOLVING BAD FAITH ON PART OF COMPANIES. HE ASKED OUR VIEW. WRIGHT AND I SAID WE FULLY AGREED WITH HIM AND THOUGHT A REAL DEBACLE FOR THE COMPANIES COULD ENSUE IF AT THIS JUNCTURE HE TRIED TO PERSUADE OR PRESSURE AMOUZEGAR INTO ABANDONING DEADLINE WHICH AGREED TO BY IRANIAN AND OTHER GULF PRODUCERS OR IF HE SHOULD TRY TO TELL AMOUZEGAR NOT TO PRESENT LETTER, PARTICULARLY SINCE AMOUZEGAR HAD AT LUNCH INDICATED LETTER ALREADY DRAWN UP AND EITHER SIGNED OR APPROVED BY IRAQI OIL MINISTER.

6. COMMENT: IN OUR JUDGEMENT THE INSTRUCTIONS STRATHALMOND RECEIVED FROM LONDON SHOWED LITTLE REALIZATION OF THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION, THE VERY SERIOUS PREDICAMENT WHICH THE COMPANIES FACE HERE AND THE FACT THAT YESTERDAY A BREAKDOWN IN THE TALKS INVOLVING THE CONVENING OF OPEC EXTRAORDINARY SESSION JAN 25 WAS NARROWLY AVERTED BY SKILLFUL MANEUVERING OF AMOUZEGAR WHO HAS CLEARLY RUN OUT OF "WIGGLE ROOM".
MACARTHUR

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ALGIERS.

SECRET

29

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 671

PAGE 0 TEHRAN 00346 220810Z

10
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSD-00 /046 W

051387

PI 220805Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3276

SECRET TEHRAN 0346

EXDIS

FOR UNDER SECRETARY IRWIN

SUBJECT: OCG SITUATION

REF: DEPT 010748

REF TELEGRAM SHOWN COMPANY REPS AS REQUESTED BY
UNDER SECRETARY. THEY HIGHLY APPRECIATIVE OF INFORMATION.
MACARTHUR

71 2
JAN 22 AM 8.20

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

Wif

$$\frac{2}{3}$$
$$\frac{3}{3}$$

047889

71 JAN 21 PM 10:06

71 JAN 21 PM 10:06

71 JAN 21 PM 10:06

71 JAN 21 PM 10:06

71 JAN 21 PM 10:06

71 JAN 21 PM 10:06

71 JAN 21 PM 10:06

71 JAN 21 PM 10:06

71 JAN 21 PM 10:06

71 JAN 21 PM 10:06

71 JAN 21 PM 10:06

46
HORIZ

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00344 212215Z

PRINCIPALS, BUT MEANWHILE HAVE GIVEN US SUMMARY:

3. OPEC EXTRAORDINARY MEETING SCHEDULED FOR JAN 25 POSTPONED UNTIL FEB 3 (LATEST DATE CALLED FOR BY OPEC RESOLUTION 120).

4. FOLLOWING SCENARIO WILL BE SET FORTH IN LETTER TO BE GIVEN NEGOTIATORS TOMORROW:

A. COMPANY EXPERTS TO BE IN TEHRAN IN TIME TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION BY JAN 24 ON MATTERS AFFECTING GULF.

B. IF PROPOSALS IN COMPANIES' OFFER ARE GLOBAL, THEY MUST CONTAIN THE TWO POINTS SOLELY AFFECTING GULF IN OPEC RESOLUTION 120 (PARAS 4 AND 5).

C. NEGOTIATIONS TO BE COMPLETED BY FEB 1.

D. IF SETTLEMENT IN GULF COMPLETED BY FEB 1, BUT NEGOTIATIONS IN OTHER OPEC COUNTRIES NOT COMPLETED BY THAT DATE, GULF NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE FINALIZED.

5. NEGOTIATORS STRESSED THEY HAD NOT IN ANY WAY COMPROMISED POSITION OF INDEPENDENTS.

6. NEGOTIATORS REPORTED "ALL WE REALLY ACHIEVED IN DELAY OF OPEC JAN 25 MEETING UNTIL FEB 3". PAID HIGH TRIBUTE TO AMOUZEGAR'S EXTRAORDINARILY HELPFUL ROLE IN ACHIEVING THIS GOAL.

7. SHORTLY AFTER MEETING TERMINATED COURT MINISTER ALAM CALLED AMBASSADOR AND ASKED HIM TO LUNCH PRIVATELY TOMORROW WITH BRITISH AMB WRIGHT AND AMOUZEGAR TO CANVAS SITUATION. IN REPLY TO AMBASSADOR'S

QUERY AS TO HOW THINGS LOOKED, ALAM REPLIED "NOT TOO BAD. IT CAME OUT ALL RIGHT TODAY".

8. PIERCY DEPARTING TEHRAN FOR NEW YORK FRIDAY A.M. JAN 22; STRATHALMOND RETURNING LONDON SATURDAY

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00344 212215Z

A.M. JAN 23.
MACARTHUR

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ALGIERS.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00337 211935Z

42
ACTION. SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

046809

O P 211236Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3270
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO OECD PARIS PRIORITY 1003
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
EC BRUSSELS 237
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

S E C R E T TEHRAN 337

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

OECD FOR TREZISE

DEPARTMENT PASS ALGIERS

TUNIS ALSO FOR UNDER SECRETARY IRWIN

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION: SECOND MEETING WITH NEGOTIATORS.

REF: TEHRAN 301

1. LORD STRATHALMOND, GEORGE PIERCY AND UK, FRENCH AND DUTCH AMBASSADORS MET WITH US AT OUR EMBASSY TO TAKE STOCK BEFORE THE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT MEETING WITH GULF PRODUCERS THIS AFTERNOON AT 4:00 P.M. TEHRAN TIME.

2. STRATHALMOND SAID HE DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHAT AFTERNOON MEETING WOULD BRING AND THEN OUTLINED DEVELOPMENTS SINCE LAST

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

SECRET

EVENING AS FOLLOWS.

3. AMOUZEGAR ASKED SEE NEGOTIATORS PRIVATELY THIS MORNING AT 10:00 AM. AMOUZEGAR VERY WORRIED ABOUT PROJECTED MONDAY OPEC EXTRAORDINARY SESSION BECAUSE HE SAW NO WAY TO CONTROL IT AND RADICAL PRODUCERS MIGHT GAIN ASCENDENCE. ALGERIAN MINISTER OF PETROLEUM ABDESALAM AND PARTY ARRIVED LAST NIGHT WITH INSTRUCTIONS (SEE PARA 6 BELOW) THAT WERE DESIGNED TO FURTHER OBJECTIVES OF LIBYA AND ALGERIA. KUWAITI MINISTER AL-ATEQI ALSO ARRIVED THIS MORNING AND VENEZUELAN ON HIS WAY. KUWAITI WOULD PROBABLY BE AT THE AFTERNOON MEETING AND PERHAPS ALGERIAN AS WELL ALTHOUGH AMOUZEGAR TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR SHAH TO RECEIVE HIM AT TIME OF MEETING SO THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE. SAUDI MINISTER YAMANI HAS NOT RPT NOT RETURNED TO TEHRAN SO HE WOULD BE ABSENT.

4. AMOUZEGAR, STRATHALMOND AND PIERCY EXPLORED THE NEGOTIATORS' INSTRUCTIONS. STRATHALMOND INFORMED AMOUZEGAR OF LETTER THEY INSTRUCTED SUBMIT FOR CIRCULATION OTHER OPEC COUNTRIES. AMOUZEGAR EXAMINED LETTER AND SAID HE WOULD ACCEPT AND CIRCULATE IT. HOWEVER, IT NOT SUFFICIENT JUSTIFY FURTHER POSTPONEMENT OF OPEC EXTRAORDINARY SESSION SCHEDULED FOR JAN 25. AMOUZEGAR WAS TOLD THAT COMPANIES HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN ABLE APPROVE TWO IDEAS THEY (STRATHALMOND AND AMOUZEGAR) HAD WORKED UP JOINTLY LAST NIGHT TO PERMIT AMOUZEGAR PRESS FOR FURTHER POSTPONEMENT OF MONDAY'S MEETING. THESE WERE (A) NEGOTIATORS SHOULD REQUEST CLARIFICATION FROM OPEC COMMITTEE OF ASSURANCE GULF STATES PREPARED OFFER TO PROTECT COMPANIES AGAINST FURTHER WHIPSAWING, AND (B) ANNOUNCEMENT TO COMMITTEE THAT ONE OR TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF INDEPENDENTS OPERATING IN LIBYA OR ALGERIA WERE COMING TO LISTEN TO COMMITTEE'S REASONS FOR BELIEVING INDEPENDENTS' POSITION NOT RPT NOT ENDANGERED BY SEPARATE GULF NEGOTIATIONS.

5. AMOUZEGAR ACCEPTED THIS BUT SAID IT IMPORTANT TO DEVELOP EXCUSE FOR POSTPONING JAN 25 OPEC EXTRAORDINARY MEETING. SINCE COMPANIES COULD NOT SEEM TO HELP HIM IN THIS, HE WOULD SPRING A "SURPRISE" IN THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETING. HE COULD NOT RPT NOT BE SPECIFIC ABOUT THE NATURE OF SURPRISE, BUT ASKED NEGOTIATORS TO BE FLEXIBLE. STRATHALMOND AND PIERCY BOTH SAID THEY SURE IT WOULD BE DESIGNED TO BE HELPFUL SINCE AMOUZEGAR CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS NEGOTIATORS CANNOT NOW PREJUDICE THE OIL INDUSTRY'S GLOBAL APPROACH.

6. AMOUZEGAR INFORMED THE NEGOTIATORS THAT PACHACHI, THE OPEC

SECRET

BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00337 211935Z

SYG, HAD FORWARDED THE JOINT LIBYAN/ALGERIAN VIEWS. IN SUMMARY, THESE WERE (A) COMPANIES ARE STALLING; (B) INDUSTRY PAPER IS AN INFRINGEMENT ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF OPEC MEMBER NATIONS; AND (C) IT IS STRICTLY A MANEUVER BY COMPANIES TO DIVIDE THE OPEC UNITY. VIEWS WERE PUT IN VERY STRONG WORDS AND AMOUZEGAR DESCRIBED IT AS A DIRTY MESSAGE FROM LIBYA AND ALGERIA. CONSENSUS OF OUR MEETING WAS THAT ALGERIAN HAD BEEN SENT WELL IN ADVANCE OF PROPOSED JAN 25 OPEC MEETING TO PRESSURE GULF PARTICIPANTS NOT TO POSTPONE MEETING FURTHER.

7. FRENCH AMBASSADOR INQUIRED ABOUT POSSIBLE REASONS FOR EARLY ARRIVAL OF ALGERIAN PETROLEUM MINISTER. HE SPECULATED HIS PURPOSE WAS TO STIFFEN THE IRANIANS' BACK AND TO SEE TO IT THAT THE COMPANIES' OPEC-WIDE NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL NOT GAIN FURTHER GROUND. FRENCH AMB OUTLINED FRENCH POSITION IN ALGERIAN NEGOTIATIONS AS SET FORTH IN THE PUBLIC STATEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER SCHUMANN (PARIS 961).

8. STRATHALMOND PLEASED AT PROSPECT KUWAITI TAKING PART MEETING SINCE THEY OLD FRIENDS AND HE THOUGHT AL-ATEQI COULD BE HELPFUL.
MACARTHUR

NOTE BY OCT: NOT PASSED ALGIERS.

SECRET

25

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 480

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00310 210631Z

12
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

040965

O P 201530Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3259
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO USMISSION EC BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY THEHAGUE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION OECD PARIS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO TEHRAN 310

EXDIS NOFORN

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT: PARA 4.)

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION: PIERCY VIEWS

REF: TEHRAN 302

1. GEORGE PIERCY (ESSO) CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING TO INFORM US CONFIDENTIALLY RE JAN 19 MEETING WITH OPEC GROUP. HE SAID ATMOSPHERE MEETING WAS EXTREMELY GOOD AND FRIENDLY, PROBABLY BECAUSE AT OUTSET HE AND STRATHALMOND HAD APOLOGIZED FOR JAN 12 MEETING BUT HAD EXPLAINED IMPOSSIBILITY OF COMPANIES' BEING ABLE TO RESPOND TO GULF OPEC GROUP UNTIL ANTI-TRUST ASPECT HAD BEEN CLEARED UP JAN 15 AND COMPANIES COULD CONSULT.

HE AND STRATHALMOND HAD ALSO INDICATED THEY PLANNED TO REMAIN TILL TALKS COULD BE SUCESSFULLY CONCLUDED.

2. HOWEVER, SUBSTANTIVELY SITUATION WAS EXTREMELY COMPLICATED AND SERIOUS. MAJOR PROBLEM WAS FACT THAT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00310 210631Z

OPEC RESOLUTION CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS BY GULF PRODUCERS AND AMOUZEGAR AND YAMANI WERE PRESSING FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCEED AT ONCE QUITE INDEPENDENTLY FROM OTHER AREAS WHEREAS COMPANY RESPONSE SIGNED BY 15 COMPANIES, SOME OF WHOM WERE INDEPENDENTS NOT OPERATING IN GULF, CALLED FOR COMPREHENSIVE OPEC-WIDE NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS. DESPITE PIERCY AND STRATHALMOND'S EFFORTS, THEY HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO PERSUADE GULF PRODUCERS GROUP TO AGREE TO PROPOSE THAT OPEC AGREE TO "COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS" (REFTEL PARA 3. PIERCY SAID THEY EXPLAINED THAT THEY WERE NOT EMPOWERED TO ACCEPT NARROW NEGOTIATIONS IN GULF CONTEXT ONLY AND THAT IN LIGHT OF IMPASSE WHICH HAD DEVELOPED MATTER WOULD HAVE TO BE REFERRED BACK TO 15 SIGNATORIES OF COMPANIES DOCUMENT FOR CONSIDERATION AND GUIDANCE. GULF GROUP AGREED TO 48-HOUR RECESS TO PERMIT COMPANIES TO OBTAIN NEW INSTRUCTIONS WITH OPEC EXTRAORDINARY MEETING BEING CORRESPONDINGLY DELAYED TWO DAYS FROM JANUARY 23 TO 25.

3. PIERCY ALSO SAID THAT DISCUSSIONS YESTERDAY REVEALED SO-CALLED ASSURANCES IRAN AND OTHER GULF PRODUCERS WERE WILLING TO GIVE HAD RESERVATIONS AND ESCAPE CLAUSES. FOR EXAMPLE, GULF GROUP SAID IF SUEZ CANAL OPENED THEN EITHER SPECIAL TRANSPORTATION PREMIUM LIBYA RECEIVED FOR CANAL CLOSURE MUST BE ELIMINATED OR GULF PRICES WOULD BE RAISED ACCORDINGLY. SIMILARLY WHEN PIERCY POINTED OUT TO YAMANI THAT IF THERE WERE LATER A SUBSTANTIAL DISPARITY BETWEEN WHAT GULF PRODUCERS HAD RECEIVED AND WHAT LIBYA WOULD GET THERE WOULD BE ALMOST IRRESISTIBLE POSITIVE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES ON GULF PRODUCERS TO ASK FOR MORE. HE SAID YAMANI HAD NOT CHALLENGED THIS. FINALLY, ALTHOUGH AMOUZEGAR HAD NOT YET MENTIONED IT, YAMANI CONFIRMED THAT GULF PRODUCERS WOULD TIE STABILITY OF GULF PRODUCER PRICES TO CONSUMER PRICES. THIS ALSO WOULD REPRESENT ESCAPE HATCH THAT COULD BE INVOKED TO MODIFY FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENT.

4. PIERCY SAID IN HIS JUDGEMENT IT WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE FOR 15 COMPANIES TO CONSIDER VERY SERIOUS ISSUES INVOLVED AND THEN REACH AGREEMENT AND SEND NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO TEHRAN BY TOMORROW JAN 21. AMONG OTHER PROBLEMS, HE WAS NOT ALL SURE THAT INDUSTRIES WHICH

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00310 210631Z

HAD SIGNED COMPANY DOCUMENT BUT WHO DID NOT OPERATE IN GULF WOULD AGREE TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH GULF GROUP UNLESS THERE ALSO NEGOTIATIONS WITH MEDITERRANEAN PRODUCERS. FURTHERMORE, DEPT OF JUSTICE WOULD HAVE TO AGREE IF PAPER THEY HAD APPROVED WAS MODIFIED. IF, AS HE FELT SURE, HE AND STRATHALMOND HAVE NOTHING TO TELL GULF GROUP TOMORROW, THERE WAS DANGER OF EXPLOSION. HE AND STRATHALMOND WANTED GOVTS AS WELL AS COMPANIES TO KNOW SITUATION AND HELP AS APPROPRIATE. HE HOPED ALSO THAT I WOULD FEEL ABLE TO HELP.

5. I REPLIED I, OF COURSE, WANTED TO HELP. WHILE USG WAS NOT A PARTY TO NEGOTIATIONS AND I WAS NOT IN POSITION TO INTERVENE SUBSTANTIVELY IN THESE MATTERS, I DID FEEL THAT I COULD CALL AMOUZEGAR PRIVATELY AND EXPLAIN TO HIM VERY REAL DIFFICULTIES 15 DIFFERENT COMPANIES WOULD HAVE IN REACHING ANY CONCLUSIONS WITHIN 48-HOUR PERIOD ALLOWED, STRESSING THAT IF, BECAUSE OF COMPLEXITY OF PROBLEM, INSTRUCTIONS HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED BY TOMORROW, WE EARNESTLY HOPED THAT NO UNTOWARD OR ARBITRARY ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN. PIERCY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION.

6. I SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED AMOUZEGAR AT HOME ON "PURELY PERSONAL BASIS, SAYING I WANTED HIM TO KNOW PRIVATELY THAT I HAD PERSONAL DOUBT THAT COMPANIES WOULD BE ABLE TO GET A REPLY BACK BY TOMORROW JAN 21. PROBLEM FOR COMPANIES WAS THAT WHEREAS GULF GROUP WANTED AGREEMENT ON GULF TO BE NEGOTIATED AT ONCE AND BEFORE AGREEMENTS ELSEWHERE, NEGOTIATORS WERE BOUND BY COMPANIES' DECLARATION TO NEGOTIATE "COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT." SINCE SOME OF 15 COMPANY SIGNATORIES DID NOT OPERATE IN GULF, THEY MIGHT WANT MORE TIME TO CONSIDER EFFECT OF CHANGE IN TERMS OF REFERENCE THEY HAD SIGNED. THAT WOULD MODIFY "COMPREHENSIVE" THAT IS, OPEC-WIDE NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE I HOPED INSTRUCTIONS WOULD ARRIVE IN TIME, IF THERE SHOULD BE A DELAY, I HOPED REASONS WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AND ANY ARBITRARY ACTION COULD BE AVOIDED.

7. AMOUZEGAR REPLIED THAT IF NEGOTIATORS DID NOT RECEIVE THEIR INSTRUCTIONS BY TOMORROW EVENING, THERE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEHRAN 00310 210631Z

WAS NOTHING HE COULD DO AND THERE WERE NO ASSURANCES HE COULD GIVE. HE HAD AGREED TO 48-HOUR MORATORIUM DESPITE GREAT PRESSURE FROM IRAQI OIL MAN TO LIMIT PERIOD TO 24 HOURS. HE THEREFORE HOPED COMPANIES UNDERSTOOD THAT IF ANSWER NOT RECEIVED BY TOMORROW EVENING, EXTRAORDINARY OPEC MEETING WOULD BE HELD JAN 25 AND NOBODY COULD TELL WHAT OUTCOME OF THAT WOULD BE. HE ADDED A BIT EMOTIONALLY THAT COMPANIES HAD DELIBERATELY CREATED PROBLEM BY INCLUDING NON-GULF MEMBERS IN 15 SIGNATORIES TO PROVIDE PRETEXT FOR DELAY. IF GULF OPERATING COMPANIES NOW HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH THESE NON-GULF OPERATORS, IT WAS UP TO FORMER TO DEAL WITH PROBLEM AND IT WAS NOT CONCERN OF OPEC GULF GROUP. AMOUZEGAR CONCLUDED BY SAYING THERE WAS NOTHING PERSONAL IN HIS REMARKS, AS I WELL KNEW, AND HE UNDERSTOOD I WAS CALLING HIM ON PERSONAL BASIS, BUT HE WANTED TO BE SURE THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN OUR MIND AS TH WHERE GULF GROUP STOOD AND WHAT CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE OF FAILURE OF COMPANY NEGOTIATORS TO RESPONS TOMORROW AFTERNOON.
GP-3

SECRET

The seal of the United States Department of State is located in the top right corner. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two stars flank the central emblem.

SECRET 478

43
ACTION SS-45

036208

O P 201530Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3260
AMEMBASSY ASWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO USMISSION EC BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY THEHAGUE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION OECD PARIS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T SECTION TWO OF TWO TEHRAN 310

EXDIS

NOFORN.

8. SHORTLY AFTER MY TALK WITH AMOUZEGAR (WHO HAD ALREADY REPORTED TO SHAH), COURT MINISTER ALAM CALLED ME ON SHAH'S INSTRUCTION TO INQUIRE REASONS WHY I THOUGHT IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR COMPANIES TO REPLY BY TOMORROW. AFTER ALSO ASSURING ALAM I HAD BEEN TALKING TO AMOUZEGAR ON PERSONAL BASIS AND AFTER ALSO MAKING QUITE CLEAR THAT I HAD NO AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER, TO GET INVOLVED IN SUBSTANCE OF TALKS BETWEEN COMPANY NEGOTIATORS AND GULF PRODUCING GROUP, I WENT OVER SAME GROUND WITH ALAM AS I HAD WITH AMOUZEGAR. I ALSO MENTIONED AS PRIVATE OBSERVATION THAT I DID NOT KNOW IF ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN COMPANIES MODIFYING ORIGINAL PAPER WOULD HAVE TO ALSO BE APPROVED BY DEPT OF JUSTICE. IF SO THIS COULD TAKE SOME TIME. I CONCLUDED BY TELLING ALAM THAT WHILE I REALLY DID NOT KNOW WHEN NEGOTIATORS INSTRUCTIONS WOULD ARRIVE, I HONESTLY BELIEVED TIME TOO SHORT AND REASON WHY I CALLED AMOUZEGAR WAS SO THAT IF IT WERE NOT POSSIBLE FOR NEGOTIATORS TO

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00310 201820Z

HAVE RESPONSE BY TOMORROW THIS FACT WOULD NOT SUDDENLY BURST ON MEETING AND BE CONSTRUED BY GULF NEGOTIATORS AS DELIBERATE AFFRONT.

9. ALAM COMMENTED, "THIS IS REALLY A VERY COMPLEX PROBLEM AND I UNDERSTAND COMPANY PROBLEM BETTER NOW." HE SAID TROUBLE WITH COMPANY PROPOSAL FOR OPEC-WIDE NEGOTIATIONS WAS THAT IRAN AND SUADI ARABIA HAD NO DESIRE TO HAVE ANY OF OTHER RADICAL ARAB STATES OTHER THAN IRAQ INVOLVED IN THEIR NEGOTIATIONS AS THIS WOULD CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS. SIMILARLY IRAN NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT AN EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF OPEC INVOLVING ALL OPEC MEMBERS BECAUSE IT WOULD GIVE RADICALS OPPORTUNITIES TO PRESS MODERATES TO TAKE MORE RADICAL POSITION. HE WONDERED WHETHER I HAD ANY IDEAS ABOUT HOW DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMPANIES AND GULF GROUP COULD BE RECONCILED. I SAID I COULD NOT OFFER ANY ADVICE BUT ON PERSONAL BASIS IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS WITH GULF AND MEDITERRANEAN GROUPS MIGHT BE AN IDEA. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD COMPANY PROBLEM BETTER NOW AND WOULD RELAY WHAT I HAD SAID TO SHAH.

10. ALAM HAS JUST CALLED ME BACK. HE SAID SHAH NOW ALSO UNDERSTOOD BETTER PROBLEMS COMPANIES HAD IN GETTING RESPONSE BY TOMORROW. ACCORDINGLY, SHAH IS PREPARED:

(A) TO GRANT A DELAY IN COMPANY RESPONSE OF 12 TO 15 HOURS BUT IN NO CASE MORE THAT 24 SINCE A LONGER DELAY WOULD CREATE MAJOR PROBLEM FOR IRAN WITH OPEC. THEREFORE, IF IN FACT COMPANY RESPONSE HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED TOMORROW AFTERNOON, COMPANY NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ASK FOR A BRIED EXTENSION INDICATING WHEN RESPONSE WOULD BE FORTHCOMING (WHIN 24 HOURS).

(B) IF NEGOTIATIONS SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED BETWEEN OPEC GULF GROUP AND COMPANIES, SHAH INSTRUCTED ALAM TO INFORM US THAT "IRAN WILL HONOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT NO MATTER WHAT ADDITIONAL BENEFITS ARE GIVEN TO LIBYA OR ALGERIA."

11. COMMENT: WE HAVE BRIEFED PIERCY ON FOREGOING AND HE WILL CONSULT THIS EVENING WITH STRATHALMOND. WHILE NEGOTIATORS ARE UNDER PRESENT MANDATE TO TIE NEGOTIATIONS IN GULF WITH THOSE IN MEDITERRANEAN, WE RECEIVED

SECRET

31
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00310 201820Z

IMPRESSION THAT THEY RECOGNIZE THERE IS NO WAY GULF STATES CAN FORCE LIBYA OR ALGERIA INTO PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS WITH OPEC FRAMEWORK. IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IS ONE OF TIME RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE. IF COMPANY NEGOTIATORS COULD TOMORROW SAY THEY WOULD HAVE REPLY ON THEIR PRINCIPALS WITHIN 24 HOURS AND IF THAT REPLY PERMITTED PROCEEDING AHEAD WITH NEGOTIATIONS WITH GULF PRODUCERS, WE BELIEVE IRAN WOULD TRY TO INDEFINITELY POSTPONE EXTRAORDINARY OPEC JAN 25 MEETING. HOWEVER, PIERCY SAYS IT IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE BY TOMORROW A SPECIFIC DATE EVEN BEYOND 24 HOURS WHEN COMPANY REPLY (REGARDLESS OF ITS SUBSTANCE) WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. SO AT TOMORROW'S MEETING NEGOTIATORS MAY FIND THEMSELVES IN VERY DIFFICULT POSITION WHERE THEY WILL HAVE TO SAY THEY HAVE NO REPLY AND CANNOT SAY WHEN THEY WILL HAVE ONE. SUCH ANSWER WILL CONJURE UP MEMORIES OF JAN 12 MEETING AND BE BADLY RECEIVED. IT COULD TRIGGER GREEN LIGHT FOR OPEC EXTRA-ORDINARY MEETING JAN 25.

12. HAVE KEPT IN TOUCH TODAY WITH BRITISH AMB WRIGHT WHO SAW SHAH THIS MORNING AND EXPLAINED TO HIM NEED FOR MORE TIME. ALAM CALLED WRIGHT THIS AFTERNOON AND GAVE HIM SAME INFOR IN PARA 10 ABOVE, SO HMG IS ALSO INFORMED OF ABOVE DEVELOPMENTS.

GP-3

MMACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 131 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

TELEGRAM

JAN 20 AM 8:41

82
ACTION SS-45

028189

S E C R E T TEHRAN 0302

EXDIS

KUWAIT FOR UNDERSECRETARY IRWIN

OECD FOR TREZISE

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION: OPEC/NEGOTIATORS FIRST MEETING.

REF: TEHRAN 301

1. CONSORTIUM NEGOTIATORS ASKED ECONOMIC COUNSELOR LEHFELDT TO CALL THIS EVENING AT 2030 TO PICK UP MESSAGE THEY ARE SENDING TO ADDISON COVERING OPENING MEETING THIS AFTERNOON.

2. TEXT OF MESSAGE IS:
QUOTE

1. WE MET AMOUZEGAR, YAMANI AND MAMMADI TODAY, ATMOSPHERE WAS VERY PLEASANT.

2. ARGUMENT CENTERED AROUND PROPOSAL TO
NEGOTIATE WITH GULF GROUP EXCEPT NO MENTION OF POINT
REGARDING PRICE INCREASES.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

SECRET

3. IT WAS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT AMOUZEGAR BELIEVES HE AND H.I.M. HAVE CONVINCED AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF THE CORRECTNESS OF THEIR POSITION ON A GULF NEGOTIATION COMING FIRST WITH THE RESULT THAT OUR NEGOTIATING STAND ON PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED IS BY NO MEANS AN EASY ONE.

5. IT CENTERED FOR SOME TIME AROUND WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE HAD TO GIVE WAY TO UNREASONABLE DEMANDS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. THEY ASSURED US THAT THEY WERE QUITE PREPARED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES IN SOME SIGNED LETTER TO PROMISE NOT TO ASK FOR FUTURE SIMILAR TREATMENT IN THE GULF FOR THE MOMENT BUT IMPLIED POINT COULD ARISE IN FUTURE. THE ONLY OTHER POINT OF SIGNIFICANCE WAS THAT IF LIBYA GETS SPECIAL TREATMENT OVER FREIGHT RATES THEN IF FREIGHT RATES COME DOWN LIBYA TAKE MUST EITHER COME DOWN OR THE PERSIAN GULF TAKE GO UP.

A. AMOUZEGAR IS INFORMING OPEC THAT THE COMPANIES' PROPOSALS ARE IN LINE WITH THE OPEC RESOLUTION AS FAR AS THE GLUF IS CONCERNED, BUT HOWEVER, THERE ARE STILL SOME PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES, AND IS ASKING FOR THE OPEC MEETING TO BE POSTPONED FROM STURDAY 23RD JANUARY TO MONDAY 25TH JANUARY.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00302 200146Z

THEY HAVE TO REPORT TO OPEC UNDER THE RESOLUTIONS.

C. IF THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED THEY WILL ALL THREE AT THE NEXT OPEC MEETING ON FEBRUARY 3RD SUGGEST THE FORMATION OF A MEDITERRANEAN COMMITTEE TO HAVE REPRESENTATIVES BOTH FROM SAUDIA ARABIA AND IRAQ ON THAT COMMITTEE.

D. IF, HOWEVER, THE ANSWER ON THURSDAY IS THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER HAVE TO BE GLOBAL THEY WILL HOLD THE OPEC MEETING ON MONDAY 25TH JANUARY AND WILL THEN DECIDE WHAT ACTION IS TO BE TAKEN. AT THE SAME TIME THE HAPPY SUGGESTION IS THAT THEY WILL ASK FOR VENEZUELA'S TERMS IN ITS ENTIRETY FOR THE GULF.

7. IT IS NOT EASY TO ADVISE ON WHAT SHOULD BE DONE. IF WE COMMENCE WITH GULF NEGOTIATIONS WE MUST HAVE VERY FIRM ASSURANCES THAT STUPIDITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WILL NOT BE REFLECTED HERE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF WE STICK FIRM ON THE GLOBAL APPROACH WE CANNOT HELP BUT THINK, IN VIEW OF THE MEETINGS REPORTED SEPARATELY, THAT THERE WILL BE A COMPLETE MUDDLE FOR MANY MONTHS TO COME. SOMEHOW WE FEEL THE FORMER WILL IN THE END BE INEVITABLE.

8. REPLY TO BE OF ANY HELP NEEDED BY THURSDAY NOON. OTHER WISE WE MUST STAND ON GLOBAL APPROACH. END QUOTE

3. STRATHALMOND AND VAN REEVEN WHO HANDED LEHFELDT MESSAGE MADE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS:

A. GENERAL ATMOSPHERE CORDIAL AND FRIENDLY WITH AMOUZEGAR MAKING OBVIOUS EFFORT TO FIND ACCEPTABLE MODUS OPERANDI.

B. MAJOR DIFFICULTY WAS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OPEC RESOLUTION APPROVING NEGOTIATIONS BY GULF PRODUCERS AND INDUSTRY PAPER CALLING FOR OPEC-WIDE NEGOTIATIONS. MOST OF MEETING WAS SPENT DISCUSSING THIS PROBLEM. STRATHALMOND INDICATED COMPANY NEGOTIATORS HAD POINTED OUT TO OPEC GROUP THE PROBLEM THEY HAD IN FOLLOWING OUT THEIR INSTRUCTIONS TO HAVE AN OPEC-WIDE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched atop a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 04 TEHRAN 00302 200146Z

4. THE NEXT PROBLEM THEY MENTIONED WAS POSSIBLE POSTPONEMENT OF JAN 23 OPEC MEETING INVOLVING ALL MEMBERS. AMOUZEGAR PROPOSED TO MEETING THAT JAN 23 OPEC MEETING BE POSTPONED IN VIEW FACT COMPANY PROPOSALS WERE GENERALLY IN LINE WITH OPEC RESOLUTION. DISCUSSION AMONG OPEC GULF MEMBERS THEN CENTERED ON LENGTH OF POSTPONEMENT. HAMADI (IRAQ) INSISTED THAT POSTPONEMENT COULD NOT GO BEYOND JAN 25 AND THIS WAS ACCEPTED.

6. LEHFELDT ASKED STRATHALMOND WHAT COMES NEXT. HE REPLIED THAT DEVELOPMENTS WOULD IN PRT DEPEND ON

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 05 TEHRAN 00302 200146Z

WHAT REPLY HE RECEIVED TO HIS AND PIERCY'S MESSAGE WHICH
HE EXPECTED WOULD BE INSISTANCE ON INDUSTRIES' OPEC-WIDE
APPROACH.
MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 133 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

HAK

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00299 191455Z

47
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

025395

P 191400Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3250
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

S E C R E T TEHRAN 299

EXDIS.

KUWAIT FOR UNDER SECRETARY

SUBJ: UNDER SECRETARY'S JAN 18 MEETING WITH SHAH
(GENERAL DISCUSSION)

REF: TEHRAN 277

DURING UNDER SECRETARY'S TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH SHAH JAN 18, LATTER GAVE HIS OWN ANALYSIS OF A NUMBER OF ASPECTS OF WORLD PICTURE, WHICH IS SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS.

1. EUROPE. SHAH AGREED WITH UNDER SECY THAT A STRONG NATO REPRESENTS ESSENTIAL COUNTERWEIGHT TO SOVIET POWER HE WAS THEREFORE INTERESTED AND PLEASED TO HEAR UNDER SECY'S VIEW THAT DECEMBER NATO MEETING HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE AND SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO CONTINUING NATO STRENGTH. SHAH COMMENTED THAT HE ALSO AGREED WITH WILLY BRANDT'S OST POLITIK FOR IF EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE TO BE GRADUALLY DETACHED FROM SOVIET UNION'S STEEL CLUTCHES, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE MORE EAST-WEST CONTACTS IN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF ECONOMIC VALUE TO CAPTIVE EAST EUROPEAN STATES. TRAGEDY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS THAT DUBCEK HAD TRIED TO MOVE "TOO FAR TOO FAST". SHAH BELIEVED DUBCEK COULD HAVE ACCOMPLISHED VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING HE SOUGHT IF IT HAD BEEN APPROACHED GRADUALLY OVER A PERIOD OF ABOUT TEN YEARS.

2. SOVIET AMBITIONS IN MIDDLE EAST. SHAH HAD NO ILLU.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

71 JUN 19 PM 9:31

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00299 191455Z

SIONS RE SOVIET AMBITIONS IN MID-EAST AND DEPLORED INCREASING SOVIET INFLUENCE ON RADICAL ARABS AS WELL AS OBVIOUS SOVIET INTENTION TO USE THEM TO REPLACE MODERATE ARAB REGIMES IN ARABIAN PENINSULA AND GULF AREA. SHAH SAID WHILE GOI POLICY WAS TO HAVE GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS, HE ALSO REALIZED THAT PRESENT SOVIET AMIABILITY TOWARD IRAN COULD REVERT TO PROPAGANDA AND PRESSURES IF SOVIETS BELIEVED THAT SERVED THEIR TACTICAL INTERESTS. FURTHERMORE, WITH SOVIETS PUMPING WEAPONS INTO RADICAL ARAB COUNTRIES, IRAN MUST BE MILITARILY STRONG TO DETER ANY MILITARY ADVENTURES BY RADICAL ARABS, OR IF THEY OCCURRED, TO DEAL WITH THEM EFFECTIVELY. IRAN WAS NOT SEEKING TO BUILD UP EXCESSIVE MILITARY FORCES AND REALIZED IT DID NOT HAVE RESOURCES TO DEFEND ITSELF SUCCESSFULLY AGAINST A SOVIET ATTACK ALTHOUGH IT WOULD FIGHT AND RESIST IF SOVIETS COMMITTED AGGRESSION. WHAT IT WAS TRYING TO BUILD UP WAS A MODEST BUT HIGHLY TRAINED AND EFFECTIVE FORCE THAT WOULD BE ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY DEAL WITH RADICAL ARAB STATES OR ANY COMBINATION OF THEM SHOULD THEY MOVE AGAINST IRAN. HE MENTIONED SIX DIVISION FORCE WHICH HE THOUGHT WAS MODEST IN VIEW OF IRAN'S TERRITORIAL EXTENT.

3. CONCERN RE PAKISTAN AND TURKEY. IN CONNECTION WITH IRAN'S DEFENSE NEEDS, SHAH ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN AND TURKEY. THESE DEVELOPMENTS TROUBLED HIM AS THE TWO COUNTRIES FLANKED IRAN. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN PAKISTAN BUT BHUTTO'S EXTREME LEFTIST TENDENCIES BODED NO GOOD. SITUATION IN TURKEY ALSO DISTURBED HIM FOR IF ANYTHING HAPPENS TO TURKEY, WHICH IS NEIGHBOR ALONG RUSSIAN BORDER, IT WOULD BE A DREADFUL DEVELOPMENT FOR IRAN, WHICH WOULD THEN BE GEOGRAPHICALLY ISOLATED. HOWEVER, HE HOPED AND BELIEVED TURKISH MILITARY WOULD NOT LET THINGS GET OUT OF HAND.

4. GREECE. FOLLOWING HIS COMMENTS ON TURKEY, HE MENTIONED GREECE, SAYING THAT MILITARY REGIME THERE WAS PROBABLY NECESSARY AT THIS JUNCTURE TO MAINTAIN STABILITY. HE HAD LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN ABILITY OF GREEK PEOPLE TO SUCCESSFULLY OPERATE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND OBSERVED THEY HAD HISTORICALLY NOT BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL

SECRET

29
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00299 191455Z

IN DOING SO. UNLIKE IRAN, WHERE MONARCHY HAD BEEN ACCEPTED INSTITUTION FOR 2500 YEARS, GREECE VACILLATED BETWEEN REPUBLICAN AND MONARCHIAL FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND AGAIN, UNLIKE IRAN, "THE KINGS WERE ALL OF FOREIGN ORIGIN. HE OBSERVED GREEKS NEED FIRM HAND TO GOVERN THEM. SHAH INDICATED KING CONSTANTINE HAD RECENTLY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM ASKING HIS ADVICE AND SHAH WAS THINKING ABOUT ADVISING HIM TO RETURN TO GREECE AND TRY TO WORK WITH PRESENT MILITARY REGIME IF CONSTANTINE BELIEVED HE COULD OBTAIN ADEQUATE GUARANTEE FOR CONTINUATION OF MONARCHY.

5. PERSIAN GULF AND ISLANDS. IN DISCUSSION OF GULF AND ISLANDS, SHAH MADE CLEAR HE CONSIDERED TUNBS AND ABU MUSA VITAL TO IRAN'S OWN SECURITY AND IF AGREEMENT CANNOT BE WORKED OUT WITH SHEIKHS, IRAN WILL PUT ITS FORCES ON THESE ISLANDS (PRESUMABLY, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT EXPLICITLY SAY SO, AFTER BRITISH WITHDRAWAL). IN SEPARATE LUNCHEON MEETING ZAHEDI ALSO STRONGLY REITERATED SAME THEME, SAYING THAT WHILE IRAN WOULD LIKE GOOD WILL OF GULF ARABS, THE ISLANDS, WHICH INVOLVED ITS OWN VITAL INTERESTS, CAME FIRST. FURTHERMORE, IRAN HAD DEMONSTRATED ITS GOOD WILL IN TURNING BACK BAHREIN TO ARABS.

6. ARAB FEDERATION. SHAH ALSO REITERATED HIS WELL KNOWN VIEW THAT ARAB FEDERATION, CONSISTING OF UAR, LIBYA AND SUDAN, MIGHT NOT BE A BAD THING AND THAT THERE COULD BE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES FOR THE THREE COUNTRIES IN COOPERATING TOGETHER. HOWEVER, IF IT INCLUDED SYRIA OR IRAQ, IT WOULD EVENTUALLY THREATEN SURVIVAL OF JORDAN AND IF JORDAN DISAPPEARED AND WAS REPLACED BY RADICAL PALESTINE OR ARAB STATE, POSITION OF SAUDI ARABIA WOULD THEN BE GRAVELY THREATENED. WHILE IRAN WOULD HELP SAUDIS, SAUDI SITUATION WAS NOT VERY ROBUST. THROUGHOUT THIS DISCUSSION AND PARTICULARLY IN SEPARATE TALK WITH FONMIN ZAHEDI RAN THREAD OF APPREHENSION ABOUT VULNERABILITY TO SUBVERSION OF SMALL SHEIKHDOMS ON ARAB SIDE OF GULF, AND DESIRE TO HELP THEM SURVIVE AGAINST THRUST OF EXTERNAL FORCES WHICH SEEKING TO TAKE THEM OVER. IF SHIEKS WERE THREATENED FROM OUTSIDE AND WISHED ASSISTANCE, IRAN WOULD HELP THEM

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEHRAN 00299 191455Z

BUT DANGER ALWAYS WAS THAT SUBVERSIVE COUP WOULD BE VERY SWIFT AND IRAN AND SAUDIS WOULD BE PRESENTED WITH FAIT ACCOMPLI.

7. IN RESPONSE TO UNDER SECY'S COMMENT THAT US HOPED AND BELIEVED BRITAIN WOULD BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE ITS ENTRY INTO COMMON MARKET, WHICH SHOULD TEND FURTHER TO STRENGTHEN WESTERN EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY AND HENCE NATO, SHAH REPLIED THAT DUTCHFONMIN LUNS, WHO RECENTLY VISITED TEHRAN, HAD PRIVATELY EXPRESSED EXTREME PESSIMISM OVER CHANCES OF BRITAIN ENTERING EEC.

8. ASSUME UNDER SECY (WHO HAS NOT CLEARED THIS MESSAGE) AND DEPT WILL DECIDE TO WHAT OTHER RECIPIENTS FOREGOING INFO SHOULD GO TO. GP-3
MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0602/10/2090
7/21/10/2090

SECRET 947

22
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 W

023790

P 190825Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3247
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
USMISSION OECD PARIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T TEHRAN 286

END IS

NOFORN

PARIS PASS TREZISE

KUWAIT FOR UNDER SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJ: OIL SITUATION

REF: TEHRAN 277 AND 279

1. IN TALKS WHICH UNDER SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR HAD WITH AMOUZEGAR JAN 18, REPORTED REFTELS, AMOUZEGAR MADE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL SIGNIFICANT POINTS:

(A) IF SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES ARE TO BE AVOIDED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH BEGIN IN TEHRAN JAN 19, THE CONSORTIUM NEGOTIATORS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR, PREFERABLY AT OUTSET BUT IN ANY EVENT NO LATER THAN WEDNESDAY JAN 20 OR AT LATEST BY THURSDAY MORNING JAN 21, THAT COMPANIES ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN TEHRAN WITH GULF PRODUCERS GROUP HEADED BY IRAN. WITH SUCH ASSURANCE AMOUZEGAR WILL BE IN POSITION TO REQUEST POSTPONEMENT OF OPEC MEETING SCHEDULED FOR JAN 23. ON OTHER:

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00286 191104Z

HAND, IF COMPANIES HAVE NOT MADE CLEAR BY THURSDAY THAT THEY ARE IN FACT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH GULF GROUP, FULL OPEC GROUP WILL MEET JAN 23 AND IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR IRAN AND OTHERS MODERATES TO CONTAIN UNREASONABLE AND EXAGGERATED DEMANDS WHICH MORE RADICAL OPEC MEMBERS WILL THEN INEVITABLY MAKE.

(B) NEGOTIATIONS WHICH BEGIN TODAY, JAN 19, SHOULD IN NO CASE BE INTERRUPTED OR BROKEN OFF AS IN CASE OF CONSORTIUM REPS WHO CAME HERE JAN 12 AND THEN RETURNED TO HOME BASE WITHOUT FIXING DATE FOR RESUMPTION OF TALKS. AMOUZEGAR SAID A SECOND INTERRUPTION OF THIS KIND WOULD CERTAINLY ALSO BE EXPLOITED BY RADICAL PRODUCERS, AND PERHAPS PRODUCE AN UNWANTED CRISIS.

GP 3

MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

551/10/2090

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 136 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

WH

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00282 181826Z

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

018579

0 181750Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WAHSDC IMMEDIATE 3243
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
US MISSION EC BRUSSELS 229
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
US MISSION OECD PARIS 995
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T TEHRAN 0282

EXDIS/NOFORN

US MISSION OECD PARIS - PASS TREZISE

SUBJECT: OIL NEGOTIATION: BRIEFING OF CONSORTIUM NEGOTIATORS

REFS: TEHRAN 277 (UNSTO 4) AND TEHRAN 279 (UNSTO 5)

1. DURING MEETING UNDER SECRETARY AND I HAD WITH AMOUZEGAR, (REFTELS), LATTER ASKED US TO EXPLAIN SITUATION TO COMPANIES AS SEEN FROM IRANIAN VIEW POINT (REFTELS) INCLUDING THE CONSORTIUM NEGOTIATORS WHO ARRIVING IN TEHRAN THIS EVENING (LORD STRATHELMOND AND PIERCY OF BP. AND ESSO). HE STRESSED IT IMPORTANT THAT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH BEGIN TOMORROW WITH COMPANIES NOT GET OFF TRACKS AT OUTGFB WHICH MIGHT HAPPEN UNLESS NEGOTIATORS FULLY UNDERSTOOD SITUATION AND IRAN'S VIEWPOINT.

2. UNDER SECRETARY AND I AGREED IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO BRIEF CONSORTIUM NEGOTIATORS TOMORROW MORNING. AFTER UNDER SECRETARY DEPART-

TURE' BRITISH AMBASSADOR TOLD ME HE PROPOSING A MEETING TOMORROW FOR AMBASSADORS OF UK, US, NETHERLANDS, AND FRANCE WITH STRATHELMOND

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00282 181826Z

AND PIERCY AT WHICH THEY WISHED ME TO BRIEF THEM ON UNDER
SECRETARY'S TALKS HERE. IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT, AFTER JANUARY 12
DEBACLE, NEGOTIATIONS BEGINNING TOMORROW NOT GET OFF TRACK AT
OUTSET. ACCORDINGLY, I PLAN TO GIVE BRIEFING UNLESS INSTRUCTED
TO CONTRARY. PLEASE CONFIRM. GP-4.
MACARTHUR

SECRET
25

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0602/01/137

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

CONFIDENTIAL 716

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00280 181838Z

52:42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 FILE-01 /047 W

018638

O 181705Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3241
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 0280

UNSTO 06

EXDIS - PASS USIA: DEPT FOR S/S

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM UNDER SECRETARY

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE VISIT BY UNDER SECRETARY

REF: TUNIS 288

1. I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR PROMPT AND MOST HELPFUL
REPLY. BARRING MOST UNLIKELY LAST MINUTE DECISION VISIT
LIBYA AND SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE, I TENTATIVELY PLAN
ARRIVE TUNIS EARLY AFTERNOON TUNIS TIME JAN 21 WITH ETD
LAST MORNING JAN 22 (THIS WOULD PUT US AT ANDREWS AFB
ABOUT 1600 FRIDAY JAN 22). IF THIS PLAN HOLDS, I WOULD
LIKE TO HAVE OPPORTUNITY MEET WITH FRANK SHAKESPEARE AND
ASSEMBLED SENIOR USIA OFFICERS. AS FOR REST OF TIME, I
WILL DO WHATEVER YOU RECOMMEND. IF YOU AGREE, SHORT CALL
ON FONMIN MASMOUDI SEEMS IN ORDER. AS YOU MAY KNOW,
DEPUTY ASST SECY RODGER DAVIES IS IN MY PARTY AND ALSO
PLANNING ATTEND PAO CONFERENCE.

2. THERE FOLLOWS LIST OF PASSENGERS AND AF CREW.
ASSUME AIRPORT VISAS CAN BE ARRANGED.

PASSENGER LIST

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

71 JAN 19 AM 8.00

2/5

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TE HRAN 00280 181838Z

1. UNDER SECRETARY JOHN IRWIN, II X060809
2. VELMA HEINE - U Y964876
3. SCOTT CUSTER - U X062015
4. NICHOLAS VELIOTES - U X010565
5. JAMES MORTON - S/S X019720
6. JANICE BARBIERE - S/S Y472257
7. RODGER DAVIES - NEA X017322
8. RICHARD MURPHY - NEA X062040
9. JACK MIKLOS - NEA X010177
10. HELEN KAMER - NEA Y964907
11. LEO AREL - S/S X022595
12. BERT BENNINGTON - SY X037300
13. WALTER SARGENT - SY X047272
14. JAMES AKINS - E X040596

CREW LIST

1. LTCOL RODERICK D. SWANK Y512328
2. MAJOR DALE K. POLENSKE Y943037
3. MAJOR RUSSELL W. JONES Y863298
4. MAJOR JOHN T. KITE Y829605
5. MAJOR LAWRENCE E. THOMAS Y889035
6. TSGT THOMAS PAPPAS Y670438

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00280 181838Z

- 7. TSGT RAYMOND E. JOHNSON Y681692
- 8. MSGT RONALD E. BROOKS Y829293
- 9. MSGT WILLIAM H. DEVELL Y638164
- 10. SSGT WILLIAM C. ELKINS Y586115
- 11. MSGT ROLAND F. VOIGT Y651127
- 12. MSGT HAROLD D. TENNISON Y814679
- 13. MSGT WILLIAM A. HOEELY Y950974

3. I AM LEAVING TEHRAN THIS EVENING, WILL OVERNIGHT IN RIYADH, AND THEN PROCEED TO KUWAIT WHERE I WILL BE FROM ABOUT 1900 JAN 19 TO 0900 JAN 21. WE WOULD PLAN TO FLY TO TUNIS FROM KUWAIT WITH ETA ABOUT 1330 HOURS JAN 21.

4. PLEASE SEND YOUR REPLY IMMEDIATE TO KUWAIT. I WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR KEEPING FRANK SHAKESPEARE INFORMED. IN ANY CONVERSATIONS WITH GOT OFFICIALS, REQUEST YOU EXPLAIN THAT IT POSSIBLE SOME LAST MINUTE HITCH COULD DEVELOP IN THESE PLANS, WITHOUT OF COURSE MENTIONING LIBYA.

5. FOR DEPT: PLEASE SEND LATEST REPORT ON PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA TO TUNIS PRIOR MY ARRIVAL.

6. SECURITY OFFICERS BENNINGTON AND SARGENT ACCOMPANYING. PLEASE ARRANGE FOR FOLLOW CAR WITH TWO PLAIN CLOTHES POLICE FOR ALL MOVES. MARINE SHOULD MEET AIRCRAFT FOR CLASSIFIED--ONE FOOT LOCKER. AIRCRAFT DOES NOT HAVE GUARDS. ARRANGE FOR COVERAGE BY LOCAL MILITARY OR POLICE. HAVE POLICE COVER OUTER PERIMETER OF RESIDENCE. IRWIN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two stars.

25th

PAGE 01 TEHRAN: 00279 01 OF 02 184502Z

71 JAN 19 AM 8:07

2
3

O: P 181700Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3239
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO US MISSION EC BRUSSELS PRIORITY 227
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
USMC SION OECD PARIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 279

EXDIS

NOFORN.

UNSTO 005

FOR USE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM IRWIN

PARIS PASS TRESIZE

SUBJ: DISCUSSIONS WITH FINMIN AMOUZEGAR RE OIL NEGOTIATIONS

REF: UNSTD 004

1. DAVIES AND AKINS MET WITH FALLAH AND MINA OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL OIL COMPANY DURING MY MEETING WITH SHAH REFEEL AND THEY MADE THE SAME POINTS. DAVIES AND AKINS SUBSEQUENTLY JOINED AMBASSADOR AND ME FOR HOUR LONG CONVERSATION WITH FINANCE MINISTER AMOUEZGAR. WE WENT OVER BRIEFLY THE SAME POINTS WE MADE WITH SHAH, PARTICULARLY REASONS FOR ACTION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL. AMOUEZGAR SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND FULLY IMPORTANCE OF THIS ACTION AND REASON

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00279 01 OF 02 181532Z

WHY COMPANIES WOULD NOT HAVE ALL FACTS AND FIGURES AT BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON JAN 19. WE AGAIN ASKED FOR PATIENCE UNTIL COMPANIES HAD TIME TO COLLECT DATA AND ORGANIZE THEIR POSITION.

2. IRANIAN APPROACH WAS MILD; THEY SAID COMPANIES PROPOSALS COULD SERVE AS BASIS FOR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN AND OTHER STATES IN GULF, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES DUE TOMORROW MUST BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS RPT NEGOTIATIONS IMMEDIATELY. THERE WAS LITTLE DISCUSSION ABOUT LENGTH OF TIME IT WOULD TAKE TO COMPLETE THESE NEGOTIATIONS ALTHOUGH AMOUZEGAR SAID COMPANIES CERTAINLY KNEW WHAT THEIR OWN PROFITS WERE, CERTAINLY KNEW WHAT THEY COULD AFFORD TO PAY AND NEGOTIATIONS "SHOULD REALLY LAST NO LONGER THAN THREE DAYS."

3. AMOUZEGAR WENT OVER COMPANIES' PROPOSAL IN DETAIL; SAID THAT IT COINCIDES IN ALMOST ALL RESPECTS WITH OPEC RESOLUTIONS. HE SAID COMPANIES' WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE POSTED PRICE LEVELS, TRANSPORTATION DIFFERENTIALS, AND TO RELATE FUTURE TAXES TO SOME INTERNATIONAL PRICE INDEX WERE PRECISELY WHAT OPEC HAD DEMANDED. HE SAID THAT IRAN COULD ACCEPT STABLE PRICES (WITH AN ESCALATION CLAUSE) PROVIDED COMPANIES ALSO AGREED NOT TO PASS UNWARRANTED PRICE INCREASES ON TO CONSUMERS. HE SAID IRAN WOULD NOT WISH TO AGREE TO KEEP PRICES DOWN IF COMPANIES WERE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OIL SHORTAGE TO RAISE PRICES TO CONSUMERS AND THEREBY INCREASE THEIR PROFITS UNJUSTIFIABLY. HE THOUGHT THIS PROVISION WOULD SURELY HAVE STRONG SUPPORT OF CONSUMING COUNTRIES.

4. NEGATIVE PARTS OF COMPANIES' PROPOSAL HE SAID ALSO ARE IN ACCORD WITH FINAL OPEC RESOLUTIONS. COMPANIES ASKED FOR STABLE TAXES AND OPEC HAS AGREED; THEY ASKED FOR NO RETROACTIVITY AND ALL MENTION OF IT IS OMITTED FROM RESOLUTIONS. MINISTER SAID OPEC MEETINGS WERE STORMY AND HE TOOK CREDIT FOR ESSENTIALLY MODERATE DEMANDS WHICH FINALLY APPEARED.

5. VENEZUELA, ACCORDING TO AMOUZEGAR, HAD ASKED OPEC TO RECOMMEND 60 PERCENT MINIMUM TAX, LIBYA HAD ASKED

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two stars.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00279 01 OF 02 181932Z

6. IT WAS ALSO AT IRAN'S INITIATIVE, ACCORDING TO AMUZEGAR, THAT OPEC HAD BEEN DIVIDED INTO THREE DISTINCT GROUPS: MODERATES IN PERSIAN GULF (HE DISCOUNTED INFLUENCE OF IRAQ), LIBYA, AND OTHERS IN A MEDITERRANEAN GROUP, WITH VENEZUELA AND INDONESIA IN THIRD. AMOUZEGAR SAID THAT COMPANIES' INSISTENCE ON NEGOTIATING WITH ALL OF OPEC WAS MONUMENTAL TACTICAL ERROR; THAT IF OPEC WERE TO INTO NEGOTIATIONS AS A UNIT, NO MODERATE COUNTRY COULD SETTLE FOR ANYTHING LESS THAN THAT DEMANDED BY MOST RADICAL. HE SAID FINAL RESULT WOULD BE A MINIMUM 60 PERCENT TAX, SUBSTANTIAL RETROACTIVITY AND ENFORCED INVESTMENT, ALL OF WHICH WOULD COST COMPANIES AND ULTIMATELY CONSUMERS HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS ANNUALLY.

8. HE SAID THAT HE FELT THAT LIBYA WOULD BE ABLE TO FORCE COMPANIES TO PAY MORE FOR THEIR OIL THAN COULD BE JUSTIFIED BECAUSE OF LIBYA'S STRONG POSITION, BUT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT AMONG LIBYA, COMPANIES AND CONSUMERS. ALL COULD REST ASSURED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH IRAN WOULD BE STABLE.

10. HE DID SAY HOWEVER THAT IRAN SUSPECTED THAT COMPANIES' OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH ENTIRE GROUP OF COUNTRIES MIGHT BE DESIGNED TO SOW DISSENSION IN OPEC RANKS AND TO ASSURE THEREBY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two stars.

SECRET

THAT NO AGREEMENT ON ANY ISSUE WOULD EVER BE REACHED.
IF THIS WERE TRUE COMPANIES HAD MADE UNFORTUNATE
MISCALCULATION WHICH COULD COST THEM DEARLY.

12. COMMENT: COMPANIES HAVE TOLD US REPEATEDLY THAT ONLY REASON THEY CANNOT NEGOTIATE IN PERSIAN GULF IS A FEAR OF A "RATCHET EFFECT"--AN INCREASE IN TAXES IN LIBYA, THEN BACK TO PERSIAN GULF, ETC. THIS ISSUE SEEMS TO BE SOLVED BY AMOUZEGAR'S ASSURANCES THAT NEGOTIATIONS CAN BEGIN WITH A GOVERNMENT STATEMENT THAT (1) ANY AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN COMPANIES AND GULF PRODUCERS WOULD BE BINDING IN GULF ALONE AND (A) GULF PRODUCERS WOULD NOT ASK FOR REVISIONS IN AGREEMENT IF OTHER OPEC AREAS (NOTABLY LIBYA) EXTRACTED GREATER PAYMENTS FROM OIL COMPANIES.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Wit

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00279 02 OF 02 181813Z

INFO OCT=01 SSO=00 CCO=00 NSCE=00 FILE=01 /047 W
019555

972 JAN 19 AM 8 00

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEHRAN 279

USNT0 005

EXDIS

13. I BELIEVE, AND AMBASSADOR STRONGLY CONCURS, THAT COMPANIES MUST TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS NEW OFFER. AND IT IS NEW. COMPANIES SHOULD COME TO TEHRAN TO NETOTIATE

PERSIAN GULF AREA. SETTLEMENT HERE WOULD GIVE US ASSURANCES OF STABILITY IN THIS CRUCIAL AREA AND THIS OIL, AT LEAST, WOULD BE AVAILABLE EVEN IF NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENTLY WERE TO BREAK DOWN IN LIBYA. AMOUZEGAR SAID EARLY AGREEMENT WITH GULF PRODUCERS WOULD MAKE IT HARDER FOR LIBYA AND ALGERIA TO BLACKMAIL COMPANIES BECAUSE GULF OPEC MEMBERS WOULD GIVE NO SUPPORT TO ADDITIONAL DEMANDS MADE BY THEM OR BY VENEZUELA. HE ALSO BELIEVED INDONESIA WOULD SUPPORT GULF STATES.

14. IF COMPANIES INSIST ON SIMULTANEOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH OPEC, IRAN WILL PROBABLY ACCEPT BUT ESTIMATE SETTLEMENT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE MORE. COMPANIES MIGHT OBJECT, SAYING THEY HAVE INFORMED LIBYANS THEY

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00279 02 OF 02 181813Z

WILL NEGOTIATE ONLY IN A GENERAL OPEC CONTEXT. AFTER CONVERSATIONS HERE WE STRONGLY QUESTION VALIDITY OF SUCH AN ARGUMENT, RECOMMEND AGAINST IT AND RECOMMEND FOR THE COMPANIES NEGOTIATING IN TEHRAN WITH PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES. IN OUR OPINION FAILURE TO DO SO WILL CAUSE VERY SERIOUS PROBLEMS. IMPORTANT ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO LIBYA IS COMPANY SOLIDARITY AND WE BELIEVE THIS HAS BEEN SHOWN. WE AS A GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO ALL WE CAN TO PROTECT CONSUMER AND COMPANY INTERESTS IN MEDITERRANEAN, ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR A SHUT-DOWN THERE. I HOPE SECRETARY CAN PASS THESE VIEWS ON URGENTLY TO JOHN MCCLOY OR COMPANIES' CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS.

15. WASHINGTON WILL INSTRUCT RE USE OF THIS MESSAGE AS PER LAST PARAGRAPH OF COMMENT OF REFTEL.

GP-3
IRWIN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

651/10/2090

AAK
TELEGRAM

WA

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00253 171723Z

42
ACTION SS=45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

013391

O 171600Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3228
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO AMCONGEN DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T TEHRAN 253

EXDIS

SUBJ: OIL NEGOTIATIONS/ SUGGESTED APPROACH TO COMPANY REPS
1. UNDER SECRETARY IRWIN INFORMED ME THAT DEPARTMENT OFFICER
ADVISED OIL COMPANIES JANUARY 15 THEY SHOULD AT OUTSET FORTH-
COMING TALKS TEHRAN, OFFER TO MAKE ANY AGREEMENT REACHED WITH
IRAN OR OPEC RETROACTIVE TO JANUARY 12--DATE NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO
HAVE BEEN.

2. I THINK THIS EXCELLENT ADVICE AND BELIEVE DEPARTMENT SHOULD REPEAT IT TO MCCLOY AND TO AMERICAN COMPANIES REPRESENTATIVES BEFORE THEY DEPART FOR IRAN. IT IS, IN MY JUDGEMENT INCONCEIVABLE THAT IRAN WILL ACCEPT ANY LATER DATE AND COMPANIES THEREFORE EVENTUALLY WILL HAVE TO AGREE TO THIS.

3. IF OFFER MADE AT OPENING BELIEVE PRESENTLY TENSE ATMOSPHERE COULD BE MODERATED AND THAT COMPANIES MIGHT ENCOUNTER LESS RIGIDITY RE TIME NECESSARY TO PREPARE FOR AND COMPLETE THESE COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS. WITHOUT THIS OFFER, I FEAR SHAH MAY BE WILLING WAIT ONLY BRIEF PERIOD FOR COMPANIES' RESPONSE--AND CERTAINLY NOT MORE THAN THE TWO WEEKS COMPANIES HAVE MENTIONED AS MINIMUM NEEDED JUST TO PREPARE FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

GP-3. MCARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 621

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00238 161416Z

45
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 1046 W
010376

0161335Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3219

SECRET TEHRAN 238

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 3)

PERSONAL FOR UNDER SECY IRWIN FROM MACARTHUR

REF (A) TEHRAN 229
(B) STATE 7012

1. I INFORMED FONMIN ZAHEDI (WHO I GATHER WILL NOT BE PRESENT AT YOUR MEETING WITH SHAH) THAT DURING YOUR VISIT HERE YOU WOULD LIKE TO CALL ON HIM. HE REPLIED HE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO SEE YOU AND SUGGESTED IN LIEU OF A CALL YOU HAVE SMALL WORKING LUNCH WITH HIM ABOUT 1:30 P.M. MONDAY, JAN 18, FOLLOWING CALL ON SHAH. HE SAID YOU COULD BRING ANY OF YOUR PARTY WITH YOU THAT YOU WISHED AND ASKED ME TO LET HIM KNOW NAMES. HE MENTIONED HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE DAVIES AND MIKLOS AGAIN, SO LET ME KNOW WHAT OTHER MEMBERS YOUR PARTY SHOULD BE INCLUDED.

2. I ALSO INFORMED HIM OF TEXT OF OIL INDUSTRY STATEMENT TO OPEC, STRESSING POINTS IN PARA 5, REFTEL B. ZAHEDI OBVIOUSLY WANT TO BE HELPFUL BUT IS OUTSIDE CHAIN OF COMMAND WHICH I GATHER, RUNS DIRECTLY FROM SHAH TO AMOUEGAR IN PRIMIN HOVEYDA'S ABSENCE.

3. IN VIEW FACT SHAH HAS COMMITTED HIMSELF TO BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS BY JAN 19, I THINK ARRIVAL OF SENIOR CONSORTIUM GROUP TO AT LEAST BEGIN SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF PROBLEM BY THAT DATE (AS VAN REEVEN PROMISED AMOUEGAR LAST NIGHT - TEHRAN 230) IS MOST IMPORTANT. THIS WILL

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00238 161416Z

MEET DEADLINE SHAH ESTABLISHED BUT AT SAME TIME NEED NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THERE COULD NOT SUBSEQUENTLY BE TALKS WITH OPEC AS WHOLE. VAN REEVEN SAYS SENIOR CONSORTIUM GROUP WILL DEFINITELY BE COMING BUT WHETHER OR NOT THEY EMPOWERED AS AMOUZEGAR ASKED TO DISCUSS PROBLEM OR SIMPLY LISTEN NOT YET CLEAR. IF THEY ONLY COME HERE TO LISTEN AND ARE UNWILLING EVEN TO COMMENT OR DISCUSS INDUSTRY PROPOSAL WHICH THEY HAVE SIGNED I THINK WE ARE IN FOR TROUBLE.

4. SHAH USUALLY DOES NOT HAVE ANY IRANIANS PRESENT AT HIS MEETINGS WITH IMPORTANT FOREIGN VISITORS AND LIKES TO KEEP SUCH MEETINGS SMALL AND INFORMAL. HOWEVER, I AM SURE HE WOULD BE QUITE AGREEABLE IN ADDITION TO YOU AND ME TO HAVING ONE OTHER SENIOR ASSISTANT SUCH AS ROGER DAVIES PRESENT. WILL YOU LET ME KNOW AS PALACE ALWAYS LIKES TO BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE. GP-3. MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

171/10/2090

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 593

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00229 161233Z

10
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 /046 W

010009

O 160910Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3214
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

SECRET TEHRAN 229

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA. 5.)

PERSONAL FOR UNDER SECRETARY IRWIN FROM MACARTHUR

REF: STATE 7997

1. DELIGHTED YOU WILL BE VISITING TEHRAN AND HOPE YOU, ROGER DAVIES, SCOTT CUSTER AND JACK MIKLOS WILL STAY WITH US AT EMBASSY RESIDENCE WHERE WE CAN MAKE YOU COMFORTABLE AND WHERE THERE ALSO EXCELLENT SECURITY.

2. HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SHAH THROUGH FONMIN ZAHEDI WHO INFORMS ME SHAH WILL BE PLEASED TO SEE YOU AT 10:00 A.M. MONDAY MORNING JAN. 18. SINCE YOU PLAN ARRIVE TEHRAN 2:00 P.M. (TEHRAN TIME) SUNDAY, JAN 17, MONDAY MORNING CALL ON SHAH EXCELLENT AS IT WILL AFFORD TIME TO GO OVER OIL AND OTHER MATTERS SUNDAY AFTERNOON OR EVENING.

3. IN ADDITION TO CALL ON SHAH AN OFFER TO CALL ON FONMIN ZAHEDI (WHO IS VERY PRO-AMERICAN AND HELPFUL)

IS IN ORDER. (PRIMIN HOVEYDA IN PARIS SO NO PROBLEM THERE.) WE ASSUME ZAHEDI WILL PROBABLY ATTEND YOUR MEETING WITH SHAH AND SUBJECT YOUR APPROVAL WOULD LIKE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02. TEHRAN 00229 161233Z

TO TELL HIM YOU WOULD WISH CALL ON HIM IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING YOUR CALL ON SHAH. IT POSSIBLE ZAHEDI WILL ASK YOU TO LUNCH WITH HIM MONDAY FOLLOWING MEETING WITH SHAH (WHICH MAY WELL LAST A GOOD TWO HOURS). IN SUCH EVENT ZAHEDI MAY WAIVE FORMAL CALL ON YOUR PART. AM RELUCTANT TO SCHEDULE ANY CALLS ON IRANIAN OFFICIALS BEFORE YOU SEE SHAH AS IT SEEMS DESIRABLE INITIAL IMPACT OF YOUR PRESENTATION SHOULD BE MADE ON SHAH HIMSELF AND NOT THROUGH FONMIN IN ADVANCE OF YOUR CALL.

4. RE SUNDAY EVENING, SINCE YOU WILL BE FATIGUED FROM TRIP, WE WOULD PLAN VERY SMALL INFORMAL AMERICAN WORKING DINNER AT RESIDENCE SUNDAY EVENING TO WHICH WE WOULD INVITE DAVIES, AKINS, CUSTER, MIKLOS MURPHY AND ANY OTHER SENIOR ADVISER YOU DESIRE PLUS A COUPLE OF MY KEY PEOPLE. REST OF PARTY WILL BE TAKEN CARE OF BY OTHER MEMBERS OF EMBASSY STAFF.

5. PRESS WILL UNQUESTIONABLY MEET YOU AT AIRPORT AND YOU SHOULD BE PREPARED WITH A BRIEF ARRIVAL STATEMENT WHICH SHOULD PAY TRIBUTE TO CLOSE AND FRIENDLY CHARACTER OF IRANIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, IMPORTANCE OF SHAH'S LEADERSHIP AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IRAN PLAYS IN WORLD AFFAIRS, FACT THAT YOU WILL NOT ONLY BE DISCUSSING OIL BUT ALSO HOPE TO OBTAIN IRANIAN VIEWS ON GENERAL SITUATION IN THIS IMPORTANT PART OF WORLD. EVEN WITH PREPARED STATEMENT, PRESS WILL PROBABLY TRY TO ASK QUESTIONS. WE ASSUME YOU WOULD PREFER AVOID THIS TYPE OF PRESS CONFERENCE ON ARRIVAL AND WILL TRY TO WORK OUT WITH FONMINISTRY (WHICH WILL HAVE SENIOR MEMBER AT AIRPORT TO MEET YOU) WAYS TO AVOID MORE THAN MAKING YOUR STATEMENT. IF YOU CAN CABLE US TEXT OF ARRIVAL STATEMENT, WE CAN REPRODUCE AND HAVE IT READY TO DISTRIBUTE TO JOURNALISTS WHEN YOU ARRIVE.

6. PLEASE LET ME KNOW HOW ABOVE PROPOSALS STRIKE YOU ASAP WITH YOUR SUGGESTED CHANGES AS WELL AS HOW LONG YOUR AND YOUR PARTY WILL REMAIN TEHRAN. SINCE VICE FONMIN WILL PROBABLY MEET YOU, PLEASE CONFIRM ETA 1400 JAN 17 (STATE 7834 WOULD SEEM PUT PLANE HERE AT 1100 JAN 17).

7. SINCE SHAH IS MENTIONED IN DEPT'S STATEMENT ON

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00229 161233Z

YOUR TRIP, I AM INFORMING FONMIN ZAHEDI (WITHOUT GIVING TEXT TILL RELEASED) THAT I UNDERSTAND WE WILL ISSUE STATEMENT AT NOON TODAY WASHINGTON TIME. I HAVE ONE SUGGESTION RE DRAFT STATEMENT IN STATE 8093. THIS WOULD BE TO INSERT THE PHRASE "MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST INCLUDING" IN FIRST PARAGRAPH BETWEEN "WITH RESPECT TO" AND "THE FORTHCOMING OIL NEGOTIATIONS," ETC. I SUGGEST THIS SINCE SHAH, AS YOU KNOW, IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO IDEA OF BEING PRESSURED AND SINCE YOU WILL INEVITABLY BE DISCUSSING OTHER MATTERS WITH HIM, IT IS I BELIEVE A MORE ACCURATE STATEMENT OF FACT.

8. I HOPE IN NEXT SEVERAL HOURS TO HAVE SOME VALID INDICATION AS TO HOW GOI AND SHAH REACT TO OIL COMPANIES PROPOSALS (STATE 7012) AND WILL CABLE YOU IMMEDIATELY. ALL BEST.

GP-3

MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 467

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00224 161005Z

11
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

009274

O 160745Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3211

S E C R E T TEHRAN 0224

EXDIS

FOR UNDER SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO, JIDDA, KUWAIT, AMMAN, BEIRUT, LONDON

SUBJECT: JANUARY 14 MEETING WITH SHAH (MID-EAST DISCUSSIONS)

REF: TEHRAN 4354, 5335, 220 AND 221

IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSING UAR PILOT SITUATION, JARRING TALKS,
AND OIL (REPORTED IN SEPTELS), DURING MY JANUARY 14 MEETING
WITH SHAH (AMB ANNENBERG ALSO PRESENT), FOLLOWING ALSO TOUCHED
UPON:

A. DEVELOPING POLITICAL WEAKNESSES IN PAKISTAN AND TURKEY.
SHAH MADE AGAIN SAME POINTS HE HAS BEFORE (TEHRAN 4354 AND 5335)
NAMELY, THAT IN LIGHT OF BASIC SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN MIDEAST.
SOUTH ASIA AREA, PAKI SITUATION DEEPLY CONCERNS HIM,
PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF BHUTTO'S SUCCESS IN RECENT ELECTIONS
AND HIS KNOWN LEFTIST TENDENCIES. TURKISH SITUATION ALSO
DISTURBING. SHAH SAID HE KNOWS USG AND OTHER WESTERN GOVTS
DO NOT LIKE "MILITARY GOVERNMENTS" NOR DOES HE, IF THEY ARE
CORRUPT OR NON-REPRESENTATIVE. HOWEVER, IF TURKISH POLITICAL
SITUATION CONTINUES DETERIORATE, IT BETTER FOR TURKISH
MILITARY TO TAKE OVER THAN TO SEE GRADUAL INTERNAL DISINTEGRA-
TION OF TURKEY WHICH IS VITALLY IMPORTANT TO IRAN IN TERMS OF
SOVIET ASPIRATIONS.

B. DISPUTED ISLANDS. SHAH VERY CRITICAL OF BRITISH SAYING THAT
ALTHOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD FROM BRITISH THEY PUSHING THE TWO

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00224 161005Z

SHEIKHS HARD, NO RESULTS SEEM FORTHCOMING. IT WAS BRITISH WHO SEIZED ISLANDS ILLEGALLY 80 OR 90 YEARS AGO AND GOI HAD IN ITS ARCHIVES SUBSTANTIAL DOCUMENTATION (CONSISTING OF OFFICIAL NOTES, ADMIRALITY CHARTS, ETC.) PROVING BRITISH HAD RECOGNIZED IRAN'S SOVEREIGNTY. IT THEREFORE UP TO BRITISH TO SOLVE PROBLEM BEFORE THEY PULL OUT AS KING FAISAL SO CORRECTLY OBSERVED. SHAH SAID IRAN PREPARED TO PUT ASIDE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE BUT IF BRITISH DO NOT SOLVE PROBLEM, IRAN WILL BE OBLIGED TO PUT ITS FORCES ON THE ISLANDS (AFTER UK WITHDRAWAL) AS THEY ABSOLUTELY VITAL TO IRAN'S SECURITY AND LIFELINE IN GULF. IF OBLIGED TO DO THIS HE SAID, HE HAD "VERY GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE" SAUDI ARABIA WOULD NOT PUBLICLY CRITICIZE SUCH ACTION.

C. ARAB FEDERATION. SHAH AGAIN MADE POINT AS HE HAS TO US IN PAST THAT IF ARAB FEDERATION CONSISTS ONLY OF UAR, LIBYA AND SUDAN, HE WOULD NOT BE UNDULY CONCERNED AND IT MIGHT EVEN BE GOOD THING SINCE IT WOULD THEN MORE PROBABLY CONFINE ITS ACTIVITIES TO MEMBERS RATHER THAN INTERVENING IN ARABIAN PENINSULA AND GULF. FURTHERMORE, LIBYA'S OIL REVENUE MIGHT IN PART BE AVAILABLE TO HELP EGYPT AND SUDAN SOLVE SOME OF THEIR DIFFICULT INTERNAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, IF VIABLE FEDERATION INCLUDES SYRIA AND/OR IRAQ, IT WILL INEVITABLY BE PUSHED BY RADICAL LEADERSHIP IN LIBYA AND SYRIA AND IRAQ TO DESTROY KING HUSEIN REPLACING JORDAN WITH PALESTINE STATE. THIS WOULD MORTALLY THREATEN SAUDI ARABIA WHICH WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN SURVIVING IN VIEW OF DISPUTES BETWEEN "200 SONS OF OLD KING SAUD" AND ALSO BECAUSE SAUDIS HAVE NOT MOVED RAPIDLY ENOUGH WITH ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS. IF SAUDI ARABIA FALLS INTO RADICAL SOCIALIST--COMMUNIST HANDS-- MOST IMPORTANT SHRINES OF ISLAM WILL BE EXPLOITED BY SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST ELEMENTS WITH PERVERSIVE EFFECT ON THE ISLAMIC WORLD WHICH STRETCHES FROM INDONESIA TO MOROCCO. RESULT WOULD BE THAT ISLAMIC FAITH WHICH HAS BEEN A BARRIER TO COMMUNIST ADVANCEMENT WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNDERMINED IN SOUTH ASIA, MID EAST AND AFRICA. SHAH CONCLUDED SAYING GOI IS WATCHING CLOSELY PODGORNEY'S VISIT TO EGYPT PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF ARAB FEDERATION.

D. KUWAIT. SHAH SPOKE DISPARAGINGLY OF KUWAITIS SAYING THEY UNRELIABLE AND TRIED TO BE EVERYTHING TO ALL MEN. FURTHERMORE, KUWAITI LEADERSHIP DOES NOT KNOW OR UNDERSTAND HARD FACTS OF LIFE. KUWAITIS FLIRTING WITH SUICIDE IF THEY THINK THEY CAN APPEASE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 00224 161005Z

IRANIS' AMBITIONS RE KUWAIT AFTER BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM GULF.
IF KUWAIT DOES NOT RELY ON ITS STRONGER MODERATE NEIGHBORS
(PRESUMABLY IRAN AND SAUDIS), IT WOULD SUCCUMB TO RADICAL ARABS.

C. TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF ARAB/ISRAELI SETTLEMENT. SHAH FEELS
JERUSALEM AND GOLAN HEIGHTS REPRESENT PERHAPS MOST DIFFICULT
TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. RE GOLAN
HEIGHTS PERHAPS ONE ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE
TOTAL DEMILITARIZATION OF HEIGHTS AND PERMANENT OCCUPATION
BY UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. RE JERUSALEM HE FULLY AGREES THAT
THERE MUST BE FREE ACCESS FOR ALL PEOPLES TO SHRINES OF THE
THREE GREAT RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES (JEWISH, ISLAMIC AND
CATHOLIC) AND THAT JORDAN MUST HAVE ADEQUATE AND APPROPRIATE
ROLE IN ADMINISTERING JERUSALEM WITH ISRAEL. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DIS
EX
DIS
EX
DIS
EX
DIS

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 307

71 WH
JAN 15 AM 8:11
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00222 150834Z

12
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

130697

R 150633Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3209

SECRET TEHRAN 222

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: EXTENDING GOI LOANS TO SAG OF AA GUNS AND
RECOILLESS RIFLES

REF: TEHRAN 5496, JIDDA 4542

1. WOULD APPRECIATE NOTICE OF EXTENSION APPROVAL OR STATUS
REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. APART FROM FACT ONE LOAN
(AA GUNS) EXPIRES THIS MONTH, FONMIN HAS INQUIRED AGAIN
RE EXTENSION AND WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN REASONS
FOR DELAY.

2. DEPT PLEASE PASS JIDDA, DHAHRAN, CINCSTRIKE. GP-3.
MACARTHUR.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED JIDDA, DHAHRAN, AND CINCSTRIKE.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 036

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00221 141606Z

42'

ACTION: SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

124952

R 141435Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3208
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USUN NEW YORK 358

S E C R E T TEHRAN 221

EXDIS:

DEPT PASS. CAIRO

SUBJ: (A) BRIEFING SHAH ON JARRING TALKS
(B) SOVIET COMMENTS ON SADAT'S BELLICOSE SPEECHES
(C) UAR INTEREST IN BIG POWER AGREEMENT LIMITING
ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ARAB COUNTRIES

REF: STATE 006313

1. I BRIEFED SHAH ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN JARRING TALKS PER REFTTEL AND HE EXPRESSED MUCH APPRECIATION. HE SAID LATEST GOI INFORMATION IS THAT EGYPTIANS HAVE REJECTED ISRAELI PROPOSALS AND INSTEAD PROPOSE FOUR-POWER PEACEKEEPING FORCE BE SENT AT ONCE WITH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO WITHIN ITS OWN BOUNDARIES AND A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING WHICH WOULD WORK OUT THESE ARRANGEMENTS. I WENT OVER WITH HIM AGAIN WHY WE FELT SC MEETING WOULD CONSTITUTE SERIOUS SETBACK TO PROSPECTS FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND ALSO FACT THAT PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS MUST DEPEND ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES. HE INDICATED ASSENT.

2. HE SAID THERE WERE TWO PIECES OF INFORMATION WHICH HE THOUGHT MIGHT INTEREST US:

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

71 JAN 14 PM 4: 44

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00221 141606Z

(A) IN RECENT DISCUSSION THAT IRANIAN EMBASSY MOSCOW HAD WITH SOV-
VIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, IRANIAN EMBASSY REP. HAD REFERRED TO BELLI-

COSE DECLARATIONS PRESIDENT SADAT OF EGYPT HAD RECENTLY BEEN MAKING.
HAD BEEN A BIT OVERDONE BUT THAT HIS SECOND STATEMENT REPRESENTED
A SENSIBLE AND REASONABLE POSTURE WITH WHICH SOVIET UNION AGREED".

(B) SECOND PIECE OF INFORMATION WAS FROM FRENCH WHICH HAD
INFORMED GOI (I GATHER THROUGH EITHER PRIMIN HOVEYDA OR FONMIN
ZAHEDI WHO HAVE BOTH BEEN IN PARIS) THAT IN RECENT TALK UAR
FONMIN HAD SAID TO FRENCH THAT PERHAPS SOME TYPE OF BIG
POWER AGREEMENT TO LIMIT ARMS SHIPMENTS TO MIDDLE EAST WOULD BE
IN ORDER. RIAD WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT WHENEVER SOVIETS SHIPPED
ARMS TO UAR THE US COUNTERED BY SENDING PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL WHICH
REQUIRED FURTHER SHIPMENTS OF SOVIET ARMS TO COMPENSATE AND THAT
SPIRAL WAS ENDLESS. SHAH SAID HE FOUND THIS INTERESTING BECAUSE
HE KNEW WE HAD FOR SOME YEAARS BEEN TRYING TO GET SOVIETS TO AGREE
TO LIMITATION ON SHIPMENTS TO ARABS AND ISRAEL AND THIS WAS FIRST
INDICATION HE HAD HEARD THAT POSSIBLY UAR MIGHT AT SOME FUTURE
JUNCTURE BE RECEPTIVE, PARTICULARLY IF ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT ACHIEVED.

GP-3
MACARTHUR

NOTE BY OCT: NOT PASSED CAIRO.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

5/1/10/2090

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 146 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

SECRET 778

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00184 131137Z

11
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

114043

O 131133Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3187

S E C R E T TEHRAN 0184

EXDIS

FOR ASST SECY SISCO AND MIKLOS FROM MACARTHUR

FONMIN ZAHEDI HAS ARRANGED FOR ME AND AMB ANNENBERG TO CALL ON SHAH THURSDAY, JAN 14. I EXPECT SHAH WILL HIT US ON OIL (REFTEL TEHRAN 182) AND ALSO ON WHAT IS HAPPENING RE JARRING TALKS. ANY GUIDANCE OR SUGGESTIONS YOU CAN SEND ME WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED ABOUT THESE TWO AND ANY OTHER SUBJECTS, BUT SUCH GUIDANCE SHOULD BE RECEIVED HERE NOT LATER THAN 8 A.M. JAN 14 TEHRAN TIME. GP3.
MACARTHUR

WHITE HOUSE
STAFF RECORDS
71 JAN 13 AM 11:14

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 148 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 706

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 00048 051259Z

54
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 051215Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3116
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

S E C R E T TEHRAN 48

EXDIS

SUBJECT: DISPUTED GULF ISLANDS

REFS: A. STATE 211340 B. TEHRAN 5578 C. STATE 000837

1. IN OUR BEST JUDGMENT IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TO DEMILITARIZE DISPUTED GULF ISLANDS WOULD BE DEFINITE "NON-STARTER" FROM SHAH'S POINT OF VIEW.

2. WHILE SHAH IS WILLING TO FUZZ SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE HE WILL NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT ANY SOLUTION THAT IN ANY WAY COMPROMISES IRAN'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. WE ARE QUITE SURE THAT HE WOULD FEEL AN "INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT" ON THE ISLANDS COULD BE CONSTRUED AS TACIT ACCEPTANCE BY GOI THAT IRAN DID NOT HAVE A VALID CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY.

3. FURTHERMORE, SHAH HAS MADE CLEAR HE WILL INSIST ON ISLAND SETTLEMENT PERMITTING SOME IRANIAN TROOPS ON ISLANDS BECAUSE OF HIS DETERMINATION TO BE IN POSITION TO DENY ISLANDS TO OTHERS IN EVENT THAT FUTURE BRINGS ABOUT WHAT HE FEARS, I.E., REPLACEMENT OF PRESENT MODERATE REGIMES ON ARAB SIDE OF GULF, INCLUDING RAS-AL-FZAIMAH AND SHARJA, WITH RADICAL ARAB REGIMES PRIMARILY INFLUENCED EXTERNALLY BY SOVIETS SITUATION WHICH WOULD ENABLE SEVERING OF IRAN'S PERSIAN GULF LIFELINE. IF KUWAIT'S FLOAT IDEA OF "INTERNATIONAL" SOLUTION IT WILL MOST CERTAINLY BE KISS OF DEATH--GIVEN STRENGTH OF IRANIAN FEELINGS TOWARD KUWAIT (REF B) AND IRANIAN SUSPICION KUWAIT NOT ABOVE ACTING ON BEHALF OF IRAQ. UK ALSO RECOGNIZES KUWAITI INTERVENTION IS UNSELLABLE TO IRAN (REF C).

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

02

71 JAN 5 PM 2:47

WHITE HOUSE
STATE DEPT

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 00048 051259Z

SHOULD WE SUGGEST TO KUWAITIS THAT THEY ADVANCE SUCH AN IDEA AND SHOULD WORD GET BACK TO SHAH IT WILL CREATE A MAJOR UPHEAVAL IN US-IRAN RELATIONS WITHOUT CONTRIBUTING TO SOLUTION OF ISLANDS PROBLEMS. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO STAY OUT OF THIS PROBLEM AT THIS TIME. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

341/10/2090

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a constellation of stars. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by small stars.

CONFIDENTIAL 097

WHITEHOUSE -
SITUATION ROOM

71 AUG 22 PM 12:11

117462

AGREE WITH POINT MADE REF A. PLEASE REWRITE SENTENCE INVOLVED IN REF B SO THAT IT READS QUOTE I WAS PLEASED TO NOTE THAT THE COMMUNIQUE CONTAINED NO REFERENCE TO THE STATUS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN AND THAT YOU BELIEVE, AS WE DO, THAT ITS PEOPLE SHOULD NOT BE DEPRIVED OF REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS. UNQUOTE. JOHNSON

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The eagle holds an olive branch in its right talon and arrows in its left. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by small stars.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

W/H

SECRET 620

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 APR 17 PM 9:15

3

PAGE 01 STATE 150333

51
ORIGIN SS-251

INFO: OCT-01 1026 R

66604
DRAFTED BY:NEA/IRN:MIKLOS
APPROVED BY:NEA/SISCO
NEA/ARP:MURPHY
NEA:ATHERTON
S/S:MILLER

081135

R 171529Z AUG 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T STATE 150333

EXDIS.

NOFORN:

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SISCO

SUBJ: GULF ISLANDS

REF: TEHRAN: 4480

I AM MUCH ENCOURAGED BY GIVE THAT HAS RECENTLY APPEARED IN IRAN'S POSITION ON TERMS OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF GULF ISLANDS ISSUE WHICH I RECOGNIZE IS DUE IN LARGE MEASURE TO YOUR OWN VERY PERSUASIVE MISSIONARY WORK. WE HAVE ONCE AGAIN URGED BRITISH ON THROUGH THEIR PEOPLE HERE, NOTING THAT AFTER AGREEMENT REACHED WITH IRANIANS, NEXT HURDLE WILL BE SELLING DEAL TO SHEIKHS. WE HAVE TOLD THEM IT OUR HOPE THAT THEY WILL EXERT MAXIMUM EFFORT WITH SHEIKHS. ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

29

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head, surrounded by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA".

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 AUG 10 AM 8:12

6.

019413

2. THERE SHOULD BE NO PUBLICITY OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTICIPATION PENDING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. IRWIN

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is at the bottom.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 144321

81
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 R

66638
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN A I KILLGORE
APPROVED BY: NEA RODGER P. DAVIES
NEA/IRN MR. MIKLOS
DOD/ISA MR. ALLEN
PM MR. FORD (SUBS)
S/S - O J.S. BRIMS

R 070111Z AUG 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T STATE 144321

EXDTS

SUBJECT: KING HUSSEIN REQUEST FOR AMMUNITION

REF: TEHRAN 4308; STATE 131310

1. YOU MAY INFORM ZELLI WE APPRECIATE SHAH'S DESIRE BE HELPFUL TO KING HUSSEIN AND HIS WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST IN DELIVERY TO JORDAN OF US AMMUNITION. HOWEVER, WE HAVE ON-GOING BILATERAL ARMS RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN AND PREFER CONTINUE DEALING DIRECTLY WITH GOJ.

2. WE ARE ALREADY RESPONDING TO EARLIER GOJ REQUEST FOR URGENT DELIVERY OF 25,000 ROUNDS 81 MM HE WITH FUZE P.D. GOI MAY WISH TO TAKE THIS INTO CONSIDERATION PREPARING ITS RESPONSE TO HUSSEIN. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ON MERITS ANY SUBSEQUENT GOJ REQUESTS WHICH MAY BE RECEIVED DIRECTLY. GP-3. ROGERS

71 AUG 7 AM 9:01
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

003987

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head, surrounded by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA".

TELEGRAM

STUDY ON THE

[illegible]

030380

2. RE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY AND IRAQI BATHIST PARTY WE ASSUME WHAT IS MEANT IS RECENT SOVIET DELEGATION TO BAGHDAD WHICH SOVIETS METICULOUSLY DESCRIBED AS BEING PARTY AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT DELEGATION. WE DO NOT RPT NOT SEE IN THIS DEVELOPMENT

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 122231

A BURGEONING SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY-IRAQI BATHIST PARTY DIALOGUE. BATHIS, IN FACT, TEND TO MISTRUST SOVIET ACTIONS WHICH SEEK TO ESTABLISH IDEOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP AS TACTICAL MOVE TO IMPROVE PLIGHT OF IRAQI COMMUNISTS. SOVIETS, FOR THEIR PART, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT CONTINUED HARSH TREATMENT BY IRAQI BATHIS OF LOCAL COMMUNISTS. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS HARSH TREATMENT MAY WELL HAVE BEEN THE MAJOR TOPIC OF DISCUSSION, TOGETHER WITH SOVIET SUPPORT FOR OBT-STATED IRAQI COMMUNIST CALL FOR POPULAR FRONT OF PROGRESSIVE FORCES IN IRAQ. THERE IS NO INDICATION TO SUGGEST THAT SOVIETS SUCCEEDED EITHER IN ALLEVIATING PLIGHT OF LOCAL COMMUNISTS OR IN OBTAINING BATHI SUPPORT FOR A POPULAR FRONT.
IRWIN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

HS1/10/0090

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

GP-3. IRWIN

71 JUL 8 1963
STATION 7

030355.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 122027

80
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66638
DRAFTED BY: P: W J BOUDREAU AND W D BLAIR JR
APPROVED BY: P: W D BLAIR JR
NEA/IRN: MIKLOS DOD: LIEBLING AND COL MACKIE
S/S: R T CURRAN

R 072239Z JUL 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T STATE 122027

EXDIS

SUBJ: SHAH'S CONTINUING CONCERN ABOUT PUBLICATION BY US PRESS OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

REF: TEHRAN 3600

YOU MAY REASSURE SHAH THAT USG AT HIGHEST LEVELS SHARES HIS CONCERN REGARDING UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF PRIVILEGED INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS. AT PRESIDENT'S DIRECTION, AN INTER-AGENCY EFFORT TO TIGHTEN SECURITY OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION (WHILE SPEEDING RELEASE OF MATERIAL NOT GENUINELY OR NO LONGER SENSITIVE) UNDERWAY FOR SOME MONTHS. SECRETARY HAS INITIATED PARALLEL EFFORT WITHIN DEPARTMENT. STEPS ALREADY BEING TAKEN BY DEFENSE (E G REGARDING ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED MATERIAL BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCHERS) AND OTHER AGENCIES TO PREVENT REPETITION OF WHAT YOU RIGHTLY DESCRIBED AS EXCEPTIONAL SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES (YOUR SECOND PARA).

WHILE DETAILS CANNOT BE SUPPLIED IN ADVANCE OF FURTHER
PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS, YOU SHOULD STRESS USG'S DETER-
MINATION TO TAKE ALL STEPS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE CONFIDENCE
OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN PRIVACY OF THEIR COMMUNICATION WITH
US. IRWIN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ES AUTH

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 529

PAGE 01 STATE 115232

82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66633
DRAFTED BY NEA IRN TWCHILDS:
APPROVED BY NEA MR DAVIES:
NEA IRN MR MIKLOS:
LI MR BUSHONG DRAFT
H MR KRIZEK DRAFT
INR DDM IRB RMULBRICH DRAFT
SY MR TULLY INFO
SYS OI RDEMMONS

073738

R 260056Z JUN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

SECRET STATE 115232

EXDIS:

FOR AMBASSADOR

SUBJ: QUOTE FREE IRAN UNQUOTE ADVERTISEMENT IN WASHINGTON POST

REF: TEHRAN 3344

1. FOLLOWING PUBLICATION OF SECOND QUOTE HOSSIN HABIBY UNQUOTE LETTER IN WASHINGTON POST, DEPARTMENT AND OTHER USG AGENCIES HAVE ELICITED FOLLOWING INFO:

(A) QUOTE HOSSIN HABIBY UNQUOTE IS APPARENTLY ASSUMED NAME, AND FREE IRAN IS NO MORE THAN A POST OFFICE BOX, RENTED IN NAME OF FREE IRAN BY ONE EDWARD MULLANEY, WASHINGTON ATTORNEY.

(B) AS YOU ARE AWARE, ONLY EVIDENCE RE IDENTITY OF HOSSIN HABIBY IS OTHER AGENCY REPORT THAT AN IRANIAN SECURITY SERVICE HAS STATED THAT HABIBY IS REALLY NASSER AFSHAR. USG HAS NO DIRECT CONFIRMATION OF THIS, HOWEVER.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

SECRET

(C) THERE IS NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON FILE IN USG AGENCIES ABOUT MULLANEY OR HIS ASSOCIATES.

(E) IN THE OPINION OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR'S OFFICE, THERE IS NOT YET SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT PRESENT RPT AT PRESENT OF ANY CRIME TO JUSTIFY A REQUEST TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO PRESS CHARGES AGAINST ANY OF THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED. POST OFFICE ADVISES NO POSTAL REGULATIONS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED.

2. RE: STATEMENT ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY SENATOR JOHN F. KENNEDY DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN UNABLE TO ESTABLISH CONCLUSIVELY WHETHER THIS HAPPENED OR NOT. A CURSORY SEARCH THROUGH THE PRINTED FOREIGN AID HEARINGS HAS YIELDED NOTHING, BUT STATEMENT MIGHT NOT HAVE APPEARED THERE. WE HAVE ALSO CHECKED WITH SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF WITH INCONCLUSIVE RESULTS. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, BASED ADMITTEDLY ON NOTHING MORE SOLID THAN HAZY MEMORIES, THAT SOMETHING OF THE SORT MAY HAVE OCCURRED. THERE WAS NEVER MUCH LOVE LOST BETWEEN THE PAHLAVIS AND THE TWO LATE KENNEDYS IN THOSE DAYS. THE DEPARTMENT WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH FACTS ABOUT THE ALLEGATION.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE
SECRET

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0602/01/157

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 318

PAGE 01 STATE 114029

82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66641
DRAFTED BY EA/ROC/TPSHOESMITH
APPROVED BY: EA- AMB. BROWN
NEA/ IRN- MR MIKLOS DRAFT S/S-O: MR EMMONS
EA/ ACA- MR BROWN DRAFT
IO: UNP- MR FELDMAN DRAFT

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

JUN 25 AM 8:38

R 250106Z JUN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NY
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

064401

SECRET STATE 114029

EXDIS

SUBJ: CHIREC- IRAN

REF: TEHRAN'S 3159 AND 3329

1. WOULD APPRECIATE VIEWS OF EMBASSY TEHRAN AND TAIPEI ON WISDOM OF PASSING ON TO GRC FONMIN CHOW SHU-KAI ON STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS PERTINENT PORTIONS OF REFTELS IN ORDER ENCOURAGE GRC TO COMPLEMENT ZAHEDI'S EFFORTS TO SLOW DOWN IRAN'S MOVE TOWARD PRC RECOGNITION BY DIRECT AND FORCEFUL APPEAL TO SHAH. IF WE WERE TO PROCEED ALONG THIS LINE, WE WOULD ANTICIPATE REITERATING OUR HOPE, AS EXPRESSED TO CHOW BY AMBASSADOR MCCONAUGHY MAY 25 (TAIPEI'S 2548, PARA 15), THAT GRC WILL BE ABLE SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY IN ACCOMMODATING TO HOST GOVERNMENT'S INCLINATIONS, ADDING THAT THIS ALSO MAY STRENGTHEN HAND OF THOSE WHO APPEAR HAVE GENUINE CONCERN TO MAINTAIN GOI- GRC RELATIONSHIP.

• FOR TEHRAN: IF YOU THINK THIS ADVISABLE, PLEASE INDICATE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two stars.

SECRET

PORTIONS OF REFTELS WHICH YOU BELIEVE CAN BE PASSED TO FONMIN
CHOW. WE OF COURSE APPRECIATE THAT ZAHEDI MAY HAVE BEEN SPEAKING
MORE FOR HIMSELF THAN GOI AND WE CERTAINLY WOULD NOT WANT TO
GET HIM IN TROUBLE WITH SHAH IF YOU THINK HIS REMARKS TO YOU
WOULD STRIKE A POOR NOTE IF PLAYED BACK TO SHAH VIA AMB. WUL.

3. RE ZAHEDI'S INTEREST IN SEMINAR ON CHIREP (TEHRANI 3329 PARA 4) YOU MAY WISH PASS ON FOLLOWING: SEMINAR WAS NOT OFFICIAL UN BODY BUT RATHER WAS HELD UNDER PRIVATE AUSPICES (FRIENDS WORLD COMMITTEE). GIVEN FACT THAT OF NINETEEN UN MISSIONS WHICH SENT PARTICIPANTS, ONLY THREE WERE FROM COUNTRIES RECOGNIZING ROC AND ONLY ONE FROM COUNTRY WHICH VOTED AGAINST ALBANIAN RES IN 1970, IT HARDLY SURPRISING SEMINAR REACHED CONCLUSIONS IT DID. CERTAINLY THIS CANNOT BE SAID TO REPRESENT "STAMPEDE TOWARD PRC POSITION" SINCE MOST PARTICIPANTS CAME FROM COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE LONG SUPPORTED PRC AND SIGNIFICANT NUMBER FROM PAST CO. SPONSORS OF ALBANIAN RES. ISSUE OF SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT IS HARDLY AS CLEAR-CUT AS ZAHEDI PORTRAYED (QUOTING HIS UNDERSTANDING OF SEMINAR CONCLUSIONS). FOR EXAMPLE, GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS ARE NOT BINDING UPON SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH ADOPTS ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE AND OWN ARRANGEMENTS. USE OF VETO IN COUNCIL IS HIGHLY COMPLEX MATTER, BUT IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE CORRECT TO SAY THAT PRC SEATING ON COUNCIL NECESSARILY WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE SUBJECT TO VETO ROGERS.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

217

CONFIDENTIAL 039

PAGE 01 STATE 106613

82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66634
DRAFTED BY: NEA IRN JCMIKLOS
APPROVED BY: NEA RPD AVIES
NEA P JEAVES JR.

R 152252Z JUN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 106613

EXDIS

REF: TEHRAN 3146, 3128

1. WE ARE IN COMPLETE ACCORD WITH WAY YOU HAVE HANDLED DARYANI STORY. SHOULD IT SURFACE HERE, WHICH HAS NOT YET OCCURRED, WE SHALL COMMENT ALONG LINES SUGGESTED REFTEL.

2. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT SUCH IRRESPONSIBLE STORY WHICH OBVIOUSLY HAD OFFICIAL BLESSING SHOULD COME OUT IN FIRST PLACE. WHILE ZAHEDI'S COMMENT THAT HE HAD SIMILAR UNPLEASANT EXPERIENCE WHEN HE WAS AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON IS TRUE, WE DON'T FEEL THAT THE TWO CASES ARE REALLY ANALOGOUS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER INSIGHTS YOU MAY GARNER AS TO WHAT MAY BE BEHIND THIS STORY AND WHAT IT MAY PORTEND REGARDING PRESENT AND FUTURE US-IRANIAN RELATIONS. ROGERS

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 JUN 16 AM 8:20

3

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

WH
TELEGRAM

SECRET 539

PAGE 01 STATE 101737

42
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66610
DRAFTED BY EA/ROC:TPSHOESMITH
APPROVED BY EA-WINTHRUP G. BROWN
NEA/IRN-MR. MIKLOS-DRAFT
S/S-MR. CURRAN
EA/ACA-MR. BROWN-DRAFT
IO/UNP-MR. FELDMAN-DRAFT

071921

P 091707Z JUN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NY
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

S E C R E T STATE 101737

EXDIS

SUBJ: CHIREC: IRAN

REF : A. TEHRAN 3000
B. TAIPEI 2667
C. STATE 88633

1. IN LIGHT YOUR CONVERSATION REPORTED REF A. WE UNCERTAIN
WHETHER GRC IS FAILING TO PRESS ITS CASE WITH GOI OR GOI
IS UNWILLING TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH IT.
WHATEVER FACTS OF MATTER, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD PLACE OUR
VIEWS, AS OUTLINED REF C. PARAS 2-4, BEFORE GOI SOONEST
UNLESS YOU FEEL THIS WOULD BE UNWISE. WE BELIEVE WE COM-
MITTED TO GRC TO MAKE SUCH REPRESENTATION PROVIDED IT FIRST
TOOK LEAD. ADDITIONALLY, WE PARTICULARLY WISH TO UNDERSCORE
OUR CONCERN THAT IN ITS DISCUSSIONS WITH PRC, GOI NOT COM-
PROMISE ITS FREEDOM OF CHOICE ON CHIREP ISSUE IN THE UN.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 101737

2. IT POSSIBLE THAT OGI MAY RESPOND TO YOUR REPRESENTATION BY INSISTING THAT GRC POSITION ON RECOGNITION OF PRC AS SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA PLACES UNACCEPTABLE LIMITATION ON ITS DESIRE TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR REACHING AGREEMENT WITH PEKING. IN VIEW FONMIN CHOW'S STATEMENT THAT GRC HAS SHOWN "MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY," YOU CANNOT, OF COURSE, SUGGEST POSSIBILITY THAT GRC MAY RETREAT ON THIS POINT. YOU CAN REITERATE OUR HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT GOI WILL BE WILLING TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH GRC IN EFFORT TO REACH SOME MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING AS TO GRC STATUS. GP-3 IRWIN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

091/10/4090

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

TELEGRAM

with

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 JUN 8 PM 8:50

064167

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 101071

THAT THERE WAS NOTHING IN SOVIET-EGYPTIAN TREATY THAT
RESTRICTED EGYPTIAN FREEDOM TO CONTINUE ITS DIALOGUE WITH
US. THIS WE FEEL IS ENCOURAGING.

GP-3 IRWIN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

0602/6/1/161
191/19/2090

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

W H

PAGE 01 STATE 090803

81
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66639
DRAFTED BY: NEA/IRN:JCMIKLOS
APPROVED BY: NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO
S/S -O: B.A.FLATIN

081710

P 250012Z MAY 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 090803.

EXDIS

NOFORN

SUBJ: POSSIBLE VISIT TO US BY EMPRESS FARAH

REF: TEHRAN 2490

REGRET IT NOT POSSIBLE MAKE ARRANGEMENTS AS SUGGESTED REFTEL WHICH WOULD MEET MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF VISIT BY EMPRESS FARAH TO US. YOU SHOULD NOT THEREFORE GIVE ANY ENCOURAGEMENT TO MEMBERS OF EMPRESS' STAFF SHOULD QUESTION SOMEHOW ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH HER PLANNED VISIT TO CANADA AT END OF JUNE. ROGERS.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

45

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 271

PAGE 01 STATE 084017

46

ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66609

DRAFTED BY: NEA/IRN: J C MIKLOS
APPROVED BY: NEA: JOSEPH J SISCO
NEA/ARP: RICHARD W MURPHY
NEA: RODGER P DAVIES
S/S: MR. CURRAN S: MR. TAYLOR

007119

P 141350Z MAY 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

SECRET STATE 084017

EXDIS

REF: TEHRAN 2473; JIDDA 1566

1. IN ADDRESSING QUESTION KHALATBARI RAISED WITH HECK YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO GOI THAT NOTHING SAID BY SECRETARY EXPLICITLY OR BY IMPLICATION COULD BE TAKEN AS USG VIEW THAT WE CONSIDER SAUDI ARABIA DOMINANT POWER IN GULF. THIS WOULD REPRESENT UNREALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF RELATIVE CAPACITY OF SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN, AND IT IS LATTER WE LOOK TO IN FINAL ANALYSIS. WE DID AS ALWAYS URGE SAUDI ARABIA TO TAKE MORE ACTIVE INTEREST IN GULF MATTERS AND COOPERATE FULLY AND FREELY WITH IRAN. WE ARE REPEATING TO YOU BEIRUT 3679 WHICH SUMMARIZES SECY'S CONVERSATION WITH KING FAISALI WHICH YOU HAVE NOT YET SEEN.

2. IN RAISING THIS MATTER YOU MIGHT NOTE IT IS NOT CLEAR TO US WHAT SAQQAF MIGHT HAVE SAID TO AMBASSADOR FARZANEGAN WHICH WOULD LEAVE IMPRESSION OF "FAR MORE RIGID AND INFLEXIBLE MOOD ON ISSUE OF TUNBS AND ABU MUSA" THAN MIGHT HAVE HERETOFORE BEEN CASE. IN SECY'S CONVERSATION WITH KING FAISALI AND IN OTHER

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 084017

CONVERSATIONS USG OFFICIALS HAVE HAD WITH HIGH-RANKING MEMBERS OF SAG, WE HAVE UNDERSTOOD SAUDI POSITION ON ISLANDS: TO HAVE BEEN ESSENTIALLY WHAT KING FAISAL PERSONALLY TOLD ZAHEDI IN JIDDA AND GENEVA. WHILE OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SAUDIS ON THIS ISSUE HAVE BEEN QUITE LIMITED AND IRANIANS SURELY HAVE FULLER IMPRESSION OF SAUDI THINKING THAN WE, WE DO HAVE FIRM IMPRESSION THAT FAISAL'S MAIN CONCERN IS THAT NOTHING BE DONE IN RESOLVING ISSUE WHICH WOULD GIVE RADICAL ARABS, PARTICULARLY IRAQ, EXCUSE FOR EXPLOITING OR INTERVENING IN LOWER GULF AFFAIRS. IN DISCUSSING FUTURE OF GULF WITH US, TOP SAUDIS HAVE MADE MANY OF POINTS YOU HAVE ALREADY MADE TO ZAHEDI AND SHAH ON THIS SAME QUESTION (REF TEHRAN 1937, 2124), PARTICULARLY RE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE FEDERATION IN GULF PRIOR TO UK WITHDRAWAL. WE BELIEVE KING FAISAL'S HOPE, WHICH WE SHARE, CONTINUES TO BE THAT SOME PEACEFUL SOLUTION, SATISFACTORY TO ALL PARTIES, CAN BE FOUND REGARDING ISLANDS BEFORE BRITISH WITHDRAW THIS YEAR. MOREOVER, WE CONVINCE THAT ANY VIEWS FAISAL MAY HOLD ON ISLANDS QUESTION ARE FORMED IN CONTEXT OF HIS STRONG DESIRE FOR CLOSE SAUDI-IRANIAN COOPERATION ON PERSIAN GULF MATTERS.

3. SUBJECT TO ANY RESERVATIONS YOU OR AMBASSADOR THACHERI MAY HAVE, YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO SUGGEST TO ZAHEDI THAT SHOULD HE BELIEVE THERE IS ANY MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN KING FAISAL AND SHAH ON THIS MATTER, THEIR FORTHCOMING MAY 17 MEETING MIGHT BE MOST OPPORTUNE OCCASION TO IRON IT OUT. ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

060201/163

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 080550

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARP: J.W.TWINAM
APPROVED BY: NEA: RODGER P. DAVIES
NEA/IRN: MR. MIKLOS (INFO), NEA/ARP: MR. MURPHY, S/Sgt. W. CURRAN

STATION ROOM

71 MAR 10 PM 3:27

EXDIS

REF: TEHRAN 2359

A. SHAH APPARENTLY STRESSED TO LUCE THAT HE BY NO MEANS OPPOSED A FEDERATION, PREPARED TO ACTIVELY SUPPORT IT ONCE IRANIAN TROOPS PERMITTED ON DISPUTED ISLANDS, AND WOULD NOT OPPOSE PREPARATORY EFFORTS TOWARD FEDERATION IN INTERIM. SHAH ASKED LUCE FOR ASSESSMENT OF FEDERATION PROSPECTS UPON LUCE'S RETURN TO TEHRAN.

2. BRITISH EMBOFF SAID FCO AT DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL HAS STATED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 080550

IT ENCOURAGED BY LUCE-SHAH DISCUSSION AND HOPES THROUGH LUCE
AND POLITICAL RESIDENT/AGENTS TO GET ON ACTIVELY WITH TASK OF
SELLING SHARJAH AND RAS AL-KHAIMAH ON ACCEPTANCE OF COMPROMISE
SOLUTION OF TYPE WHICH SHAH APPEARS TO BE OFFERING.

GP-3. ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

21

0602/10/2090

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

6241

SECRET 706

PAGE 01 STATE 076140

88

ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66610

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:RWMURPHY

APPROVED BY NEA-RODGER P. DAVIES

SYS-MR. CURRAN

NEA/IRN-MR. MIKLOS

049623

R 032219Z MAY 71

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

S E C R E T STATE 076140

EXDIS:

NOFORN

SUBJ: GULF ISLANDS

REF: TEHRAN 21241 SECTO 37

1. FCO ARABIAN DEPARTMENT CHIEF ACLAND VOLUNTEERED TO DEPTOFF IN LONDON LAST WEEK THAT BRITISH HAD DECIDED THEY COULD COUNTENANCE IRANIAN MILITARY PRESENCE ON GULF ISLANDS PRIOR TO UK WITHDRAWAL.

2. ACLAND COMMENTED THAT FCO LAWYERS REMAINED OPPOSED TO THIS POSITION AVERRING IT TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH U.K. DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARD ARAB AMIRATES. FCO WOULD NONETHELESS NOT PERMIT SUCH OBJECTIONS TO IMPEDE POSSIBLE STRIKING OF DEAL BETWEEN TEHRAN AND SKAYKHS ON OTHER ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING ISLANDS.

3. COMMENT: DEPARTMENT CONSIDERS THIS SHIFT FROM FORMER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

WHILE
SITUATION ROOM

71 MAY 4 AM 8:35

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 076140

BRITISH POSITION EVIDENCE OF ENCOURAGING NEW FLEXIBILITY
IN BRITISH THINKING ON ISLANDS PROBLEM. GP-3 IRWIN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

591/10/2090

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 166 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

WH
TELEGRAM

SECRET 417

PAGE 01 STATE 048275

21
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66663
DRAFTED BY: NEA/IRN: TWCHILDS
APPROVED BY: NEA - MR. DAVIES
NEA/IRN - MR. MIKLOS
NEA/IRN - MR. DOWELL
DOD/ISA/MA AND S - MR. MYERS (SUBS)
NEA/ARP - MR. TWINAM (PHONE)
DOD/ISA/NESA - MR. PEYER (PHONE)
DOD/OSD/GENERAL COUNSEL - MR. HERO (SUBS)
S/S-O - BRIMS

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 MAR 23 AM 8:25

109101

R 230448Z MAR 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
CINCSRIKE
SECDEF

SECRET STATE 048275

EXDIS:

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: GOI ARMS LOAN TO SAG

REFERENCE: TEHRAN 1295; JIDDA 854

CONCUR IN SUGGESTION MADE PARA 3 TEHRAN'S 1295. ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
4

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 452

PAGE 01 STATE 042732

92
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66638
DRAFTED BY: NEA/IRN: J C MIKLOS
APPROVED BY: RODGER P DAVIES
NEA/ARP: JOSEPH W WWINAMS NEA: ATHERTON
EUR/BMI: ROBERT T BURNS S/S-0: BRIMS

037727

P R 130240Z MAR 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T STATE 042732

EXDIS

NOFORN

FOR AMBASSADOR

REF: TEHRAN 1172 AND 1175; LONDON 2239

1. WE CONCUR WITH LONDON'S VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY
USEFUL FOR YOU TO STOP IN LONDON ENROUTE TO WASHINGTON.

2. CONCUR FULLY THAT THRUST OF YOUR INFORMAL
CONVERSATIONS WITH BRITISH BE ALONG LINES PARA 2
TEHRAN 1047. IN VIEW OF FRANKNESS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS
TO DATE WITH BRITISH HERE, IN LONDON AND TEHRAN, WE
THINK WIDE-RANGING EXCHANGE OF ASSESSMENTS WOULD BE
MOST HELPFUL. WE THINK BRITISH WOULD PARTICULARLY
APPRECIATE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF HOW DRIFT COULD RESULT
IN DISRUPTIVE SEIZURE OF ISLANDS AND NO FEDERATION.

3. IN SUCH INFORMAL EXCHANGE WITH BRITISH, BELIEVE IT

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 042732

WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR YOU TO PROBE DEPTH OF BRITISH THINKING ON ROLE IRAN CAN OR SHOULD PLAY IN GULF FUTURE. WE HAVE FEELING FROM THIS DISTANCE THAT NEITHER BRITISH NOR IRANIANS HAVE FULLY EXPLORED THIS QUESTION WITH EACH OTHER AND WONDER WHETHER TIME HAS NOT NOW COME FOR THEM TO DO SO. FROM MORE OPEN IRANIAN/BRITISH EXCHANGE MAY EMERGE SOME NEW THINKING ON WAY OF RESOLVING, OR MITIGATING DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS OF, ISLANDS PROBLEM, AND PERHAPS EVEN OF DRAWING IRAN INTO SUPPORT OF FEDERATION.

4. WE TOO ARE INTRIGUED WITH "CIVILIANIZATION" IDEA ALAM HAS FLOATED WITH YOU AND LEAVE TO YOUR DISCRETION WHETHER YOU FEEL IT CAN BE GENTLY PUT ON TABLE FOR BRITISH TO LOOK AT DURING YOUR LONDON VISIT. IF YOU DECIDE TO SO, HOWEVER, TRUST YOU AGREE WE SHOULD AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF ADVOCATING OR HAVING BOUGHT THIS IDEA OR ANY OTHER SCHEME SUGGESTING US SUPPORT OF IRAN'S POSITION ON ISLANDS. ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

891/10/2090

TELEGRAM

WILLIAM L. SITTINGER
SITUATION ROOM

6/11/71 May 12 PM 10:13

3

3

3

034145

034145

034145

034145

034145

- 034145

IS EACH OTHER
25

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 041753

FURTHER US EFFORT AND WE ARE MAKING IT.

3. PERIOD AHEAD IS DELICATE AND DIFFICULT AS WE WORK TO
CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH CEASE FIRE WILL BE EXTENDED AND
NEGOTIATION PROCESS CAN PROCEED. WE APPRECIATE GOI INTEREST
AND WILL REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH IT.

GP-3. ROGERS

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 242

PAGE 01 STATE 040751

92
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66634
DRAFTED BY: NEA IRN JCMIKLOS
NEA ARP JWTWINAM
APPROVED BY: THE UNDER SECRETARY
EUR BMI RTBURNS
NEA ATHERTON
NEA RPDVIES
NEA JOSEPH J. SISCO
S S BREWSTER

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 MAR 11 AM 8:28

2

018208

P R 110247Z MAR 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

SECRET STATE 040751

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: PERSIAN GULF ISLANDS AND FEDERATION

REF: LONDON 2063

1. AS REFTEL INDICATES, IT SEEMS CLEAR BRITISH NOT PRESENTLY PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING MORE ON ISLANDS QUESTION THAN CONTINUE SOMEWHAT PRO FORMA EXHORTATIONS TO RULERS OF SHARJAH AND RAS AL-KHAIMAH TO SEEK NEGOTIATED ARRANGEMENT WITH SHAH. THIS DRIFT INTO 1972 ON ISLANDS QUESTION WOULD SEEM TO IMPLY UK ASSESSMENT THAT TRUNCATED FEDERATION CAN BE CREATED WITHOUT IRANIAN COOPERATION. WE ARE NOT YET PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS ASSESSMENT AND BELIEVE IT MORE LIKELY THAT UNLESS IRAN IS BROUGHT INTO ACT IN CONSTRUCTIVE WAY BRITISH WILL END UP AS AMB MACARTHUR HAS POINTED

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 040751

OUT WITH WORST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS (TEHRAN 1047). WE ALSO ARE LEFT WITH IMPRESSION THAT BRITISH HAVE STILL NOT CONSIDERED FULLY HOW IRAN MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO PLAY MORE POSITIVE ROLE IN COMING MONTHS IN CREATING SOME SORT OF FEDERATION IN GULF.

2. WHILE WE APPRECIATE THERE FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES TO PERSUADING IRAN TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN THIS RESPECT (AND EVEN SOME RISK IN MAKING ATTEMPT) WE NEVERTHELESS FEEL THAT RULERS OF SOME OF IMPORTANT AMIRATES SUCH AS QATAR MAY BE AMENABLE TO IRANIAN PERSUAASION THAT FEDERATION EFFORTS PROCEED PROVIDED THERE IS UNDERSTANDING THAT ISLANDS WILL NOT BE PART OF FEDERATION TERRITORY. AS REFTEL INDICATES, IT NOW QUITE LIKELY THAT BAHRAINI DECISION TO GO FOR INDEPENDENCE MAY OCCUR IN NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. QATAR WILL BE NEXT TO FACE UP TO THIS ISSUE. IN THIS FLUID AND FAIRLY RAPIDLY MOVING SITUATION, WE BELIEVE IRANIAN/SAUDI COOPERATION AND A MORE ACTIVE IRANIAN ROLE WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT IN HELPING QATAR AND TRUCIAL STATES TO SORT OUT THEIR FUTURE.

3. AT MOMENT WE PREFER TO DEFER DECISION AS TO WHETHER AND HOW WE AND PERHAPS OTHERS MIGHT ATTEMPT TO IMPRESS ON SHAH THE VALUE OF SOME SORT OF FEDERATION IN GULF. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR VALUE TO OUR DELIBERATIONS IF AMB MACARTHUR COULD STOP BRIEFLY IN LONDON ON HIS WAY BACK TO WASHINGTON LATER THIS MONTH TO CONSULT WITH APPROPRIATE UK OFFICIALS. WHILE WE APPRECIATE THAT SIR WILLIAM LUCE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS SECY OF STATE'S SPECIAL REP FOR PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS WE WONDER WHETHER IT MIGHT NOT BE HELPFUL FOR AMB MACARTHUR TO MEET OTHER HIGH-RANKING MEMBERS OF FOREIGN OFFICE WHOSE EXPERIENCE HAS NOT BEEN CONFINED MAINLY TO ARAB SIDE OF GULF AND WHOSE PERSPECTIVE THEREFORE MIGHT BE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT. WE OF COURSE DEFER TO EMB LONDON ON WHETHER THIS FEASIBLE.

4. WE EXPECT REVIEW PROSPECTS AND OPTIONS ONCE AGAIN AFTER ARP DIRECTOR MURPHY RETURNS FROM TOUR OF AREA AND DURING AMB MACARTHUR'S CONSULTATIONS HERE MARCH 28.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
4



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 040751

APRIL 7. ROGERS

DIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

4

The seal of the United States Department of State is located in the top right corner. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched over the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched along the bottom. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 222

2

PAGE 01 STATE 039026

43.
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 R

66604
DRAFTED BY:NEA/IRN:MIKLOS
APPROVED BY:D:SAMUELS
E/ORF/FSE:CLARK
NEA:DAVIES
S/S:CURRAN

R 091753Z MAR 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
INFO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T STATE 039026

EXDIS

NOFORN

1. KERMIT ROOSEVELT AND TOM JONES, PRESIDENT OF NORTHROP, CALLED ON DEP UNDERSECY SAMUELS MARCH 1 TO RELATE CONVERSATION THEY HAD WITH SHAH IN PRINCE BERNHARD'S PRESENCE IN SAN MORITZ FEB. 26 ABOUT OIL SITUATION. THE SHAH HAD EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION OVER CONCLUSION OF TEHRAN NEGOTIATIONS AND APPRECIATION OF ROLE USG HAD PLAYED. HE WENT ON HOWEVER TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT HOW NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT GO WITH LIBYA. SPECIFICALLY HE SAID THAT SHOULD OIL COMPANIES GIVE IN TO EXCESSIVE LIBYAN DEMANDS IT WOULD PLACE HIM IN VERY DIFFICULT POSITION AND HE WAS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER HE WOULD BE ABLE TO HOLD HIS PERSIAN GULF NEIGHBORS--SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQ AND KUWAIT--IN LINE AGAINST LEAPFROGGING. WHILE THE SHAH CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD GIVEN HIS WORD AS KING THAT HE WOULD HONOR AGREEMENT REACHED WITH OIL COMPANIES AND THAT HE INTENDED TO STICK TO HIS WORD,

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 MAR 9 PM 7:35

005579

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

SECRET

NEVERTHELESS HE WAS CASTING ABOUT FOR SOME WAY TO EASE DILEMMA HE MIGHT HAVE TO FACE. ACCORDINGLY AN IDEA HAD OCCURRED TO HIM WHICH HE ASKED ROOSEVELT AND JONES TO PASS ON TO USG WITH UNDERSTANDING THAT (A) IF WE FOUND IT OF MERIT WE WOULD NOT ATTRIBUTE ITS AUTHORSHIP TO SHAH, AND (B) IF WE DID NOT THINK IT WAS FEASIBLE, THAT NOTHING MORE NEED BE SAID ON SUBJECT. WHILE ADMITTING THAT HE HAD NOT THOUGHT THROUGH ALL OF RAMIFICATIONS, BASIC THOUGHT WAS SIMPLY THAT MAJOR AND INDEPENDENT OIL COMPANIES IN LIBYA AGREE THAT IF SOMEBODY HAS TO GIVE IN TO LIBYANS, IT BE THE INDEPENDENTS. THE SHAH FELT THAT IF MAJORS HELD, THIS WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR HIM TO HOLD FAST TO HIS WORD ON TEHRAN AGREEMENT AND TO ENABLE HIM TO PERSUADE HIS PERSIAN GULF OPEC PARTNERS TO DO SAME. (COMMENT. PRESUMABLY SHAH WOULD ARGUE THAT HIS AGREEMENT CONCERNED MAINLY MAJOR OIL COMPANIES AND SINCE THEY WERE NOT IN EFFECT BREAKING FAITH WITH HIM, HE WOULD OF COURSE NOT BREAK HIS WORD WITH THEM).

2. SAMUELS NOTED THAT SHAH'S REMARKS ABOUT IMPACT OF SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER SETTLEMENT IN LIBYA ON PERSIAN GULF PRODUCERS WAS EXACTLY THE THING THAT HAD CONCERNED OIL COMPANIES MOST DURING TEHRAN NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT COMPANIES HAD BEEN SO METICULOUSLY INSISTENT ON WORKING OUT AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR ASSURED AND ORDERLY FLOW OF OIL FROM GULF DURING LIFE OF AGREEMENT. WE FELT IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF DOUBTS WERE TO BE CAST ON VALIDITY OF THIS AGREEMENT NOW AND IN FUTURE. WE DID NOT BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT IT WOULD BE WISE FOR US TO FLOAT SHAH'S IDEA WITH OIL COMPANIES AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES TO WORK OUT SUCH AGREEMENT AS THEY COULD WITH LIBYANS, UNENCUMBERED BY ANY NOTE OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT SOLIDARITY OF TEHRAN AGREEMENT. FURTHER, WE VERY MUCH DOUBTED WHETHER MAJORS WOULD BE AT ALL DISPOSED TO VACATE LIBYAN FIELD TO INDEPENDENTS OR FOR THAT MATTER, COULD BE LEGALLY ACQUIESCE TO SUCH CARTEL-LIKE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN MAJORS AND INDEPENDENTS.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 039026

EM FOR AMB. MACARTHUR. AS WE KNOW YOU HAVE IN PAST,
WE HOPE YOU WILL CONTINUE TO FIND OPPORTUNITIES IN
FUTURE TO CONTINUE TO STRESS TO APPROPRIATE GOI
OFFICIALS IMPORTANCE AND VALUE WE ALL ATTACH TO
TERMS AND STABILITY OF TEHRAN OIL AGREEMENT. THE
SECRETARY HAS TAKEN SPECIFIC COGNIZANCE OF THIS IN
HIS MESSAGE TO FONMIN ZAHEDI AND THIS FACT MAY BEAR
REPEATING FROM TIME TO TIME. ROGERS

ADIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
37

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 172 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 173 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 174 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

TELEGRAM

Wt

PAGE 01 STATE 030505

80
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 /046 R

66648.
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARP:RWMURPHY 2/23/71
APPROVED BY: NEA-RODGER P. DAVIES
NEA/IRN-MR. MIKLOS
S/S-MR. CURRAN

027675

R 232230Z FEB 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
CINCSRIKE/CINCEAFSA
COMIDEASTFOR

S E C R E T STATE 030505

EXDIS.

SUBJ: GULF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS:

REF: TEHRAN: 862.

1. AS PART OF CONTINUING DIALOGUE, WE ADVISED UK EMBASSY LAST WEEK OF OUR CONCERN LEST IRANIANS MAKE UNHELPFUL UNILATERAL STATEMENT IN WAKE UK PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON GULF. WE OUTLINED IDEA OF ENCOURAGING JOINT SAUDI/IRANIAN COMMUNIQUE WITH SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICIAL TO VISIT JIDDA AND POSSIBILITY OF SIMILAR TRIP TO KUWAIT. FAILING JOINT COMMUNIQUE WE NOTED THAT PERHAPS PARALLEL STATEMENTS WOULD BE POSSIBLE, EITHER TYPE OF STATEMENT BEING PREFERABLE TO UNILATERAL IRANIAN STATEMENT.

2. WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT BRIEFED BRITISH ON ZAHEDI'S REACTION CONTAINED TEHRAN 844, BUT BELIEVE WE SHOULD AT LEAST KEEP BRITISH IN TEHRAN AS WELL AS HERE INFORMED.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 030505

THAT YOU HAVE MADE THIS SUGGESTION TO ZAHEDI. WE DEFER
TO YOUR JUDGEMENT AS TO WHETHER ZAHEDI INITIAL REACTION IS
SUFFICIENTLY AUTHORITATIVE TO BE SHARED WITH BRITISH.
IRANIAN EMBASSY HERE ALREADY INFORMED BY ZAHEDI OF HIS
CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR ON THIS SUBJECT. GP-4. ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

521/10/-090

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 028524

83
ORIGIN SS-45.

INFO: OCT-01 1046 R:

66634
DRAFTED BY: NEA:RPDAVIES:
APPROVED BY: NEA:RPDAVIES:
L: NEA:BOYD (DFT)
NEA:ARP: MURPHY (DFT)
NEA:IRN:MIKLOS (DFT)
S: S:MR. CURRAN:

R 192222Z FEB 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T STATE 028524

EXDIS:

NOFORN

1. SHAH'S PUBLIC STATEMENT FEB 16 ON POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE TO TAKE GULF ISLANDS WHICH REFLECTED COMMENTS HE MADE TO SIR WILLIAM LUCE (TEHRAN 773) ARE CLEAR INDICATION THAT IRANIAN POSITION ON TUNBS-ABU MUSA IS HARDENING RELATIVE TO PREVIOUS WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A SOLUTION BASED ON A JOINT GARRISONING AND A QUOTE FUZZING UNQUOTE OF THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE. STAKING OUT THIS PUBLIC POSITION FOR WHATEVER REASON REDUCES THE OPTIONS OPEN TO GOI AND MAKES MORE LIKELY IRANIAN SEIZURE OF ISLANDS WHICH COULD STRAIN IRANIAN RELATIONS WITH MODERATE ARABS, WHICH WE BELIEVE TO BE IN OUR AND AREA INTEREST.

2. IN THIS SITUATION WE WONDER WHETHER DISCREET COUNSEL TO APPROPRIATE IRANIANS THAT SUCH DENOUCMENT COULD WELL CIRCUMSCRIBE THE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN GULF AND PENINSULA AFFAIRS WHICH SHAH COULD PLAY IS INDICATED.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 028524

3. WE HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY INDICATIONS THAT THE IRANIANS AND THE RULER OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH WERE MAKING SOME PROGRESS IN EXPLORING A POSSIBLE DEAL. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE FOR ANY GULF RULER TO REACH AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD SURRENDER SOVEREIGNTY OVER THESE ISLANDS. THUS, UNLESS THERE IS TO BE FORCEABLE SEIZURE WITH ATTENDANT ADVERSE REPERCUSSIONS FOR IRAN IN PENINSULA AND ARAB WORLD GENERALLY, SOME COMPROMISE NOT INVOLVING SURRENDER OF SOVEREIGNTY MUST BE SOUGHT.

4. IT MAY BE USEFUL AT SOME POINT FOR US TO FEED IN POSSIBLE FORMULAS. ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE AN AGREEMENT ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: QUOTE

THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND THE RULER OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH RECOGNIZING THEIR COMMON INTEREST IN THE SECURITY OF THE GULF AREA, AGREE TO COOPERATE IN A JOINT DEFENSE OF THIS REGION. IN FURTHERANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT BOTH PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO ENSURE THE DEFENSE OF THE TUNBS ISLANDS. THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WILL UNDERTAKE TO SUPPLY DEFENSIVE FORCES AND WILL UNDERTAKE TO HELP EQUIP, TRAIN, AND FINANCE RAS AL-KHAIMAH FORCES FOR THIS JOINT DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT AS WELL AS FOR THE DEFENSE OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH COASTAL TERRITORIES.

THE PARTIES ALSO AGREE TO APPOINT MEMBERS TO A COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT TO AN EQUITABLE DELIMITATION OF CONTINENTAL SHELF AREAS WHICH EACH PARTY IS ENTITLED TO EXPLOIT, SUCH AREAS TO BE NEGOTIATED AND AGREED TO WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE LOCATION OF THE AFORESAID ISLAND.
UNQUOTE

FYI - ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA AGREED TO NEGOTIATE CONTINENTAL SHELF BOUNDARY IN ADRIATIC WITHOUT REFERENCE TO LOCATION OF EACH OTHER'S ISLANDS EVEN THOUGH NONE WERE SUBJECT TO DISPUTED CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY. END FYI.

4. SHOULD FOREGOING OR SOME OTHER FORMULA PROVE ACCEPTABLE, WE WOULD ENVISAGE TRYING TO APPLY IT SUBSEQUENTLY TO ABU MUSA PROBLEM.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 028524

5. ADDRESSEE COMMENTS ON THIS APPROACH REQUIRED. GP-3.
ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 776

PAGE 01 STATE 018185

82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66635
DRAFTED BY: NEA/IRN:JCMIKLOS RETYPED:U:NAVELIOTES
APPROVED BY: UNDER SECRETARY
E/ORF/FSE:WCLARK, JR.
NEA:RODGERP.DAVIES
NEA/ARP:RMURPHY
E:PHILIPH.TREZISE
S/S-ELIOT

WASHDC
SITUATION ROOM

71 FEB 3 AM 8:04

006165

O P 030106Z FEB 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL OECD CAPITALS PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

SECRET STATE 018185

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION

REF: STATE 17387

1. PRESS AND OIL REPS HERE HAVE REPORTED OIL NEGOTIATION
BREAKDOWN LATE EVENING FEB 2 TEHRAN TIME. ACCORDINGLY,
UNLESS YOU BELIEVE IT COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND NOT REPEAT
HELPFUL TO RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS, REQUEST YOU PASS TO
SHAH IN MANNER YOU CONSIDER MOST EXPEDITIOUS AND FEASIBLE
THOUGHTS OUTLINED IN REFTEL. IN DOING SO FOLLOWING POINTS
SHOULD BE STRESSED: A) OUR IMPRESSION THAT THERE HAS BEEN
CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY ON BOTH SIDES AND AND THAT THERE
REMAINS SCOPE FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATION IF ONLY MORE TIME AVAIL-

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 018185

ABLE: B) OUR DEEP CONCERN THAT STABILITY OF OIL SUPPLY TO FREE WORLD NOT BE JEOPARDIZED BY UNILATERAL ACTION; AND C) IN THIS CONNECTION WE BELIEVE A PRIMARY CONSIDERATION IN REACHING ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT IS ASSURANCES OF ITS DURABILITY.

2. REALIZE SHAH HAS SET STAGE FOR PRONOUNCEMENT ON THIS QUESTION IN SCHEDULING APPEARANCE BEFORE MAJLIS AFTERNOON FEB 3 AND HE MAY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO NOT GO BEYOND ASSURANCES THAT PROGRESS IS BEING MADE AND NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONTINUING, TO SAY THE LEAST. WHILE IT IS OBVIOUSLY DIFFICULT TO SEE FROM THIS DISTANCE WHAT FACE-SAVING FORMULA MIGHT BE SUGGESTED, IT OCCURS TO US THAT SHAH MIGHT FIND USEFUL TO SAY SOMETHING ALONG LINE THAT IN CONSIDERATION OF INTERESTS OF PEOPLE OF CONSUMING COUNTRIES HE HAS DECIDED TO EXTEND DEADLINE FOR CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS. ON OTHER HAND IT MAY BE BEST TO SAY NOTHING ON THIS POINT AND LEAVE TO YOUR DISCRETION WHETHER YOU WISH TO ADDRESS PROBLEM AT ALL.

3. FOR AMBS THACHER AND WALSH. ON INDICATION FROM AMB MACARTHUR THAT HE INTENDS TO PROCEED ON FOREGOING, YOU AUTHORIZED EXERCISE YOUR OWN DISCRETION AS TO WHETHER YOU WISH TO PASS SUBSTANCE PARA 1 TO KING FAISAL AND EMIR, RESPECTIVELY.

ALL POSTS IN OECD CAPITALS AUTHORIZED AT THEIR DISCRETION INFORM HOST GOVTS OF INSTRUCTIONS THIS TEL AND STATE 17387. ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0602101177

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

WH
TELEGRAM

SECRET 214

PAGE 01 STATE 017387

21
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 R

66662
DRAFTED BY:OC/T:MPI:J•BALSITIS
APPROVED BY:OC/T:CCO:MR•PITMEN

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 FEB 2 AM 8:25

129128

P R 020410Z JAN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
INFO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION OECD PARIS
USMISSION NATO
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

S E C R E T STATE 017387

EXDIS

MRN C O R R E C T I O N NOTICE

THE MESSAGE SENT YOU AS: STATE 107387, SUBJECT: OIL
NEGOTIATIONS; THE MRN SHOULD BE CORRECTED TO READ
STATE 017387 IMI 017387. ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched atop a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 FEB 2 AM 8:25

84
ORIGIN SS-45

66640
DRAFTED BY NEA IRN RLDOWELL, JR.
APPROVED BY E PHILIP H TREZISE
NEA IRN MR MIKLOS
NEA ARP MR MURPHY
NEA RODGER P DAVIES.
S/S-0: MR BRIMS

128963

P R 020410Z FEB 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
INFO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION OECD PARIS
USMISSION NATO
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

S E C R E T STATE 107387

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADORS

SUBJECT: OIL NEGOTIATIONS

REF: A. TEHRAN 480; B. TEHRAN 497; C. STATE 16611

1. WE SHARE TEHRAN'S VIEW PARA 6, REF. A. THAT GULF PRODUCING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 007387

STATES' SUPPORT OF OPEC MAY TAKE FORM OF SANCTIONS AGAINST COMPANIES WHICH COULD INCLUDE SHUTDOWN OR SUBSTANTIAL CUTBACK IN PRODUCTION. IF EITHER APPEARS IMMINENT YOU SHOULD APPROACH APPROPRIATE MINISTER OF YOUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS TO REMIND HOST GOVT OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S MESSAGE STRESSING HOW VITAL IS CONTINUED SUPPLY OF OIL TO FREE WORLD AND NEED FOR SECURE SOURCE ON REASONABLE TERMS. YOU SHOULD ALSO INDICATE THAT WHILE USG IS NOT AND DOES NOT INTEND TO BECOME PARTY TO NEGOTIATIONS, A) WE FEEL COMPANIES SINCERE AND SERIOUS IN THEIR DESIRE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT, AND B) WE FEAR THAT EVEN SHORT-TERM SYMBOLIC PRODUCTION STOP-PAGE WOULD INTRODUCE AGGRAVATING POLITICAL FACTORS INTO ESSENTIALLY ECONOMIC PROBLEM; AND FURTHER THAT SUCH FACTORS, PARTICULARLY INSOFAR AS RADICAL STATES JOIN IN STOPPAGE, MIGHT MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO LIMIT PERIOD OF STOPPAGE. YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT EACH HEAD OF STATE ASSURED UNDERSECY IRWIN THAT GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO BE BOUND FOR SOME TIME BY PROVISIONS OF ANY AGREEMENT THAT MIGHT BE REACHED WITH COMPANIES AND FURTHER THAT THE SHAH MADE SIMILAR COMMITMENT IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE OF JAN 24. YOU SHOULD ALSO EXPRESS VIEW THAT STRONG MUTUALITY OF INTEREST MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE BY BOTH PARTIES TO CONTINUE TO WORK TO IDENTIFY AREAS OF AGREEMENT.

2. REQUEST AMB MACARTHUR NOTIFY AMBASSADORS THACHER AND WALSH SHOULD HE INTEND TO PROCEED TO ACT ON FOREGOING IN ORDER TO INSURE THAT ALL POSTS ACT ON TIME AND IN CONCERT.

3. A BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING THE RETURN OF THE TEAM TO LONDON IS NOT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO TRIGGER THE ACTION CALLED FOR IN PARAS 1 AND 2; ONLY IF SHUTDOWN OR SUBSTANTIAL CUTBACK IN PRODUCTION APPEARS IMMINENT SHOULD THESE INSTRUCTIONS BE IMPLEMENTED. ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

671/10/2090

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

wt
TELEGRAM

SECRET 216

PAGE 01 STATE 016534

44
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66605
DRAFTED BY: NEA/IRN: JCMIKLOS
APPROVED BY: NEA: RPD AVIES
DOD/ISA: MR REED(SUBS)
NEA/ARP: MR MURPHY
S/S-0: BRIMS

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 JAN 31 AM 9:09

3

OR 301748Z JAN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA

115777

SECRET STATE 016534

EXDIS

REF: TEHRAN 487

WE PREFER NOT RPT NOT TO AGREE TO FURTHER EXTENSIONS
FOR LEGAL AND POLICY REASONS. INSTEAD PROPOSE GOI CON-
SIDER PURCHASING EQUIPMENT (AT CURRENT VALUE WHICH WE
WOULD NOT EXPECT WOULD BE VERY MUCH FOR THE AA GUNS) AND
IN TURN DISPOSING OF IT IN MANNER IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE
TO SAG. USG CONCURRENCE IN GOI DISPOSAL PLANS REQUIRED
BUT ANTICIPATE NO PROBLEMS. WE MAY BE ABLE TO EXPAND ON
FOREGOING WHEN RESPONSIBLE DOD OFFICIALS ARE AVAILABLE
ON MONDAY.
ROGERS

SECRET
23

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

HAK'd
TELEGRAM

SECRET 441

PAGE 01 STATE 016444

82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66632
DRAFTED BY: NEA/IRN JCMIKLOS/E/ORF: JLKATZ
APPROVED BY: D MR. SAMUELS
NEA MR. DAVIES S/S-O: MR. EMMONS
E MR. TREZISE

111906

O 300302Z JAN 71 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 016444

EXDIS

SUBJ: OIL SITUATION (POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO SHAH)

REF: TEHRAN 464; LONDON 856

1. WE STRONGLY CONCUR YOUR VIEW MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
OR USG IN CONCERT WITH OTHER CONSUMER COUNTRIES TO SHAH
DESIGNED TO STAVE OFF FINAL BREAK AND ADOPTION OF
VENEZUELAN FORMULA WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AT THIS TIME.
INDEED MOST LIKELY RESULT OF CONCURRENT APPROACH WOULD BE
TO STIFFEN SHAH'S RESOLVE TO EXACT TOUGHEST TERMS POSSIBLE
FROM OIL COMPANIES. AS NOTED STATE 25432 (NOTAL)
WE HAVE BEEN IN FOREFRONT IN OIL SITUATION AND NOW PREFER
TO AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER FURTHER
ACTION OUR PART ADVISABLE OR FEASIBLE. WE WILL OF COURSE
KEEP THIS POSSIBILITY IN MIND IN DAYS AHEAD.

2. ONLY COURSE WE SEE OPEN AT THIS MOMENT FOR OIL
COMPANIES TO MAKE MAXIMUM EFFORT TO KEEP NEGOTIATIONS
GOING. IN PRESENT CLIMATE OF DEADLINES AND THREATS WE ARE
LIKELY FACE ALMOST DAILY CRISES. COMPANIES AND OTHER
GOVERNMENTS SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT FREQUENT REPRESENTATIONS

SECRET

45

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 016444

TO IRANIANS AND OTHER OPEC STATES OR HEADS OF STATE ARE NOT
LIKELY WEAKEN THEIR RESOLVE TO STRIKE A HARD BARGAIN.

3. FOR AMBASSADOR MACARTHUR. WE HAVE HEARD THROUGH
MCCLOY THAT COMPANIES HAVE IMPRESSION AMOUZEGAR HAS
WATERED DOWN ASSURANCES EXPRESSED TO UNSEC IRWIN AND TO
YOU AGAINST WHIPSAW AND IS WEAKENING ON FIVE-YEAR
AGREEMENT. UNLESS YOU HAVE REASONS TO CONTRARY SUGGEST
YOU CONSIDER IN MANNER YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE QUERYING
AMOUZEGAR ABOUT COMPANIES IMPRESSION WHICH WE HOPE
ERRONEOUS.

4. LONDON FOR AKINS. REQUEST YOU MAKE FOREGOING POINTS
WITH OIL COMPANY REPS SHOULD THEY RAISE QUESTION WITH YOU
OF FURTHER USG AND/OR CONSUMER COUNTRY INITIATIVES. GP-2
ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

181/10/2090

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched over the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched along the bottom. Two small stars separate the top and bottom text on the left and right sides.

Wit

PAGE 01 STATE 014705

85
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 R

66644
DRAFTED BY: E/ORF/FSE: CLARK
APPROVED BY: E/ORF: KATZ
S/S/O: MALONE

091559

P R 280133Z JAN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USINT ALGIERS
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION NATO
ALL OECD CAPITALS

S E C R E T STATE 014705

EXDIS

REF: LONDON 744 AND RELATED STATE TEL.

YOU SHOULD NOT RPT NOT INDICATE TO LOCAL OIL INDUSTRY
REPS YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF PROPOSALS CONTAINED REFTEL. ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 008901

88

ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 FILE-01 /047 R

66644

DRAFTED BY: NEA/IRN: DOWELL

APPROVED BY: NEA: VAN HOLLEN:

EVORF:KATZ

S/S/O: MALONE

D: SAMUELS

P R 190345Z JAN 71 ZFF5

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMCONSUL: DHAHRAN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

USMISSION OECD PARIS

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

SECRET STATE 008901

EXDIS

TOUNS: 22.

US MISSION OECD PARIS PASS TREZISE

DHAHRAN ALSO FOR UNDER SECRETARY IRWIN.

SUBJ: OIL NEGOTIATIONS; BRIEFING OF CONSORTIUM

NEGOTIATORS

REF: TEHRAN 277, 179, 282

1. SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH COMPANIES NOT GET OFF TRACKS AT OUTSET. DEPT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 008901

WOULD BE PLEASED IF YOU WOULD BRIEF, AS YOU HAVE PROPOSED,
LORD STRATHELMOND AND GEORGE PIERCY AS WELL AS BRITISH,
DUTCH AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS.

2. SECRETARY CALLED MCCLOY AND GAVE HIM SUMMARY
OF DISCUSSION WITH IRANIANS. SECRETARY SUGGESTED
COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES BE DESIGNATED AS "NEGOTIATORS"
AND THAT COMPANY WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO NEGOTIATE
WITH GULF PRODUCERS WITH PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS WITH
LIBYANS. ROGERS.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0602/01/83

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 008195

92
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66644
DRAFTED BY: E/ORF/FSE: CLARK
APPROVED BY: E/ORF: KATZ
S/S/O: MALONE

013797

O R 172215Z JAN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

S: E: C: R: E: T: STATE: 008195

EXDIS

SUBJ: CONSORTIUM NEGOTIATING PLANS WITH OPEC

REF: TEHRAN 253:

1. BRITISH EMBOFF (WILLMOTT) REPORTS CONTROVERSY WITHIN CONSORTIUM OVER COMPOSITION OF TEAM TO GO TO TEHRAN. FINAL DECISION TO SEND TEAM OF LORD STRATHELMOND (WILLY FRACER) AND GEORGE PIERCE OF BP AND ESSO RESPECTIVELY WAS REPORTEDLY COUPLED WITH PROVISIO THAT LARGER TEAM WILL FOLLOW, PRESUMABLY COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL PRINCIPAL CONSORTIUM MEMBER COUNTRIES, WHEN TALKS REACH LATER STAGE. AS FAR AS WE KNOW, NO SPECIFIC TIME WAS SET FOR TRIP BY LARGER CONSORTIUM TEAM.

2. WILLMOTT DESCRIBES LORD STRATHELMOND AS HIGHLY SKILLED IN CARRYING OUT TALKS AND AVOIDING CRITICAL CONFRONTATION.

3. PIERCY DEPARTED US EARLY THIS MORNING FOR TEHRAN VIA LONDON. WE ASSUME EMBASSY TEHRAN WILL HAVE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 008195

OPPORTUNITY MEET WITH PIERCY AND STRATHELMOND
ON MONDAY OR TUESDAY, JAN 18-19, TO DISCUSS REFTEL.

GP-3. ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0602/01/184
681/19/2090

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars separate the top and bottom text on the left and right sides.

TELEGRAM

JAN 17 AM 10:23

2

66609
DRAFTED BY: NEA: RODGER P. DAVIES
APPROVED BY: U: THE UNDER SECRETARY
SYS: MR. ELIOT JR.

010850

4. I WILL BE PREPARED TO ISSUE A PRESS STATEMENT FOR USE ON ARRIVAL TEHRAN ALONG THE LINES OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 008115

I AGREE COMPLETELY THAT WE SHOULD AVOID RESPONDING TO PRESS QUESTIONS AT THIS JUNCTURE.

5. I MET LAST NIGHT WITH JACK MCCLOY, HENRY MOSES AND CHARLES HEDLUND AND UNDERSTAND THAT TWO SENIOR NEGOTIATORS WILL ARRIVE TEHRAN BEFORE JANUARY 19. AT OUR SUGGESTION THEY AGREED TO INSURE THAT IRANIANS UNDERSTAND TEAM WILL BE PREPARED TO GIVE OIL COMPANIES POSITIONS ON OPEC RESOLUTIONS.

6. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE WE WOULD LIKE TO ARRANGE FOR A CALL ON FINMIN AMUZEGAR IN VIEW HIS INTIMATE INVOLVEMENT IN OIL ISSUE BUT LEAVE FINAL DECISION YOUR DISCRETION.

7. NOW SCHEDULED DEPART WASHINGTON 1800Z JANUARY 16 WITH ARRIVAL TEHRAN APPROXIMATELY 1 PM THERAN TIME. FINAL DECISION ON DEPARTURE FROM TEHRAN CONTINGENT ON ARRANGEMENTS IN RIYADH BUT OUR CURRENT PLAN IS TO LEAVE FOR RIYADH SOME TIME AFTERNOON JANUARY 18.

8. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU.

GP-3. ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

581/10/2090

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

WH
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 008093

81
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66640
DRAFTED BY S/PRS JOHN KING/U:NVELIOTES
APPROVED BY: THE UNDER SECRETARY
NEA RODGER DAVIES
E/OR/FSE JAMES AKINS
S/S MR ELIOT, JR.

Q R 160237Z JAN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

007184

S E C R E T STATE 008093

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PRESS STATEMENT ON UNDER SECRETARY'S TRIP

REF: STATE 7997

1. DEPARTMENT PLANS ISSUE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AT NOON WASHINGTON TIME AFTER DEPARTURE OF UNDER SECRETARY AND PARTY.
2. QUOTE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN N. IRWIN II LEFT WASHINGTON AT NOON TODAY FOR IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT TO DISCUSS THE USG CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO THE FORTHCOMING OIL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANIES AND THE OPEC OIL PRODUCING NATIONS.
3. HE IS EXPECTED TO MEET WITH THE SHAH OF IRAN IN TEHRAN, THE KING OF SAUDI ARABIA IN JIDDA AND THE AMIR OF KUWAIT, AS WELL AS OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF THOSE GOVERNMENTS. HE EXPECTS TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON IN ABOUT A WEEK OR TEN DAYS.
- UNQUOTE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

W H

SECRET 391

PAGE 01 STATE 007997

18

ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 R

66662

DRAFTED BY: NEA:RPDAVIES

APPROVED BY: THE UNDER SECRETARY

SYS: MR. ELIOT

008726

O R 160133Z JAN 71 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

INFO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY LONDON

SECRET STATE 007997

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y. CORRECTION OF DATE IN
PARA 2 TO READ JAN. 17 VICE JAN. 16

EXDIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED UNDER SECRETARY JOHN IRWIN TO SERVE
AS HIS SPECIAL EMISSARY TO THE SHAH, KING FAISAL, AND AMIR
OF KUWAIT IN ORDER TO DISCUSS USG INTEREST WITH RESPECT TO UP-
COMING OPEC COMPANY NEGOTIATIONS.

FYI MR. IRWIN MAY CARRY A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO THE THREE RULERS.
FYI.

2. EMBASSIES SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REQUEST APPOINTMENT FOR MR.
IRWIN WITHIN THE FOLLOWING TIME FRAME:

TEHRAN - 2:00 PM, SUNDAY, JANUARY 17 THROUGH MONDAY, JANUARY 18

RIYADH - TUESDAY, JANUARY 19 - JANUARY 20

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
JAN 16 AM 9:04

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched atop a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched over the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched along the bottom. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 STATE 007997

KUWAIT - JANUARY 20 - JANUARY 21

ONCE TEHRAN'S ARRANGEMENTS FIRM, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE TIMES
OTHER POSTS WILL BE SCHEDULED. EMBASSIES JIDDA AND KUWAIT
SHOULD REQUEST FLEXIBILITY IN TIMING OF APPOINTMENTS UNTIL THIS
INFORMATION RECEIVED. FOR TEHRAN: IN ORDER ARRIVE TEHRAN 2:00
PM JANUARY 17, IRWIN AND PARTY PLANNING DEPART ANDREWS AFB
NOON WASHINGTON TIME JANUARY 16. AFFIRMATIVE REPLY RE APPOINTMENT
WITH SHAH NECESSARY IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE OF LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

3. ACCOMPANYING UNDER SECRETARY IRWIN WILL BE:

ROGER P. DAVIES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, NEA
JAMES AKINS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FUELS AND ENERGY
SCOTT CUSTER, UNDER SECRETARY'S EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
NICHOLAS VELIOTES, UNDER SECRETARY'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT
VELMA HEINE, UNDER SECRETARY'S PERSONAL ASSISTANT
S/S-S - JAMES MORTON AND JANICE BARBIERI
S/S-EX - LEO AREL
JACK MIKLOS, DIRECTOR OF IRANIAN AFFAIRS
RICHARD MURPHY, DIRECTOR OF ARABIAN PENINSULA AFFAIRS
HELEN KAMER, NEA SECRETARY
WALTER SARGENT AND BERT BENNINGTON - SY OFFICERS

4. WILL REQUIRE HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS FOR UNDER SECRETARY IRWIN AND PASSENGERS LISTED PLUS SIX DOUBLES AND ONE SINGLE FOR AIR FORCE CREW.

5. REQUEST FOR AIRCRAFT CLEARANCE, VISAS WILL BE SUBJECT SEPARATE MESSAGES AS WILL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS.

6. DEPARTMENT WILL ANNOUNCE TRIP MID-DAY JANUARY 16. POSTS WILL RECEIVE TEXT OF PROPOSED STATEMENT BY IMMEDIATE SEPTEL, AS WELL AS PRESS BACKGROUND WE NOW ANTICIPATE HOLDING NOON 16.

7. FOR TRIPOLI: DEVELOPMENTS NEXT WEEK COULD RAISE QUESTION ADVISABILITY OF STOPOVER BY UNDER SECRETARY IN TRIPOLI AFTER VISIT TEHRAN, RIDYAH AND KUWAIT. SUCH STOPOVER DOES NOT SEEM DESIRABLE AT PRESENT TIME. DECISION WOULD HINGE ON YOUR ASSESSMENT AS TO WHETHER, IN CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING NEXT WEEK, INCLUDING MANIFESTED LIBYAN ATTITUDE TOWARD OPEC-COMPANY NEGOTIATIONS, USEFUL MEETINGS COULD BE ARRANGED WITH QUADHAFI OR JALLUD.

CP-3. ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0602/01/187

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 022

PAGE 01 STATE 006313

92
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66635
DRAFTED BY: NEA/IAI:TAWAHL
APPROVED BY: NEA:ALFREDL:ATHERTONJR.
NEA/IRN:JMIKLOS
NEA/UAR:MSTERNER
S/S-O:GLRUECKERT

O R 140247Z JAN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET STATE 006313

EXDIS

SUBJECT: BRIEFING SHAH ON JARRING TALKS

REF: TEHRAN 184 (NOTAL)

1. YOU MAY BRIEF SHAH AS FOLLOWS ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
IN JARRING TALKS:

2. FOLLOWING ITS DECISION TO RETURN TO JARRING TALKS,
ISRAELI GOVT ASKED JARRING TO VISIT ISRAEL FOR DISCUS-
SIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER MEIR AND SENIOR OFFICIALS. DURING
INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS JANUARY 8-9, JARRING WAS GIVEN DOCU-
MENT PRESENTING ISRAEL'S SUBSTANTIVE VIEWS ON CONDITIONS
OF PEACE WITH THE UAR. SIMILAR PAPERS DEALT WITH JORDAN
AND LEBANON. JARRING CONSIDERS THEM TO BE USEFUL BEGINNING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

COH

3

119827

71 JAN 14 AM 8:01

QUITE USEFUL

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 006313

AND AGREED TO CONVEY THEM TO ARAB REPRESENTATIVES, WHICH WAS DONE IN NEW YORK.

3. DESPITE WIDESPREAD SPECULATION THAT ISRAEL WOULD RAISE PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN WAY WHICH COULD IMPEDE JARRING'S NEGOTIATIONS, THIS WAS NOT DONE.

4. IN OUR VIEW, ISRAELI DOCUMENTS CAN AND SHOULD SERVE AS STARTING POINT FOR GENUINE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THEY DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH EACH PRINCIPAL ELEMENT OF UNSC RESOLUTION 242 INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS OF PEACE, REFERENCES TO SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, FREEDOM OF MARITIME PASSAGE, REFUGEES, AND A GENERAL STATEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL. WE RECOGNIZE ISRAELI PAPER NOT ACCEPTABLE TO ARABS AS IS BUT BELIEVE UAR POLICY ALREADY EMBRACES MOST ELEMENTS OF ISRAELI PROPOSALS.

5. OUR HOPE, WHICH IS SHARED BY JARRING, IS THAT EGYPTIANS WILL RESPOND IN POSITIVE, NONPOLEMIC AND SUBSTANTIVE MANNER BY SEEKING CLARIFICATIONS OR FURTHER EXCHANGES AND PRESENTING THEIR OWN POSITIONS AS PART OF NORMAL NEGOTIATING PROCESS. WE PARTICULARLY HOPE EGYPTIANS WILL CHOOSE PATH OF JARRING NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN CALL FOR SC MEETING WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE SERIOUS SETBACK TO PROSPECTS FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. EGYPTIANS, ESPECIALLY FOMIN RIAD IN RECENT TOUR OF WESTERN EUROPE, HAVE SAID THEY WILL CALL FOR SC MEETING IF THERE NO PROGRESS IN JARRING TALKS BY END OF JANUARY OR IF FOUR POWERS DO NOT PROVIDE GUIDELINES. WE HOPE EGYPTIANS WILL NOW ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS UNDER JARRING. THIS COURSE WOULD NOT ONLY OPEN UP POSSIBILITY FOR EXTENSION OF CEASEFIRE AND FOR CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT BY FOUR POWERS TO DEAL WITH QUESTIONS OF GUARANTEES AND PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS, TO WHICH UAR HAS SAID IT ATTACHES IMPORTANCE. IT WOULD ALSO CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH WE CAN CONTINUE TO EXERCISE POSITIVE INFLUENCE. EFFORTS TO GENERATE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES VIA SECURITY COUNCIL ROUTE AT THIS STAGE, AT TIME WHEN ISRAELIS HAVE COME FORTH FOR FIRST TIME WITH OPENING NEGOTIATING POSITION ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES VIA INDIRECT NEGOTIATING PROCESS UNDER JARRING, COULD ONLY HAVE OPPOSITE EFFECT.

6. WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO MOUNT PRESSURE CAMPAIGN ON UAR,

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 006313

WHICH MUST REACH OWN DECISIONS. WE HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WILL NOT PROVE TO BE ANOTHER AND POSSIBLY CRITICAL LOST OPPORTUNITY IN HISTORY OF ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT EFFORTS, AND IN THAT SPIRIT, WE HAVE MADE OUR FOREGOING VIEWS AND JUDGMENTS KNOWN TO UAR AND OTHER GOVTS.

GP-3 ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

Wit

PAGE 01 STATE 006068

81
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 R!

66636

DRAFTED BY: E/ORF/FSE: WCLARK, JR. / NEA/IRN: JCMIKLOS

APPROVED BY: NEA: JOSEPH J. SISCO

E/ORF/FSE:MR. J. AKINS

AF/N:MR. BLAKE

S/S: MR. ELIOT

NEA: MR. DAVIES

118762

P R 132330Z JAN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION OECD PARIS
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USINT ALGIERS

S E C R E T STATE 006068

EXDIS

REF: A. TEHRAN 182; B. TEHRAN 143; C. TEHRAN 184 (NOTAL)

1. DEPARTMENT STRONGLY APPROVES YOUR PROPOSAL TO TAKE SAME LINE WITH SHAH AS IN YOUR STATEMENTS TO ALAM (REF B).

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 006068

2. YOU MAY ADD THAT A) WE HAVE FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE THAT OIL COMPANIES HAVING GENUINE LEGAL AND COMMERCIAL PROBLEMS IN ARRIVING AT JOINT NEGOTIATING POSITION, BUT WE FIRMLY BELIEVE COMPANIES PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE AND FORTHCOMING WHEN NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN, AND B) COMPANIES ARE DEFINITELY PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE AS SOON AS THESE PROBLEMS IRONED OUT, WHICH WE EXPECT WILL BE IN VERY NEAR FUTURE.

3. YOU MAY ALSO NOTE THAT LIBYANS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO US THAT IT IS THEIR INTENTION TO ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE USG POLICY TOWARD ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE BY PENALIZING OIL INDUSTRY AND THROUGH IT OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES. WE EXPECT TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO LARG THAT THIS TACTIC WILL NOT SUCCEED AND THAT WE INTEND TO CONTINUE OUR PRESENT POLICY OF PROMOTING PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED. WE KNOW THAT IRAN SHARES THIS OBJECTIVE AND DO NOT BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT IT WOULD WITTINGLY OR OTHERWISE BECOME A PARTY TO LARG TACTIC. WE BELIEVE PETROLEUM ISSUES SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ON THEIR ECONOMIC MERITS AND HOPE THAT IRAN CAN USE ITS SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE WITH OTHER OPEC MEMBERS IN PERSUADING OPEC TO PROCEED ACCORDINGLY.

4. IN THIS CONNECTION YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT WE WOULD VIEW ANY POLITICALLY INSPIRED PRODUCTION CUTBACK OR SHUTDOWN WITH UTMOST CONCERN AND INsofar AS OUR RELATIONS WITH THOSE COUNTRIES ARE CONCERNED WITH WHICH WE HAVE HITHERTO HAD CLOSE AND COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, IT COULD NOT HELP BUT HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS AND UNFORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES.

GP-3. ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

681/10/2090

NODIS

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 190 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 191 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 192 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 193 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 194 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State

SECRET

W19 10
TELEGRAM

P 040025Z AUG 71

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5284

8 8 7 Q

BT

S E C R E T TEHRAN 4233

4 AUGUST 7 16 AM

NODIS/SENSITIVE/NOFORM

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM MACARTHUR

SUBJECT: CHIREP: US ANNOUNCEMENT OF POLICY

REF: (A) STATE 139511
(B) STATE 139587
(C) STATE 139829
(D) TEHRAN 3592

SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR CONVEYED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO FOMIN ZAHEDI AND THROUGH HIM TO SHAH. ZAHEDI INDICATED IRAN WILL PROBABLY MOVE SWIFTLY ON CHIREC AND POSSIBLY ON CHIREP FOLLOWING TURKISH ANNOUNCEMENT AUGUST 5 RECOGNIZING PRC (AND LIQUIDATING ROC EMBASSY ANKARA). SINCE SHAH MOVING SWIFTLY ON BOTH CHIREC AND CHIREP ISSUES WITH PRC, ZAHEDI URGED WE LET HIM KNOW SOONEST DEGREE OF SUPPORT WE EXPECT OUR CHIREP PROPOSAL TO RECEIVE FROM OTHER UN MEMBERS. ZAHEDI BELIEVES THAT IF SUCH SUPPORT REASONABLE OR SUBSTANTIAL, IT MAY HELP HIM TO MAINTAIN GOI FLEXIBILITY RATHER THAN HAVING IT COMMIT ITSELF SOON TO COURSE OF ACTION IN UN DIFFERING FROM OURS.

1. UNFORTUNATELY YOUR MESSAGE ONLY REACHED US LATE NIGHT AUGUST 2 AFTER YOU HAD ALREADY PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED US POSITION ON CHIREP ISSUE. THIS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONVEY YOUR MESSAGE TO SHAH AND ZAHEDI (REF A AND B) UNTIL AUGUST 3.

2. ACCORDINGLY AND SINCE SHAH IS AT HIS CASPIAN SUMMER RESIDENCE, I SAW ZAHEDI ALONE ON AUGUST 3 AND GAVE HIM:

(A) TEXT OF YOUR STATEMENT AND TRANSCRIPT OF YOUR PRESS CONFERENCE;

(B) PAPER CONVEYING YOUR CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO HIM AND SHAH;

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- TEHRAN 4288 NODIS SENSITIVE NOFORN

(C) ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS PAPER BASED ON REF C
(APPROPRIATELY EDITED) COVERING TALKING POINTS.

I EXPRESS HOPE GOI WOULD BE ABLE TO VOTE FOR
RESOLUTION (A) TO SEAT BOTH ROC AND PRC AND (B) FOR MOTION
THAT A PROPOSAL TO DEPRIVE ROC OF ITS UN REPRESENTATION
REQUIRES TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY UNDER ARTICLE 18. CONCLUDED
BY SAYING WE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE VIEWS OF SHAH.

2. ZAHEDI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION, SAYING ON RECEIPT OF
MESSAGE I SENT HIM EARLY MORNING AUG 3 HE HAD HELD PLANE
WHICH WOULD CARRY CONFIDENTIAL POUCH TO SHAH LATE SAME DAY.
HE WOULD SEND PAPERS TO SHAH AND IN DUE COURSE LET ME KNOW
SHAH'S REACTION. (HE MENTIONED SHAH RETURNING TO TEHRAN
AUG 4 FOR TWENTY-FOUR HOURS.)

3. AT SAME TIME IN STRICT CONFIDENCE ZAHEDI SAID HE
REGRETTED WE NOT ABLE TO OUTLINE OUR POSITION TO GOI
SOONER AS HE HAD SUGGESTED (REFTEL D) BECAUSE SITUATION
RE IRANIAN RECOGNITION OF PRC AND POSITION ON CHIREP HAD
MOVED SWIFTLY BECAUSE OF TURKISH DECISION TO ANNOUNCE
RECOGNITION OF PRC ON AUGUST 5. ZAHEDI HAD QUERIED TURKS,
ASKING WHAT THEY WOULD DO ABOUT ROC EMBASSY AND REPRESENTA-
TION IN ANKARA, MENTIONING PRC HAD INFORMED GOI THAT TURKS
WOULD "GET RID OF ROC EMBASSY IN ANKARA." ZAHEDI SAID HE
RECEIVED REPLY FROM ANKARA INDICATING THAT WHILE ROC
EMBASSY IN ANKARA WOULD BE LIQUIDATED, TURKS NONETHELESS
HOPED CONTINUE TO HAVE SOME FORM OF AMICABLE ARRANGEMENT
WITH ROC. I SKED IF TURKS WERE REFERRING TO POSSIBILITY
OF ROC TRADE OR ECONOMIC MISSION IN ANKARA AND ZAHEDI
REPLIED HE DID NOT KNOW PRECISELY BUT THOUGHT THIS MIGHT
WELL BE THE CASE. HE ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT SHAH'S ACTION
VIS-A-VIS ROC EMBASSY IN TEHRAN WOULD PROBABLY PARALLEL
ACTION TAKEN BY TURKS AND I HAD DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT
ANNOUNCEMENT OF GOI RECOGNITION OF PRC WOULD FOLLOW
REASONABLY SOON AFTER TURKISH ANNOUNCEMENT.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DIS
N
O
D
I
S
N
O
D
I
S



Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

-3- TEH RAN 4288 NODIS SENSITIVE NOFORN

4. HE THEN REVERTED TO CHIREP ISSUE, SAYING WE MUST UNDER-
STAND THAT THIS ALSO IS BEING CONSIDERED TOGETHER WITH
CHIREC ISSUE. ONCE SHAH COMMITS GOI PUBLICLY ON CHIREP
ISSU, BALL-GAME WILL BE OVER AND THERE WILL BE NO
POSSIBILITY OF CHANGING OR MODIFYING GOI POSITION.
WITH THIS IN MIND HE HOPED MOST EARNESTLY THAT YOU WOULD
LET HIM KNOW SOONEST THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT WE CAN COUNT
ON RECEIVING FOR OUR PROPOSAL RE HANDLING OF CHIREP ISSUE
IN UNGA. HE WAS NOT ASKING US TO DIVULGE CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION RE ATTITUDES OF SPECIFIC COUNTRIES BUT RATHER
TO LET HIM KNOW OUR VIEW ON HOW MANY OTHER COUNTRIES MIGHT
SUPPORT OUR PROPOSITION OR SOME ACCEPTABLE VARIANT THEREOF,
HOW MANY WERE NEUTRAL AND UNDECIDED AND HOW MANY OPPOSED,
ETC. IF FIGURES WE GAVE HIM INDICATED REASONABLE TO
SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION, HE WOULD BE ABLE TO
USE THIS INFORMATION (WITH SHAH) TO TRY TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR
OUR PROPOSITION OR AT LEAST TO TRY TO HAVE GOI MAINTAIN
FLEXIBILITY RATHER THAN COMMIT ITSELF PUBLICLY IN NEAR
FUTURE ON SOME OTHER COURSE OF ACTION. HE ADDED OUR
GENERAL APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM HAD NOT COME AS COMPLETE
SURPRISE TO GOI BECAUSE WHEREAS WE HAD APPARENTLY NOT BEEN
ABLE TO BE VERY FORTHCOMING WITH GOI, SOME WEEKS AGO
JAPANESE, WHO DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT CHREP-CHIREC ISSUE,
HAD CONFIDENTIALLY INFORMED ZAHEDI OF TALKS JAPANESE HAD
HAD WITH US AND VIEWS WE HAD OUTLINED TO THEM.

SECRET

D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

-4- TEHRAN 4288 NODIS SENSITIVE NOFORN

5. COMMENT: ZAHEDI WHO HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN SYMPATHETIC TO ROC IS OBVIOUSLY STRUGGLING TO KEEP GOI POSITION FLEXIBLE AND TO AVOID PREMATURE FORMAL AND PUBLIC COMMITMENT RE CHIREP ISSUE WHICH MAY DIFFER CONSIDERABLY FROM OUR POSITION. THEREFORE AND SINCE THIS ISSUE IS ON SHAH'S FRONT BURNER, IT WOULD SEEM STRONGLY IN OUR OWN INTEREST TO BE AS RESPONSIVE AS WE POSSIBLY CAN JUST AS SOON AS WE CAN TO HIS QUERY RE DEGREE OF SUPPORT WE EXPECT FOR OUR PROPOSAL FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. FOR IT SUCH SUPPORT IS REASONABLE OR SUBSTANTIAL, HE BELIEVES IT WILL HELP HIM PRESERVE FLEXIBILITY AND PERHAPS ALIGN GOI WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WHO SHARE OUR GENERAL APPROACH TO THIS DIFFICULT PROBLEM. HE CALLED ME EARLY AUG 4 TO SAY SHAH HAD GONE OVER PAPERS I HAD GIVEN HIM AND SEAD AN ANSWER FOR US. HOWEVER, ZAHEDI BELIEVES SHAH MAY NOT HAVE FULLY UNDERSTOOD CERTAIN ASPECTS OF OUR PROPOSAL AND ACCORDINGLY HE WILL SEE SHAH EVENING OF AUG 4 OR ON AUG 5 FOLLOWING WHICH HE WILL LET ME KNOW THE SCORE.

6. SUGGEST THIS MESSAGE BE PASSED ANKARA. GP-3.

MACARTHUR

SECRET

S
N
O
D
I
S

S
N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 261130Z JUL 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5183
BT
SECRET TEHRAN 4066

NODIS

SUBJECT: CHIREP: IRAN

REF: (A) TEHRAN 3925
(B) STATE 129850
(C) TEHRAN 4047
(D) STATE 134630

1. JAFFAR NADIM, CHIEF OF MFA SECRETARIAT ON WHOM FONMIN ZAHEDI RELIES FOR ADVICE ON CHIREP AND CHIREC MATTERS, CALLED ME TO MFA JULY 25 TO REPORT DECISIONS GOI HAD SO FAR REACHED ON TWO POINTS REGARDING CHIREP ISSUE ESPECIALLY AS THEY PERTAIN TO "PIECE OF PAPER" WE HAD LEFT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER (REF A). NADIM SAID THESE POINTS CONCERNED REFERENCE TO ROC IN UNGA RESOLUTION AND MATTER OF SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT (PARA 2E OF REF B).

2. STATING HE WAS CONVEYING OFFICIAL GOI POSITION, NADIM SAID GOI HAS REACHED CONCLUSION THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE CHINA AND NOW REGARDS PRC AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THAT CHINA. GOI WILL ACCORDINGLY VOTE AT NEXT UNGA FOR ADMISSION OF PRC AND FAVORS PRC FOR SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT. GOI IS OPPOSED TO REFERENCE IN RESOLUTION TO ROC BY ITS PRESENT NAME.

3. NADIM ALSO STATED GOI BELIEVES THAT ISLAND OF FORMOSA/ TAIWAN HAS RIGHT TO ITS OWN SEPARATE EXISTENCE AND GOI WOULD SUPPORT ITS MEMBERSHIP IN UN AS ORDINARY MEMBER UNDER WHATEVER NAME IT CHOOSES OTHER THAN ROC.

4. IN DISCUSSION THAT ENSUED NADIM ADDED THAT IF IMPORTANT QUESTION RESOLUTION INTRODUCED THIS YEAR GOI WOULD NOT RPT NOT VOTE FOR IT AS IT HAS FOR LAST SEVERAL YEARS. GOI HAS NOT DECIDED WHETHER TO ABSTAIN OR TO VOTE AGAINST RESOLUTION.

5. I EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS SHARING OF VIEWS WITH US AND SAID THAT WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH GOI IN NEAR FUTHRE TO DISCUSS FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CHIREP QUESTION. GP-3.

HECK
BT

WHITE
HOUSE
SITUATION
ROOM

21 JUL 26 PM 2:37

7012Q

8:45 AM

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

0 200800Z JUL 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5119
BT
SECRET TEHRAN 3934

CN: 5103Q
Rec'd: July 20, 1971
4:37 a.m.

NODIS

SUBJ: CHIREP: SECRETARY'S JULY 20 MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR AFSHAR

REF: (A) STATE 130610
(B) TEHRAN 3925

1. AS RESULT MY JULY 19 MEETING WITH ZAHEDI (REFTEL B) HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THAT WE DID NOT RPT NOT ENGAGE IN SERIES OF "CONSULTATIONS" WITH TWENTY OTHER GOVTS BEFORE PRESIDENT'S PEKING VISIT WAS ANNOUNCED BY SIMPLY INFORMED REPS OF OTHER GOVTS ABOUT PEKING VISIT SHORTLY BEFORE PRESIDENT MADE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. WHAT ORIGINALLY WOUNDED ZAHEDI'S AND SHAH'S SENSIBILITIES WAS IMPRESSION THEY HAD THAT WE HAD CONSULTED OVER PERIOD OF SOME TIME WITH TWENTY OTHER GOVTS ABOUT VISIT BUT HAD NOT INCLUDED IRAN. THIS, I THINK, IS PRINCIPAL POINT TO MAKE TO AFSHAR COUPLED WITH ASSURANCES OF HOW HIGHLY WE VALUE CLOSE AND INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE WITH IRAN WHICH ENABLES US TO ENGAGE IN VERY FRANK AND USEFUL CONSULTATIONS ON MANY MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

2. IF APPROPRIATE OCCASION PRESENTS ITSELF, IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR SECRETARY TO EXPLAIN WHY WE BELIEVE IT UNWISE AND IMPRACTICAL TO TRY TO CHANGE NAME OF ROC TO "REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN" OR SOME SIMILAR DESIGNATION. IN SO DOING, HOWEVER, WOULD PREFER THAT SECRETARY NOT RPT NOT MENTION MY DISCUSSION WITH ZAHEDI ON THIS POINT BECAUSE ZAHEDI WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO IMPART TO ME SHAH'S RECENT THINKING ON THIS SUBJECT AND DID SO ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY IN ORDER TO GET AMMUNITION TO KNOCK DOWN IDEA. HOWEVER, BELIEVE SECRETARY COULD APPROPRIATELY RAISE IT WITH AFSHAR, SAYING THAT HE KNEW SOME COUNTRIES HAD IN THEIR CONTINGENCY THINKING CONSIDERED SUCH A POSSIBILITY AND THEN SECRETARY COULD GO ON TO EXPLAIN WHY, IN OUR JUDGMENT, IT PRESENTS DANGERS.

GP-3.

MACARTHUR

BT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

WH

12

CONTROL: 4868Q
RECD: 19 JUL 14 34Z

O 191325Z JUL 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5113
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 3925

NODIS

SUBJECT: CHIREP: IRAN

REF: (A) STATE 129849
(B) STATE 129850
(C) TEHRAN 3899

SUMMARY: AT MEETING WITH ZAHEDI JULY 19 I CONVEYED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE (REF A) WHICH FULLY MOLLIFIED HIM. ALSO LEFT WITH HIM "PIECE OF PAPER" INCORPORATING SUBSTANCE OF REF B REGARDING RESOLUTION WE ARE CONSIDERING TO DEAL WITH CHIREP PROBLEM AT NEXT UNGA. AFTER STUDYING PAPER ZAHEDI ASKED ABOUT (A) SUPPORT FOR RESOLUTION AND (B) WHO WOULD SPONSOR IT. HE ALSO INFORMED ME CONFIDENTIALLY SHAH CONSIDERING RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ADMISSION OF PRC WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ROC BUT IF IT HAD TO BE REFERRED TO WAS TOYING WITH REFERRING TO TAIWAN AS REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN. ZAHEDI DID NOT THINK AUSTRIAN COMMUNIQUE WAS RELEVANT TO IRAN CASE AS GOI PONDERED MATTER OF RECOGNITION OF PRC. AS I MAY BE SEEING ZAHEDI AGAIN TOMORROW TO GET SHAH'S REACTION TO OUR PAPER WOULD APPRECIATE WHAT DEPT CAN SEND ME ON (A) SPONSORSHIP QUESTION; (B) ARGUMENTS REFERRING TO ROC AS ROT; (C) ANY OTHER RELEVANT POINTS.

1. I SAW FONMIN ZAHEDI AT NOON JULY 19. ONLY JAFFAR NADIM, CHIEF OF SECRETARIAT, WAS PRESENT. I CONVEYED GIST OF SECRETARY'S MESSAGE EXPLAINING THAT CONTRARY TO ZAHEDI'S EARLIER UNDERSTANDING, THERE HAD NOT BEE CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF CONSULTATIONS WITH TWENTY OTHER GOVTS BUT THEY HAD SIMPLY BEEN INFORMED JUST PRIOR TO ACTUAL ANNOUNCEMENT BY PRESIDENT. I STRESSED WE VALUE OUR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN AND ON MOST SECRET BASIS I WAS AUTHORIZED TO CONVEY FOR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

SECRET

-2- S E C R E T TEHRAN 3925, NODIS, JULY 19

SHAH AND ZAHEDI OUR PRESENT THINKING RE CHIREP ISSUE, EMPHASIZING THAT WE WERE CONSULTING SECRETLY WITH ONLY VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF OTHER STATES. ZAHEDI WAS FULLY MOLLIFIED, SAYING HE UNDERSTOOD SITUATION AND SENT HIS WARM REGARDS AND BEST WISHES TO SECRETARY.

2. I THEN GAVE HIM "PIECE OF PAPER" AS AUTHORIZED IN REFTEL B. HE AND NADIM (WHO SERVES AS CONFIDENTIAL SENIOR OFFICIAL ON CHINA MATTERS FOR SHAH AND ZAHEDI) READ PAPER CAREFULLY. ZAHEDI ASKED SEVERAL CLARIFICATION QUESTIONS, WHICH I WAS ABLE TO ANSWER THANKS TO HELPFUL REFTEL B AND PREVIOUS COMMUNICATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT.

3. HE THEN ASKED WHO WOULD SPONSOR RESOLUTION WE HAD IN MIND. WOULD IT BE (A) US; (B) US AND OTHER STATES; OR (C) SIMPLY OTHER STATES? HE ALSO ASKED HOW MUCH SUPPORT US HAD FROM OTHER COUNTRIES ON RESOLUTION WE HAD IN MIND. I REPLIED I WOULD QUERY DEPT BUT THAT THUS FAR I FELT SURE SPONSORSHIP, WHICH IS TACTICAL QUESTION, HAD NOT BEEN DECIDED ON SINCE WE ARE AT BEGINNING OF CONSULTATIONS WITH A FEW OTHER COUNTRIES WHOSE VIEWS WE VALUED. ON PERSONAL BASIS, HE INDICATED RESOLUTION MIGHT DRAW GREATER TACTICAL SUPPORT IF IT CAME FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH SHARED ITS SUBSTANCE RATHER THAN FROM US. HE UNDERSTOOD, HOWEVER, THAT UNTIL OUR CONSULTATIONS PROGRESSED FURTHER, WE COULD NOT REACH ANY DECISIONS ON SPONSORSHIP NOR BE EXPECTED TO KNOW HOW MUCH SUPPORT SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD RECEIVE.

4. I THEN REFERRED TO OUR TALK ON JULY 17 (REFTEL C) AND ASKED IF HE HAD ANY INDICATION AS TO HOW SHAH HAD REACTED TO TWO POSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS HE HAD MENTIONED TO ME (PARA 4 REFTEL C). I RECALLED (A) ONE WOULD CALL FOR ADMISSION OF PEKING BUT TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY REQUIRED TO EXPEL TAIWAN. AND BOTH WOULD BE REFERRED TO BY THEIR PRESENT NAMES OF PRC AND ROC; (B) OTHER CALLED FOR ADMISSION OF PRC WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ROC. ZAHEDI REPLIED THAT HE NOT AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS THIS WITH ME BUT IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE HE WANTED ME TO KNOW THAT SHAH IS IN LAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS LEANING TOWARD RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD SIMPLY CALL FOR ADMISSION OF PRC WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ROC. HOWEVER, IF SOME REFERENCE TO ROC WERE REQUIRED, SHAH LIKED IDEA OF REFERRING TO IT WAS "REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN" (ROT) RATHER THAN ROC. ZAHEDI ASKED MY VIEW ABOUT THIS.

5. I REPLIED THAT WHILE THIS WAS NOT COVERED IN MY INSTRUCTIONS I PERSONALLY THOUGHT THAT ANY SUCH PROPOSAL COULD RESULT IN WORST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS, PARTICULARLY SINCE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

SECRET

-3- S E C R E T TEHRAN 3925, NODIS, JULY 19

GOI DID NOT WANT ROC EXPELLED FROM UN. IN EFFECT IT COULD LEAD TO ADMISSION OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND AS PRACTICAL MATTER PERMANENT EXCLUSION OF ROC. I EXPLAINED THAT THERE IS NO SUCH INTERNATIONAL ENTITY AS "REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN" AND UNQUESTIONABLY SOME COUNTRIES WOULD TAKE POSITION THAT ROT WAS NEW STATE AND WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO APPLY FOR ADMISSION AS SUCH FROM SCRATCH. WITH PRC ADMITTED TO UN AND SITTING ON SECURITY COUNCIL, IT WOULD NOT ONLY BE DIFFICULT TO GET TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY TO ADMIT ROT BUT PRC AS SC MEMBER COULD ALWAYS VETO ITS ADMISSION. MY PERSONAL VIEW THEREFORE WAS THAT FOR LEGAL AND OTHER REASONS IF ROC WAS TO BE MENTIONED IN ANY RESOLUTION OR UN PAPER IT SHOULD BE MENTIONED BY ITS PROPER NAME.

6. I ALSO POINTED OUT THERE ARE PRECEDENTS OF SORTS FOR REFERRING TO PRC AND ROC BY THEIR PRESENT NAMES. FOR EXAMPLE, IN UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS THERE WAS REFERENCE TO TWO KOREAS, TWO VIETNAMS AND TWO GERMANIES AND THEREFORE IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IRAN WOULD BE STANDING ON FULLY DEFENSIBLE GROUND TO INSIST THAT ROC AND PRC BE REFERRED TO AS SUCH IN ANY UN RESOLUTION OR PAPER.

7. ZAHEDI SAID PRIVATELY THAT HE PERSONALLY AGREED AND WOULD INFORM SHAH THAT FOREGOING REPRESENTED MY PERSONAL VIEW. HE FELT SUCH ACTION WAS NEEDED TO STAVE OFF A POSSIBLE EARLY DECISION WHICH COULD CREATE PROBLEMS. HE SAID HE HAD AIRPLANE STANDING BY SO THAT HE COULD SEND REPORT TO SHAH (WHO IS AT CASPIAN) ON OUR TALK. HE HOPED TO BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH ME TOMORROW, JULY 20, REPORTING SHAH'S REACTION TO OUR DISCUSSION, WHICH HE FELT HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN GRINDING MORE CONSIDERATIONS INTO VARIOUS OPTIONS WHICH SHAH IS PRESENTLY CONSIDERING, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO CALLING ROC BY ITS PROPER NAME.

8. AT CONCLUSION OF OUR DISCUSSION OF CHIREP I RAISED GOI RECOGNITION OF PRC AND COMMENTED THAT IF, AS I UNDERSTOOD, GOI CONTEMPLATING RECOGNITION, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO LOOK AT AUSTRIAN COMMUNIQUE WHICH DOES NOT MENTION TAIWAN. ALSO WE UNDERSTOOD AUSTRIA GAVE NO COMMITMENT TO PRC RE CHIREP ISSUE IN UN. MADIM REPLIED THAT GOI HAD LOOKED AT AUSTRIAN FORMULA BUT CASE OF IRAN AND AUSTRIA ARE DIFFERENT. WHEREAS IRAN HAS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ROC AND AN AMBASSADOR ACCREDITED TO TAIPEI, AUSTRIA NEVER RENEWED DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION WITH CHINESE AFTER WORLD WAR II. ZAHEDI, THINKING ALOUD, SAID THAT IF IRAN WITHDREW ITS AMBASSADOR TO TAIPEI, WITHOUT BREAKING RELATIONS WITH

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

SECRET

-4- S E C R E T TEHRAN 3925, NODIS, JULY 19

ROC, IT MIGHT BE IN MORE OR LESS SAME POSITION AS AUSTRIA.
NADIM DID NOT THINK SO.

9. ZAHEDI THEN MENTIONED THAT IN RECOGNIZING PRC, GOI WAS WILLING TO RECOGNIZE IT AS "SOLE GOVT OF CHINA." I OBSERVED PEKING WOULD INTERPRET THIS AS GOI AGREEMENT THAT IT WAS SOLE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF PEOPLES OF CHINA AND THEREFORE HAD AUTHORITY OVER TAIWAN AND OTHER OVERSEAS CHINESE. ZAHEDI SAID HE HAD THOUGHT ABOUT THIS BUT IRAN DID NOT AGREE WITH SUCH AN INTERPRETATION AS IT WAS NOT RECOGNIZING PRC AS "SOLE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF PEOPLES OF CHINA." IT WOULD BE UP TO CHINESE ON FORMOSA AND ELSEWHERE OVERSEAS TO OPT FOR THE GOVT THEY DESIRED TO REPRESENT THEM.

10. COMMENT: IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING AND SINCE I MAY WELL BE MEETING WITH ZAHEDI AGAIN TOMORROW, I WOULD APPRECIATE ANYTHING DEPT CAN SEND ME SOONEST ON (A) SPONSORSHIP PER PARA 3 ABOVE; (B) ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTATIVE OR POINTS TO MAKE WITH RESPECT TO SHAH'S IDEA OF REFERRING TO ROC AS ROT, WHICH IS PERHAPS MOST CRITICAL POINT THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO KILL IMMEDIATELY IF WE IN FACT DIAGREE WITH SHAH ON THIS; (C) ANY OTHER GENERAL POINTS WHICH CAN SUPPLEMENT TIMELY AND EXCELLENT INFO ALREADY SENT US. GP-3.

MACARTHUR

BT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

SECRET

Col K
SECRET
TELEGRAM

O 171340Z JUL 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5099
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 3899

4 6 7 3 Q
JULY 17, 1971
2:53 P.M.

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM MACARTHUR

IF APPROPRIATE, SUGGEST THIS MESSAGE BE PASSED ANKARA
AND TAIPEI

SUBJECT: CHIREC & CHIREP: SHAH ABOUT TO MAKE FINAL DECISION

REF: (A) STATE 129134 AND TEHRAN 3871
(B) TEHRAN 3866

SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI AND SHAH DEEPLY
WOUNDED THAT WE INFORMED TWENTY OTHER COUNTRIES IN ADVANCE
RE PRESIDENT'S PEKING VISIT BUT FAILED INCLUDE IRAN.
SHAH IS PRESENTLY CONSIDERING ALL ELEMENTS OF CHIREP
QUESTION PREPARED BY FOREIGN MINISTRY AND WILL PROBABLY
MAKE FINAL DECISION "IN NEXT SEVERAL DAYS" UNLESS WE
LET HIM KNOW OUR VIEWS, WHICH I STRONGLY RECOMMEND WE
CONVEY TO SHAH SOONEST.

1. AT FONMIN ZAHEDI'S INVITATION GIVEN SEVERAL DAYS AGO
I LUNCHEDED ALONE WITH HIM TODAY. ALTHOUGH I HAVE DEVELOPED
VERY CLOSE AND WARM PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM, HE WAS
COOL AND DISTANT IN GREETING ME. AFTER SOME PROBING IT
DEVELOPED THAT HE AND SHAH ARE DEEPLY WOUNDED THAT WE
INFORMED SOME TWENTY OTHER NATIONS OF PRESIDENT'S PLANS
IN ADVANCE OF BROADCAST BUT OMITTED IRAN. HE EXPRESSED
REGRET OVER OUR LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN IRAN WHICH SURPRISING
IN VIEW OF CLOSE AND INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP HE HAD WITH YOUR.

2. IN VIEW OF WHAT WAS OBVIOUSLY VERY HEAVY CLOUD OVER OUR
RELATIONS WITH IRAN I TOOK LIBERTY OF SAYING THAT I WAS
GLAD HE HAD BROUGHT UP SUBJECT OF CHINA AS I HAD
MESSAGE FOR HIM FROM YOU TO EFFECT THAT WE WILL IN NEAR
FUTURE WISH TO HAVE HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION WITH
HIM TO OBTAIN HIS VIEWS AND THOSE OF SHAH ON HANDLING OF
CHIREP QUESTION IN UN CONTEXT. HE REMAINED COOL FOR AWHILE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

SECRET

-2- TEHRAN 3899, JULY 17

BUT FINALLY THAWED OUT AND SAID IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT IF WE HAD ANY IDEAS ON THIS SUBJECT, WE SHOULD LET HIM HAVE THEM AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT SINCE SHAH IS TODAY STUDYING IN NOWSHAHR COMPLETE PACKAGE OF OPTIONS ON CHIREP-CHIREC QUESTION PREPARED BY FOREIGN MINISTRY WHICH INCLUDES VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES AS WELL AS VIEWS OF GRC CONVEYED BY GRC AMB WOO PER TEHRAN 3866. ZAHEDI SAID SHAH MIGHT REACH FINAL DECISION IN NEXT DAY OR TWO AND IF HE ONCE DECIDED, IT MIGHT BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR ZAHEDI TO RE-OPEN DECISION.

3. IN LIGHT FOREGOING I SUGGESTED ZAHEDI SEND MESSAGE TO SHAH IN NOWSHAHR BY COURIER TONIGHT SAYING THAT I HAD INFORMED HIM THAT WE WOULD VERY SOON BE CONVEYING IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE OUR VIEWS ON CHIREP ISSUE AND THAT WE WOULD VALUE HIGHLY SHAH'S COMMENTS THEREON. ZAHEDI AGREED, SAYING THIS WAS BEST WAY TO TRY TO KEEP QUESTION OPEN UNTIL OUR VIEWS AND IDEAS WERE FORTHCOMING, BUT HE HOPED THAT I WOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE HIM SOMETHING BY MONDAY AS SHAH WANTS TO MOVE AHEAD ON THIS PROBLEM AT ONCE.

4. ONLY SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS ZAHEDI MADE WERE TO EFFECT THAT AMONG POSSIBILITIES BEING CONSIDERED BY GOI WAS:
(A) UN RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ADMISSION OF PEKING BUT TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY REQUIRED TO EXPEL TAIWAN, REFERRING TO BOTH BY THEIR PRESENT NAMES (E.G., PRC AND ROC):
(B) RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ADMISSION OF PRC WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ROC.

5. RECOMMENDATION: SINCE ZAHEDI AND SHAH ARE BOTH CONSIDERABLY MIFFED BY FACT WE INFORMED TWENTY OTHER COUNTRIES BEFORE ANNOUNCEMENT BUT OMITTED IRAN, I STRONGLY URGE THAT INSTRUCTIONS RE CHIREP PROMISED IN REFTEL A BE SENT ME SOONEST AND BE INFORM THAT I CAN DELIVER AS "PIECE OF PAPER" TO MAKE SURE SHAH RECEIVES MESSAGE ACCURATELY. I ALSO URGE, IF THERE IS A RATIONALE THAT WILL WASH, THAT IN DELIVERING PIECE OF PAPER WITH OUR PROPOSALS I ALSO CONVEY PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM YOU TO ZAHEDI EXPLAINING WHY IRAN WAS OMITTED FROM COUNTRIES NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE OF ANNOUNCEMENT. HOWEVER, IF WE DO NOT HAVE EXPLANATION ON THIS ONE THAT ZAHEDI AND SHAH WOULD FIND PLAUSIBLE, I RECOMMEND THAT WE SAY NOTHING ON THIS. FINALLY. IN VIEW OF FACT THAT SHAH IS DETERMINED TO MOVE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

SECRET

-3 - TEHRAN 3899, JULY 17

AHEAD IN VERY NEAR FUTURE--A DETERMINATION PROBABLY
STRENGTHENED BY ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRESIDENT'S PEKING VISIT--
I WOULD HOPE MOST EARNESTLY THAT I COULD RECEIVE REVISED
INSTRUCTIONS PROMISED IN REFTTEL A NOT LATER THAN 7:00 A.M.
MONDAY JULY 19, FOR THE LONGER THESE INSTRUCTIONS DELAYED,
GREATER POSSIBILITY THAT SHAH MAY MOVE WITHOUT CONSIDERING
OUR VIEWS. GP-3.

MACARTHUR

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 200 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

HAKID
TELEGRAM

SECRET

WID 7

R 210658Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4412
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 2679

CN: 6174
Rec'd: May 21, 1971
5:07 a.m.

NODIS

SUBJECT: SHAH'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT RE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE

REF: TEHRAN 2649

1. WHEN I MET WITH SHAH MAY 19 (REFTEL) HE TOLD ME HE IS VERY MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT LACK OF PROGRESS IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS AND HAD VERY RECENTLY SENT ANOTHER LETTER TO PRESIDENT NIXON DESCRIBING FAVORABLE PRESENT SITUATION IN EGYPT AS HE SEES IT, DANGERS IF ISRAEL CONTINUES TO BE NEGATIVE AND EXPRESSING HOPE WE WILL USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL TO CAUSE IT TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. HE ALSO SAID HE IS SENDING WORD DIRECTLY TO ISRAEL POINTING OUT THAT IF PRESENT OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE IS MISSED, ISRAEL WILL NOT ONLY BEAR HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY BUT IN LONG TERM BE THE BIG LOSER.

2. WHEN I MET WITH FONMIN ZAHEDI MAY 20 HE PRIVATELY GAVE ME COPY OF SHAH'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT DATED MAY 18. IN SO DOING HE MENTIONED SHAH HAD NOT YET RECEIVED REPLY FROM EARLIER LETTER HE HAD SENT PRESIDENT ON SAME SUBJECT. SHAH HAD HESITATED TO SEND SECOND LETTER WITHOUT REPLY FROM EARLIER ONE. HOWEVER, BECAUSE (A) HE FEELS STRONGLY THAT IF THERE IS NOT FORWARD MOVEMENT IN PEACE TALKS SADAT WILL BE REPLACED BY LEADERSHIP MUCH LESS FAVORABLE AND FORTHCOMING TO FREE WORLD INTERESTS IN THIS VITAL AREA; (B) BECAUSE HE THOUGHT DELAY IN REPLYING TO EARLIER COMMUNICATION MIGHT HAVE BEEN CAUSED IN PART BY SECRETARY'S ABSENCE ON MIDDLE EAST TRIP AND PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO HAVE SECRETARY'S LATEST ASSESSMENT; AND (C) IN VIEW OF "VERY SPECIAL FEELINGS SHAH HAS FOR PRESIDENT AND CLOSENESS OF THEIR RELATIONS," SHAH DECIDED TO SEND MAY 18 LETTER EVEN THOUGH HE HAD NO REPLY TO EARLIER LETTER.

3. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, RECOMMEND PRESIDENT SEND REPLY TO SHAH'S LETTERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GP-3.

MACARTHUR

BT

SECRET

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

TELEGRAM

HAK'D

SECRET

R 131333Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3996
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 1885

3 9 7 7 Q
13 APR 71 Z14 44

NODIS

NOFORN

SUBJECT: (A) FONMIN ZAHEDI'S VIEWS ON ARAB-ISRAEL
CONFLICT IN LIGHT TALKS WITH UAR FONMIN
AND (B) SHAH'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT

REF: TEHRAN 967

1. DURING APRIL 12 MEETING WITH ZAHEDI HE SAID THAT AS
RESULT OF TALKS HE AND SHAH HAD WITH RIYAD THEY BOTH
CONVINCED THAT UNLESS ISRAEL CAN BE PERSUADED TO BE
FORTHCOMING IN NEAR FUTURE AND RENOUNCE ITS EXTENSIVE
TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS, PRESENT CEASE-FIRE WILL BREAK
DOWN AND HOSTILITIES WILL BE RESUMED WITH (A) INCREASED
SOVIET PENETRATION MIDDLE EAST AND SOVIET ACTIVITY ON SIDE
OF UAR AND (B) DANGER OF SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATION. HE SAID
UAR PRESIDENT SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE GONE AS FAR
AS THEY CAN GO AND UNLESS ISRAEL FORTHCOMING AND RESPON-
SIVE, THERE IS ALSO RISK THAT GREAT FRUSTRATION WILL
DEVELOP IN UAR POSSIBLY LEADING TO REPLACEMENT OF SADAT
BY SOME "YOUNG CAPTAINS" WHO ARE MUCH MORE MILITANT
AND UNREASONABLE THAN IS SADAT. HE AND SHAH BELIEVE
UAR LEADERSHIP GENUINELY DESIRES PEACE, THAT THEY FEAR
CONTINUATION OF PRESENT IMPASSE IN JARRING TALKS WILL
VERY ADVERSELY AFFECT UAR POSITION AND THAT IF
PRESENT SITUATION CONTINUES NEW HOSTILITIES ARE
INEVITABLE. GOI FIRMLY SUPPORTS UN SECURITY RESOLUTION
AND ROGERS PEACE PLAN BUT IT IS NOW ESSENTIAL FOR ISRAEL
TO RESPOND POSITIVELY IF GRAVE DANGERS ARE TO BE AVOIDED.

2. IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE AND SINCE HE KNEW I WOULD BE
SEEING SHAH IN NEXT FEW DAYS, HE SHOWED ME COPY (WITHOUT
SHAH'S AUTHORIZATION) OF LETTER WHICH SHAH HAD SENT TO
PRESIDENT VERY RECENTLY (ABOUT APRIL 10 I UNDERSTOOD)
WHICH HE SAID WAS NOW IN PRESIDENT'S HANDS. HE ALSO SAID
HE HAD, ON SHAH'S INSTRUCTION, SENT ANOTHER STRONG

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

SECRET

-2- TEHRAN 1885, APRIL 13, NODIS

MESSAGE TO ISRAELI FONMIN EBAN ON APRIL 11 POINTING OUT THAT ISRAEL'S POSITION IN WORLD IS STEADILY ERODING AS RESULT OF ITS RIGID AND UNRESPONSIVE REPLY TO JARRING INITIATIVES AND THAT UNLESS ISRAEL IS FORTHCOMING AND RESPONSIVE TO UN RESOLUTION AND ROGERS PEACE PLAN, IT WILL LOSE MANY OF ITS PRESENT FRIENDS IN WORLD, INCLUDING IRAN.

3. ZAHEDI ALSO SAID THAT RESPONSE TO INITIATIVE HE TOOK LAST FEBRUARY IN ASKING OTHER GOVTS TO PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL (PARA 2, REFTTEL) HAD BEEN OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORABLE AND POSITIVE, WITH VIRTUALLY ALL OTHER COUNTRIES HE HAD CONTACTED AGREEING THAT PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST DEPENDED ON ISRAEL BEING OBLIGED TO BE REASONABLE. HE ALSO SAID THAT WHILE, AS WE KNEW, HE IS DEVOTED TO UNITED STATES, HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD KNOW THAT MANY OF OUR FRIENDS WHO HAVE VITAL STAKE IN PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST DO NOT BELIEVE WE ARE EXERTING ALL LEVERAGE ON ISRAEL THAT WE ARE CAPABLE OF.

4. I REPLIJD THAT, AS ZAHEDI SURELY KNEW, WE WERE NOT IN POSITION TO IMPOSE SOLUTION ON ISRAEL, AND THAT IF WE TRIED TO DO SO, WE ONLY RISKED HARDENING ISRAELI POSITION. WE HAD MADE GREAT EFFORTS AND HAD HAD SOME SUCCESS IN MODIFYING ISRAEL'S ORIGINAL POSITION AND I COULD ASSURE HIM WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN TO MOVE ISRAEL FORWARD. PROBLEM LAY NOT JUST WITH US BUT WITH FACT THAT PRIME MINISTER GOLDA MEIR HAD SOME STRONG OPPOSITION WITHIN HER OWN GOVT TO SOLUTION ALONG LINES WE HAD PROPOSED. ZAHEDI REPLIED THAT HAVING BEEN AMBASSADOR TO US HE KNEW WE HAD, IN ADDITION TO PROBLEMS I MENTIONED, OTHER PROBLEMS OF A DOMESTIC POLITICAL NATURE THAT RELATED TO ISRAEL. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WHILE FONMIN RIYAD DOES NOT THINK WE ARE USING OUR INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL AS MUCH AS WE COULD AND SHOULD, RIYAD NONETHELESS SPOKE IN FRIENDLY FASHION OF EXCHANGES WHICH SADAT GOVT HAD WITH USG AND ALSO WITH APPRECIATION OVER STAND USG HAD TAKEN IN FAVOR OF UAR DURING 1956 SUEZ CRISIS. GP-3.

MACARTHUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 203 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 6854Q
23 AUG 71, 4:39 P.M.

R 232039Z AUG 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQVAN/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 9221
INFO RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 9477
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5690
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3140
RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0579
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2475
RUEIVC/USINT CAIRO 8892
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9593
BT
SECRET STATE 154380

NODIS

SUBJECT: BRIEFING OF IRANIAN COUNSELOR ON SISCO TRIP

1. ON AUGUST 21 DEPASSTSEC ATHERTON BRIEFED IRANIAN EMBASSY COUNSELOR IZADI ON SISCO TALKS IN JERUSALEM WITH ISRAELI LEADERS AND ON STATUS OF OUR CURRENT EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT ALONG THE SUEZ CANAL. ATHERTON'S P

PRESENTATION COVERED POINTS CONTAINED PARAS 2, 3 AND 4 OF STATE 151777. IN CONCLUDING HIS PRESENTATION, ATHERTON STRESSED OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT INTERIM ARRANGEMENT ALONG CANAL OFFERS BEST NEGOTIATING POSSIBILITY AT THIS TIME. PROGRESS MADE ON THIS FRONT COULD PAVE WAY TOWARD OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENT AND USG REMAINS CAUTIOUSLY HOPEFUL THAT AGREEMENT ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED.

2. IZADI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ABOVE INFORMATION WHICH HE ANTICIPATED WOULD BE WELCOMED BY HIS GOVERNMENT. HE THEN ASKED ABOUT PRESS REPORTS CONCERNING THE "BERGUS PROPOSAL" AND HOW THIS FITTED INTO USG EFFORTS. ATHERTON CAUTIONED HIM TO TREAT SUCH PRESS REPORTS WITH GREAT RESERVE, NOTING THAT PRESS DOES NOT HAVE WHOLE STORY AND MANY REPORTS ARE IN FACT QUITE MISLEADING. ATHERTON EXPLAINED THAT BERGUS PAPER WAS LATTER'S OWN PERSONAL INITIATIVE. IT WAS NOT, AND WAS NOT MEANT TO BE, USG TRIAL BALLOON. PURPOSE OF PAPER HAS BEEN QUITE MISUNDERSTOOD BY PRESS SINCE IT WAS MERELY SUGGESTION BY BERGUS TO EGYPTIANS OF WAY IN WHICH THEY MIGHT MORE CONSTRUCTIVELY STATE THEIR OWN CASE.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

12 WH

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

23 AUG 71 PM 9:47



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2-STATE 154380, AUG 23

3. IZADI ASKED WHETHER PERSIAN GULF PROBLEMS HAD COME UP IN COURSE OF SISCO CONVERSATIONS WITH ISRAELIS. HE PARTICULARLY WONDERED IF IRAN'S READINESS TO COOPERATE WITH OTHER REGIONAL STATES TO PRESERVE PEACE AND STABILITY IN GULF AND TO ASSIST PROGRESS OF THAT AREA HAD COME UP FOR DISCUSSION. ATHERTON REPLIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ONLY VERY GENERAL DISCUSSION WITH ISRAELIS OF AREA DEVELOPMENTS AS A WHOLE. US SIDE HAD NOTED PLANNED UK WITHDRAWAL FROM GULF AND OUR HOPES FOR IRANIAN-SAUDI COOPERATION THERE. SISCO HAD NOT GOTTEN INTO DETAILS OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS WITH ISRAELIS AND FOCUS OF TALKS WAS ALMOST ENTIRELY ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENT QUESTION.

4. IZADI WONDERED ABOUT DEPARTMENT'S REACTION TO DAYAN'S "BELLIGERENT" SPEECH TO ISRAELI STAFF COLLEGE. ATHERTON REFERRED HIM TO AUGUST 20 DEPARTMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT, ADDING THAT DAYAN STATEMENT WAS CERTAINLY UNHELPFUL. HE NOTED THAT PRESS STORIES FROM ISRAEL SUGGEST THAT PRIME MINISTER MEIR'S OFFICE ALSO SEEKING TO DISASSOCIATE HER GOVERNMENT FROM DAYAN'S VIEWS. IZADI THOUGHT THAT PROMPT USG REACTION TO DAYAN STATEMENT HAD BEEN A GOOD GESTURE. JOHNSON
BT

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARP:BW rampelmeier
APPROVED BY: NEA-Alfred L. Atherton
CLEARANCES: S/S-Mr. Miller

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 205 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

10
TELEGRAM

W H

Grant
SECRET

O 021528Z AUG 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 8989
BT
S E C R E T STATE 139587

O 1 5 7 Q
02 AUG 71 Z15 28

NODIS

EYES ONLY

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

PLEASE CONVEY PERSONALLY MESSAGE FROM ME TO THE SHAH,
REGARDING OUR ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION
POLICY, AS CONTAINED IN SEPTTEL BEING REPEATED TO YOU. YOU
MAY USE INFORMATION IN PARA E. ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 5 8 1 2Q
RECD: 21 JUL '71, 8:35PM

P R 212318Z JUL 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQVAN/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 8900
INFO RUEHTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI 7657
BT
S E C R E T STATE 132278

NODIS

1. IRANIAN AMBASSADOR AFSHAR CALLED ON SECRETARY JULY 20 TO ELICIT HIS VIEWS ON BACKGROUND AND MEANING OF PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO VISIT PEKING BEFORE MAY 1972.

2. SECRETARY OPENED BY COMMENTING THAT AMB MACARTHUR HAD REPORTED THAT SHAH AND FONMIN ZAHEDI HAD BEEN UPSET BY OUR FAILURE TO TAKE IRAN INTO OUR CONFIDENCE BEFORE THIS MATTER BECAME PUBLIC. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING AS TO WHAT IN FACT WE HAD DONE. THERE HAD BEEN NO REPEAT NO CONSULTATION WITH ANY COUNTRY ABOUT SUBSTANCE OF DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT TO PEKING OR ITS RESULTS. WE HAD VERY SHORTLY BEFORE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT NOTIFIED FEW COUNTRIES ON PERIPHERY OF MAINLAND CHINA OR WHO HAD RELATIONS WITH PRC OF IMPENDING ANNOUNCEMENT. THIS WAS DONE BECAUSE OF THEIR VERY SPECIAL DIRECT INTEREST AND WAS TOTALLY UNRELATED TO QUESTIONS OF CONFIDENCE AND FRIENDSHIP. INDEED, SECRETARY EMPHASIZED, WERE IT QUESTION OF NOTIFYING THOSE WITH WHOM WE HAD ESPECIALLY CLOSE RELATIONS, IRAN WOULD HAVE BEEN AMONG FIRST TO HAVE BEEN CALLED. SECRETARY SAID HE HOPED AMBASSADOR WOULD CONVEY THIS TO SHAH AND ZAHEDI, EMPHASIZING HIGH VALUE AND TRUST WE HAVE IN THEM AND OUR RELATIONS.

2. MOVING ON TO QUESTION OF DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT TO PEKING AND RESULTS, SECRETARY NOTED THAT SUBSTANTIAL PART OF DR. KISSINGER'S CONVERSATIONS DEALT WITH DESIRABILITY OF PRESIDENT'S VISIT, FORMULATION OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE COMMUNIQUE, AND PRELIMINARY PREPARATION FOR SUMMIT MEETING ITSELF.

3. DR. KISSINGER ALSO TOOK ADVANTAGE OF HIS PRESENCE TO RESTATE US POLICY ON WIDE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, MOST OF WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN PUBLICLY EXPRESSED. OTHER SIDE DID SAME THING. NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON ANY SUBJECT OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL VISIT.

4. SECRETARY NOTED THAT COMMUNIQUE WAS MOST CAREFULLY WORDED AND NO DEEPER MEANING SHOULD BE READ IN TO LANGUAGE EMPLOYED. SPECIFICALLY, TERM "NORMALIZATION" WAS INTENTIONALLY USED TO CONVEY BROAD GENERAL CONCEPT THAT WE WISHED TO ACKNOWLEDGE NEED TO

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

SECRET

-2- STATE 132278, JUL 21, 1971 (NODIS)

HAVE SOME KIND OF DIALOGUE WITH NATION OF 800 MILLION PEOPLE. WE HAD NO ILLUSIONS. THERE ARE HARD FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US JUST AS THERE ARE BETWEEN US AND USSR. NEVERTHELESS WE FEEL THAT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IS PREFERABLE TO NO CONTACT AT ALL. SECRETARY CONFIRMED PUBLIC REPORTS THAT NO SPECIFIC TIME HAD YET BEEN FIXED FOR PRESIDENT'S VISIT.

5. SECRETARY NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN GREAT DEAL OF PUBLIC SPECULATION ABOUT PRC'S ADMISSION TO UN AND IMPACT PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT MIGHT HAVE HAD ON THIS ISSUE. HE POINTED OUT THAT DEVELOPMENTS ON UN QUESTION HAD ACTUALLY PRECEDED, AND WERE NOT REALLY DIRECTLY LINKED TO, PRESIDENTIAL VISIT. HE SAID THAT IT HAD BECOME CLEAR TO HIM IN HIS TALKS WITH OUR NATO ALLIES AND OTHERS THAT IMPORTANT QUESTION RESOLUTION WOULD LIKELY FAIL THIS YEAR AND THAT THERE WAS GOOD CHANCE THAT ALBANIAN RESOLUTION MIGHT BE PASSED. WE HAD SEARCHED VERY HARD FOR POSSIBLE FORMULAE WHICH MIGHT GET US AROUND THIS PROBLEM BUT CONCLUDED THAT WE MUST FACE REALITY THAT PRC WOULD COME TO UN ONLY IF IT GOT SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT. THIS OF COURSE PRESENTED ROC WITH EXCRUCIATING DILEMMA AND WE OURSELVES WERE NOT YET CERTAIN OF WHAT WE MIGHT DO. WE ARE CLEAR HOWEVER THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO CHANGE OUR GLOBAL POLICY OR ALLIANCES OR DEFAULT ON OUR TREATY COMMITMENTS.

6. IN RESPONSE TO AMB AFSHAR'S QUERY AS TO POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF PRESIDENT'S TRIP ON VIETNAM SITUATION OR ON OUR RELATIONS WITH USSR AND OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH IT ON FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS SUCH AS DISARMAMENT AND BERLIN, SECRETARY SAID THERE WAS NO DIRECT LINKAGE AND THAT IT WAS STILL TOO EARLY TO PERCEIVE IN ANY DETAIL WHAT MIGHT DEVELOP. WE DID FEEL HOWEVER THAT ANY CONTRIBUTION TO THE EASING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS WOULD BE BOUND TO FACILITATE OUR EFFORTS TO WORK OUT ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE KINDS OF SPECIFIC PROBLEMS THE AMBASSADOR MENTIONED. ROGERS
BT

DRAFTED BY: NEA/IRN:JCMiklos
NEA:RPDavies
EA/ROC:LRStarbird

APPROVED BY: S:WPRogers
NEA:JJSisco
S/S-Mr.Eliot

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State ¹² TELEGRAM

SECRET

O R 200309Z JUL 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQVAN/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 8860
INFO RUEHTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI 7621
BT

OUTCN: 5 0 63Q
JULY 20, 1971
0347Z

SECRET STATE 130610

NODIS

SUBJECT: CHIREP: IRAN

REFS: A. TEHRAN 3925 B. TEHRAN 3866

1. YOU WERE CORRECT IN SAYING TO ZAHEDI THAT WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS AS CO-SPONSORSHIP. FYI: WE DO NOT EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO DO SO FOR SOME DAYS YET. END FYI.
2. RE USE OF "REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN" (ROT). THERE IS ONE ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT WHICH YOU COULD USE IF YOU CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE. MINISTER WOO HAS SAID (REF B) THAT ROC REFUSED TO REMAIN IN A COUNTRY FOLLOWING ITS RECOGNITION OF PRC IF IT WANTED ROC TO CHANGE NAME TO TAIWAN. IT, THEREFORE, LIKELY ROC WOULD SIMILARLY REFUSE TO CHANGE NAME FOR UN PURPOSES. THUS USE OF ROT COULD BE FACTOR PUSHING ROC TOWARD WITHDRAWAL OR AT LEAST MAKING IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR ROC DECIDE REMAIN IN UN UNDER SOME DUAL REPRESENTATION FORMULA.
3. WE ARE NOT IN POSITION TO PROVIDE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING US CHIREP POLICY NOW BEYOND SAYING THAT NO FINAL DECISIONS HAVE BEEN REACHED EXCEPT THAT WE CONTINUE TO BE OPPOSED TO ROC EXPULSION.
4. FYI: AMBASSADOR AFSHAR MEETING JULY 20 WITH SECRETARY, WHO PLANS GIVE REASSURANCES ALONG LINES HIS MESSAGE TO ZAHEDI AS WELL AS GENERAL BACKGROUND ON PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT. GP-1 ROGERS

BT

DRAFTED BY: EA/ROC:LRStarbird APPROVED BY: EA - Marshall Green
CLEARANCES: IO/UNP: Mr. Armitage
EA/ROC: Mr. Shoesmith
NEA/IRN: Mr. Miklos
NEA: Mr. Davies (subs)
S/S-O: Brims

NNNN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 4766Q
JUL 18, 1971-5:19 P.M.

O R 182119Z JUL 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 8852
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2798
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI 7612
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NY 8914
BT
S E C R E T STATE 129850

NODIS

SUBJECT: CHIREP - IRAN

REF: A. TEHRAN 3899
B. TEHRAN 3807
C. STATE 127791
D. D. STATE 125508

1. REF A REPORTS THAT SHAH NOW STUDYING COMPLETE PACKAGE GOI OPTIONS ON CHIREC-CHIREP AND THAT HE MAY REACH DECISION IN NEXT DAY OR TWO WHICH, ONCE MADE, WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR ZAHEDI TO RE-OPEN. PRESIDENT HAS NOT YET REACHED FINAL DECISION ON CHIREP POLICY. HOWEVER, IN VIEW SHAH'S INTEREST THIS MATTER AND CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH REF A, WE BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE THAT YOU SPEAK TO HOST GOVERNMENT ALONG LINES OF PARA 2 BELOW AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. IN RESPONSE REQUEST IN REF B AND PARA 5 REF A, AUTHORIZATION CONTAINED REF C TO LEAVE "PIECE OF PAPER" IS EXTENDED TO COVER PARA 2 BELOW.

2. APPROACH TO HOST GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE MADE ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A. EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR PAST SUPPORT OF IQ AND THE HOPE THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY ON CHIREP ISSUE.

B. NOTE USG VERY CONCERNED AT CHIREP SITUATION DEVELOPING FOR 26TH UNGA. ALTHOUGH IQ PASSED BY 66-52-7 VOTE IN 1970, EROSION IN POSITION HAS OCCURRED AND TREND IS ADVERSE. PROBABILITIES ARE THAT IF 26TH UNGA FACED WITH SAME SCENARIO AS IN PAST (IQ IN TRADITIONAL FORM VS. ALBANIAN RES), IQ WILL FAIL, AR WILL RECEIVE INCREASED MAJORITY, ROC WILL BE EXPELLED AND PRC SEATED ON ITS OWN TERMS.

C. WHILE NOTING SENTIMENT THAT PRC BE SEATED HAS INCREASED, WE BELIEVE MAJORITY IN GA STILL BASICALLY OPPOSES EXPELLING ROC, AS OF COURSE DO WE OURSELVES.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

SECRET

-2 -STATE 12 9850, JUL 18

D. AS PRESIDENT NIXON HAS SAID, WE ARE INTENSIVELY REVIEWING ENTIRE CHIREP QUESTION AND HE EXPECTS TO MAKE POLICY DECISIONS IN JULY. WE SHOULD LIKE TO FIND CHIREP FORMULA WHICH CAN COMMAND BROAD SUPPORT IN ASSEMBLY, AND WHICH WILL NOT DO VIOLENCE TO INTERESTS OF EITHER THE 800 MILLION PEOPLE OF MAINLAND CHINA OR THE 14 MILLION OF TAIWAN.

E. WE HAVE NOT YET REACHED A DECISION, BUT AMONG THE ALTERNATIVES WE ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERING IS A FORMULA WHICH WOULD CALL FOR PEKING'S SEATING, CONTINUE MEMBERSHIP FOR ROC, AND PROVIDE THAT LATTER DECISION COULD BE REVERSED ONLY BY TWO-THIRDS VOTE.

WE HAVE IN MIND USING NAMES THAT PRC AND ROC THEMSELVES
USE. WHILE AVOIDING HAVING GENERAL ASSEMBLY TAKE ANY POSITION
ON THEIR RELATIONSHIP OR RESPECTIVE CLAIMS.

ALSO, WE WOULD HOPE TO AVOID ANY STATEMENT ON SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT. THAT IS A DECISION THAT CAN ONLY BE MADE IN COUNCIL ITSELF. ATTEMPTING DEAL WITH IT BEFORE ANYONE KNOWS WHAT THE FACTUAL SITUATION WILL THEN BE COULD COMPLICATE EFFORTS TO SEAT PEKING WHILE MAINTAINING ROC MEMBERSHIP. WE UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS THINK THAT A DUAL REPRESENTATION RESOLUTION WILL HAVE TO INDICATE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT SHOULD GO TO PEKING IF IT IS TO STAND MUCH CHANCE OF PASSING.

WE SHOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT IN GIVING CONSIDERATION TO RESOLUTION OF THIS TYPE, OUR INTENTION IS NOT THE FINDING OF SOME SUBTLE SCHEME TO KEEP PRC FROM ENTERING UN. OUR INTENTION IS TO PROVIDE FOR EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION OF BOTH PEKING AND TAIPEI. WE THINK APPROACH SKETCHED OUT WOULD BE FAIR TO BOTH PARTIES AND WOULD STAND GOOD CHANCE OF GAINING MAJORITY SUPPORT WITHIN ASSEMBLY.

F. WE HOPE EVEN IF GOI DOES AT SOME POINT RECOGNIZE PEKING, IT WILL RETAIN FOR ITSELF OPTION OF SUPPORTING MORE REASONABLE AND EQUITABLE RESOLUTION OF CHIREP ISSUE THAN THAT PROVIDED BY THE AR. (IF YOU THINK IT USEFUL, YOU MAY POINT OUT THAT AUSTRIAN COMMUNIQUE DOES NOT MENTION TAIWAN AT ALL AND THAT WE UNDERSTAND AUSTRIA HAS UNDERTAKEN NO COMMITMENT REGARDING CHIREP.)

G. WOULD APPRECIATE EXPRESSION OF GOI VIEWS AND TRUST IT WILL UNDERSTAND NECESSITY FOR KEEPING THESE EXCHANGES HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL AT THIS POINT AND RESTRICTED TO NARROW LIMITS WITHIN GOI. INFORM GOI THAT WE ARE IN CONSULTATION WITH LIMITED NUMBER OF COUNTRIES AND THAT DECISIONS HAVE NOT BEEN TAKEN BUT ARE EXPECTED IN NEAR FUTURE.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

SECRET

-3-STATE 129850, JUL 18

3. FOR ANKARA. UNLESS THERE ARE PRESSING CIRCUMSTANCES, SIMILAR TO THOSE DESCRIBED REF A, WE PREFER TO CONTINUE TO DELAY APPROACH TO GOT. SHOULD SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES DEVELOP, PLEASE INFORM US SOONEST.

GP-1. JOHNSON
BT

DRAFTED BY: LRStarbird-EA/ROC
APPROVED BY: Mr. Green-EA
CLEARANCES: Mr. Miklos(subs) -NEA/IRN
Mr. Davies(subs) -NEA
Brims_S/S-O
Mr. Armitage(subs) -IO/UNP

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

(12)
TELEGRAM

SECRET

O 182118Z JUL 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 8851
BT
S E C R E T STATE 129849

CONTROL: 4762Q
JUL 18, 1971-5:18 P.M

NODIS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S JULY 15 ANNOUNCEMENT

REF: TEHRAN 3899

1. IF IN YOUR JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN IMPROVING ATMOSPHERE FOR APPROACH ON CHIREP (INSTRUCTION BY SEPTTEL), YOU ARE AUTHORIZED CONVEY FOLLOWING AS ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO ZAHEDI.
2. WE REGRET WE NOT ABLE COMMUNICATE WITH GOI IN ADVANCE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT. NECESSITY FOR UTMOST SECRECY AND UNCERTAINTY ABOUT OUTCOME UNTIL FINAL MOMENTS LEFT LITTLE TIME TO INFORM OTHER GOVERNMENTS PRIOR TO ACTUAL ANNOUNCEMENT. WE THUS ABLE COMMUNICATE ONLY WITH GOVERNMENTS MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED. IN FACT, WE IN TOUCH WITH FEW, ALL OF THEM EITHER IN EAST ASIA OR HAVING DIRECT INTERESTS IN THE AREA, PARTICULARLY IN CURRENT PROBLEMS THERE.
3. WE REGRET CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT PERMIT US TO BE IN TOUCH IN ADVANCE WITH VALUED FRIENDS SUCH AS SHAH, AND WE HOPE HE WILL UNDERSTAND THAT IT WAS DUE SOLELY TO LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY TIME AND COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS. WE VALUE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH SHAH IN PAST, AND WE CERTAINLY HOPE CONTINUE THEM IN FUTURE. GP3 JOHNSON
BT

DRAFTED BY: LRStarbird-EA/ROC
APPROVED BY: Mr. Green-EA
CLEARANCES: Mr. Miklos(subs) -NEA/IRN
Mr. Johnson (subs) -S
Mr. Davies(subs) -NEA
Brims-S/S-O

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 1138Q
JUN 3, 1971-7:32 P.M.

P 032333Z JUN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQVAN/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 8283
INFO RUESFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 3162
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 7190
BT
S E C R E T STATE 098144

NODIS TOSEC 79 (LISBON ZFF4 ONLY)

SUBJ: FAISAL TALKS IN US

REF: TEHRAN 2951

1. WITH EXCEPTION NOTED IN FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH, STATE 97180
COVERS ALL SUBSTANTIVE POINTS MADE IN TALKS KING FAISAL HAD
HERE. YOU MAY OF COURSE DRAW FREELY ON THIS WRAP-UP.

2. ONE ADDITIONAL OBSERVATION MADE BY KING AND HIS ADVISERS
SEPARATELY WAS THAT GULF ISLANDS NOT CRITICAL TO IRAN'S SECUR-
ITY. SAUDIS CONSIDER THEM OF NO MILITARY VALUE. NONETHELESS
SINCE WE KNOW FAISAL WENT TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS TO AVOID
DISCUSSING THIS VIEW WITH SHAH IN TEHRAN, WE DO NOT THINK IT
APPROPRIATE THAT WE PASS IT ON.

IRWIN
BT

DRAFTED BY: NEA/IRN;JCMiklos
APPROVED BY:NEA;Rodger P. Davies
CLEARANCES: NEA/ARP:Richard W. Murphy
S/S-Mr. Curran

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 JUN 3 PM 10:28

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

7
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

R 300144Z APR 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 7887
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 074359

11130Q
April 29, 9:44 PM 1971

NODIS

REF: TEHRAN 2010

REGRET PLANNING OF PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE HAS NOT YET REACHED POINT
WERE ANYTHING DEFINITIVE CAN BE SAID ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF PRESI-
DENT VISITING IRAN THIS YEAR. SHOULD YOU FEEL IT NECESSARY OR
DESIRABLE TO SPEAK TO THIS POINT IN NEAR FUTURE, YOU MAY, AS
YOU SUGGEST IN REFTTEL, REITERATE TO ALAM THAT IT JUST NOT POSSI-
BLE FOR PRESIDENT TO BE ABSENT FROM UNITED STATES IN OCTOBER,
BUT THAT WE HOPE TO SUGGEST ANOTHER DATE FOR HIS VISIT IN DUE
COURSE. IRWIN
BT

Drafted by: NEA/IRN - J C Miklos
Cleared by: White House - H Saunders (subs)
NEA - Mr Davies
S/S-O - G L Rueckert
Approved by: NEA/IRN - Jack C Miklos

11 APR 30 AM 10:21
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

HARD

P R 093050Z APR 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQVAN/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 7611
INFO RUQVGM/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2701

CONTROL: 2965Q
APR 8, 1971- 7:50 P.M.

BT
SECRET STATE 060023

NODIS

FOR CHARGE FROM SISCO

REF: TEHRAN 1730 AND 1731

1. APPRECIATE YOUR FINE WORK IN ASSISTING AMERICAN EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS FROM DACCA. PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR BRIEFINGS AND YOUR SUCCESS IN ABSORBING CHILDREN IN TEHRAN AMERICAN SCHOOL. WE ARE AWARE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS TO WHICH MANY OF OUR PEOPLE HAVE BEEN EXPOSED AS WELL AS GRIEVANCES SOME HOLD.

2. WE ARE REPEATING STATE 58039 AND ISLAMABAD 3196. IF YOU FEEL SHORT-TERM PROBLEM REMAINS, YOU MAY AT YOUR DISCRETION DRAW ON THESE MESSAGES IN EXPRESSING TO INDIVIDUAL AMERICANS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF DEPARTMENT'S AND EMBASSY ISLAMABAD'S VIEWS. STRESS PARTICULARLY LAST PARAGRAPH STATE 58039. IN THIS CONNECTION, DEPARTMENT LISHES ENCOURAGE OPENNESS, BUT WE EXPECT IT TO BE USED TO GET VIEWS PRIVATELY AND DIRECTLY TO TOP POLICY MAKERS BUT NOT AS DEVISE TO PUBLICLY CRITICIZE THEM.

3. AFTER LAST EVACUEES DEPORTED EAST PAKISTAN, DEPARTMENT ISSUED STATEMENT (STATE 53694) WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL ALSO BE HELPFUL TO YOU IN DISCUSSING OUR POSITION WITH EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS AND OUR POLICIES RE PAKISTAN SO THAT YOU CAN KEEP EMPLOYEES AND DEPSN ENTS CURRENT.

4. AGRES HOU DECISION TO HAVE CONCERNED AMERICANS SEND MESSAGES THROUGH COMMERCIAL CHANNELS.

5. WE ARE REPEATING REFTELS AND THIS MESSAGE TO EMBASSY ISLAMABAD FOR INFORMATION. IRWIN

DRAFTED BY: NEA:CVanHollen

APPROVED BY: NEA:Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES: O:Mr. Macomber, S/S:Mr. Eliot

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

CIA

CODEWORD

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 214 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.